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The concept of the unknown captivated medieval theologians, mystics, lovers, 
and travelers for centuries, and yet literary scholars too readily reduce this topos to a 
romance trope. “Unknowing the Middle Ages” reconsiders the grounds of late-medieval 
literary discourse by showing how canonical Middle English literary texts eschew the 
historical knowledges that informed them and, instead, affirm impossibility as a 
productive site for a literary poetics. My dissertation identifies what I call a “poetics of 
unknowing” as an important component of a budding late-medieval literary discourse that 
offers a way to discuss not only what can be known, but also that which exceeds 
exegetical, geographic, historical, and sensory comprehension. “Unknowing the Middle 
Ages” makes its argument through four chapters, each of which focuses on a narrative 
tradition extending at least five hundred years. Each chapter follows a figure—Herod the 
Great, Prester John, the Pearl, and Criseyde— from the texts that established their 
axiological significance to their appearances in Middle English texts, which attempt to 
unknow these figures. In their Middle English narratives these figures negotiate between 
an inherited religious ethics and an intellectual context compelled increasingly by that 
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which eludes comprehension. In each case, material concerns regarding the unknowable 
infiltrate the formal composition of the text itself, and resonate at the level of a literary 
ethics. The “poetics of unknowing” that inhabit these texts reveal an epistemology less 
encumbered by the practical demands of clarity to which other modes of medieval 
writing are beholden, and also—perhaps of interest to scholars of modern literature and 
contemporary theory—refute the critical tendency to view the epistemological 
valorization of the unknown as a distinctly modern phenomenon.  
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Introduction: On “Unknowing the Middle Ages” 
 
I resolved long ago not to seek knowledge, as others do, but to seek its contrary, 
which is unknowing [non-savoir]. I no longer anticipated the moment when I 
would be rewarded for my effort, when I would know at last, but rather the 
moment when I would no longer know, when my initial anticipation would 
dissolve into NOTHING. This is perhaps a mysticism in the sense that my craving 
not to know one day ceased to be distinguishable from the experience that monks 
called mystical—but I had neither presupposition nor a God… Only unknowing is 
sovereign. 
   -Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, Vol. III: Sovereignty 
 
Poetry alone, which denies and destroys the limitations of things, can return us to 
this absence of limitations—in short, the world is given to us when the image 
which we have within us is sacred, because all that is sacred is poetic and all that 
is poetic is sacred. 
  -Georges Bataille, Literature and Evil 
 
 
This dissertation reconsiders four prominent figures of medieval literary history—
Herod the Great, Criseyde, the Pearl, and Prester John— and focuses on how medieval 
theorizations of the limits of knowledge have been funneled through literary practice. 
“Unknowing the Middle Ages” proposes that the topos of the unknown in late-medieval 
English literature offers more than some mystery to be revealed; instead it winds through 
the very poetic fabric of canonical Middle English texts.   
Given this project’s explicit engagement with the literature and thought of the 
English Middle Ages, it may seem strange to begin with the gnomic maxims of a 
twentieth-century French anti-philosopher. However, my analysis of the concept of 
unknowing is two-fold, at once medieval and post-medieval. I begin with these 
statements from Bataille because they help frame this project’s investment in and 
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departure from twentieth-century conversations on the work of unknowing as well as to 
show how medieval unknowing informs and is informed by literary practice. 
Among twentieth century thinkers, Georges Bataille, a medievalist by training, 
engages most specifically with a theoretical concept and practice of un-knowing.  
Although he never formally defines the term, Bataille’s unknowing owes much to his 
consideration of a relationship between the thought structures of the Middle Ages and his 
larger, economic (non-) system of thought.1 As he confesses above, the work of 
unknowing is at once a distinctly twentieth-century project and a medieval one. It is a 
kind of secular mysticism in which an inverted notion of sovereignty replaces the 
apophatic divinity of medieval negative theology.  
In order to grasp something of Bataille’s investment in unknowing, it is 
instructive to turn first to La somme athéologique (1943-45), whose title signals an 
engagement with the medieval and post-medieval legacy of Thomas Aquinas (and his 
Summa Theologica).2 As Bruce Holsinger has shown, Bataille’s aphoristic and non-
systematic Somme shares a relationship with the high Scholastic Summa more complex 
and nuanced than one of mere inversion (Holsinger calls Bataille a “para-Thomist”).3 
                                                
1 Bataille’s term is “nonsavoir,” which is also translated as “non-knowledge,” as in the 
English title of a later work, The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge. The idea of 
“unknowing” or “nonknowledge” permeates Bataille’s works, but its meaning is never 
explicitly articulated in any of his works.  
2 La somme athéologique is the title of a collection of three works written over that 
period: Inner Experience, Guilty, and On Nietzsche.  
 3 For more on Bataille’s medievalism, see “Para-Thomism: Bataille at Rheims” in Bruce 
Holsinger, The Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of Theory (Chicago: 
U of Chicago P, 2005). 
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Rather than dismiss medieval theology tout court as relic of a bygone ideology, Bataille 
posits a form of mysticism (“inner experience”) enveloped by larger questions of 
knowledge and ignorance, knowing and unknowing, figures whose fundamental 
inseparability permeate his entire (anti-) philosophical project. Bataille refuses to 
conform to the dialectical logic of Aquinas’ Scholasticism, however. While Bataille’s 
Somme highlights the fondness he shares with Aquinas regarding “contraries,” he posits 
that their engagement, rather than refining the economy of knowledge, yields no 
synthesis. For Bataille, opposing forces remain knotted together. Their elusive (if not 
impossible) points of contact suggest that philosophy can never faithfully systematize 
analytical thought into the service of any single episteme. Rather than continue a 
philosophical project aimed at synthesis, Bataille turns the reader’s focus to the resistance 
of assimilation, a realm that he designates as the experience of excess. 
Bataille understands this turn to excess as a political and ethical decision to retreat 
from knowledge, which demands utility, and towards the heterogeneous space he calls 
“unknowing,” in which desire is suspended. Bataille turns to unknowing because as he 
sees it, the structure of knowledge, an existential guarantee, bears little more than an 
economy of assimilation. The “para-Thomist” Bataille posits unknowing as knowledge’s 
“contrary” [contraire], neither the inverse of knowledge nor its undoing, but the 
condition of epistemological and ontological suspension. Only within this pseudo-
mystical state can one experience possibility at its most radical, a guarantee that promises 
nothing. Here (and only here), one is free, subject to the demands of no economy. Thus, 
for Bataille, the grounds of sovereignty must come from outside of knowledge.  
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But what of medieval unknowing? The foremost resonance for medieval 
unknowing likely stems from the discourse of mysticism, from “perhaps” to which 
Bataille alludes, but from which he ultimately separates his work. Indeed, pseudo-
mystical discourse was highly popular at the time during which Bataille completed The 
Accursed Share, a historical period Michel de Certeau identifies as something of a 
renaissance.4 But studies of the “medievalism” of twentieth-century theory have already 
successfully recuperated the centrality of mysticism to twentieth-century epistemologies.5 
Rather than return once more to the fertile grounds of medieval mysticism, I trace another 
resonance of unknowing as it forms and is formed by the practice of poiesis.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I use the term unknowing to refer a narrative 
moment that recognizes some external demand (historical, theological, philosophical), 
but refuses to answer such a demand in a conspicuous way. This act of willed suspension 
drives my investigation of literary discourse in the late Middle Ages as a way of knowing 
that can be formally distinguished from the work of theology or history. By investigating 
texts that share an interest in revising large-scale historical narratives, I maintain 
                                                
 4 Michel de Certeau and Marianne Brammer, “Mysticism,” Diacritics 22.2 (1992): 11-
25, 12. 
 5 If Holsinger returns Bataille’s thought to the Middle Ages, Alexander Irwin and Amy 
Hollywood urge the centrality of mysticism to Bataille’s politics and to his private 
anguish, respectively Alexander Irwin, Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the 
Politics of the Sacred (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2002); Amy Hollywood, Sensible 
Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexuality, and the Demands of History (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
2002). I too have published on the twentieth century epistemological thought and its 
dependence on a medieval tradition of (especially female) mysticism. See “Being Beheld: 
Julian of Norwich’s Mystical Surreal and the Violence of Vision,” in Beholding Violence 
in the Medieval and Early Modern Culture, eds. Erin F. Labbie and Allie Terry-Fritsch, 
105-23 (London: Ashgate, 2012). 
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unknowing as a reading ethic that underwrites a late-medieval movement toward 
understanding the literary as a sovereign discourse. I offer “unknowing” as a literary 
trope that replaces a revelatory poetics with one grounded in a refusal of mastery that 
sustains narratives, encourages repetition and revision, and exposes the violence that 
epistemological certainty risks imposing on the practice of faith.  
In order to frame the possible connections between unknowing, literature, and 
sovereignty in the late Middle Ages, I turn back, once again, to Bataille. As it turns out, 
Bataille never fully relinquishes the theological vocabulary from which he attempts to 
separate his theory of unknowing, but merely transfers it onto the realm of poetics. Poetry 
is sacred, according to Bataille, a point insisted even more fervently in the writings of his 
frequent interlocutor Maurice Blanchot, because it does not demand, require, or produce 
knowledge.6 What better way to un-know one’s surroundings than through the act of 
writing, through poetics, an experience that returns us to a world without limits, asks 
Bataille. As the second epigraph indicates, the apparent elimination of theology from the 
unknowing is less a removal than a displacement. It is literature (poetry specifically) that 
provides the liberatory and destructive energy necessary to return the thinking subject to 
the realm of the excessive, the realm of unknowing. The poetic is sacred, in part, because 
it can never be fully known. 
Bataille does not explicitly ally the sovereignty of unknowing with the sanctity of 
poetics, and yet he grounds both within the structural logic of suspension. Unknowing, 
                                                
 6 On Blanchot, unknowing, and poetics, see especially, The Space of Literature, trans. 
Ann Smock (Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1982).  
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like poetry, empties discourse of both limitation and destination, and yet both flirt with 
the mystical, which lends unknowing its oblivion and poetry its sanctity. Neither Bataille 
nor Blanchot speak of a “poetics of unknowing,” because both reject the culture of faith 
that, as I will argue, renders poetry’s deferral of meaning truly radical. As is clear from 
the first epigraph, non-savoir requires one to relinquish even faith. In a more secular 
vocabulary, what separates unknowing from mysticism stems from the practical rigor of 
unknowing. Bataille’s unknowing enacts an existential suspension completely devoid of 
demand, the difference between a staged “trust fall” and the spontaneous decision to let 
oneself plunge. What I hope to contribute in my turn to the medieval is a sense of the 
radical nature of Middle English narrative. For Bataille, unknowing persists because there 
is no structural demand for it to answer; thus, the poetic can provide a model of such 
sovereignty because such literary knowing is able to suspend the demands for resolution 
that are put toward it. For late-medieval texts written under the aegis of a Christian 
epistemology, such a demand can hardly be avoided. This, then, is what medieval, 
literary forms of unknowing have to offer, as distinct from modern, theoretical forms: a 
model of literary knowing that receives, but ultimately distinguishes itself from, 
epistemological demand.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to bring these terms together, poetics and 
unknowing, through a consideration of Middle English narrative. As opposed to Bataille, 
who offers unknowing as a practice theorized for a historical moment devoid of faith and 
yet overflowing with anguish, “Unknowing the Middle Ages” shows how late-medieval 
Middle English literature suspends the questions it inherits from the historical past, from 
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within a culture of faith. Through a consideration of four figures featured prominently in 
medieval narratives, I show how, by suspending the demands of knowledge to which 
these figures were subjected, Middle English literary narratives conceive of a truly 
radical faith that rests on no structural guarantees, unlike analogous narratives concerned 
explicitly with history or theology. 
In this introduction, I seek to establish the medieval grounds for such a poetics of 
unknowing as well as a larger, diachronic understanding of how the category of literary 
writing has functioned for those interested in an anti-philosophy of unknowing. On the 
global level, I attempt to give shape and purpose to a nebulous, yet transhistorical 
discourse of unknowing. I challenge those critics who attempt to historicize the 
valorization of the unknown as a distinctly Modern(ist) project and show how this 
practice is immanent to literary discourse. I do so by looking at medieval literature, 
within which the topos of the unknown does not mark a failure to make meaning, but 
helps ground a poetics that extends beyond the limits that the unknown prescribes for 
historical or theological discourse.  
On the local level of medieval studies, this dissertation shows how, rather than 
ascribe to post-medieval strategies of understanding the unknown, a study of medieval 
unknowing can return to the literary texts themselves, the poetics of which often provide 
their own theoretical construct of how the unknown functions within literary discourse. 
Taken together, “Unknowing the Middle Ages” reconsiders the grounds of late-medieval 
literary discourse by showing how Middle English literary texts eschew the historical 
knowledges that informed them and, instead, affirm impossibility as a productive site for 
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a literary poetics. By reading literary figures alongside the historical, theological, 
geographic, and scientific-mathematical contexts contemporaneous with their late-
medieval appearances, “Unknowing the Middle Ages” offers innovative readings of 
English cycle drama, the Middle English Pearl, Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, and the 
legend of Prester John. My dissertation identifies what I call a “poetics of unknowing” as 
an important component of a budding late-medieval literary discourse that offers a way to 
discuss that which exceeds exegetical, geographic, historical, and sensory 
comprehension. In each case, contra their historical or theological legacies, each figure 
becomes unknown through a poetics that expels them from their knowledge economies 
they helped build but, within this epistemological exile, suspends the question of their 
death. A medieval poetics of unknowing leaves its figures encrypted, but not yet buried.7  
Unknowing: From the via negativa to “Non-Classical Thought” 
 
The word “unknowing” comes directly from Middle English (unknawyng) a term 
derived, appropriately enough, from Christian devotional work. Variations of the Middle 
English unknawyng, usually denoting a state of ignorance, appear here and there in 
theological texts, but the term receives its most thoughtful consideration in the 
fourteenth-century devotional manual, The Cloud of Unknowing.8 Composed within the 
                                                
 7 Here I allude to Abraham and Torok’s theory of “cryptonomy,” as explicated in The 
Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, trans. Nicholas Rand (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 2005).  
 8 The OED attests that unknawyng first occurs in The Prik of Conscience (c. 1340), a 
devotional text, usually ascribed to the English hermit Richard Rolle, that is popularly 
known to have produced more manuscripts (130) than any other Middle English poem. 
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temporal heart of this present study, The Cloud of Unknowing transforms unknowing 
from one of several words signaling spiritual unawareness into the paradoxical grounds 
of an apophatic methodology of mystical enlightenment. The Cloud of Unknowing offers 
a method of Christian devotion rooted in two basic propositions: first, that penetrating 
into the unknown has a theological function and, second, that one can obtain a closeness 
with God without explicitly knowing God. Put simply, The Cloud turns the theological 
abstraction of the via negativa into practical spiritual advice.  
Popularized in the Middle Ages through the fifth-century writings of Pseudo-
Dionysius, negative theology, the via negativa, elucidates a system of skepticism without 
skepticism. Popular among mystical communities and considered doctrinally sound in the 
Middle Ages (Aquinas cites Pseudo-Dionysius over 1700 times), negative theology rests 
on the assumption that if God exceeds human’s ability to conceive of Him, the only path 
toward understanding God involves a meditation on what He is not. One can never 
approach an understanding of God if thinking in positive terms since God is not 
perceptible in human terms. As the Cloud-author writes, “But now thou askest me and 
seiest: ‘How schal I think on Himself, and what is Hee?’ And to this I cannot answere 
thee bot thus: ‘I wote never’" (6/1).9 According to Pseudo-Dionysius, to approach God 
one must think of Him in terms of “dissimilar similarities,” words or concepts that appear 
to have nothing to do with God’s benevolence or divinity and therefore fit him more 
appropriately (because they prevent us from reducing a discourse on God to simplistically 
                                                
 9 The Cloud of Unknowing, ed. Phyllis Hodgson, EETS 218 (London: Oxford UP, 
1934). 
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positive ideals). These dissimilarities, slowly but surely, negate assumptions of what God 
must be, and according to followers of the via negativa, indirectly propel one closer God. 
According to the logic of the Cloud, however, this approach already presumes too 
much: one cannot access God through language, but only through love. If one wants to 
cultivate a relationship with God, one needs un-know oneself into epistemological 
obscurity, which is the realm of the divine. One must relinquish all sensory pretense 
towards understanding and strive upward towards this “cloude,” a spiritual darkness 
signifying “a lacking of knowing” (23/14).10 Once there, only love can pierce God’s 
cloud of unknowing, but, in order to love, one must suppress desires beneath a cloud of 
forgetting. A reduced formulation of the Cloud’s devotional program would read thus: 
one must relinquish all material and sensory desire in order to empty oneself fully of all 
pretense towards knowledge: only then may one feel God’s love and fill the 
epistemological void with faith and, ultimately, a “oneheed” with God.  
The Cloud of Unknowing demonstrates aptly how Bataille draws on and departs 
from the Middle Ages in his conception of unknowing. In the Cloud, as in apophatic 
theology, the unknown remains a sanctified space because it is the realm in which God 
dwells. However—and here is where Bataille’s “perhaps” enters— mystical unknowing 
rests ultimately on a demand: that God reveal himself to Christians through His love. 
Whereas unknowing excites Bataille as a site where the dialectic breaks down, this 
medieval version of unknowing, this “cloud… which cannot be seen, which is nothing” 
                                                
 10 The image of the cloud is taken from Exodus 20:21 and had invited exegetical 
expansion by the late Middle Ages, most notably by Philo and Gregory of Nyssa. 
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nonetheless “unites all opposition.”11 It would be too much to suggest that the Cloud of 
Unknowing offers a “poetics of unknowing” since its goal rests ultimately in the 
cultivation of knowledge. Moreover, as Bataille and Derrida, among others, have shown, 
it is impossible to really conceive of unknowing in strictly theological discourse because 
such discourse depends necessarily on a founding certainty (the existence and agency of 
God) whereas the power of unknowing lies precisely in its suspension of epistemological 
questions. Although a careful reader can perceive the beginnings of an epistemological 
transition in how the Cloud, one of the earliest English prose texts, instrumentalizes the 
unknown, it is necessary to turn to literature, whose logics of deferral, doubleness, and 
belated arrival provide a space through which the problems of historical certainty might 
be re-written as open questions and into a poetics of unknowing. 
 The epistemological demands of Christian mysticism announce Bataille’s 
departure from the medieval, but, as I will argue, mysticism is not the only framework 
circulating for models of medieval unknowing. The relationship between unknowing and 
the work of literature, however, has been studied thus far only in relation to the advent of 
literary Modernism as it separates itself from positivist accounts of the epistemology of 
literature. Given Modernism’s break with Enlightenment narratives of progress 
(experienced most acutely through the horrors of the Great War) and its intellectual focus 
on expanding knowledge by demolishing inherited epistemological paradigms (literary 
realism, Euclidean geometry, Newtonian physics), this notion of “unknowing” refers less 
                                                
 11 Nike Kocijaneie Pokorn, “The Language and Discourse of The Cloud of Unknowing,” 
Literature & Theology 11.4 (1997): 408-21, 414. 
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to a theoretical construct and more as a modus operandi. To their credit, writers who 
mobilize a theoretical framework of ‘unknowing’ to understand twentieth-century 
thought tend to carefully historicize it. Invariably, those who employ the term champion 
its contemporaneity, its modernity—a twentieth-century response to a twentieth-century 
problem. Where its theorists succeed contextually, they struggle with regard to clarity.  
For Philip Weinstein, unknowing is the “work of Modernist fiction,” a skeptical 
phantom-realism that infiltrates the thematic structures of some of the period’s most 
accomplished literary technicians.12 In his monograph devoted to Modernist literary 
subjectivity, Weinstein employs the term unknowing to designate a purposeful (and 
“strenuous”) “leap of faith” into alternative psychological and ethical attitudes towards 
fiction that unsettles traditional accounts about how a literary subject functions in space 
and time. Focusing on the work of Kafka, Proust, and Faulkner, Weinstein seeks to 
provide a sense of how literary Modernism answers the demands of reality by showing 
how these demands are, at bottom, unanswerable, and must be un-recognized or un-
known in order to be responsibly addressed. Modernist novelists accomplish this 
primarily by experimenting with temporality (memory, trauma, meditation) and literary 
subjectivity (ambiguity, inaccessibility, irony), all of which coalesce, for Weinstein, 
under the rubric of unknowing. This Modernist project of unknowing sets the stage for 
the radical openness “beyond knowing” that characterizes Postmodernity. Rather than 
view the Modernist project as a masculinized and elitist attempt to secure control over 
                                                
 12 Philip Weinstein, Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
2005). 
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and/or re-write the master narratives of culture and epistemology, Weinstein locates its 
true literary intervention in its presentation of a world beyond understanding.13  
This is not to say that literary historians have unilaterally ignored pre-
Enlightenment narratives of unknowing in discussions of its literary import. In a 
monograph dedicated to the themes of “absence, unknowing, and emptiness” in literature, 
Timothy Walsh finds an antecedent to modern discourses of negation through The Cloud 
of Unknowing.14 Throughout his book, Walsh discusses a range of creative pursuits, from 
sculpture to music, in order to demonstrate how absence and unknowing are structurally 
necessary to aesthetic texts and how as themes, absence and unknowing encourage 
readers to explore the limits of human existence. Although Walsh does not treat medieval 
literature, he extracts from the Cloud a doctrine of “something” that lies beyond the 
                                                
 13 This is not to say that Weinstein’s unknowing is something that can be easily defined. 
Sometimes he performs the ambiguity of the texts he treats, reveling in such formulations 
as “knowing as unknowing’s most cunning guise” (76). Weinstein does historicize the 
discourse of unknowing, situating its emergence as a reaction against Enlightenment 
values and as a response to Freudian psychoanalysis. In the first chapter, Weinstein posits 
a Western genealogy of “coming to know” in which he grounds the realist novel in a 
series of intellectual developments that constellate Europe’s period of Enlightenment: 
Bacon’s observable world, the Cartesian “knowing” subject, Newton’s systematized 
physics, Locke’s liberalism, and Kant’s universalized ethical imperatives. While 
Weinstein makes no explicit claim regarding the historical singularity of Modernism’s 
dis-inheritance of the authoritative accounts of a past more secure of itself than the 
present, he nonetheless sets the Modernist project against “a premodernist commitment to 
knowing.” Not only does Weinstein appear to present a binary understanding of Western 
intellectual history hinging on Modernism’s advent, he fails to consider the West’s 
epistemological investments prior to the Enlightenment, and dismisses the relevance of 
the Middle Ages to his discussion in one parenthetical for a self-evident lack of 
subjectivity (25). It is as if, prior to Modernism, Western writers lacked access to the 
destabilizing tools that might un-know an inherited philosophical truth. 
 14 Timothy Walsh, The Dark Matter of Words: Absence, Unknowing, and Emptiness in  
Literature (Edwardsville: Southern Illinois UP, 1998), 160-67. 
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“nothing” of unknowing. Whereas Weinstein dismisses the Middle Ages for its un-self-
conscious ontology, Walsh cites medieval theology to establish the important function of 
the unknown in non-literary settings (a methodological move echoed also in the scientism 
of the book’s title, The Dark Matter of Words). Walsh appears to invoke astrophysics and 
medieval theology to buttress an implicit contention about the transhistorical verity of 
literary unknowing and the structural power of absence, which like “dark matter,” has 
always “been there” even if it has remained undiscovered up until the twentieth century.  
Weinstein, on the other hand, clearly resists the argument that unknowing can be 
understood as a transhistorically consistent theme in literature. In order to assert a clean 
break between pre-Modern and Modern literature, Weinstein turns also to scientific 
discourse. Specifically, Weinstein identifies Freud as the agent of an epistemological cut 
that destabilizes any notion of a “subject of knowledge.” For Weinstein, Freud is not only 
an “architect of modernist thinking” (3), his theories have inaugurated a new tradition, a 
“poetics of the afflicted soul” (83). The cut between pre-modern and modern, if one 
exists at all, certainly required something more than Freud’s observations about the 
fundamental irrationality of human desire. At the same time, it is worthwhile to consider 
what contributions Freud did make to the discourse of unknowing.  
Freud’s primary intervention into a philosophy of unknowing involves claims 
about a subject no longer in control of her desire, but driven un-consciously by it. Freud’s 
project, as initially formulated, responded to a scientific interest in the unknown 
association between neuroses (understood as a purely physiological phenomena) and the 
more difficult to perceive logic of psychological structures. Among the effects of 
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psychoanalysis on twentieth-century epistemological thought, two jump out for the 
effects on this Modernist preoccupation with unknowing. On the one hand, Freud insists 
on the unknowability of human desire and contends that people deliberately misread the 
world around them in order to integrate their experiences into some such fantasy they 
wish, unwittingly, to uphold. Rather than turn melancholic over the passing of self-
possession, Freud also offers new models that mediate the relationship between the 
human and the unknown. Thanks to the logic of repression, that which is unknown must 
eventually unravel into some kind of knowledge, whether we recognize it or not.  
Questions of his true novelty notwithstanding, Freud’s development of an 
unconscious did propose for the first time a scientific remedy for what had hitherto been 
recognized as an epistemological problem. In designating the unconscious as place, Freud 
localized unknowing to a place and system of logic that, however metaphysical, was 
marked by what one does know or at least can know about the human psyche. After all, 
for Freud, knowledge does not merely help us understand the law of human psychology, 
this knowledge is the law. More than circumscribing the unknowable to a register outside 
of human psychic potential, Freud integrated that which was inherently and necessarily 
unknown/inaccessible into a coherent system of knowledge, positioning the unknown as 
an essential cog within the machinery of human subjectivity. In other words, Freud’s 
unconscious was as much a product of the Enlightenment ideology of “coming to know” 
as it was a departure from that system of belief. Freud may have replaced the “subject of 
knowledge” with a “subject of the unconscious,” but he also prescribed a method through 
which the individual may experience self-possession. Even if psychoanalysis failed to 
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return the analysand to his desire, the blame was never placed on the human capacity for 
knowledge in the first place. Once the unknown became itself systematized, it could be 
studied, discovered, and revealed. The implications, as are well known, were quickly 
applied ideationally to discourses far removed from the scientific.15  
In perhaps the most disciplinarily inclusive understanding of twentieth-century 
unknowing, Arkady Plotnitsky advances the scientism claimed by the previous writers 
and situates the work of unknowing at the epicenter of the debate over the “two cultures.” 
In The Knowable and the Unknowable, Plotnitsky sketches a theory of “nonclassical 
thought,” an epistemological paradigm of non-teleological discourse organized around 
the recognition that an object can remain unknowable and yet still produce measurable 
effects on that discourse.16 For Plotnitsky, the unknowable is a very specific concept, 
“that which is placed beyond the limit of any analysis, knowledge, or conception while… 
having shaping effects on what can be known” (xiii). Plotnitsky fixes in on quantum 
mechanics as the discovery that helped make possible an epistemological shift that 
refocuses intellectual attention away from trying to unveil the unknowns and focuses 
                                                
 15 The Surrealists, as an early example, were quick to realize the potential bridge the 
unconscious could build between the realm of the knowable and the realm of being. 
Automatic writing, as outlined by André Breton, was predicated not only on the desire 
but the belief that what is unknown to the self can be revealed through a studied process 
of self-annihilating repetition of thought. Unlike stream-of-consciousness, which works 
only to reveal what one is thinking, automatic writing, as formulated by Breton, was 
made possible by a powerful belief in a concept (and little more than that for Breton) that 
the unknown had been contained and need just be accessed, conjured, or drawn out. 
 16 Arkady Plotnitsky, The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, 
Nonclassical Thought, and the ‘Two Cultures’ (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2002).  
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instead on how scientists might orient scientific knowledge around the unknowable.17 
Plotnitsky’s major intervention, however, is in the way he attends to the foundational 
similarities shared in the epistemologies of theoretical physics and of post-structuralism, 
both of which he understands as “making the unknowable an irreducible part of 
knowledge” (xiii). In other words, nonclassical thought suggests that quantum mechanics 
has ushered in a new relationship with knowledge in which our intellectual advancement 
depends on our ability to constantly discover “new horizons of the unknown” (21).  
This is not to say that Plotnitsky’s account is a romanticization of the unknown. 
On the contrary, Plotnitsky insists on the interdependence of classical and nonclassical 
thought. For example, one scientific outcome made possible within a nonclassical 
framework is physicist Niels Bohr’s “complementarity,” which holds that the 
measurements of quantum objects differ according to the perspective of observation and 
method of measurement. While scientists may not know why light is both a wave and a 
particle (efficacity), they do know that it must, at some level, exist as both, just not at the 
same time (effects). While his law would not have been possible within the traditional 
framework of classical thought, Bohr insisted that the effects of his law, paradoxically, 
must be explained in terms of classical physics. Nonclassical thought does not guarantee 
the permanent inaccessibility of anything: to acquiesce to the impossibility of 
understanding light would be a kind of knowledge in itself, after all. For Plotntisky, this 
                                                
 17 For Plotnitsky, nonclassical thought entails the recognition of two kinds of 
epistemological discontinuity. First, there must be a rupture between the knowable effects 
produced by an object and the unknowable power/purpose of those effects. Second, there 
must also be a fissure between the objects of a given theory and the “un-objects” existing 
outside of that theory that can potentially act upon the former.  
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notion finds its most appropriate theoretical analogue in none other than Bataille’s theory 
of unknowing [nonsavoir], which, with Bohr, forms a larger “complimentary 
epistemology.” According to Bataille, whom Plotnitsky claimed was profoundly 
influenced by quantum physics, one can never speak of un-knowledge, but only of its 
effects. These are the kinds of conceptual analogies Plotnitsky seeks throughout The 
Knowable and the Unknowable. While his subsequent chapters treat Derrida and Lacan 
rather than Bataille (who, after this first mention, becomes another name on a list), 
Bataille’s non-savoir remains for the work a kind of bridge between the epistemological 
foci of physics and post-structuralism.  
The significance of Plotnitsky’s work resides in his ability to show how the so-
called “two cultures” of sciences and humanities share foundational premises and work 
on similar problems. For this project in particular, it is also significant that Plotnitsky 
understands the unknown to be the means of this confluence. Yet, however indebted to 
the quantum shift post-structural thought accounts of unknowing might be, Plotnitsky 
tells only one side of the story. The intellectual debts of post-structural unknowing are 
numerous and owe to a legacy that extends much further back than the arrival of quantum 
theory. One of these legacies, as Bataille has already pointed out, returns us to the 
religious culture of the Middle Ages, a topic whose investments might at first appears 
completely incompatible with the scientific concerns post-structuralism also shares.  
I am certainly not the first to point out the influence of medieval thought on the 
intellectual development of post-structuralism, many practitioners of which were trained 
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as medievalists.18 In terms of the discourse of unknowing, however, one strain of 
medieval thought has been particularly influential: that of negative or apophatic theology. 
For many twentieth-century artists, scientists and philosophers, the admission of even a 
hint of theological influence threatened to discredit their work (one thinks of Sigmund 
Freud’s infamous split with Carl Jung).19 However, others, including Levinas, Derrida, 
and Lacan, among others, engage seriously with theological arguments—Derrida’s 
engagement with negative theology has even prompted an entire edited volume on the 
subject.20 The relationship between Derrida’s deconstruction and the apophatic mysticism 
of the via negativa is not unlike that between post-structuralism and nonclassical thought. 
In fact, it might be said that each pair bears a relationship of complementarity. 
Regardless of their ultimate overlap, Deconstruction and negative theology both 
involve a kind of unknowing. In the more secular terms of Plotnitsky’s two modes of 
thinking, the via negativa (and its differences with nonclassical thought) might be 
understood thus: while apophatic theology may note the manifest effects of God’s 
existence, it claims no access to their efficacity; therefore one must avail oneself entirely 
of the classical model of thinking (positivism or cataphatic theology), to unknow it, 
because its assumptions will only get in the way of any future progress in the nonclassical 
                                                
 18 See Holsinger’s aforementioned Premodern Condition and Erin Labbie, Lacan’s 
Medievalism (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2006). 
 19 Freud wrote to friend Romain Rolland that he feared Jung was “something of a 
mystic” and therefore not suitable for serious scientific inquiry. Qtd. in Michel de 
Certeau and Marsanne Brammer, “ 12. 
 20 See Derrida and Negative Theology, eds. H. Coward and T. Foshay (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1992). 
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system. Nonclassical thought, on the other hand, still relies on classical thought for the 
purposes of understanding the efficacity of an effect. Whereas nonclassical thought 
makes no assumptions about the unknown, it retains faith in the possibility for a 
explanatory apparatus; negative theology assumes the existence of an unknown 
relationship between things but concedes the impossibility of explaining it. Negative 
theology and nonclassical thought are thus fundamentally incompatible, though both 
remain essential to post-structural epistemology. However, neither offers an answer to 
unknowing’s efficacity: what is, in the end, the purpose of either approach: to know more 
or to know less? 
These discourses, though incompatible, maintain a complementary relationship 
insofar as each relies dialectically on the other to hold in abeyance the radical possibility 
of absolute knowledge or un-knowledge. A deconstructive practice un-haunted by the 
specter of negative theology risks un-reasoning itself into the highly dogmatic conclusion 
that unknowing guarantees the impossibility of any and all knowledge. Negative theology 
posits a rhetorically useful, ultimately positive counterweight to the nihilist absolutism 
that post-structuralism risks since it leaves open the possibility that a realm of unknowing 
can provide a means of coming to knowledge, however incrementally or asymptotically. 
Of course, the guarantee of knowledge that might extend from the via negativa 
reinscribes a positivism that this discourse was developed, in part, to subtend. Likewise, 
negative theology must avoid submitting to an epistemology that describes a knowable 
universe divorced from an unknowable instrumentality to which use that knowledge is 
put. In other words, deconstruction and negative theology each suggest conclusions that, 
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if accepted, would undermine a founding assumption shared by their epistemological 
approaches, that of unknowing as suspension. As Bataille was keen to point out, 
unknowing must guarantee absolutely nothing. It is the very ex-cessive nature of 
unknowing that grounds it as the realm of a sovereign poetics.  
From a Poetics of Revelation to a Poetics of Unknowing  
 
The discussion of more contemporary uses of the term unknowing provides a 
foundation for the reasons writers invest in a discourse oriented away from knowledge. 
While for the twentieth century unknowing reinvested literature with a potential to access 
modes of understanding unavailable to a rationalist, teleological approach to knowledge, 
the stakes of medieval unknowing are necessarily grounded in a theological conversation 
about the relationship between faith and belief. Rather than accede to Weinstein’s notion 
of a “premodernist commitment to knowing,” I discuss a medieval poetics of unknowing 
as an important literary response to a widespread political and theological demand to 
instrumentalize narrative into the service of what I call a poetics of revelation. If 
medieval ways of knowing can be most easily separated into ratio (active, rational 
deduction) and intellectus (intuitive, associated with divine knowledge), I am concerned 
primarily with how history and narrative delineate the ethics of the latter. While the 
impetus to unknow in late-medieval England may, at times, draw on existential and/or 
phenomenological themes found also in the twentieth century, my focus here is to show 
how unknowing becomes a formal device within a text that models how literary accounts 
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of faith and belief may be incompatible with the intellectualism that pervades literary 
culture through the thirteenth century.  
 
*  *  * 
 
The lines between history and literature in the Middle Ages are, of course, 
effectively blurred. In order to make the past memorable and meaningful, medieval 
chronicles often idealized the past, fleshing out important events with fantastic detail and 
situating kings or kingdoms within logic of imperial succession, or translatio imperii. 
Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia Regum Britanniae, written in the first third of the 
twelfth century, provides what is perhaps the most well-known narrative account of 
translatio imperii. The Historia makes productive use of the overlap shared by historia 
(account, story, history) and fabula (play, story, fable) with such success as to 
revolutionize contemporary views of English history, while also planting the seeds of 
romance. As Geraldine Heng writes, “King Arthur materializes at the vanishing point of 
historical narration.”21 Geoffrey, who memorably claims that he is merely translating an 
ancient book, combines political and ecclesiastical interests in order to create an English 
past through a narrative driven by memorable characters (Brutus, Vortigern, Arthur, 
Merlin) who steer the course of history and give it meaning (it is no coincidence that 
chronicles recalling British history became known as brut).  
                                                
 21 See “The Genesis of Medieval Romance,” in Geraldine Heng, Empire of Magic: 
Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural Fantasy (New York: Columbia UP, 
2003), 17-62, 33.  
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As has been well-rehearsed, these fictional elements, or fabula, represent neither a 
roadblock to nor an opposition to historical truth. Instead, the flourishes of artistic merit 
in chronicles serve to illustrate an already-known truth that might otherwise go 
unrepresented, if it were not repackaged as a coherent (and entertaining) narrative. In 
other words, stories like the Matter of Britain utilize narrative in order to give shape to an 
otherwise abstract epistemological premise: that sacred and secular history are one and 
that the rulers of Britain stand in metonymically at the head of the West’s great new 
empire. Whether received as believable or fantastic, figures like Arthur and Brutus 
allowed readers to most effectively know the past, and do so through the power of 
narrative. To actively create the past from the vantage of the present raises the stakes of 
historical knowledge from a set of facts about the past, some recoverable and some 
unknowable, to a transhistorical knowledge that connects past, present, and future by 
narrativizing the connections between these temporalities.  
Biblical exegesis, the other primary means of knowing the past, worked on a 
similar logic to connect past, present, and future. A properly exegetical understanding of 
Scripture required a scholar to interpret a pre-Christian Old Testament event as 
prefiguring the ascendency of a Christian present. Augustine, for example, sets in motion 
an exegetics that requires pre-Christian history to exist alternately for itself and for later 
biblical history—reading the Old Testament as vacillation between the lex or promissio, 
which emphasized a literal reading, and the symbolic figura, which focused on how these 
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passages forecasted a knowledge of a Christian present and future.22 By focusing on 
levels of interpretation that include history, allegory, and tropology, exegetes such as 
Hugh, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and Peter Comester situated the pre-Christian 
(usually Old Testament) past as an active force capable of forging a dialogue with 
contemporary events as well as those prophesied to come.  
While the romancing of the chronicle tradition illustrates the way that writers built 
a narrative thread that linked recorded events into manufactured historical knowledge, the 
exegetical unfolding of the biblical text points to the way in which theologians inscribed 
the present and future into an otherwise closed narrative about the past. Given these two 
frameworks for interpreting the past, the actions of individuals and the outcomes of 
singular events came to form the primary means through which the Middle Ages 
understood history. Yet, as exegesis shows us, those looking to understand the past often 
privileged the transhistorical meaning or significance of an event/individual over its/their 
outcome/actions (the lex of the history). In order for it to matter, the historical event, 
whose details are often inaccessible to the present, required additional description on the 
one hand, or, in the case of Old Testament events, a more explicit link to an established 
Christian truth. In other words, writers and theologians had to recreate history in order to 
situate it within the dominant logics of their understanding of how the world worked 
(Christian eschatology; translatio imperii).  
                                                
 22 See Book 3 of Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, trans. D.W. Robertson (New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958). For more on the evolution of medieval exegesis, see Henri 
de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis, Vol. 2: The Four Senses of Scripture, trans. E.M. 
Macierowski (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2000). 
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The chapters of this dissertation explore whether the four pseudo-historical 
figures I treat can provide something other than a confirmation of a previously 
established truth. In doing so, I hope to show how literature sets limits on the knowable 
and suggests that there are advantages to understanding our relationship to the past as 
permanently unknowable. But why the fourteenth century, in particular? As I will now 
discuss, the thirteenth century helped codify a demand for revelation through which the 
purpose or efficacity of an event or figure must be integrated into a larger epistemological 
system. The poetics of unknowing I discuss in this dissertation thus form a movement 
against such a demand.  
So what do I mean when I refer to the texts I treat as “literary” narratives? First, to 
be clear, I do not offer in this dissertation an understanding a transhistorical, essentialist 
concept of literature, nor do I even wish to participate in the debate over whether the 
category of literature merits a relativistic or essentialist designation. The only writer I 
have mentioned so far that does anything close to that is Maurice Blanchot, and his 
concerns lie more with what literature does than what it is. Like the medieval “quarrel of 
the universals” the debate over the historical status of the literary has invited spirited 
debate for centuries, oscillating between the Realist position of a stable literary essence 
and a Nominalist critique of literature’s particularity in accordance with broader 
humanities trends. For instance, many of the most robust definitions of the literary, such 
as those theorized by Roman Jakobson and Viktor Shklovsky, rose out of the broader 
trends of formalism and structuralism. On the other hand, the second half of the twentieth 
century abounds with critiques of literary essentialism, influenced surely by the larger 
 26  
concerns of post-modernism and, more specifically, post-structuralism. With the advent 
of cognitive approaches to studying literature—again an invocation of “two cultures” 
compatibility—cognitive science appears to have swung the pendulum back to the side of 
the existence of a stable literary essence.23  
The subsequent discussion of the medieval literary rests on the following 
propositions. First, literary scholars have associated twentieth-century literature with the 
work of “unknowing,” but have done so without defining literature or unknowing. 
Second, there exist Middle English literary texts that transform not-knowing (whether 
through unwillingness or inability) not into an endpoint but into an entrance into 
understanding a text and its alternate relationship to a specific historical past. Moreover, I 
suggest that attending to the unknowability of these figures actually maintains their 
transhistorical significance, rather than undermining it. Now, when I refer to the 
“literary,” I simply mean a narrative that creates an imagined world whose inhabitants 
possess the ability to act independently of any historical demands placed upon them or 
whose actions require an explanation of motive. To put it more simply, I ally the literary 
with poiesis, an act of making that transforms the world. In associating literature with 
unknowing, I am explicating what I understand to be a consequence of poiesis: that this 
transformation of the world affords an understanding of epistemology that does not 
require the unknown to reveal itself. In the literary narrative, history functions not as 
                                                
 23 For an excellent overview of the debates over (and stakes of) defining literature and 
the literary, including a discussion of how cognitive science has affected these debates, 
see Vladimir Alexandrov, “Literature, Literariness, and the Brain,” Comparative 
Literature 59.2 (2007): 97-118. 
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knowledge, but as a kind of belated materiality. To be clear, I am not suggesting that all 
literature involves unknowing, nor am I discounting the possibility of an essentialist link 
between medieval and post-medieval literariness. Rather, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, I propose that one way to distinguish late-medieval literary writing from 
other modes of discourse is its valorization of what cannot be known.  
 
* * * 
 
In order to separate what I understand as a poetics of revelation from one of 
unknowing, I return to a text foundational to the creation of a mode of medieval discourse 
understood as literary. The epistemological program and attendant popularity of Geoffrey 
of Monmouth’s Historia might be better understood when considered in its twelfth-
century historical context. The twelfth-century, often credited as an intellectual high point 
for the Middle Ages, can be equally characterized by the numerous epistemological crises 
it faced.24 The crusading movements that began in the late eleventh century understood 
the recapture of the Holy Land as the first step in establishing a united societas 
Christiana, and though the First Crusade (1096-99) achieved its goal, the optimism it 
heralded was short-lived. Crusading was a form of pilgrimage, holy war, and imitatio 
Christi, all of which afforded to Latin Christians the confidence that they were God’s 
chosen people. Although it was not yet readily apparent whether Islam represented a 
“divine scourge” or whether Muhammad was the heresiarch meant to usher in the 
                                                
 24 For an excellent overview of twelfth-century intellectual culture, see M.D. Chenu, 
Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester Little 
(Toronto: MARTS, 1997). 
 28  
Apocalypse, it was certain that Islam’s military impact was linked to its significance in 
the narrative of Christian history.  
From the late twelfth century onward, Muslims held Jerusalem, the ideological 
and geographical navel of the world, and had even recaptured the first Crusader state ever 
established, Edessa. In addition to losing Jerusalem and its surrounding territories, the 
crusading project turned inward to factionalize Christendom itself. Crusaders slaughtered 
Jews living in their own lands, slaughtered other Christians living outside their lands, and 
even mounted a “crusade” against Christians in Southern France.25 The goals of 
crusading as a means of unifying Christendom came into tension with a contemporary 
drive within the Church to root out heresy by dividing it. Those deviant systems termed 
heresy might understood as the underpinning logics between faith and reason not yet 
revealed (or thought to be obscured) by the cultural-epistemological system of 
Catholicism. Latin Christians found themselves trying to carve out a definitive societas 
Christiana, in part because Europe had begun to look dangerously heterogeneous.  
Gregorian reform, the rise of new monastic orders, and the most significant spread 
of heresy in the last five hundred years challenged the sovereignty (as well as the 
singularity) of the Church and outlined the need for the Catholicism to (re-)organize 
                                                
 25 For a first-hand account on the slaughter of Jews on the way to the First Crusade, see 
Solomon bar Samson’s account of “The Crusaders in Mainz, May 27, 1096,” reprinted in 
Jacob Marcus, The Jew in the Medieval World: A Sourcebook, 315-1791 (New York: 
JPS, 1938), 115-20. On the Fourth Crusade and its violence toward Eastern Christians, 
see Donald Queller and Thomas Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of 
Constantinople (Philadelphia: U of Penn P, 1997). For more on the persecution of 
Cathars and the so-called Albigensian Crusade, see Joseph Strayer, The Albigensian 
Crusades (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1992). 
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itself.26 And so it did. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 remains one of the most 
significant events of the Middle Ages not only for its influence on Christian doctrine, or 
for its ability to return political power to the Church, but also for its effects on Western 
epistemology. The systematic attempt of an assertive pope—one “less than God but more 
than man”—to exercise power over the body of Latin Christendom produced 
consequences that reverberated well into the Early Modern period.  
The Fourth Lateran Council re-asserted the centrality of the Church in the West 
by positioning itself as the central hub through which even the most intimate knowledges 
must circulate. Taken together, Innocent III’s pronouncements concretized a longstanding 
association between discipline and wisdom into a decree that knowledge comes from 
attendance to boundaries, to rules already regimented. The call for yearly confession 
helped strengthen ties to more rural areas where congregations adhered less strictly to 
doctrine, but this was also a reform within the Church as well. Along with a ban on new 
monastic orders, Innocent worked to distinguish a Catholic inside from an equally 
homogeneous outside, including a reaffirmation of all previous denunciations of heresies 
as well as the reduction of all theological deviance into the conceptual singularity, heresy. 
The sustained persecution of heresy was, in effect, an exploration of the limits of the 
                                                
 26 R.I. Moore discusses the new threats to western Europe in the twelfth-century and 
their responses in his two works, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and 
Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1988) and The 
Origins of European Dissent (London: Allen Lane Publishing, 1977). Curiously, neither 
book says much about the impact of Islam on twelfth-century Christians’ conceptions of 
heresy, which will become a primary theme for John Tolan and the work of more recent 
historians. 
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Christian body with aims to establish recognizable boundaries for a wholly Christian 
subjectivity, a cohesive societas Christiana.  
The plan to mark the othered bodies (Jews, Muslims) within Europe’s borders, 
and to declare a Fifth Crusade on those outside its limits, approximated a panoptical 
surveillance over the medieval West. Even the ban on ordeals signified a departure from 
providential justice towards the Church’s circumscription, as Body of Christ, of veritas. 
Previously, God was relied upon to enforce and sanctify the transmission of truth; 
thereafter, transparency, uniformity and consistency were to rule the realm of knowledge. 
The dictums of Lateran IV coalesced to disclose one common demand: that the unknown 
might reveal itself so that it could be categorized within a new system of orthodoxy. 
 In the wake of an institutional desire to clarify and guard the distinction between 
inside and outside, intellectual approaches towards things unknown shifted to 
accommodate Fourth Lateran’s desire for schematization and reflexivity. The council 
also helped usher in a thirteenth-century Scholasticism, which, through the logic of the 
dialectic, united known and unknown into a synthesis that helped refine, piece by piece, 
all theological knowledge. Bolstered by a university statute (also 1215) that required 
students to study Aristotle’s logic, theology acquired the status of a science. Buoyed by 
the institutionalization of Scholastic thought and a systematic program of surveillance by 
the Church, epistemology and religious ethics began to coalesce across textual 
communities. Devotional manuals, for instance, experienced an unprecedented surge in 
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popularity during the thirteenth century.27 The need for private instruction on how faith 
was properly cultivated and maintained testifies to the demand that these institutional 
practices, ecclesiastical and Scholastic, created among individual Christians. 
The literary legacy of Lateran IV was no less significant and also reflected an 
interest in modes of disclosure revealed in line with a specific disciplinary practice. As 
disciplinary handbooks of Christian truth surged in popularity, so too did poetic manuals, 
which outlined the rules and decorum for artifice. Even so, secular narratives often 
struggled to justify themselves without recourse to extra-romantic intellectual or political 
pursuits. The advent of (French) romance was thought to offer a mode through which 
stories about the past could focus on entertainment rather than didactic value— 
essentially freeing fiction from its necessary subjection to historical knowledge. Romance 
separated itself from chronicle by adhering to comparatively equivocal logics of deferral 
and interlacement, but was also subjected to thirteenth-century demands for clarity. The 
Grail-object, for example, so crucial to the ambiguous charms of Chrétien’s Perceval, 
became a Eucharistic symbol by the century’s second decade.28 At the narrative level, the 
relationship between what the speaker knows about his story and the justification, in 
terms of poetic authority, that the narrative seems to require echoed the larger cultural 
                                                
 27 See Leonard Boyle, “The Fourth Lateran Council and Manuals of Popular Theology,” 
in The Popular Literature of Medieval England, ed. Thomas Heffernan, 30-43 
(Knoxville: U of Tennessee P, 1985). 
 28 We can see Robert’s pre-LIV Grail as complemented by Lateran IV. See E. Jane 
Burns, Arthurian Fictions: Re-Reading the Vulgate Cycle (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 
1985); Roger Sherman Loomis, The Grail: From Celtic Myth to Christian Symbol 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963); and, most specifically, Suzanne Wilson, “From Enigma 
to Explanation: Rereading Old French Grail Stories in Light of the Fourth Lateran 
Council,” PhD Thesis, Washington University in St. Louis, 1989. 
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problem with auctoritas as the very condition of knowing. As E. Jane Burns notes, 
writing of Arthurian romance, “[i]nvention is thus based on the rewriting and reworking 
of previous texts. The task of the author is not to respect the autonomy of his source but 
to tamper actively with its contents.”29 How then is knowledge to be discovered when 
one can only know what has already been revealed? To know in the present tense (or to 
narrate) is a dangerous practice as well as a highly regulated one, as evidenced by the 
contemporary discourses on heresy.  
This is not to say that all literary art of the thirteenth century adopted the 
epistemological programs of the church and university; however, a sense of urgency for 
knowledge was certainly prevalent. During the thirteenth century, the dream vision, a 
genre appropriately reliant on revelation and on the authority of non-material agents, vied 
with romance in terms of popularity and became the preeminent vessel for literary-
philosophical explication. Kathryn Lynch situates this period as the apogee of the “high 
medieval dream vision,” which Lynch names, along with romance, the “genre of the age” 
for a period that coincided with “the natural order of knowing,” defined as a progression 
from imagination, reason, and memory towards truth.30 Dream visions arouse the 
possibility of transcendence, the fantasy of a “secret cnawyng” revealed spontaneously to 
reader/dreamer as opposed to having been earned through the epistemological 
disciplining of the Cloud of Unknowing. Even though dream visions, like the devotional 
                                                
 29 Burns, Arthurian Fictions, 26. 
 30 See Kathryn Lynch, The High Medieval Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy, and 
Literary Form (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988). Lynch explains how philosophical 
paradigms in the Middle Ages shift to accommodate new empirical data (11). 
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Cloud, tend to ultimately privilege knowledge, they operate within a framework of 
ignorance, pointing to a tension between knowledge and un-knowing that will begin to 
unravel in the fourteenth century.  
In addition to the more self-consciously literary genres of romance and dream 
vision, the travel narrative also adapted to a thirteenth-century Christian culture of 
disclosure. By the mid-thirteenth century, historical knowledge about the doings in the 
East had finally began to replace the fantasmatic projections of monsters, riches, and 
distant Christian outposts that had dominated travel literature through the twelfth century. 
East bound travelers came back to the Latin west with first-hand intelligence about the 
Mongols who, just a century before, were miscast as a prophesied band of Christian 
military allies. Travel also affected the relationship between Christians and Muslims. 
Instead of casting Islam as the producer of a heretical antichrist, authors began to argue 
instead that because Islam and Christianity are so similar in doctrine, the conversion of 
Muslims to Christianity should be easy. Missionaries also sought out Mongols who, now 
better understood, were perceived as blank slates theologically. Already in 1245, 
Innocent IV had sent Franciscan John of Plano Carpini to the East to deliver letters to the 
Mongol khan, inviting the khan to embrace Christianity. The transition in travel writing 
from splendor and wonder to mercantile and missionary utility answers the Fourth 
Lateran Council’s call to delineate ideological boundaries and helped set the European 
imperialist program for the coming centuries.  
In each of these cases—devotional treatise, romance, dream vision, travel 
narrative— writers used narrative to guard the distinctions between authority and 
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invention, which resulted in a teleological poetics focused on revelation. The equation in 
which order guarantees knowledge underwrote Lateran IV’s scheme of a united 
Christendom, but this schema left little room for speculation and, more importantly, even 
less room for faith. The invention upon which so much of the literary narrative depends 
was replaced rather systematically by typology, metaphor, and metonymy—as much 
figures of medieval history as they were literary commonplaces. These devices create 
schemes for knowing that establish both the meaning of the past and an event’s bearing 
on the present and future. The stories that circulated around important historical figures 
become illustrations of knowledge, even if their details had to be invented. The unknown 
was either integrated into a more knowable framework, or, in the case of prophecy or a 
truly nebulous historical event, subjected to faith in the teleology of revelation, whereby 
the event’s meaning would be made known—it was only a matter of time.  
Here I return to the Cloud of Unknowing because of its position in between the 
discourses of revelation and the counter-discourse of unknowing that I trace in this 
dissertation. As is now evident, the Cloud’s system of devotion is rooted in a practice of 
un-knowing, understood as a faith-driven repression of worldly materiality in order to 
propel oneself closer towards a spiritual understanding of God’s love. As has also been 
noted, what appears to be the Cloud’s founding negation actually turns out to be its 
primary affirmation insofar as the goal of unknowing is to, in fact, arrive at the truest 
knowledge conceived within a Christian system. This arrival at revelation, coupled with 
the Cloud’s stratified program for getting there, indicates how the fourteenth-century 
Cloud of Unknowing resembles the devotional practices outlined in the popular 
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thirteenth-century manuals. The key difference, of course, is that the vast majority of 
devotional manuals view the unknown as that which exists outside of the Christian order 
(or outside of the concerns of the individual’s contemplations) whereas, for the Cloud, 
the unknown grounds the very system of knowledge to which all Christians should aspire. 
 
Towards a Poetics of Unknowing 
 
The thirteenth-century concerns over heresy, identity, and discipline point to a 
larger cultural tension between knowing and the unknown. While the mechanisms of 
confession, revelation, and resolution that underwrote contemporary ecclesiastical and 
Scholastic practices impacted discourses both secular and religious, this demand for 
certainty was not without its complications. The complex transformation of Eucharist 
from bread to flesh invited much speculation and debate, but was ultimately reduced to a 
matter of faith over knowledge. Later, the Lollard movement will cite as one its major 
concerns the actual potential for transformation of substance into Body, forming the 
central question for the Church to identify and persecute the Lollard heretics. For the 
Catholic Church, as evidenced by the Fourth Lateran Council and the documented 
sermons that caution against putting forth too much effort in attempting to understand the 
Sacrament, it was better, after all, to not know. Following the so-called Condemnation of 
1277, which banned texts of Aristotle among others, a wave of thinkers, including Duns 
Scotus, Thomas Bradwardine, and William of Ockham begin to reject the logic of 
Thomism in favor of the revelatory power of the Word. The Nominalism of Ockham, 
specifically, offered a way out of the Scholastic epistemological demand that order must 
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be understood as a kind of knowledge in itself—the kind of logic that underwrote the 
majority of the Church’s plans to eliminate heresy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.  
Turning to the methods of the “speculative visionary works of the early and late 
fourteenth century,” Nicholas Watson has argued for a turn toward a study of imagination 
for historians.31 Like Watson, I borrow also from the vocabulary of mystical theology, 
but rather than history and the imagination, I turn to literature and the unknown. While 
nominalist philosophy marked a departure from these demands for revelation that did 
influence literary discourse, literary responses to the poetics of revelation did not depend 
on Nominalism to separate themselves from these demands.32 By focusing on fourteenth-
century Middle English texts, my project traces what I see as an important shift away 
from the teleological clarity of a revelatory poetics. I turn to the medieval literary not just 
for its use of ambiguity but for the way the fourteenth-century Middle English texts 
remediate problematic certainties inherited by history and theology by valorizing of what 
comes to be permanently unknowable. To be clear, this epistemological suspension is 
neither a technique of enlightenment nor a celebration of impossibility, but rather the 
condition of knowledge itself. The engagement with the Christian past foundational to the 
re-writings I treat underscores an abiding tension between what can be known about the 
past and the faith with which the Christian reader accepts the authoritative interpretation 
of the historical events that constitute that past.  
                                                
 31 Nicholas Watson, “The Phantasmal Past: Time, History, and the Recombinative 
Imagination,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 32 (2010): 1-37.  
 32 See, for example, Hugo Kepier et al., eds., Nominalism and Literary Discourse: New 
Perspectives (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997). 
 
 37  
This dissertation will re-consider four archetypal figures of Christian history 
whom scholarship has traditionally treated as representing the medieval limits of 
knowing. I am concerned with how literary narratives can affects historical figures and 
their archetypal status as illustrations of knowledge outside of literary texts. This entrance 
into the literary, I argue, shifts their relationship knowledge and belief as traditionally 
posited. By examining Herod, Prester John, Pearl, and Criseyde as characters I hope to 
show how they actually avoid answering the questions of knowledge to which they are so 
routinely subjected. The authors of the texts in which these figures appear as characters 
(mystery plays, Anglo-Norman romance, the Middle English Pearl, and Chaucer’s 
Troilus and Criseyde) reroute these figures from an otherwise abstract, over-determined 
path, allowing the characters to exceed the typological significance to which they have 
been historically pinned. To see a raging, impotent Herod embody contemporary enemies 
of Christianity, to turn the politically significant Prester John into a romance character, to 
test the difficulty of belief through a dialogue with a Pearl, and to interrogate the ethical 
boundaries of rewriting the past through a character who must remain unknowable 
challenges the traditional meanings ascribed to these figures.  
Chapter one focuses on the figure of Herod the Great in early English drama. The 
Middle English cycle plays, not unlike the devotional manuals so admired in the 
thirteenth-century, enact a vernacular theological practice that prescribes a balance 
between faith and knowledge. The plays negotiates a tension between knowing and not-
knowing in part by dramatizing the dueling temporalities of biblical typology, through 
moments in which the audience participates in both a biblical past and English present. 
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The success of this dramatic maneuver depends, of course, on a pageant’s ability to 
include playgoers in the world it builds, to raise the stakes of their attention. I argue that 
it is Herod the Great, himself the very embodiment of ‘knowing too much’ who functions 
as the gatekeeper between these worlds. 
The medieval Herod loomed so large in the Christian imagination that, at least by 
the late Middle Ages, the three biblical characters named Herod—Herod the Great 
(Matthew 2), Herod Antipas (Acts up to 4:27), and Herod Agrippa (Acts 12)— were 
collapsed into one figure, often referred to simply as King Herod. While he remains a 
peripheral character in continental religious drama, the English mystery cycles amplify 
his significance to the degree that he becomes the character most anticipated, consistently 
played, and often studied. Each cycle presents a unique vision of the tyrant, and yet two 
uniquely English characteristics reoccur, each of which helps frame Herod’s ability to 
collapse the biblical world (and time) into which he was cast into a contemporary, 
English present. First, Herod demonstrates an anachronistic understanding of Christ’s 
significance that he could not possibly know; Herod becomes the foil of Christ (often 
parroting Christ’s rhetoric). Second, his burlesque physicality, manifest in his 
characteristic raging, refocuses attention from the narrative onto Herod’s body, the 
immediacy of which helps bring the audience into the biblical world. While consistently 
portrayed as knowing, Herod tests the will of his audience who are instructed to oppose 
all that which Herod represents. 
 Herod’s interactions with the audience only reinforce the degree to which he is 
cast as negative exemplar of one who favors material knowledge over faith. Across they 
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cycles I examine (Chester, York, Towneley, N-Town, and Coventry) the English 
dramatists assure Herod’s ultimate failures in the face of Christian power positioning him 
at the head of an impotent genealogy of non-Christian tyrants. Rather than viewing these 
theatrical performances as departures from a traditionally figural understanding of Herod, 
I argue that the plays illustrate the prophetic symbolism of the narrative of Christian 
salvation as exegetically understood. Herod points to a double standard— that the 
dynamics of revelation upon which the Church depends depend on keeping some things 
unknown. Herod, Christianity’s anti-hero, remains a necessary irritant to the system that 
requires him to threaten, however impotently, the dynamics of eschatology. As I show, 
Herod’s performances turn typology from a diachronic structure of belief into a narrative 
that empowers the individual to shape their destiny through unknowing.  
In chapter two, I turn from biblical history to the foundational narrative of English 
secular history, the Matter of Troy. Rather than treat how England un-knew its own 
history by instead forging a genealogical relationship with the classical past, I concentrate 
on a later invention to the Troy-England tradition, the figure of Criseyde. Although little 
more than a structural detail to enhance the Troy/Troilus analogy, Criseyde became, in 
the minds of medieval readers, a historical figure whose actions foretold the 
untrustworthy dispositions of actual women and who helped render the dynamics of 
translatio imperii more fluid by giving Troilus a reason to fall. Through an analysis of 
Criseyde’s literary appearances, I read the way that romance negotiates its allegiances 
with an authoritative past that is itself the product of literary invention. Nowhere are the 
complexities of navigating romance’s relationship with time and knowledge more 
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apparent than in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, where the narrator consistently 
foregrounds the difficulty in making room for the multiplicity of his own narrative 
against the presumably monolithic historiography on Troy.  
From the opening lines of the poem, the narrator situates himself not as creator of 
meaning, but as the medium, or “sorwful instrument,” through which an already-
determined “sorwful tale” can reach an audience of lovers in the present. The narrator 
reiterates this desire to maintain fidelity to an already-written Trojan past in the opening 
lines of the subsequent books, although he begins to also emphasize the points at which 
his sources do not report the details of a specific scene, that they differ, or that he wants 
to deviate from them. These narratological strategies coalesce in the narrator’s conception 
of Criseyde who, due the immensity of critical attention she has received from readers 
medieval and post-medieval (and despite being one of few non-historical characters in the 
poem), becomes the most known and the most unknowable character in the romance, if 
not all of Chaucer’s work. As the daughter of Calchas, a “gret devyn” and the first locus 
of authority in the text (“lord of greet auctoritee”), Criseyde is from the beginning 
situated within the dialectics of knowing against which the narrator so conspicuously 
labors. Throughout the narrative, Criseyde frequently stands in for the narrator’s larger 
concerns about knowing and re-telling, leading to moments in which the narrator 
confronts, through her, what exceeds his ability to know as a storyteller. The narrator and 
Criseyde, taken together, reveal how unknowing can serve as a structural necessity when 
re-telling a narrative so presumably well known. 
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In chapter three, I turn to a dream vision that fits neither Kathryn Lynch’s rubric 
for the “high medieval dream vision” nor the demands for clarity to which other 
thirteenth-century literary narratives worked toward. The Middle English elegy Pearl, 
written in the late-fourteenth century, challenges the epistemological demands of its 
genre by insisting that even within the scene of dream revelation, divine knowledge 
remains suspended in the impossible-to-reach realm separating material from divine 
worlds. As a poem, Pearl tests the very boundaries the maiden cautions against, raising a 
paradox: how do you instruct about the immaterial knowledges that escape human 
cognition from the material world? Yet the poem, as a literary object, brings the dreamer 
(and reader) into understanding its message precisely by telling them what they cannot 
understand, building the immaterial into the very metaphor (pearl) of the material 
condition of knowing. In this chapter, I turn to the rich symbolic history of the pearl, an 
object that has, in both Christian and non-Christian contexts, signaled the union of divine 
and material forces. Through an analysis of the Pearl-poet’s formal engagement with 
contemporary mathematical discourse about proportionality and divinity, I show how 
Pearl’s pearl becomes a signifier of epistemological suspension that the poet supplements 
with a precise, but imperfect network of mathematical ratios. If Herod and Prester John, 
shorn of the limitations of historical personage, are re-imagined as literary figures in 
order to become textual agents of Christian history, the ethereal maiden of Pearl, a figure 
native to the medieval dream-narrative tradition, shows how the putatively literary 
symbol can intervene in the historical understanding of a subject’s relationship to the 
Word and the aporias of reading practice.  
 42  
As has been noted by several critics, Pearl’s insistence on the symbolic richness 
of its object renders the poem’s signifying economy literally into a string of pearls. Yet 
where critics tend to associate this flattening of the signifier as symptomatic of the 
difficult work of mourning, I will show that, in its medieval context, the dreamer’s desire 
centers more on an epistemological question (of not-being-able-to-know) than on an 
actual hope or desire to recover a loss. Pearl complicates this traditional Christian symbol 
by rendering its perfection tangible, but also by tracing its legibility across an impossible 
geometry, self-contained as it is endlessly expansive. By tracking the different 
significations of the pearl, the poem’s relationship with knowledge, and the function of 
the maiden, I will show how the pearl comes to signify (in all of its paradox and 
impossibility) the very condition of knowing. 
The final chapter addresses the political stakes of this literary discourse of 
unknowing through a reading of one of the most lasting legends in European history, the 
legend of Prester John. Although a twelfth-century invention, the figure of Prester John 
maintained a mystique, and an unknowability, well through the thirteenth century’s 
investment in debunking Eastern splendor. In fact, many of the tropes of wonder that 
were suppressed by more naturalistic travel accounts survive through the Letter of Prester 
John. The legend of Prester John and his magnificent kingdom has captivated scholarly 
and lay audiences from the twelfth-century through the twenty-first partly, as I argue, 
because Prester John’s integration into literary narratives, which helped postpone the 
death of earthly wonders and a promise of a global Christendom. In this chapter, I 
contextualize the early development of the legend within a larger narrative of global 
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Christian expansion. In this wider historical context, Prester John reads as cognate to a 
longstanding attempt to instill an imperial logic of Christian expansion from the dawn of 
the Crusades to the imperialism of later centuries.33 
Just as literature helps invent historical truths, so too can the putative historicity of 
Prester John ground generic transformations of the legend that help re-contextualize his 
unknowability by providing him with a reflexively literary identity. A literary Prester 
John helps sustain the legend in three ways: making Prester John more familiar by 
continuing to integrate the priest-king into the genealogies of notable medieval literary 
figures; giving cause for John’s migration to lands both real and imagined; and, finally, 
lending an aesthetic depth to John’s elusiveness. Moving forward, the biggest problem 
underwriting the verisimilitude of the Letter—John’s unknowability— becomes not a 
hindrance to the perpetuation of belief, but rather the foundation of a poetics around 
which the legend will endure.  
* * * 
The trope of unknowing produces a point at which theological, imaginative, 
epistemological, and temporal registers converge into a non-classical view of history that 
renders the unknowable “an irreducible part of knowledge,” rather than as the 
antechamber to revelation. When translated into literary contexts, these figures overlap at 
questions of representation, exceeding the logics of the texts that they inhabit, expressed 
                                                
 33 I refer not to Benedict Anderson’s “transnational Christianity” but to an amoebic, 
self-splitting, imperial Christian drive, unified only in theory, called into existence by an 
increasing attempt to unify Latin Europe through the project of Crusading. For 
Anderson’s account, see Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread 
of Nationalism, revised edition (London: Verso, 2006).  
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through the difficulty their readers have had putting them—and the epistemological 
conundrums they embody—to rest.  
What unites these four figures, other than their significant narrative histories, is 
the way that their fourteenth-century rewritings maintain a focus on their respective 
deaths. The cycle plays complicate an already strange medieval tradition of Herod’s 
death (figured as suicide, murder, or genital rot) by asserting that Herod’s anti-Christian 
villainy will perpetuate itself through a genealogy of impotent tyrants that will forever 
haunt, but never quite threaten the narrative of Christian eschatology. For generations of 
readers, one of Chaucer’s most frustrating narrative ambiguities in Troilus and Criseyde 
arises from the uneven handling of the downfall of its title characters. Chaucer follows 
Troilus to his death, but suspends the question of Criseyde’s punishment (and death), 
which created a demand for closure that not only inspired Robert Henryson’s “uther 
quaire,” The Testament of Cresseid, but also prompted early editors to append 
Henryson’s punishment of Criseyde onto early editions of Chaucer’s poem. Pearl’s 
dreamer’s desperate attempt to establish a material connection to his lost daughter 
testifies to his inability to admit with finality the irrevocability of his loss. And finally, 
the afterlife of the Prester John legend, which should have ended when his prophesied 
arrival turned into disastrous military defeat, indicates the degree to which the suspension 
of its death remained necessary to the vitality of a possibly global Christian future.  
In other words, the practice of unknowing enacts a symbolic death by which 
embodied knowledges become disentangled from the desires that underwrote them. This 
symbolic death occurs when these figures are removed from the economies through 
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which their meaning was generated. And yet, rewritten into literary narratives, these 
figures suffer no real death; in fact, they appear to live on. The suspension that literary 
unknowing enacts can be understood as an ontological in-betweenness, no longer a site 
through which knowledge is generated and yet still here, haunting the logics that stripped 
these figures of their singularity in the first place. Like Bataille’s realm of nonsavoir, the 
space between two deaths resonates as an existence ostensibly evacuated of desire and, 
by extension, absent of telos. And yet, as I hope to show in this dissertation, the practice 
of unknowing the Middle Ages shows us the fiction at the heart of unknowing, that a 
practice absent of desire, if one exists, is already itself a poetics.
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Chapter One 
The Once and Future Herod1 
 
The character of Herod the Great creates a strange bifurcation in the narrative of 
Christianity as understood in the Middle Ages. Although a character of the New 
Testament, Herod resides at the juncture of Old and New Testament logics: original 
enemy of the young Christ, but one whose ruling tactics explicitly recall those of 
Pharaoh. His death in some traditions even coincides the birth of Christ.2 While Herod 
the Great received little biblical attention, his exegetical significance was made apparent 
from even the earliest patristic commentaries.3 Christian writers in the Middle Ages 
portrayed Herod the Great as an exemplar of pride whose characteristic rage betrayed a 
fundamental madness—the result of a blind insistence on material accomplishment.4 
Herod not only provided a bridge between Old and New Testaments, he also figured in 
the politics of Christian eschatology, and demonstrated the superiority of spiritual over 
                                                
 1 Portions of this chapter have been published in Christopher Taylor, “The Once and 
Future Herod: Vernacular Typology and the Unfolding of Middle English Cycle Drama,” 
New Medieval Literatures 15 (2014).   
 2 Michael Grant suggests that some medieval traditions claim Herod in the very year of 
Jesus’ birth. Modern scholars fix the death of Herod the Great died in 4 BCE, the same 
year that Roman Jewish historian Josephus Flavius, writing in the first century, reports. 
See Herod the Great (New York: American Heritage Press), 16. 
 3 The early Latin Church Fathers generally viewed the biblical episode of “Massacre of 
the Innocents” (Matthew 2. 16-18) as producing the first Christian martyrs. On Herod’s 
early exegetical significance, see M. J. Mans, “The Early Latin Church Fathers on Herod 
and the Infanticide,” Hervormde Teologiese Studies 53 (1997): 92-102. 
 4 Penelope Doob focuses on the exemplarity of Herod’s madness in “The Mad Sinner: 
Herod and the Pagan Kings,” in Nebuchadnezzar's Children: Conventions of Madness in 
Middle English Literature (New Haven: Yale UP, 1974), 195-233. 
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temporal manifestations of power.5 The figure of Herod loomed so large in the Christian 
imagination that late-medieval narratives often collapsed the three biblical characters 
named Herod—Herod the Great (Matthew 2), Herod Antipas (Acts up to 4. 27), and 
Herod Agrippa (Acts 12)—into a singular King Herod.6 
Authoritative information on the life of Herod was limited to a handful of Bible 
verses (with some development by Josephus7). Consequently, most early portraits of 
Herod focus on his exemplarity rather than address his psychological makeup or the 
historicity of his actions. From late-antiquity through the twelfth century Herod tended to 
represent the moral insanity produced by a hubristic appetite for earthly power.8 By the 
late Middle Ages, vernacular writers began to more inventively extrapolate on the scant 
                                                
 5 In twelfth-century Latin liturgical plays Herod became a political tool used to comment 
on and intervene in the contemporary tensions between Pope and Emperor. See John 
Marlin, “The Investiture Contest and the Rise of Herod Plays in the Twelfth Century,” 
Early Drama, Art, and Music Review 23 (2000): 1-18.  
 6 S. S. Hussey discusses the popular conflation among the multiple Herods in “How 
Many Herods in the Middle English Drama?” Neophilologus 48 (1964): 252-59. 
 7 Josephus’ Bellum judaicum and Antiquitates judiaicae, both of which predate the 
Gospel of Matthew, were considered reliable sources on Herod’s life throughout the 
Middle Ages. Most medieval traditions regarding Herod’s death rely at least indirectly on 
Josephus. I refer to book and chapter numbers from: The Jewish War, ed. and trans. by H. 
St. John Thackeray, rev. ed. (London: William Heinemann, 1927; repr. 1997) and Jewish 
Antiquities, trans. by Ralph Marcus (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1961). 
 8 Herod received little attention in Latin patristic works prior to the fourth century but 
became a popular homiletic point of reference about madness in Prudentius, Augustine, 
Chrysostom, Isidore, and Bede. See Mans, “The Early Latin Church Fathers,” 92-102. 
Twelfth-century Latin liturgical drama helped establish the iconic “raging” Herod. The 
“Feast of Fools” celebrations, popular throughout Europe, helped inspire the comic 
aspects that become standard in the English characterization of Herod. For more on 
Herod’s development, see Kathleen Ashley, “The Politics of Playing Herod in Beaune,” 
European Medieval Drama 9 (2005): 153-65, 155 and Martin Stevens, “Herod as 
Carnival King in the Medieval Biblical Drama,” Mediaevalia 18 (1994): 43-66.  
 48  
source material.9 Among these more popular renderings, Herod receives the most 
expanded treatment in the pageants of the English mystery cycles, where a comparatively 
unique balance of bumbling physicality and tyrannical madness marks him as medieval 
cycle drama’s most anticipated, consistently played, and often studied character.10 
Within the extant English cycles (Chester, York, Towneley, Coventry, N-Town)11 
Herod retains his traditional significance as originary Christian enemy, but also 
consistently engages the present and becomes a negative exemplar of a corrupt English 
noble. In this first chapter, I examine the ways that dramatists of these five cycles 
negotiate between an inherited exegetical tradition on the one hand, and contemporary 
                                                
 9 Herod is featured in several non-biblical medieval texts, including Peter Comestor’s 
Historia Scholastica (c. 1175), Jacobus de Voragine’s Legenda Aurea (c. 1260), the 
Cursor Mundi (c. 1300), Higden’s Polychronicon (c. 1342), the Historia Trium Regum 
(c. 1370), John Mirk’s Festial (late-14th), the Stanzaic Life of Christ (late-14th/early-
15th), Lydgate’s Fall of Princes (1430s), “The Ballad of St. Stephen and Herod” (15th) 
and the Life of Saint Anne (mid-late 15th).  
 10 The continental plays tend to characterize Herod as chivalric whereas the English 
plays feature a “raging” Herod. On the continental Herod, see Miriam Anne Skey, 
“Herod the Great in Medieval European Drama,” Comparative Drama 13 (1979): 330-
364. 
11 I understand the challenges of writing about the plays as if they were knowable 
entities whose late-medieval performances we can easily trace. For instance, although we 
know that the York cycle was active throughout the fifteenth century, scholars cannot be 
sure about the degree to which revisions were made year to year (the sole manuscript 
dates between 1463 and 1477). Likewise, the Chester cycle was performed at least from 
1422 but the oldest manuscript dates from 1521. The date of the single extant manuscript 
of the Towneley plays ranges from 1422 to 1530. The Coventry plays, first performed in 
1392, survive in a copy of a manuscript that has since been lost. Perhaps most 
frustratingly, the N-Town play, whose manuscript dates from the mid-fifteenth century, 
was recorded by a scribe who arranged the plays chronologically, leaving the original 
arrangement to the critic’s imagination. While I will close read passages from the texts 
that we have received, my understanding of Herod relies far more on an intertextual 
analysis of the cycles (as received) and the sources they betray. 
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political-religious concern on the other, in order to portray a realistically dangerous, and 
yet perpetually inept Herod. And while each cycle presents a unique vision of the tyrant, 
my goal is to stress two characteristics that these depictions of Herod share: his 
epistemological arrogance and his burlesque physicality. In each of the cycles, Herod 
lusts after knowledge and proves to know too much, although the cycles also indicates 
that his is the wrong kind of knowledge. Herod’s physicality—crystallized in the famous 
Coventry stage direction, “Here Erode ragis in the pagond and in the street also”—
underscores his ability to break through the play’s temporal constraints of a biblical past 
in order to remind playgoers and readers of his continued relevance in the present.12  
Given how much is still not known about the cycles, studies of early drama tend 
to isolate a specific cycle or pageants.13 My attempt to seek continuity across the English 
cycles guides me to choose Herod as my text. I focus on how the plays utilize Herod as 
epistemological bridge to interrogate the relationship between typology and the limits of 
                                                
 12 This stage direction from the Coventry Shearmen and Taylor’s pageant (l. 729 s.d.) 
has been analyzed for its implications in how the plays were staged and what technically 
constituted the acting area. See, for example, Meg Twycross, “The Theatricality of 
Medieval English Plays,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval English Theatre, 2nd 
edition, eds. Richard Beadle and Alan Fletcher, 26-74 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2008), esp. 46-8.  
 13 Along with the difficulties in dating and preparing texts contemporaneous with their 
performances, scholars continue to debate how and where the plays were staged, how 
they relate to the Church, and how they were paid for. As John McGavin quips, “it has 
taken a lot of dedicated scholarly work and much medieval–style enactment over the last 
fifty years to make the civic religious drama of the Middle Ages look as complicated as it 
does today.” See “Performing Communities: Civic Religious Drama,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Medieval Literature in English, ed. Elaine Treharne and Greg Walker, 200-
18 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010), 210. See also the exemplary work of Alexandra F. 
Johnston and David Mills. For the most exhaustive documentation of the logistical 
specificities required to stage the plays, refer to the Records of Early English Drama 
(REED), much of which has been digitized and is available online. 
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knowledge.14 Kathleen Biddick contends, “the layout of the [late twelfth-century] glossed 
Bible rationalizes textual organization and thus renders typology, once an argument about 
reference [to another event], now also a representation.”15 Following the work of 
Biddick, I submit that the typology’s representational potential reaches its apex with the 
English dramatic Herod.  
As I illustrate, Herod’s performances across cycles become a shorthand for an 
entire legion of fruitless attempts to alter the unfolding of Christian eschatology. An 
obsession with Herod’s impotence, shared by medieval writers and modern scholars, all 
but guarantees one of two possibilities: either he will fail to transmit the real threat he 
poses or the potential usurpers he engenders will inherit his characteristic impotence in 
the face of real power. Herod’s villainy become metonymic in the sense that he comes to 
represent a larger Christian truth— the futility of resisting Christian eschatology. 
Likewise, their vernacular insistence on revision renders the traditionally neat parallelism 
of typology something sloppy and indefinite.  
Thus, in addition to telling the story of the English dramatic Herod, this chapter 
urges an expanded understanding of medieval typological thought, and through it, a 
reconsideration of the literary stakes of English cycle drama. I structure my discussion 
                                                
 14 For an overview of the role of typology in the English mystery plays, see Walter 
Myers, “Typology and the Audience of the English Cycle Plays,” in Typology and 
English Medieval Literature, ed. H.T. Keenan, 261-74 (New York: AMS Press, 1992). 
 15 See Kathleen Biddick, The Typological Imaginary (Philadelphia: U Penn Press, 
2003), 14. Biddick’s theological use typology refers to the supercessionary understanding 
of Old Testament events as belonging (via allegory) to the epistemological paradigm of 
the New Testament. Biddick deploys the term typology to denote a supersessionary 
narrative in which “Christians subsumed the Hebrew bible into an ‘Old Testament’ and 
conceive of this Old Testament as a text anterior to their New Testament.”  
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according to three facets of Herod’s representation: his unique typological function 
within the pageants, his ability to exist simultaneously within the past and present of the 
pageants, and, lastly, the textual obsession with his potency (or lack thereof). In each 
section, I emphasize the plays’ frequent recourse to associate the process of knowing with 
arrogance and not-knowing with faith. These practices underscore Herod’s representative 
role as Christian villain whose epistemological hubris augurs a similar fate for anyone 
pretending to knowledge outside of the realm of Christian faith. As I hope to show, these 
pageants, far from eliciting a naive confabulation of historical and cultural identity, 
provide a representation of how the tensions between inherited exegetical practices and 
their use value for understanding the narrative of Christian history depend necessarily on 
unknowing. 
 
“For Mahound’s Blood!” : From Saraceny to Susa  
 
An exploration of Herod’s typological significance is itself fraught with tension. 
The separation of the biblical hermeneutic understanding of typology from its linguistic 
homonym is a good place to begin, instructive as it is. In the tradition of Christian 
exegesis, typology refers to a relationship between biblical happenings in which an Old 
Testament historical event prefigures another later historical event (usually New 
Testament), and whereby the former event’s full significance is grasped only in the 
fulfillment of that second event.16 Although the Pauline definition of typology, employed 
                                                
 16 More specifically, typology (figura) refers to the capacity for a figure or event to 
possess meaning not only to his/her time or place but also future events, however 
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by Biddick among others, restricts the two-part understanding of history to the discrete 
temporal categories of Old and New Testament, I would like to adopt a broader 
understanding, as traced by philologist Friedrich Ohly.17 Ohly investigates the ways in 
which medieval deployments of typology accommodate events outside of the Old/New 
Testament binary, and refer more broadly to a harmony that embraces the simultaneity of 
pasts and present, one in which “the difference between the two is eliminated by the unity 
of their both being directed towards Christ” (p. 33). Like Auerbach, Ohly understands the 
second event always as a kind of fulfillment, but Ohly also suggests that this fulfillment 
might alter the stakes of that original event, while still preserving the memory impressed 
by the that first event. I will try to be clear in my usage. 
                                                                                                                                            
unrelated they may seem. This first, prefigural sense is always rooted in a concrete 
historical context in order to announce something that is also both historical and real. 
Erich Auerbach traces the etymology of the term figura from “plastic form” to 
“simulacrum” and “form” (Lucretius), to form of rhetorical discourse (Cicero and 
Quintilian), to imago of the future (Tertullian), to tool for the ethical interpretation of 
history (Origen), to prefiguration (Augustine), to, most generally, deep or allegorical 
meaning. See “Figura” (1938), republished in Scenes From the Drama of European 
Literature, ed. P. Valesio and trans. Ralph Manheim, 11-74 (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1984). 
 17 See Ohly, “Typology as a Form of Historical Thought,” in Sensus Spiritualis: Studies 
in Medieval Significs and the Philology of Culture, trans. by Kenneth J. Northcott 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). Ohly argues that typology, as a 
“hermeneutic principle for understanding the past and the present—with the unified 
synoptic view that points to both of them—makes a great claim upon the new era by 
demanding that it not only keep pace with the whole of the old era, including antiquity, as 
it does with renaissances, but that it change it, by intensification into a new era, and also 
raise it, at the height of a return, in such a way as to make the old era remain unforgotten 
even in the moment that it is being surpassed” (65). 
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Discussions of typology in the cycle plays have thus far omitted Herod from their 
analyses.18 Although Herod may appear to have a typological forebear in Pharaoh, he 
appears to lack the clear New Testament fulfillment possessed by more traditional 
pairings.19 The lack of criticism on Herod’s typological status in the plays is not 
surprising given the disagreements over the relative stability of an English dramatic 
Herod across the cycle plays. Although Herod’s characteristic rage, foregrounded in all 
English stagings, suggests a common point of origin for the playwrights’ dramatic 
creations, Carolyn Coulson-Grigsby laments the critical “tendency towards character 
homogenization” that downplays the local conditions and dramatic choices that help 
shape unique versions of the tyrant in each cycle.20 Surely the differences in 
characterization must be accounted for; yet among those scholars who prefer to 
emphasize the variety of Herods there still exists a propensity to classify Herod’s 
character within a discrete set of pre-determined characterological types. This critical 
move runs the risk of constructing dichotomies—between comic and tragic, local tyrant 
                                                
 18 These readings tend to emphasize the more conventional anti-type events of 
Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, Noah’s flood, Moses’ burning bush, and Abel’s sacrificial 
lamb. See Rosemary Woolf, “The Effect of Typology on the English Medieval Plays of 
Abraham and Isaac,” Speculum 32 (1957): 805-25; Arnold Williams, “Typology and the 
Cycle Plays: Some Criteria,” Speculum 43 (1968): 677-84; Pamela Sheingorn, “Typology 
and the Teaching of Medieval Drama,” in Approaches to Teaching Medieval English 
Drama, ed. R.K. Emmerson, 90-100 (New York: MLA Press, 1990); and the 
aforementioned Walter Myers, “Typology and the Audience of the English Cycle Plays.” 
 19 In these cases, Abraham and Abel’s sacrifices suggests God/Christ’s sacrifice, the ark 
resting on the mountain of Ararat prefigures Christ’s resurrection, and Moses’ burning 
bush is fulfilled by Mary’s virginity. 
 20 Coulson-Grigsby targets especially the work of Miriam Dahl Burno and Penelope 
Doob in her criticism. See Coulson-Grigsby, “Enacting Herod the Great’s Diseased 
Spirit,” Early Drama, Art, and Music Review 23 (2001): 110-126, 110-11. 
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and exotic potentate, ignorant pagan and self-aware pseudo-Christian— that the plays 
themselves resist. Indeed, the most salient commonality among these portrayals of Herod 
is the way that he provokes terror and ridicule from the audience in nearly equal parts.  
Another major line of Herod scholarship on the English dramatic Herod relies on 
an excavation of possible source texts, attempting to resurrect a piecemeal Herod who is 
little more than the sum of his source parts. The endgame of this exercise leaves little to 
savor: either the development of Herod as a stock dramatic character merely clarifies 
allusions found in the more canonical writings of Chaucer and Shakespeare21 or the 
strange paradoxes inherent to his character are naturalized, and thus satisfactory 
reconciled, by the accidents of local tradition. To assume a linear or evolutionary view of 
the dramatic Herod does a disservice to the complexity of the plays themselves and the 
interesting connections between them. Rather than naturalizing his playing as indebted 
solely to local concerns, insisting on a singularly understood villain, or restricting 
analysis to distinct character types, I propose an understanding of Herod as an inherently 
flexible character, one who allowed playwright and audience to explore tensions between 
Herod as human character and Herod as exegetical figura.  
                                                
 21 See, for example, Parker, “The Reputation of Herod”; Pamela King, “He pleyeth 
Herodes upon a scaffold hye?” LSIE, 32 (2001): 211-227; Anne Marie D’Arcy, “‘Cursed 
folk of Herodes al new’: Supercessionist Typology and Chaucer’s Prioress,” in Writing 
Gender and Genre in Medieval Literature: Approaches to Old and Middle English Texts, 
ed. E. Treharne, 117-36 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2002); Peter Beidler “Dramatic 
Intertextuality in the Miller’s Tale: Chaucer’s Use of Characters from Medieval Drama as 
Foils for John, Alisoun, Nicholas, and Absolon,” Chaucer Yearbook 3 (1996): 1-19; 
Jonathan Gil Harris, “‘Look not big, nor stamp, nor stare’: Acting up in The Taming of 
the Shrew and Coventry Herod Plays,” Comparative Drama 34 (2001): 365-98; Chris 
Hassel Jr., “‘No Boasting like a fool?’ Macbeth and Herod,” Studies in Philology 98 
(2001): 205-24. 
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The title of S.S. Hussey’s oft-cited article captures an important confusion 
regarding the study of the preeminent biblical villain in the cycle plays: “How many 
Herods in the Middle English Drama?” In the Bible, there is a distinction made between 
Herod the Great (Matthew 2), his grandson, Herod Agrippa (Acts 12), and Agrippa’s 
uncle, Herod Antipas (Matthew 14:1-11; Luke 23:6-12).22 Each of the five major cycles 
(Chester, York, Towneley, Coventry, N-Town) contain two to three plays that 
prominently feature Herod: the coming of the Magi to Herod, the Killing of the 
Innocents, and Christ’s trial before Herod.23 As Hussey discusses, whilst the Herod of the 
Magi and the Killing of the Innocents episodes (Matthew 2:1-9 and 16-18, respectively) 
differed from the Herod (Antipas) who actually met Christ (Acts 4:27), the differences in 
characterization within the plays were often elided in order to portray a single, raging 
                                                
 22 Herod the Great, king of Judea, is the figure associated with the Massacre of the 
Innocents. His son, Herod Antipas, was the Tetrarch of Galilee (and so called in Acts) 
and is the Herod responsible for calling for John the Baptist’s head and was also thought 
to receive Christ during his trial. Herod Agrippa, the grandson of Herod the Great, was 
responsible for beheading James and sending Peter to prison. 
 23 For the Chester, York, Towneley, and N-Town pageants, I will refer to individual 
plays by number, denoting the order that they appear in that cycle (as printed in the 
authoritative EETS editions). See The Chester Mystery Cycle, Vol. 1: Text, ed. R.M. 
Lumiansky and David Mills (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1974); The York Plays, Vol. 1: Text, 
ed. Richard Beadle (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009); The Towneley Plays, Vol. 1: Text, ed. 
Martin Stevens and A.C. Cawley (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994); The N-Town Play, Vol. 1: 
Text, ed. Stephen Spector (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991). For Coventry, I will refer to the 
name of the play itself, as printed by the Medieval Institute, the most recent edition. See 
The Coventry Corpus Christi Plays, ed. Pamela K. King and Clifford Davidson 
(Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2000). In terms of the plays of the cycles, a 
character called Herod appears in Chester (8, 10, 16), York (16, 19, 31), Towneley (14, 
16), N-Town (18, 20, 29), and Coventry (‘Nativity Play,’ ‘The Death of Herod,’ ‘Pageant 
of the Shearmen and Tailors’).  
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villain.24 The inclusion of an on-stage death of Herod in the N-Town and Chester cycles 
also brings the third Herod (Agrippa) into the fold, whose gruesome death was subject to 
many a biblical commentary.25 Although the playwright in the Chester ‘Slaughter of the 
Innocents’ (10) describes Herod’s “legges rotten and… armes” (l. 421), recalling directly 
the tradition of a rotting Herod Agrippa (who was eventually eaten by worms), the death 
described in the play is actually that of Herod the Great. The three Herods are not 
conflated at all times within the cycles, but the dramatic advantages of collapsing the 
negative characteristics of three figures into one are worth exploring. 
Other than his characteristic rage and sometimes-humorous inability to realize his 
ambitions, Herod’s non-Christian religious allegiances are the most recognizable 
component of his character. The most common of Herod’s proclaimed affinities, found in 
all cycles, is with the figure “Mahound” or “Mahowne.” Whether by oath (“Be 
Mahound”), as genealogical relative (“cosyn Mahound”), or as guarantor of his title (“by 
grace of Mahowne”), the playwrights in each cycle forge a relationship between Herod 
and one of the most recognizable enemies of Christendom, mythical or actual.26 Though 
little more than a caricature of the historical Muhammad, Mahound—from the Old 
                                                
 24 Staines explains that the apparent confusion on behalf of the playwrights was due to a 
realistic lack of specificity in the Bible, which opened up his character to individual 
interpretations (“To Out-Herod Herod,” 209). 
 25 See Acts 12:20-25. The account of Herod Agrippa’s death in Acts as being eaten 
alive by worms is consonant with that of the historian Josephus as well, albeit much more 
sympathetically in the latter. As might be expected, the significance of this cause of death 
was heavily remarked upon in exegetical study.  
 26 The above lines come from N-Town no. 18 (l. 92), Towneley no. 16 (l. 78), and 
Towneley no. 16 (l. 15), respectively. 
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French “Mahon”—had long proved a useful placeholder for writers of medieval romance, 
amalgamating the spiritual heritages of villainous characters across time and space into 
one convenient, pseudo-pagan genealogy.27  
As the plays establish a single genealogy for the titans of non-Christian villainy, 
the pageants themselves maintain a sense of Herod as fundamentally out of place. The 
Towneley “Magnus Herodes” (no. 16) begins with a speech by Herod’s messenger 
(Nuncius) who proclaims Herod’s sovereign and fearsome qualities in a speech that lasts 
some 115 lines. After demanding silence from the audience Nuncius employs the 
inexpressability topos to approximate Herod’s unknowable significance:  
 His renowne  
 Can no tong tell, 
 From heuen vnto hell;  
 Of hym can none spell 
 Bot his cosyn Mahowne. 
 (ll. 74-78) 
 
 Nuncius maintains the ineffable breadth of Herod’s geographic jurisdiction and 
simultaneously inserts him into an imaginative and putatively non-historical genealogy of 
romance xenophobia. Although Mahound traditionally functioned to mark non-European 
geographies as homogeneous and inherently threatening spaces that demanded 
redemption under the aegis of history, the cycle plays collapse that spatio-temporal 
alterity onto the English present. The lateral relationship between Herod and Mahound 
                                                
 27 The figure of Mahoun derives from French romance, where he often comprises one 
part of a trio of pagan gods that also includes Termagant and Apollo. For more on the use 
of Mahoun in the English cycle plays, see Michael Paull, “The Figure of Mahomet in the 
Towneley Cycle,” Comparative Drama 6 (1972): 187-204. For more on understanding 
Islam in western medieval Europe, see the work of John Tolan, especially Saracens: 
Islam in the European Imagination (New York: Columbia Press, 2002).  
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written into the Towneley and N-Town cycles suggests that the two figures are peers; 
their genealogical bond cements Christian alterity as born of a single and knowable 
strain, rather than the random and therefore chaotic accidents of human will. 
Herod’s villainy knows no geographic border; nor does it recognize temporal 
boundary. In addition to Mahound, Herod aligns himself with the Roman gods, 
traditional pagan gods, Jews, Satan/Lucifer, and Antichrist. Each cycle relies on multiple 
associations to secure an understanding of Herod as not only non-Christian, but 
persuasively anti-Christian— even if these affiliations produce contradiction. In the York 
“Trial Before Herod” (no. 31), Herod prays to “ser Satan oure sire,/ And Lucifer moste 
luffely of lyre” (ll. 51-52), whereas at the end of the Chester “Massacre” (no. 10) a dying 
Herod speaks of Satan as “my foe/ [coming] to fetch me to hell” (ll. 428-29). In the Magi 
pageant of the York Cycle (no. 16), Herod calls on “Jubiter and Jouis, Martis and 
Mercurij” (l. 2), and also proclaims Mahound as his true God (l. 157) while nonetheless 
professing himself the legitimate “juge of all Jury [Jewry]” (ll. 182-83).28  
V.A. Kolve views the practice of characterizing Herod in such a thoroughly anti-
Christian manner as “undoubtedly the result of nothing more than a wish to write vivid, 
colloquial dialogue,” and, to be sure, Herod was hardly the first figure to boast a partly-
invented spiritual legacy. Yet Herod’s religious attachments also appear to have the effect 
of strategically maximizing his distance from the Christian faith at all times. Coupled 
                                                
 28 As John Tolan has noted, the line between Saracen and pagan remain blurred well 
into the late Middle Ages, and the former was commonly considered to practice 
polytheism. See “Saracens as Pagans” in Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European 
Imagination (New York: Columbia UP, 2002), 105-34. 
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with the consistent characterization of Herod’s “renowne” as unknowable, these 
allegiances suggests a figure who absorbs an entire history of anti-Christian deviance.29  
Herod’s relationship with Christ reinforces the notion of his metonymic status. In 
the York “Trial Before Herod” (no. 31), Herod compares himself favorably to Christ as a 
ruler, concluding that “He [Christ] knawes noyot the course of a kyng” (l. 192). Yet, as 
the audience is well aware, Christ does know: the dramatic irony effected by Christ’s 
clueless enemy, who insistently poses as knowing, marks Herod as representative of all 
infelicitous knowledges. The negative consequences of Herod’s actions stand in stark 
contrast with the superiority he attempts to exhibit when speaking to the audience—they 
cannot even fathom how much he knows.30 Indeed, Herod’s arrogance not only 
exemplifies the pitfalls of a life without Christ, but also calls attention to the more opaque 
dangers of unwarranted epistemological certainty. 
This arrogance, insofar as it demonstrates that Herod understands what he is up 
against, becomes one of the more fascinating aspects of Herod’s character. In the N-
Town Magi pageant (no. 18) Herod predictably reports his relation to Mahound, but 
couches his boasts in familiar, but chronologically inaccessible Gospel rhetoric: “I dynge 
with my dowtynes the devyl down to helle, / For both of hevyn and of herth I am kynge, 
                                                
 29 Kolve, The Play of Corpus Christi, 104.  
 30 Herod’s self-assurance in the plays complicates Jody Enders’ argument about pagan 
figures and the epistemology of torture in the plays. While Enders’ torturers know not the 
“Christian truth that is expounded through the death of their victims,” Herod betrays an 
understanding of Christian exegetics in several Magi plays. For Enders’ influential 
treatise on the intersections of drama, torture, and Christian epistemology see “The 
Dramatic Violence of Invention,” in The Medieval Theater of Cruelty (Ithaca: Cornell 
UP, 1999), 25-62, esp. 44-46. 
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sertayn!” (ll. 7-8). Perhaps because it gives Christ a legitimate antagonist, the practice of 
depicting Herod with a premature awareness of Christian history becomes common 
across cycles. In lines 82-94 of the same Magi pageant Herod reveals prescient 
knowledge of Jesus’ birth and then announces his plan to kill the young children of 
Bethlehem even though this knowledge should not be made available to him until the 
Slaughter episode that occurs two pageants later (no. 20). While Stephen Spector, the 
editor of the EETS N-Town play, calls this an error, given the forethought Herod 
possesses in other plays, the purpose of a Herod who foresees an ascendant Christianity is 
worth reconsidering.  
A similarly anticipatory logic pervades the Chester Magi pageant (no. 8). Here 
Herod once again parrots Christ’s rhetoric, referring to himself as “kinge of kinges” (l. 
168) and promises to “drive the devils all bydeene” (l. 174).31 This pageant also divulges 
Herod’s familiarity with Scripture, despite the fact that he “is noe Jewe borne nor of that 
progenye” (l. 278). Although he has his doctors gather prophecy, Herod possesses 
knowledge of the Old Testament: he denounces “that olde Villard” Jacob (l. 284), the 
“sleepie sluggard” Daniel (l. 305), and the “Shepard with his Sling” David (l. 354). As 
David Mills points out, Herod necessarily comprhends the prophecies of Christ’s coming 
“and so possesses the necessary Scriptural information, but he refuses to believe it.”32 To 
                                                
 31 These two lines have biblical analogues in Revelation 17. 14, Revelation 19. 16, and 
Luke 12. 15, respectively.  
 32 David Mills, “Some Possible Implications of Herod’s Speech: Chester Plays VIII 
153-204,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen: Bulletin de la Sociétié néophilologique de 
Helsinki 74 (1973): 131-43, 140. 
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reveal such intimate knowledge of the very system he is set to destroy casts Herod as all 
the more villainous for knowing the stakes of his actions.  
When Herod’s death is performed at the conclusion of the same N-Town play 
(20), Herod’s multiplicity again takes center stage. The playing of this extended scene in 
which Death, as messenger of God, delivers a lengthy, moralizing monologue (ll. 246-
284) would not appear to invite any confusion regarding the shared identity of this Herod 
and the Herod (Antipas) of “The Trial of Christ Before Pilate and Herod” (29), and yet 
the playwright still manages to produce this very conflation. In line 6 of the Slaughter of 
the Innocents (20), long before his death, Herod the Great, traditionally located in 
Jerusalem, appears instead in Galilee—the realm of his son Herod Antipas, tetrarch of 
Galilee. Whilst this error appears to conflate the two Herods mistakenly, it can also be 
read as an element of foreshadowing to the trial of Christ before Pilate and Herod (29) 
and as a way to connect the two Herods despite the on-stage death of the former. If the 
two Herods are indeed connected, this dramatic choice creates another moment in which 
Herod’s foreknowledge of Jesus’ messianic significance is revealed. Perhaps this is due 
to Herod’s own messianic pretensions in the play. 
As Herod prefigures attempts to usurp the eschatological power of Christianity, he 
remains uncannily aware of both the gravity and impossibility of such a task. Herod, after 
all, appears anxious in the Chester Magi play (8) about the alliance of the Jewish faith 
and the rule of a Jewish kingdom:  
I read you take those wordes agayne 
For fear of velanye. 
There is none soe great that me dare gayne, 
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 To take my realm and to attayne 
 My power.  
(ll. 162-166) 
His anxiety over a theology he intuitively understands helps explain why Herod’s 
death in the Slaughter can be attributed, according to the Demon character, to his heresy 
or false beliefs, rather than the traditional reason, his madness: “I am comment to fetch 
this lord you froe, in woe ever to dwell… and all false beleevers I burne and lowe” (ll. 
436-437; 439). Indeed, the ability for a playwright to connect Herod to the entire history 
of Christian alterity without obscuring the coherence of the narrative appears to have a 
stronger effect than making good dialogue.  
Insofar as Herod’s failure is predetermined, the cycles situate non-Christian 
knowledge as necessarily incomplete. Herod’s Christian audience knows better than to 
claim to understand these performances of eschatology when the payoff for belief can be 
spelled out so clearly. David Staines and Roscoe Parker have documented how the plays 
parallel contemporary sermons, but these dramatic decisions also validate the program of 
willed unknowing (as both a forgetting and a refusal of mastery) advocated by 
contemporary contemplative manuals such as the Cloud of Unknowing.33 Just as the 
Cloud urges against active thought in favor of epistemological submission, cautioning 
that Christians too often fundamentally misperceive the very notion of knowledge, so too 
do the Herod pageants reaffirm an almost Boethian understanding of agency in which 
epistemological submission becomes a tool for the management of belief. In 
                                                
 33 See, for example, the sermon “De innocentibus” in John Mirk’s Festial, vol. 1, ed. T. 
Erbe (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1905), 35-8. 
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performance, on the razor’s edge of typology, biblical past and political present coalesce, 
revealing themselves to be equally rehearsed.  
“Here Erode ragis in the pagond and in the street also” 
 
 Herod’s perceived grasp on the futures of such disjointed temporalities draws on 
a paradox inherent to the structure of the plays. As Kolve emphasizes, the Corpus Christi 
dramas perform the sequence of world history in seven ages, and, in doing so, explore 
how the current, sixth age maps onto that arrangement. 34 Yet this is not to say that these 
plays should be understood as discrete episodes one need merely read. Writing about the 
York Cycle, Beadle observes “topographical evidence indicates that the stations were 
occasionally within sight and usually within earshot of the one preceding and the one 
after,” from which he asserts the presence of “a sense of simultaneity in the 
presentation.”35 This simultaneity allows the audience themselves to bound themselves 
within in an embodied Christian eschatology. The effect, John Marlin explains, helped 
emphasize “the interconnectedness of historical events with both the historical present 
and the absolute present inhabited by the divine.”36 In other words, despite their 
                                                
 34 Kolve, The Play Called Corpus Christi, 101-123. 
 35 Richard Beadle, “The Chester Cycle,” in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval 
English Theatre, 2nd edition, ed. by R. Beadle and A. Fletcher, 99-124 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2008), 114. 
 36 Marlin, “The Investiture Contest,” 2. While Miri Rubin insists that the performances 
varied from year-to-year and place-to-place in both the quality of their execution and in 
the number of mistakes, the visual arrangement itself likely produced a captivating 
unfolding of Christian history regardless of the nuances of individual performances. For a 
better picture of the logistical concerns of Corpus Christi drama, see Rubin’s “The Living 
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frequently populist aims, the mystery cycles do in fact provide a highly complex and 
exegetically sound representation of a typologically inflected Christian eschatology.  
While Kolve argues that the present served “mainly as a time for amendment and 
preparation,” Herod’s performances establish how the past can inform, and possibly 
redeem, the present.37  Exploring the political valence of the cycle plays, scholars tend to 
stress the ways in which characters of individual plays or cycles criticize contemporary 
English personages or social groups. Rosemary Woolf, building on the work of G.R. 
Owst, reads the delight the soldiers share in the murders of children in the Chester and 
Towneley Innocents plays as a satirical stab at the contemporary military life, 
lampooning, for example, the notion of the “carpet-knight.”38 Because the flexibility 
afforded to the English Herod inspired such a diverse set of historical and imaginative 
resonances, the plays were able to concatenate a view of supreme anti-Christian villainy 
outside of time with one attuned to contemporary political matters. Herod becomes an 
especially good medium through which to satirize specific rulers or to stereotype the 
English nobility more generally. Most famously, the Wakefield Master’s characterization 
of Herod in the Towneley “Magnus Herodes” (no. 16) is said to recall the Duke of 
                                                                                                                                            
Feast: Sermons, Fraternities, Processions, and Drama,” in Corpus Christi: The Eucharist 
in Late Medieval Culture, 213-78 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991). 
 37 Kolve, The Play Called Corpus Christi, 102.  
 38 Rosemary Woolf, The English Mystery Plays (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974), 205-7 and G.R. Owst, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1961).  
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Suffolk.39 Still, lest an overtly English locale undermine the verisimilitude of the play’s 
action, the Towneley Herod guarantees his sovereignty in places both exotic and local (ll. 
46-49).  
Herod’s form of speech— not only what he says but also how he delivers it— also 
illuminates the importance of the present in the plays. In the Chester Magi pageant (no. 
8), the English-speaking Magi switch to French only when introduced to Herod (ll. 153-
160). Considering that the Magi are the putative foreigners in this arrangement, the 
direction of this code-switching is somewhat surprising. Herod replies once in French 
before transitioning to English, punctuating a bizarre moment that secures both a courtly 
and an English resonance for the pageant. Herod’s code-switching pervades other cycles: 
he is trilingual in both York’s “Christ Before Herod” (no. 31) and Towneley’s “Oblacia 
Magorum” (no. 14).40 In the York pageant, Herod’s use of Latin (ll. 243, 245, and 260-
263) and broken French (l. 239) might recall the (sometimes clumsy) trilingualism of 
England’s own rulers. Herod’s bungled execution of common Latin and French phrases 
in the Towneley Magi pageant— i.e. “ditizance doutance” [dit sans doutance: said 
without a doubt] (l. 247)— takes a more overt stab at the faux-sophistication of the 
English nobility. The last line of the pageant in which Herod claims to have no more 
“Fraunch” confirms the dilettantism of his courtly pretensions. For the audience, this 
                                                
 39 J. Whetley wrote in the Paston Letters: “Ther was never no man that playd Herrod in 
Corpus Crysty play better and more agreeable to hys pageaunt than he dud.” Stevens and 
Cawley note the reference in Vol. 2 of the EETS Towneley Plays (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1994), 521. For the letter in its original context see Paston Letters and Papers of the 
Fifteenth Century, ed. R. Beadle and C. Richmond (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006), ii. 426.  
 40 Herod is also the only trilingual character in each of these cycles.  
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“French” moment secures an eminently English resonance for the play. Stripped of 
epistemological hubris, Herod might be closer to the audience than initially imagined.  
Herod’s clumsy ruling practices combined with an occasional reminder of the 
English local he inhabits creates the impression that that the playwrights used Herod in 
part to parody local tyrants and other contemporary rulers through a comic violence that 
rendered acute political threats farcical and predetermined to fail. Herod’s performances 
have been regarded as satirizing not only individuals, but institutional practices as well. 
James Simpson finds that the cycle plays often re-contextualize Scriptural events in order 
to “act out dramas of interrogation and punishment that address critical prohibitions in 
fifteenth-century English society.”41 Simpson discerns a spirit of “inclusive theology” in 
the York and Towneley Cycles that he carefully avoids equating with Lollard 
sympathy.42 Simpson reads Herod’s demand for silence in the York “Christ Before 
Herod” (no. 31; ll. 1-7) as at once a comic public service announcement and a poignant 
reminder of contemporary strictures on religious expression, including an allusion to 
English Archbishop Thomas Arundel’s 1409 ban on vernacular translations of Scripture.  
                                                
 41 See Simpson, “The Dramatic,” in The Oxford English Literary History, Vol. 2, 1350-
1547: Reform and Cultural Revolution, 502-57 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), esp. 506. 
 42 At least one Lollard tract, “a treatise of miraclis pleying,” railed against clerical 
participation in mystery plays. For the text, see Anne Hudson, ed. Selections from 
English Wycliffite Writings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 97-104. The 
debate over the effect of Lollard theology on the mystery plays remains ongoing among 
specialists. Although Wycliffe’s doctrines secured a popular audience around the same 
time that the cycles became established civic routines, the majority of the cycle plays (for 
which we have evidence) were played in the north of England, where Lollardy was 
slower to take hold. Certainly, Lollard sympathizers would likely find the sacramentalism 
at the heart of the cycle plays problematic, and it is unclear just how much the 
playwrights themselves took Lollard views into account.  
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Simpson’s citation of the famous 1409 ban provokes a larger question about the 
place of these cycle plays in the context of fifteenth-century vernacular theology in 
England. The publication of After Arundel (2011) has thoroughly dismantled the once-
dominant notion that Arundel’s program of orthodoxy in England held in check the 
exploration and advancement of fifteenth-century theological thought, and that, 
subsequently, religious writings written in the vernacular slowed.43 The theological 
complexity of cycle drama, while not quite speculative, provides excellent support of 
After Arundel’s counter-narrative, including, for example, the deployment of a kind of 
vernacular typology in the case of Herod. However, After Arundel, in its expansive thirty 
essays and six-hundred-plus pages, contains not a single essay on the version of 
vernacular theology to which the largest number of people in the English fifteenth 
century were likely exposed. Whether understood as the locus for the production of 
vernacular theology or as a site through which scholars might trace its changes, the cycle 
plays help complicate the picture of the very nature of orthodox thought. After all, what 
was so harrowing about Herod was his insistence that he knows better, an 
epistemological arrogance associated with (depending on one’s perspective) vehement 
reformers, such as Wycliffites, but also orthodox lackeys.  
                                                
 43 Instead, After Arundel re-orients the narrative of vernacular religious history in 
England away from Thomas Arundel, who becomes, for the volume, an emblem of the 
historiographic desire to view fifteenth-century vernacular Christian history as haunted 
by a fear of dissent post-Arundel and/or as marking a point after which English 
theological writings remained remarkably and consistently orthodox. See After Arundel: 
Religious Writing in Fifteenth-Century England, ed. by V. Gillespie and K. Ghosh 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2011). 
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Thus, although Simpson’s analysis astutely singles out a telling political 
resonance embedded in Herod’s bombast, it is equally important to recognize that Herod 
is also used in the plays unironically as a negative exemplar of the dangers of thinking 
for oneself. Herod’s sense of omnipotence and his own “inclusive theology” are, after all, 
the very bad habits that lead to his death in the N-Town and Chester cycles. This is the 
same Herod who, in this York play, swears by Mahounde (l. 9), prays to Satan (ll. 51-54), 
and compares his might favorably to that of Jesus (l. 13). Simpson’s sensitivity to the 
satirical overtones of York may indeed suggest that the pageants contain instances of 
“sharply critical reflection on royal and episcopal mechanisms in the prosecution and 
management of ‘sedition’ and ‘heresy’” (506). Nonetheless, in the larger picture, Herod 
also reinforces some of those very same mechanisms insofar as he serves as negative 
exemplar of the epistemological pride that stems from thinking for oneself. 
As shown above, an effective typological casting of Herod does not rely purely on 
its Scriptural fidelity to achieve its full didactic value; however, despite the plays’ 
occasional criticism of political-religious institutions the playing of Herod was, in fact, 
aligned with reading and interpretive practices sanctioned by the Church’s most 
influential theologians. For whilst Augustine sets in motion an exegetics that requires 
pre-Christian history to exist alternately for its own present and future (reading the Old 
Testament as vacillation between a literal lex or promissio foregrounding presence and 
the symbolic figura that requires interpretation and a nod to futurity), it is through 
exegetes such as Hugh of St. Victor, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and Peter Comestor 
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that the pre-Christian (usually Old Testament) begins to signify a simultaneous dialogue 
with past and future.  
This reading was made possible by the triplex intelligentia mode of exegesis, 
popularized by Hugh of St. Victor in the twelfth century but actually only a slight 
emendation of the traditional fourfold method used rather loosely throughout the Middle 
Ages. Though this method included three modes of reading— history, allegory, and 
tropology—Hugh privileged the unglossed historical-literal meaning as the most 
important.44 During the twelfth century, the Victorines, among others, began to champion 
a return to the historical sense, affirming the importance of literal exposition or what 
Aquinas later called “the whole meaning” of the inspired writer. Allegory, which for 
Hugh meant “when through that which is said to have been done, something else is done” 
applies “whether in the past or in the present or in the future” and thus emphasizes the 
importance of belief by combining faith with the historically rooted concept of 
typology.45 The movement from the historical to the allegorical sense signaled the 
movement from the letter to the spirit and also that between the purpose of the writer and 
sacred significance that God has bestowed upon that writing. The last, or tropological 
sense, remains in the realm of the spiritual and imparts the morally edifying lesson that 
the Scriptural event confers upon the reader. Beginning perhaps with Augustine’s De 
                                                
 44 For more on the evolution of the medieval study of Scripture, especially as regards 
the increased attention to the literal sense, see Beryl Smalley’s influential The Study of 
the Bible in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973). 
 45 Cited in James Preus, From Shadow to Promise: Old Testament Interpretation from 
Augustine to the Young Luther (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1969), 27. The futural 
aspect of the allegorical sense is sometimes recognized as its own layer, often called the 
anagogical sense, which concerns mainly the eschatological meaning of Scripture. 
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doctrina Christiana and virtually unchallenged until the Reformation, Christian thinkers 
in the Middle Ages had understood that all Christian knowledge came from Scripture and 
that one could arrive at a proper understanding of Scripture only through a reading 
practice sensitive to the authoritative hermeneutic modes established in the glosses.46 
Anything less would amount to heresy.  
Each cycle separates the individual plays such that one play represents one 
important biblical event, usually to be staged and played by one guild. Once staged, the 
plays become discrete performances spatially and narratologically independent of the 
other action. This separation distinguishes the res gestae, or the historical level, from the 
higher, spiritual levels. The fact that some towns opted out of the cycle format in favor of 
playing one or two of the most popular biblical events suggests that these plays could be 
enjoyed at this most literal level. However, the organization of the cycles into individual 
plays that nonetheless link spatio-temporally with the others (while still maintaining their 
independence) reflects the mingling of the historical and spiritual senses championed by 
medieval Europe’s most authoratative exegetes. Although some of the characters and 
settings are modernized to establish familiarity with their English audience, these choices 
neither enforce a specific interpretation nor do they affect the plot.47  
                                                
 46 For more on the hermeneutic tradition of Catholicism in the Middle Ages, see Henri 
de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, 2 vols., trans. Mark Sebanc 
and E.M. Macierowski. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1998-2000).  
 47 Rather, as Rubin notes, the entire production of the cycles—from number of plays to 
the characterization of its figures—was tailored to a town’s needs. The addition, deletion, 
or merging of crafts were also conveyed in the changing structure of the plays (The 
Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture, 276). This malleability did not compromise the 
historical-literal veracity of these events. Although de Lubac notes that the primary goal 
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As discussed in the previous section, the playwrights satisfy the allegorical level 
of reading with a Herod that signals the futility of any future resistance to the 
predetermined Christian eschatological narrative. Herod exists in a pre-Christian time but 
nonetheless encapsulates the false beliefs of successive generations of Christian doctrinal 
disobedience. Herod’s downfall (including, at times, quite melodramatic death scenes 
devoid of biblical precedent), signals not a defeat of just one man, but of an entire group 
of non-Christians, including a religious group—Muslims—who did not yet exist. These 
hyper-referential cycle plays embrace the historical present as they also postpone the 
significance of their historical concerns, which should compel us to approach them not 
only as individual plays representing linear events, but as hypotactic narratives whose 
meaning cannot be gleaned without reference to the whole cycle. 
The tropological level, while also evident in each of the cycles, varies somewhat 
in its degree of transparency. Since these plays certainly served at least partly as moral 
edification for the townspeople, some plays built this didacticism into the play. For 
example, the N-Town ‘Death of Herod’ (20) features a character, Mors, who explicitly 
conveys the moral significance of Herod’s death at the end of the play: 
Off kynge herowde all men beware 
That hath rejoyced in pompe and pryde 
Ffor all his boste of blysse ful bare 
He lyth now ded here on his syde. 
   (ll. 246-249) 
                                                                                                                                            
of the historical sense is to “deliver us facts,” he also notes that in its medieval sense, this 
desired historical sense was also attuned to the character of those facts, the very thing 
that these plays aim to present to the audience (Medieval Exegesis, 44-5).  
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Herod’s death in N-Town does not occur until two plays after the Massacre, but the 
message is clear: one can be sure of very little else than the passing of all things temporal. 
Although traditional readings of Herod privilege his madness over his arrogance, by the 
time of the English mystery plays, Herod’s madness had nearly become a comic cliché, 
and therefore less didactically effective than his haughty sense of omnipotence.48  
Of the cycles that avoid overt moralization, the Towneley Herod plays, written 
and arranged by the so-called Wakefield Master, rely most heavily on the audience to 
deduce Herod’s tropological import. Here, as with N-Town, the play uses Herod’s 
arrogance to convey the fleetingness of temporal matters and insists on how little the 
Christian playgoer really knows. In the main Herod play (16), the Wakefield Master 
accentuates the incongruity between Herod’s perception of himself and the audience’s 
knowledge of the actual unfolding of events. The fact that Herod takes thirteen lines to 
painstakingly describe the breadth of his regal jurisdiction (ll. 66-78) and yet also recalls 
a local tyrant suggests that his word, and subsequently, his authority, are not to be 
believed. The most telling narrative detail regarding the message of the Herod plays 
comes from the Magi play (14). In soliciting a search for prophecy regarding the coming 
of Christ, Herod authorizes all sources except the Scriptural accounts on which both the 
cycle and its audience rely as the authoritative locus of all pertinent knowledge. Although 
the Herod story ends with its characters under the assumption that Herod’s soldiers did 
                                                
 48 Herod’s madness, although somewhat less threatening in the English cycles, was a 
major point of emphasis in the traditional exegetical readings of the Massacre of the 
Innocents episodes. Augustine saw in Herod’s rage a lesson cautioning believers from 
letting fear drive them to madness. Eusebius, Bede, and, later, Peter Comestor, agree that 
Herod’s violent behavior led directly to his disease and gruesome death.  
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actually murder the young Christ, the audience knows better. The Towneley Herod, the 
audience begins to surmise, must insist on unknowing Christian history in order to 
survive. Though Herod does not die in this cycle, his final words, “I can nomore 
Fraunch” (l. 513) suggest that, exasperated, he is losing the only grip he ever really had—
the ability to bluster on about nothing in particular. 
Insofar as Herod’s interactions with Scripture reinforce orthodox theological 
practice and also recall ignorant clerics preaching what they do not themselves 
understand, Herod himself provides a lesson about the dangers of reading incorrectly. As 
mentioned earlier, Chester’s “The Three Kings Come to Herod” (no. 8) depicts Herod’s 
familiarity with prophecy (ll. 233-36) and also specific prophets (ll. 261-68). Yet when 
his doctor confirms the legitimacy of these prophecies, Herod refuses to acquiesce to the 
demands of Scripture and instead commissions the Massacre (ll. 327-338). Herod spends 
the remainder of the pageant looking for his “grand parent” in old texts in an attempt to 
establish authoritatively his lineage and right to the throne. Like its York counterpart, the 
Towneley “Offering of the Magi” (no. 14) presents a scene in which the kings inform 
Herod of Scriptural passages that herald the coming of Christ. Herod ignores altogether 
the authority of biblical prophecy—he claims that he received the news, rather, from a 
little bird (l. 287-88). In further rebellion against the merits of scriptural hermeneutics, 
Herod gives his counselors the following task: 
Syrs, I pray you inquere 
 In all wrytyng, 
 In Vyrgyll, in Homere, 
 And all other thing 
 Bot legend. 
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 Sekys poecé-tayllys, 
 Lefe pystyls and grales; 
 Mes, matins noght avalys— 
 All these I defende. 
(ll. 291-99) 
Rebelling against the merits of scriptural hermeneutics, Herod authorizes his counselors 
to search for prophecy in any but biblical texts. His counselors object, but Herod insists 
on reading incorrectly. While Woolf is undoubtedly correct in noting that no audience 
member would confuse him or herself for another Herod (240), Herod does help affirm 
the audience’s agency in assessing the status of their own salvation while also reinforcing 
ecclesiastical mechanisms that authorize faith as the ultimate instrument of knowledge. 
Herod’s failure to read correctly across cycles affirms one version of the 
epistemological economy of Christianity, in which a subject must sacrifice knowledge in 
favor of a faith in the unknown, the realm from which that believer can be redeemed. Not 
simply an anti-Christ, Herod inverts the Christian economy of knowledge. As a figure 
through which Christianity’s own complicated poetics of knowing can be negatively 
understood, Herod shows us what not to do. Stubbornly assured of his omnipotence, he 
turns the practice of faith on its head; confident that the logic of the temporal-political 
extends to the eschatological-divine, he mistakes knowledge to be purely material and 
therefore fundamentally available. Herod’s rejection of Christian forms of knowing—
rooted in faith in and sacrifice to the unknowable—become the self-abdicating act 
through which he is undone in the plays. The plays reify the importance of faith through a 
faithless Herod who understands, but rejects, the eschatology that he is powerless to alter. 
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Blind to the fact that his reliance on non-Christian knowledges limits his ruling potential 
to the material world, he eliminates any possibility of defeating Christ. 
If Herod’s reading practices reaffirm the importance of faith, the moments where 
he engages the audience allow the playgoer to insert themselves into the narrative of 
Christian history. In the York Magi pageant (no. 16), for instance, Herod opens the 
pageant challenging the audience to become his subjects:  
Lordis and ladis, loo, luffely me lithes, 
For I am fairer of face and fresher on folde— 
Þe soth yf I saie sall—seuene and sexti sithis 
Þan glorius gulles, at gayer is an golde in price. 
How thynke ye þer tales that I talde? 
I am worthy, witty, and wyse. 
(ll. 16-22) 
 
Herod’s direct threats to the playgoers expel him from the play’s historical context and 
insert the audience into the cycle’s eschatological context. Even the prosody of these 
lines isolate this moment as one that stands out from the rest of the play: Beadle and King 
note that the opening scene is cast largely in the alliterative long line while the remainder 
of the pageant is composed in standard, twelve-line stanzas (65). Herod’s fate has been 
decided, and yet this shift of poetic and dramatic registers indicates the audience’s 
important role in the drama of Christian salvation. 
In this light, the famous stage direction in the Coventry “Pageant of Shearman and 
Taylors,” which describes Herod physically leaving the stage (“Here Erode ragis in the 
pagond and in the street also”) might be revisited, not as proof of the popularity and 
expectation garnered by Herod as a character, but as an indication of the degree to which 
the playwrights use Herod to write the audience into the eschatological arc of the plays. 
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Herod’s descent into the crowd arouses the possibility that the audience has become the 
spectacle, written into the narrative. Regardless of the verisimilitude of Herod’s rage, this 
moment allows the audience to experience Christian history as if immanent to the 
scriptural event. An embodied Herod calls attention to the agency that the audiences 
possess regarding their own salvific narrative, in which the unknown— once understood 
as a potential disruption to accepted eschatology— is now reined in by faith, subjected to 
a logic of impotent repetition, and repurposed as the lubricant needed to inch forward the 
progression of Christian history.  
Herod’s spiritual simultaneity, played in all of the cycles, when coupled with his 
potential toward Christian enlightenment, confirms that his most tragic trait is that he 
lacks true faith. A repentant Herod can foresee Christian history is not at all incongruous 
with a Herod who shares a familial relation to Muhammad, a Herod who speaks in 
broken French, or a Herod who sees himself as a messianic figure. That a Christian 
audience foresees his failures immediately implicates them within an empowering 
exegetical system in which the pre-Christian past is governed by cognitio, as Hugh of St. 
Victor advocates, rather than a unitary attendence to the literal and present moment. 
Herod became an instructive figure49, and as such, cannot be bound by temporal or spatial 
restraints—the more of anti-Christian characteristics that he could absorb, the more 
poignant his failures. In the final section, I will discuss how Herod’s typological and 
                                                
 49 The cycles (and individual plays) differ in the degree to which they cast Herod for 
overtly didactic purposes. The most deliberate of these instructive stagings occurs in the 
N-Town ‘Slaughter of the Innocents,’ when, after the allegorical figure of Death kills 
Herod, he ends the play with a soliloquy to the audience reminding them of the 
inevitability of their own deaths.  
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eschatological significance is often located, both critically and textually, in questions 
regarding Herod’s generative potency. 
An Impotent Genealogy? : The Once and Future Herod  
 Despite the attention paid to Herod’s characteristic raging, scholars have yet to 
achieve a consensus on what his anger signifies. Although the critical strains differ in the 
traditions they target, they do share one overriding concern: that Herod must fail 
spectacularly. What remains puzzling is the consistency with which assessments of his 
character, regardless of the critical point being made, describe Herod’s rage specifically 
as “impotent.”50 Is Herod’s rage impotent? If so, why must it be understood as such? At 
the most literal level, Herod the Great cannot be considered sexually impotent, given the 
genealogy he extends in the Bible and in Josephus. Likewise, taking potency to indicate 
the ability to exert power or influence, the damage Herod does to the bloodlines in 
Bethlehem cannot be overlooked. What other ways, then, might readers and critics 
understand these charges? Perhaps more importantly, what does the preoccupation with 
impotence suggest about the way the medieval dramatic Herod has been read? Just as 
                                                
 50 See, for a sample, Doob’s “impotent fury” (Nebuchadnezzar’s Children, 128); 
Campbell’s “impotent old tyrant” (“Liturgy and Drama,” 291); Herod’s “ultimate 
impotence in the face of supernal power” in Marlin’s reading of the Latin Herod plays 
(“The Investiture Contest,” 14); the “impotent ranting” and “ironic impotence” in Chris 
Hassel Jr., “No Boasting Like a Fool?,” 211-12; Herod’s “political impotence” in 
Christina Fitzgerald’s The Drama of Masculinity and Medieval English Guild Culture 
(New York, Palgrave, 2007), 121; Herod’s “impotent” authority in John McGavin, 
“Performing Communities: Civic Religious Drama” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Medieval Literature in English, ed. by Elaine Treharne and Greg Walker (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 2010), 210. Morse, taking a different tack, asserts that “If Herod came to symbolize 
dramatic crudity, he was no less potent for that” (“Truth and Convention,” 66).  
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theologians through the thirteenth century reduced Herod to his madness, so can twenty-
first-century readers perceive that the English plays and scholarship on them share a 
desire to condense the entire network of Herod’s ambitions within one final assertion of 
his ultimate generative failure. 
For one, such insistence on the teleological failure of the troubling desires Herod 
express un-knows the complex theological landscape made possible by a virile Herod. A 
mass slaughter becomes impotent fury, unchecked madness becomes impotent rage, and 
ruthless ambition becomes political impotence. By discussing the generative, political, 
and eschatological resonances of Herod’s impotence, critics reanimate a medieval desire 
to understand Herod as a fearsome ruler ultimately doomed by a powerlessness to hold 
his kingdom, an inability to grasp Christianity, and an incapacity to produce an heir 
through which his ambitions might be realized. 
In both the Bible and Josephus, Herod the Great produces a son and heir in Herod 
Antipas. In the biblical account (Matthew 14. 1-11; Luke 23. 6-12), Antipas even 
explicitly maintains his father’s struggle against Christ and Christianity. Given the 
inauspicious beginnings of this family tree, the question of why medieval scholars and 
playwrights commonly collapsed the three biblical Herods into one figure merits 
revisiting. As long as Herod remains impotent theologians can domesticate non-orthodox 
practices as toothless, which maintains an uninterrupted narrative of Christian salvation. 
Similarly, the charge of impotence in criticism provides scholars a lowest common 
denominator from which to establish a medieval Herod.  
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Although several Latin Herod dramas featured a son of Herod, the same cannot be 
said for the English mystery cycles.51 Only the York Cycle features a speaking role for a 
character verified internally as Herod’s son. In the York Magi pageant (no. 16), Herod’s 
son, called only Filius, aids his father in the decision to commission the Slaughter. The 
pageant makes no effort to explain why Filius is there or how he got there, from which 
readers might insinuate that his appearance was hardly remarkable. However, given 
Herod’s proposal to eliminate an entire generation of males from Bethlehem, the contrast 
between his eager son, likely thinking of his own political fortunes, and an absent infant 
Christ, one of few males to escape, helps enhance the dramatic tension of the episode, at 
the very least. While the York pageant plays the filial parallel more explicitly than other 
versions do, York’s Herod also proves the most toothless of the English versions. 
Whereas the other Herods fight off the prophecies received by the Magi and Herod’s own 
advisors, the Herod of the York Magi pageant uniquely responds to the prophesied loss of 
his kingship with exasperation rather than anger: “Allas, than am I lorne,/ This wax ay 
werre and werre” (ll. 235-6). The York Massacre presents a comparatively desperate 
Herod, resigned to the loss of his kingdom. It is no small irony that the only play to 
extend Herod’s family tree is also the play in which Herod’s reign is the most evidently 
doomed. 
A son of Herod does materialize in another episode of the Massacre, but as a non-
speaking infant, and thus proves little more than a prop. In the Chester “Slaughter of the 
                                                
 51 Several of the Latin Herod plays, including Fleury and Montpellier, include Herod’s 
son, called either Archilaus or Filius, as a significant character in the drama.  
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Innocents” (no. 10), after Herod approves the Massacre, one of his knights kills an infant 
whom any attentive audience member would recognize as too richly adorned to be the 
son of simple townsfolk. Shortly after the boy’s caretaker reveals the identity of the slain 
infant to the knight, Herod enters the scene to confirm what the audience already knows:  
 Hee was right sycker in silke araye, 
 In gould and pyrrie that was so gaye.  
They might well knowe by this daye 
He was a kinges sonne.  
(ll. 409-412) 
 
The Chester pageant appears to include baby Herod in order to highlight the contrast 
stressed in the York cycle with additional poignancy. In a dramatic turn of events, 
Herod’s knights spare the infant Christ and instead kill the king’s only heir, ending 
Herod’s reign doubly. Reconciled to his now-impotent future, Herod’s arms and legs 
begin to rot and he dies twenty lines later.  
Although the death of Herod’s infant son was hardly biblical, its apocryphal 
popularity must have been activated by some desire: to position Herod’s knowledge and 
faithlessness as herald of the premature end to his family line makes for divine retribution 
indeed. The Chester playwright emphasizes the tidiness of Herod’s downfall by playing 
the death of father and son so closely to one another—some sixty lines apart—testifying 
to the swift and sure justice meted out to those who misperceive the grip of faith over 
blood in matters of regal legitimacy.52 If questions of Herod’s potency were related to 
genealogical concerns, the Chester cycle visualizes just such an effectively castrated 
                                                
 52 As Marlin observes, Latin playwrights had historically used Herod to advocate in 
favor of ecclesiastical authority in contemporary conflicts over investiture and the bounds 
of secular power. See “The Investiture Contest and the Rise of Herod Plays.” 
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Herod. Curbing Herod’s ability to felicitously reproduce, this scene counteracts some of 
the more dangerous contingencies that threaten to spawn from the shadows of the cycle’s 
epistemological program of faith as reason. 
The issue of Herod’s potency, consonant with his ability to extend a genealogy of 
anti-Christian villainy, relates also to the varied history of his death. The most popular 
depiction of his demise, in which a corrupted Herod decomposes while still alive, comes 
from Josephus, and can also be found in the Historia Scholastica, Legend Aurea, and the 
Stanzaic Life of Christ. In these texts, as in the Chester Massacre, Herod rots to death, 
although in Josephus this occurs only after he murders two sons and suffers the accidental 
death of a third.53 However, in a stark reversal of Josephus, the Cursor Mundi, inspired 
perhaps by Herman of Valenciennes’ versified French Bible, arranges Herod’s death at 
the hands of his own son: aided by members of Herod’s court, Herod’s son Archelaus 
drowns the king in a tub of boiling oil.54 Traditions of a suicidal Herod proliferate also in 
a strand of apocrypha that includes Eusebius and Remigius of Auxerre, narratives 
featured in late-medieval Middle English texts including the Life of St. Anne55 and a 
                                                
 53 In Josephus’ account, Herod suspects disloyalty among his sons, Alexander and 
Aristobulus, and travels with them to Rome for a hearing in front of the Emperor, who 
finds the sons innocent. However, Herod’s lingering, paranoid doubts begin to drive him 
mad. Herod holds his own trial where he finds his sons guilty and has them strangled 
(Antiquities 16. 394; Jewish War 1. 27). The aforementioned texts abbreviate these 
events and attempt to reconcile them with timeline of related events in the Bible. 
 54 For a detailed account of this strange version of Herod’s death, see Miriam Skey, 
“The Death of Herod in the Cursor Mundi,” Medium Ævum, 57 (1988), 74-80.  
 55 Josephus reports that in his later life, wracked with disease, Herod attempts suicide 
with a fruit knife, but is “saved” by his cousin, Achiabus. When in the third century 
Eusebius translates Josephus, he renders the suicide successful—a proper ending for a 
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sermon of John Mirk.56 Such interest in Herod’s downfall should not be surprising given 
his popularity as an exemplary figure throughout the Middle Ages. However, the fact that 
each of these traditions emphasizes Herod’s failure to ensure the transmission of his 
genes, lineage, and narrative for another generation testifies to a longstanding association 
between the fate of a failed Herod and that of a triumphant Christendom.  
In no tradition then is Herod sexually impotent, and yet the narrative accounts of 
his death indicate a cursed lineage: either he kills his sons (directly or indirectly) and then 
kills himself, or, murdered by his son, suffers an unnatural death related to his sinful life. 
Often his death relates directly to regal failures, through which some level of political 
impotence is implied. While the expansive tradition of Herod’s death signals an 
undeniable interest in his genealogy, it cannot be safely concluded that castrating him 
helped playwrights neutralize the villainy these plays cite as descending from him. 
Though Herod’s Filius in the York cycle proves harmless, some of the cycles feature a 
more powerful Herod Agrippa, the son of Herod’s son Aristobulus, and grandson of 
Herod the Great. As remarked earlier, Herod the Great’s death in the some cycles recalls 
the biblical description of the death of Agrippa, described in Acts 12. 20-25. In Acts, 
Agrippa is literally eaten alive by worms, which Josephus understood as gangrene of 
Herod’s genitals (Jewish War, 1. 656). The N-Town death of Herod invokes this image of 
a divinely castrated king, punished for his behavior such that “wormys mete is his body” 
(l. 256). So even Herod’s relatives—along with the N-Town Herod the Great— suffer a 
                                                                                                                                            
wicked king. See Eusebius, The History of the Church from Christ to Constantine, trans. 
G.A. Williamson (New York: New York UP), 1966. 
 56 Mirk, Festial, 194.  
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death symbolically located at the site of male potency. Even if his progeny are able to 
escape Herod’s madness, they partake of the same cursed fate that plagued their forbear. 
While questions about the genealogy Herod engenders often center on 
reproduction, the fact that the most significant challenge to his rule comes from a child of 
unknown paternity calls attention to the matter of regal legitimacy. Throughout his 
textual tradition, Herod displays his customary arrogance and jealousy, but also exudes a 
paranoia through which he betrays his own insecurities about the authority of his 
kingship. Historically, this make sense given that, as an Idumean and pro-Roman “client 
king,” Herod lacked a secure hold on the throne of Judea. According to biographer 
Michael Grant, Herod existed “in a no-man’s land of cultural territory.”57 Not only was 
he widely considered a usurper of the throne, the Chester playwright insists that he “is 
noe Jewe borne nor of that progenye” (l. 278).58 Herod certainly paid little respect to 
those who came before him, in any case. According to Josephus, he rifled the tombs of 
David and Solomon, his forebears and models for kingship, in order to secure the 
necessary funds to continue his own building projects (Antiquities, 16. 7). Eusebius 
modifies Josephus, claiming Herod burned the Jewish genealogies so that no one would 
know that he was only nominally Jewish (1. 7).59 Thus, by the fourth century, Christian 
                                                
57 Grant, Herod the Great, 11. 
58 Josephus writes that the historical Herod was of Arab blood and, although nominally a 
Jew, was accepted neither by the Jewish community over which he ruled nor the Roman 
government under which he served. 
59 Moreover, as Coletti notes, Eusebius stresses Herod’s lowly origins, claiming that 
Herod’s father was the son of a “certain temple slave” who, because his father was to 
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scholars recognized King Herod as an illegitimate stranger of ignoble blood who, as the 
first foreign king of Judea, paid no respect to past or future kings, and whose jealousy and 
paranoia inspired the murders of his own family members—the only allies he might have 
had. The Stanzaic Life of Christ, expanding this medieval legend, accents Herod’s 
paranoia with an underlying madness: here Herod burned the genealogies so that no 
would know that there ever existed any other king (ll. 3597-3612).  
Tautological as it might be, Herod’s refusal to surrender to the faith-based 
genealogy of Christian rule legitimates his fear, expressed in Chester (no. 10), that Christ 
will “bereave [his] heritage” (l. 27). Such insistent preventative thinking, combined with 
an oversimplification of the circumstances he attempts to escape, accomplishes a view of 
Herod who deceives himself, with a history-denying mauvaise foi, into thinking that he 
knows better. Though he possesses the Scriptural information, Herod also lacks faith, 
which leaves him shrouded in ignorance. Of course, these narratives also stress that 
Herod’s impatient disposition negates any notion of permanence to which these 
legitimating tactics might aspire.  
Still, the critical habit of referring to Herod’s impotence, while pervasive and 
ultimately accurate, often belies the complex network of resonances circulating beneath 
this apparently benign appellation. Impotence, after all, also implies the punctuation of a 
pre-established narrative teleology. Failing to interrogate the meaning of that impotence 
generates the false impression that the plays unfold in a straightforward matter, and that 
                                                                                                                                            
poor to pay for his return, was brought up as an Idumaen after robbers carried him there 
from Ascalon (1. 6). 
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Herod’s role is to somehow suspend, perhaps through his comic but ultimately useless 
ranting, the unfolding of God’s plan. But as Kolve reminds us, the interplay of 
temporalities and geographies are hallmark qualities of the cycle plays: “causality and 
chronological sequence,” he insists, are the tools of secular thought (118). Reductive as 
this distinction may be, how then can critics reconcile the implied teleology of Herod’s 
impotence with the layered temporality of the cycles plays? 
 Zrinka Stahuljak’s focus on the narrative strategy of hypotaxis as a viable 
metaphor to help read disruptions in traditionally filial metaphors of translatio provides a 
model for integrating these competing understandings of performed eschatology.60 The 
plays’ epistemological reliance on typology and their attention to moments that challenge 
the continuity of a Christian genealogy (Noah’s wife’s reluctance, Joseph’s incredulity, 
Herod’s impotence) complement the more acute narratological deviance (incest, rape, 
patricide) Stahuljak writes about. Stahuljak locates the linguistic at the center of 
understanding literary representations of genealogy, which provides a model in which the 
moments that threaten the seamless transmission of meaning across become fundamental 
to our understandings of translatio. Once imposed onto narrative, the seemingly 
disjointed moments of translatio imperii, and those of Christian eschatology, can be 
                                                
 60 See Stahuljak, Bloodless Genealogies of the French Middle Ages: Translatio,  
Kinship, and Metaphor (Gainesville: U of Florida P, 2005). Stahuljak “propose[s] a new 
way of reading genealogy in its representations that addresses the question of how incest 
and other perversions of genealogy are integrated into a narrative as totalizing as 
genealogy” (10). Stahuljak views hypotaxis, a left-modifying style in which a narrative is 
not grammatically complete until the final phrase or clause signals, as narrative model 
that allows for the inscription of seemingly inassimilable wrinkles that would otherwise 
threaten the stable transmission of genealogy. 
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encoded hypotactically and read as linguistic accretions whose meaning is only gradually 
unveiled through metonym and metaphor.  
To position a virile Herod as genealogical forbear of spiritual infelicity and 
epistemological hubris threaten Christian eschatology, which guarantees victory only to 
true believers. However, the pageants illustrate the inevitable sterility of ambitions not 
rooted in faith. Although his raging and arrogance command the most immediate 
attention, the manifest valences of Herod’s “impotence” across the cycles—sexual, 
spiritual, political, and linguistic— ultimately establish his eschatological appeal. In each 
cycle, a comparison between Herod and Christ pits a history of patricide, suicide, and 
ruin against the fluid, if not mystical continuity of Judeo-Christian eschatology. Herod’s 
impotence becomes the genealogical metaphor through which audience and critic 
understand resistance to a Christian unfolding of history as futile. 
 
Reading with Herod 
Hussey suggests that the collapse of the three biblical Herods into one stage 
character was founded on a tension between good history and good drama (258). I would 
like to both challenge this suggestion and take it seriously. To take Hussey’s “history” in 
a more medieval sense, as a kind of verisimilitude, the plays take medieval history to its 
limits—that is, to the present. In so doing, the plays construct a typological Herod that 
must reflect faithfully the accumulation of his historical significances as well as account 
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for the demands of the local (considered both spatially and temporally).61 After all, 
despite medieval attempts to render the biblical Herod into a singular figure, he 
persistently resists a concrete Christian typological attribution as one instantiation of a 
larger eschatological pattern. While Staines maintains that “more than any other single 
character in medieval drama, Herod becomes a variety of persons under one name,” it is 
the sense with which Herod straddles traditions that lends his dramatic performances such 
weight (207). The English Herod did not only straddle the line between the drama and 
history (Hussey) or comic and tragic (Staines), but also between Old and New Testament, 
Roman time and Christian time, paganism and Judaism, and a biblical past and a political 
present. 
I have traced the performances of Herod in Middle English cycle drama to show 
how he becomes the metonymic villain who marks the shift between an older, “impotent” 
historical genealogy and the ascendency Christianity. There is clearly something anxiety-
provoking about a virile Herod, and yet the real conflict regarding his potency centers on 
a struggle to untangle Herod’s ability to fruitfully multiply from his doomed prowess as 
ruler. The cycle plays partially undercut the threat he poses by simplifying his genealogy 
into a Herod-function, collapsing Christian alterity into one genealogical line of Christian 
enemies, and then, through his actions, eliminating the possibility of regeneration 
altogether. It is the very abundance of conflicting spiritual, political, and narrative 
associations that finally defines Herod in the cycles. Wedged between earthly and 
                                                
 61 Isidore of Seville’s definition of history might here provide a useful touchstone: 
“Historia est narratio rei gestae, per quam ea, quae in praeterito fata sunt, dinoseunter” 
(Etymologiae i.xli.i). 
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spiritual rule as well as historical-Roman time Christian-messianic time, Herod represents 
the oppression Christianity had overcome. Embodied on stage, he also evokes 
contemporary enemies of the Christian present, known and unknown, and suggests, 
through his pre-determined failures, the impotence of a non-Christian future.  
Herod models the necessity of attending to local and universal concerns when 
reading the plays. To understand Herod’s antagonistic relationship with Christ as only 
dangerous ignores the audience’s position as participants in an already understood 
salvific history. To view Herod’s absurd pomposity as a mere comic distraction from a 
cycle’s more sober concerns misreads the figural significance of Herod’s bombastic 
effect. As a medium through which playwrights develop a kind of vernacular typology, 
these representations of Herod testify to the vitality of cycle drama for the project of 
more clearly understanding the landscape of fifteenth-century vernacular theology in 
England.  
Given Herod’s outsider status, his role in the cycles complicates both medieval 
and contemporary assessments of the Christian typological supersession traditionally 
affixed to the relationship between the Old and New Testaments. While in some 
moments, the cycle plays hint at a typological foreshadowing, the moment of Christ’s 
birth represents a movement from the aberrant, worldly, and non-transcendent genealogy 
of Herod to the elegantly mystical dynamics of Christ’s genealogy, traced from 
generations of Jewish prophecy. Herod’s function as epistemological hinge shows that 
the cycles align Jewish with Christian time and pit that unbroken genealogy against one 
representative of temporal force and non-belief. In the context of Lollard threats and 
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other concerns about orthodoxy, the plays favor a unitary understanding of the narrative 
of Christianity rather than one punctuated by reform and renewal.  
And, indeed, although typological readings of the cycle plays have been criticized 
as intellectualizations of a decidedly popular narrative form, Ohly reminds us that 
typology was so pervasive in medieval thought that its deployment in cycle drama would 
hardly be considered elite or esoteric. The cycle plays complicate supercessionary 
typology by foregrounding the degree to which Herod knows the severity of his actions. 
The composite picture of Herod’s character across pageants belongs to a larger practice 
of forecasting the Christian enemy as eternal, knowing, and thus outside traditional 
notions of history. The alignment of deviance and knowledge reaffirms faith and humility 
as the governing ethics of Christian epistemology.  
In a Christian cosmology, there are far worse things than the unknown.  
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Chapter Two 
(Un)knowing the (Un)knowable Criseyde 
 
Early in the first book of Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, an anxious Criseyde 
visits the Trojan prince Hector. Her father Calkas, armed with critical foreknowledge 
predicting the inevitable defeat of the Trojans, has defected to the Greek camp. Criseyde, 
meanwhile, attempts to persuade Hector that her father’s treason bodes no treachery of 
her own. Hector, “pitous of nature,” absolves Criseyde from responsibility for her 
father’s deeds and assures her safety. Before they part ways, Hector offers a curious 
presentiment of his own:  
“And al th’onour that men may don yow have 
 As ferforth as youre fader dwelled here, 
 Ye shul have, and youre body shal men save, 
 As fer as I may ought enquere or here.” 
      (I. 120-23) 
 
While Chaucer is translating this scene from Boccaccio’s Il Filostrato, the specific 
reference to Criseyde’s body during the poem’s opening is unique to the Troilus. At first 
glance, the allusion appears only to guarantee Criseyde’s safety; yet, given Troilus and 
Criseyde’s hyper-sensitivity to its own narrative history, any addition Chaucer makes to 
the textual tradition merits critical attention. On further inspection, a careful reader may 
detect a resonance that exceeds the stated desire to comfort Criseyde. Indeed, Chaucer’s 
syntax seems to provide at least two different readings of line 122. The first, more 
obvious, reading implies that the Trojan men will protect Criseyde, metonymically 
reduced to her body, from the Greeks. The repetition of “have” and use of “enquire” 
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makes for a somewhat cumbrous reading, suggesting as it does that all of the honor she 
once had she will have again (to the degree that he can influence it). This understanding 
remains logically consistent with Hector’s larger point of assuring Criseyde’s safety. 
However, this reading is inconsistent with Hector’s later willingness to relinquish 
Criseyde’s body when he agrees to trade her for Antenor in Book IV. Criseyde’s body, 
once traded, does help save this particular man (Antenor), but it would be difficult to 
make the case that this has anything to do with Criseyde’s honor. Given the lack of such 
an explicit promise in Il Filostrato,1 coupled with Hector’s reputation for chivalrous 
behavior throughout the Middle Ages,2 it seems unlikely that Chaucer would expand this 
moment only to critique Hector’s reputation (since, after all, most readers would have 
already known the outcome of this particular narrative). To be sure, war sometimes calls 
for reversals of intent; yet, at the very least, such a reading would imply that Chaucer 
created a dramatic irony absent in his sources and unremarked in criticism. Already the 
careful reader can discern something of the difficult commitments one must make when 
rendering poetic a putatively historical narrative, especially when that consequences of 
the narrative bear on nothing less than the origin story for England. 
                                                
 1 In Boccaccio, Hector promises that she will not be harmed and assures her of the 
Trojans’ honor and favor, but makes no explicit promise to “save her body” (I. 13-14).  
 2 Hector was considered one of the “Nine Worthies,” a pantheon of men honored for 
their legendary chivalry. He was one of three pagans (along with Julius Caesar and 
Alexander the Great); he also shared this honor with three Jews (David, Joshua, and 
Judas Maccabeus) and three Christians (Arthur, Charlemagne, and Godfrey of Bouillon, 
the first ruler of the Kingdom of Jerusalem). The “Nine Worthies” or Les Neuf Preux, 
were popularized through Jacques de Longuyon’s Voeux du Paon, a fourteenth-century 
chanson de geste.  
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 A second, less conventional way to interpret this line would be to understand 
Criseyde’s body as itself the agent of salvation, a textual and material self-sacrifice. 
Perhaps it is Criseyde’s body that saves men, inasmuch as Hector can “enquere or here.” 
In this reading, Chaucer explodes the temporal frame of a singular moment in order to 
comment on one of the principal extra-textual consequences of this legendary medieval 
narrative: the establishment of Criseyde’s reputation. Much like Herod, Hector invites the 
audience into the narrative’s dueling temporalities by calling attention to the unknowable 
mechanism through which a Trojan past becomes an English present: the body of 
Criseyde. Occupying simultaneously the roles of ancient Trojan and English chivalrous 
knight, Chaucer’s Hector appears all too aware of the legacy engendered by Criseyde’s 
betrayal of Troilus and, more importantly, of how that legacy has been written upon the 
body of Criseyde, a figure who played no part in Trojan history prior the twelfth century.  
We will uphold you and you will uphold us, Hector avers. Criseyde’s body will 
save men insofar its lessons can reach other men. But how can the body of a woman who 
never existed save anyone? For one, Criseyde’s body will save men insofar as it is 
rendered legible, a text. And as the rest of the text makes clear, where there is learning 
and hearing, there is often also reading.3 Given Criseyde’s well-known reputation by the 
                                                
 3 The scenes of reading and writing, usually centered on Criseyde, have been addressed 
in several publications. See Carolyn Dinshaw, “Readers in/of Troilus and Criseyde,” The 
Yale Journal of Interpretation in the Humanities 1.2 (1988): 81-105; Kara Doyle, 
“Criseyde Reading, Reading Criseyde,” in New Perspectives on Criseyde, ed. by Cindy 
L. Vitto and Marcia Smith Marzec, 75-110 (Asheville, NC: Pegasus, 2004); Victoria 
Warren, “(Mis)Reading the ‘Text’ of Criseyde: Context and Identity in Chaucer’s 
‘Troilus and Criseyde,’” Chaucer Review 36.1 (2001): 1-15; and Sarah Stanbury, 
“Women’s Letters and Private Space in Chaucer,” Exemplaria 6.2 (1994): 271-85. 
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time of Troilus and Criseyde (1380s), it is impossible to separate her historical body from 
her textual one: her body becomes the medium onto which her reputation is written, a 
process we can trace across a dozen narrative iterations of what we might call the 
Criseyde-function.4 Criseyde, who famously becomes an emblem for feminine deceit in 
the Middle Ages, was invented as a away to make the masculine dynamics of translation 
work more fluidly.5 In this chapter, I return to the Criseyde’s literary beginnings in order 
to un-know Criseyde and to show how Chaucer’s famously ambiguous account of the 
heroine buttresses an attempt to re-open the question of English history she helped settle.  
 Until Benoît de Sainte-Maure’s Roman de Troie (c. 1184), the story of Troilus 
and Criseyde did not have a Criseyde. Dares and Dictys, whose versions of the Fall of 
Troy later assume the status of Chaucer’s “olde bookes,” contain hardly a trace of what 
later became a literary archetype. In Benoît’s narrative, Criseyde (here called Briseis) 
helps transform Troilus from an inexperienced soldier ancillary to the war’s central 
events to a central figure who embodies (and foreshadows) the fate of Troy itself. Given 
Troy’s predetermined fate, Briseis’s role must be established before she even arrives. The 
                                                
 4 Glenn Burger discusses the “textual body” as depicted in Chaucer. See “Doing What 
Comes Naturally,” in Masculinities in Chaucer, ed. Peter Beidler, 117-30 (Cambridge: 
D.S. Brewer, 1998), 123. 
 5 The matter of Criseyde’s reputation has been a popular topic in the last thirty years. See  
Gretchen Mieszkowski, "The Reputation of Criseyde, 1155-1500," Connecticut Academy of Arts  
and Sciences Transactions 43 (1971): 71-153; Gayle Margherita, "Criseyde's Remains: Romance  
and the Question of Justice," Exemplaria 12.2 (2000): 257-92; Roberto Antonelli, "The Birth of 
Criseyde-An Exemplary Triangle: 'Classical' Troilus and the Question of Love at the Anglo-
Norman Court," in The European Tragedy of the Troilus, ed. Piero Boitani, 21-48 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), Sally Mapstone, "The Origins of Criseyde," in Medieval Women: Texts 
and Contexts in Late Medieval Britain, eds. Jocelyn Wogan-Browne et al., 131-47 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2000). 
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legibility of Criseyde’s body marks her as both knowable and known, a situation which 
frames what Mieszkowski calls the “problem of Criseyde” (78). Her entrance into the 
narrative merely guarantees that in order for Troy to fall, and in order for England to rise, 
Troilus must suffer. Briseis is invented in order to become the agent of that suffering. 
Briseis must betray Troilus. In one fell swoop, Benoît replaces the failures of the Trojans 
with the missteps of two lovers. 
The advent of Criseyde brilliantly displaces the Matter of Troy’s central conflict 
from the singular military failure of the Trojans to a more universalizable lesson from 
which men might “enquire” and “here”: the inevitability of feminine deceit. This 
manipulation of “history” is not unlike the playwrights who amplify the significance of 
Herod in the English cycle plays in order to provide a knowable genealogy for the 
perceived enemies of Christianity. In Briseis, Benoît creates a character who performs a 
crucial role in the putatively historical record of Trojan history. Once interjected into the 
narrative tradition she comes to signify a truth retroactively understood as innate to all 
real women—or at least the courtly ones. Thus, in the Roman de Troie, the fall of Troy 
has as much to do with Troilo’s naïve belief that Briseis will return to him as it does the 
Trojans’ naïve belief that the Greek Horse was a tribute to Athena. In effect, the 
‘Criseyde-function’ raises the possibility that the endless translation of empire might end 
if only we would listen and learn from its central lesson. The better men know Criseyde 
(as deceitful), the more bodies will she save. This awareness provides male readers the 
opportunity to understand the fundamental instability of feminine desire, to know this 
unknowable thing, a lesson whose comprehension might allow them to avoid the fate of 
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the Trojans. 
I employ the term ‘Criseyde-function’ for two reasons: to emphasize Criseyde’s 
medieval emergence as a narrative tool (rather than a historical personage) and as a way 
refer to her textual tradition (rather than a specific iteration of her character). Criseyde is 
no woman, but rather a body of work, as testified by a monologue tradition, present in 
almost all medieval accounts, during which she bemoans the manner that future 
generations will read her. The similitude Criseyde forges between her material body and 
her textual body underscores a correlation between reading and knowing that perpetuates 
itself not only in the narrative but in modern criticism.6 Just as Chaucer’s narrator gives 
the text a body, so too does Chaucer’s Criseyde inherit a misogynistic tradition whose 
legibility depends on its material subjection into a plausibly historical Criseyde. Chaucer, 
Hector, and the critics all seem to share an interest in how to read Criseyde’s body, which 
suggests that the over-determined, over-written nature of this body might be understood 
as less a fault of critics and more as a legitimate effect of Chaucer’s text. 
What makes Criseyde an interesting character and Troilus and Criseyde such a 
successful narrative is that both resist our best attempts at comprehension. In the past, the 
structuralism inherent to Lacanian psychoanalytical accounts of desire has provided 
critics with a methodology by which the text’s historiographical contradictions might be 
                                                
 6 Victoria Warren argues that Troilus’ failure to understand as a lover results from “his 
failure to read the text of Criseyde,” a result of his limited perspective and inability to 
“get outside of his own text.” See “(Mis)Reading the ‘Text’ of Criseyde,” 1. Gretchen 
Mieszkowski discusses this collapse of modern critical desires onto the Chaucer’s re-
telling as a “a classic illustration of the interdependence of literary history and literary 
criticism” (“The Reputation of Criseyde,” 78). 
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compared with Criseyde’s function in the text. According to Margherita, the concerns 
over Criseyde’s historical function are “strategically displaced onto a culturally 
overcoded anxiety about sexuality” such that Criseyde begins to signify “an uncertainty 
about women as the symptom of all that is unstable, excessive, unknown” (264). Lest one 
reduce Criseyde’s importance to such simple analogical thinking, Margherita goes 
further, and suggests that Criseyde exceeds this homology by also coming to represent 
the “radical undecideability” of Chaucer’s text. Aranye Fradenburg too writes of the 
“undecideability of Chaucer’s Troilus.”7 These critics use psychoanalysis to draw 
attention to an important feature of Chaucer’s text, the way in which Criseyde resists 
final judgment. In my reading of Troilus and Criseyde I would like to move beyond 
“undecideability” and insist on Criseyde’s unknowability, which resists the either/or logic 
of praise and blame, love and hate. The unknowing of Criseyde, which grounds 
Chaucer’s revisionist account of Trojan history, indicates instead to how poetic narrative 
interrogates and unsettles received accounts of how history has created its present 
                                                
 7 Fradenburg, “‘Oure owen wo to drynk’: Loss, Gender and Chivalry,” in Chaucer's Troilus and  
Criseyde: Subgit to alle Poesye. Essays in Criticism, ed. by R.A. Shoaf, 86-106 (Binghamton:  
Medieval and Renaissance Text Studies, 1992), 101. Other notable critics have relied on the  
language of psychoanalysis to link the textual past with Criseyde’s material body through its  
well-known discussions of the relationship between history, desire, and the unconscious. 
See James Paxson, "Triform Chaucer: Deconstruction, Historicism, Psychoanalysis, and  
Troilus and Criseyde," in Approaches to Teaching Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde and  
the Shorter Poems, eds. by Tison Pugh and Angela Jane Weisl, 127-42. New York, NY:  
Modern Language Association of America, 2007). See Kate Koppelman, “‘The Dreams  
in which I’m Dying’: Sublimation and Unstable Masculinities in Troilus and Criseyde,”  
in Men and Masculinities in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, eds. Tison Pugh and Marcia  
Smith Marzec, 97-114 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2008); Jamie Fumo, "Hating Criseyde:  
Last Words on a Heroine from Chaucer to Henryson," Chaucer Review 46 (2011): 20- 
38; George Edmondson, The Neighboring Text: Chaucer, Boccaccio, Henryson (Notre  
Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 2011).  
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moment. 
I dwelled so long on a reading of Hector’s remarks because I think they announce 
aptly Chaucer’s departure from earlier versions of Criseyde, and mark my departure from 
the majority of Criseyde-related criticism. The import of Hector’s remark affects the 
reader belatedly as she recognizes that Troilus and Criseyde challenges the settled fact of 
Criseyde’s knowable body. In order to un-know Criseyde, I discuss the way that critics 
have tried to “know” her, attending especially to the frequent desire to see her as an 
exemplar of one quality or another (noting the disagreements that ensue). If anything, 
critics occupy not the position of analyst but of analysand, vying with one another for the 
best reading of what amounts to an ink blot in Chaucer’s literary Rorschach test. Rather 
than pretend to comprehend Chaucer’s “entente,” I show how the effect of these changes 
inspires readings of Criseyde whose only common feature is their penchant for 
contradicting and invalidating the accounts of previous scholars. My purpose is to begin 
to understand how generations of brilliant, well-trained readers have agreed on 
Criseyde’s narrative function as an exemplar, but have disagreed so vehemently 
regarding the quidditas of that exemplarity (paragon of infelicity or faithful lover; 
spineless coward or quiet hero; bane of feminism or model of empowerment).  
Chaucerians have produced a nearly overwhelming number of critical accounts 
focused on Criseyde; my aim in this chapter is not to supplant these analyses but to 
connect them to two other important strands of Troilus criticism: those focused on the 
function of the narrator and on the literary form of the narrative. After exploring 
Criseyde’s paradoxical exemplarity, I turn to readings that have emphasized the 
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incomprehensible nature of Chaucer’s Criseyde in comparison to her previous 
incarnations in earlier source texts. These readings represent elements of Criseyde’s 
unknowability as important to Chaucer’s text but rarely discuss their repercussions on the 
larger narrative tradition. I aim to unite these understandings of Criseyde’s structural 
resistance with discussions of Troilus’s enigmatic narrator and argue that the one cannot 
be understood without the other. As the Troilus moves away from a full recovery of the 
Trojan past (and a familiar Criseyde), the narrator’s frequent recourse to a fundamentally 
unknowable narrative core becomes less an admission of failure than a feature essential 
to its telling. If Chaucer’s predecessors created a knowable Criseyde through which men 
might appropriate feminine instability as, ironically enough, a kind of masculinized truth, 
Chaucer un-knows these previous accounts of Criseyde in order to lay bare the 
impossibility of historicizing literary narrative.  
Chaucer’s literary art lies in his ability to sufficiently obscure Criseyde’s motives, 
the narrator’s investment, and the historicity of the account, while keeping the reader 
invested in these mysteries. In choosing one of the most notorious and well-known of 
medieval legends, Chaucer faces the challenge of re-writing a story in which everything 
is both already known and incomprehensible. The narrator’s attention to gaps and 
contingencies in his tale make transparent the need for poetic narrative to ground itself in 
the open-endedness of the unknowable. In other words, Troilus and Criseyde offers 
uncertainty as integral to the shape, purpose, and function of literary discourse. In order 
to help separate the literary from historical elements, I turn to Steven Justice and his 
character-driven attention to Chaucer’s “history effect” as a means through which readers 
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can understand characters as “products,” rather than “sources” of literary discourse.8 I 
show how the consequences of Chaucer’s “history effect” extend beyond his own 
narrative and ultimately articulate a version of historical re-writing that not only tolerates, 
but embraces the impossibility of fully knowing the past. I contend that the narrator’s 
relationship with Criseyde provides the most complete illustration of the narrator’s 
concerns with knowing and rewriting a written past that is simultaneously coherent, as 
having measurable effects, and open-ended, lacking details that remain inaccessible to 
even the most dedicated historian.  
In short, Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde produces a literary ethics rooted in 
unknowability as an alternative to historical re-writing. If, as Steven Justice has it, the 
late-medieval text’s “literary status is achieved by resisting clarity,” it is not through 
psychoanalytic recourse to a textual unconscious that critics might recover the originary 
kernel of that literary status. By rendering her unfamiliar, Chaucer makes Criseyde not 
the symbol of an innately feminine deceit; rather, by virtue of her unknowability, 
Chaucer’s Criseyde personifies the necessity for literary narratives to move beyond 
historicity and instead embrace the fundamental impossibility of historical fidelity, a 
hallmark trait of the very category of literary writing. 
The Invention of a Historical Fact 
In order to establish what Chaucer’s text seeks to un-know, it is necessary to first 
                                                
 8 Steven Justice, “Chaucer’s History Effect,” in Answerable Style: The Idea of the 
Literary in Medieval England, ed. Frank Grady and Andrew Galloway, 169-94 
(Columbus: Ohio State UP, 2013), 171.  
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recount how earlier medieval versions of the narrative created a Criseyde who grew from 
a textual function into a historical personage whose actions came to predict the 
temperament of any and all courtly women. As mentioned earlier, Benoît de Sainte-
Maure’s Roman de Troie (c. 1184) was the first to feature the Criseyde-function, but this 
is not to say that she was created from thin air. The development of the character 
Criseyde owes a good deal to two female characters from the Iliad. Readers can glimpse 
pieces of Criseyde’s character in both Chryseis, daughter of a Trojan priest who, taken by 
the Greeks, becomes a concubine of Agamemnon, and as Briseis, a beautiful widow 
whom Achilles takes as a slave and whom Agamemnon insists on receiving if he must 
give up Chryseis. While some of these details are absent from Benoît’s two 
acknowledged sources, Dares and Dictys, Sally Mapstone argues convincingly that 
Benoît would have encountered Briseis’ letters to Achilles through Ovid’s Heroides, 
which was commonly read in the twelfth century as a school text.9 As will become 
crucial to the characterization of Criseyde in Boccaccio’s Filostrato and Chaucer’s 
Troilus, the Briseis of the Heroides explains herself in terms of writing, especially in 
allusions to other stories from the Classical past.10 Mapstone posits an origin from which 
the Criseyde-function, from its very inception, becomes complicit in the writing of her 
own history (138). By the time of Chaucer’s Troilus, the Criseyde-function betrays an 
                                                
 9 Mapstone, “The Origins of Criseyde,” 135. Mapstone also suggests that Benoît would 
have likely encountered the Ilias Latina, another popular school text.  
 10 On Criseyde and writing in Chaucer’s Troilus, see Catherine Sanok, "Criseyde,  
Cassandra, and the Thebaid: Women and the Theban Subtext of Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde,"  
Studies in the Age of Chaucer 20 (1998): 41-71, and John Fleming, “Criseyde’s Poem: Anxieties  
of the Classical Tradition,” in New Perspectives on Criseyde, ed. Cindy Vitto and Marcia Smith  
Marzec, 277-98 (Asheville: Pegasus, 2004). 
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awareness of its exemplarity, existing both inside and outside of literary history, 
commenting on and perpetuating her status as archetype of feminine betrayal. 
 In order to resist viewing the development of the Criseyde-function as mere 
teleology, it will be valuable to attend to some of the idiosyncrasies found in each of its 
major medieval iterations. As implied explicitly by the title, choice of language, and the 
love plot he invents, Benoît uses Criseyde (Briseis) to transport historia to the world of 
romance.11 Here Troilus is not the inexperienced-yet-fierce warrior of Dares and Dictys, 
but rather a sullen and lovesick young man. Briseis enters the narrative as a typically 
lovely romance heroine—“Plus esteit bele e bloie e blanche / Que flor de lis ne neif sor 
branche" [She was more lovely, blonde, and fair than the fleur-de-lis or a snow-covered 
branch] (5277-78). However, as Roberto Antonelli observes, Briseis is hardly a main 
fixture of the text, active in only 1,350 of the Roman’s 30,000 lines and not once in a 
sustained block of text (87). Since the most memorable of those lines have to do with her 
betrayal of Troilo, her limited appearances bestow upon her little more than the status of 
negative exemplar. After betraying Troilo, thus completing the action for which she was 
engendered, she essentially disappears from the narrative. For Mieszkowski, too, Briseis 
assumes the form of a narrative function, “illustrat[ing] many aspects of women, their 
shallowness and flirtatiousness, the pragmatism that quiets their consciences, the cruel 
pleasure they take in alternately encouraging and refusing men, and, most of all, their 
faithlessness” (79). Both Antonelli and Mieszkowski understand Briseis as a known 
                                                
11 The Roman de Troie was almost always paired with Roman de Thèbes, Eneas, and/or 
Wace’s Brut, popular romances that also treat classical history. 
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figure who performs a specific function in Benoît’s narrative.  
 Despite Benoît’s curious addition of a female character who only confirms what 
had already been established, the spurious historicity of Briseis’ character did little to 
undercut the reception of the Roman as authoritative. As Guido delle Colonne later insists 
in his remediation of the Roman (1287), Benoît claims to report only what he has 
received from Dares, the only author of the Trojan War who was able to deliver all of the 
facts (Proem 97-104).12 Through the figure of Briseis, Benoît upholds Lee Patterson’s 
claim that “in the world of romance, history is less given than made” (96). Neither 
Patterson nor Benoît account for what happens when a character exceeds the history for 
which she was invented, however. Briseis’ historical fame resounds as more than external 
fact. Not only do her actions indirectly account for the Fall of Troy, they inspire a truism 
to be applied more broadly to the behavior of women: they give a face to the uncertainties 
of masculinity. 
Briseis remains known inside the text as well. In Benoît’s Roman, unlike later 
versions, most men in Troy know of the affair. To the extent that the fates of Troilus and 
                                                
 12 As Lee Patterson notes, Benoît’s narrative was composed within the same French 
courtly context that produced another cornerstone of medieval mythical vernacular 
historiography, Wace’s Brut, a translation of Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia Regum 
Brittaniae, the foundational text for medieval secular history. As Patterson details, the 
Roman de Troie was granted enough authority in the thirteenth century for Jean 
Malkaraume to include some of its passages in his versified French Bible. Jean’s Bible, 
preserved in a late-thirteenth century manuscript (BNF, f. 903), inserts most of the 
Roman de Troie directly following the account of the death of Moses and compares the 
impact of these foundational sacred and secular events. This strange confluence of sacred 
and secular narrative attests not only to the canonicity of Benoît, but more importantly, to 
the historicity of his account. See Patterson, Chaucer and the Subject of History 
(Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1991), 90-2. 
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Troy historically converge, the affair (and Briseis’ function within it) provide Benoît with 
an opportunity to historicize the fickleness of women as the knowable moral to be drawn 
from the Matter of Troy: 
Ja jor ne cuideront mesfaire :  
Des folies est ço la maire. 
Qui s’i atent ne qui s’i creit 
Sei meïsme vent e deceit.13 
  (ll. 13453-56) 
Perhaps most significantly, Briseis shows herself as aware of this exemplary status: “De 
mei n’iert ja fait bon escrit/ Ne chantee bone chancon” (20255-62) [About me no 
beautiful work will be written/ No good song will be sung].  
This line, familiar to readers of Chaucer’s text, sets in motion a series of what 
David Benson terms “contradictory” statements whereby Briseis condemns her own 
actions against Troilus and also affirms the need to move on, unrepentant, to the arms of 
Diomede.14 Benson reads this moment as the origin of Chaucer’s “opaque” Criseyde, 
arguing that Briseis’ speech reveals the tangled nature of her desire, which conveys the 
impression of multiple Criseydes, “every one of which has the potential to be developed 
into the portrait of a different kind of women” (27). For Benoît, Briseis’ conflicted state 
does not betray her fundamental opacity; rather, her ambivalence grounds the 
establishment of an archetype, that of the fickle courtly woman: “Qui s'i atent ne qui s'i 
                                                
 13 “Never a day will they think to commit misdeeds/ Of all follies, [hers] is the greatest/ 
He who aspires to that and who believes in it / Is fooling himself.” Thanks to Michael 
Johnson for assistance with this translation.  
 14 Benson, “The Opaque Text of Chaucer’s Criseyde,” in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde: 
Subgit to alle Poesye. Essays in Criticism, ed. R.A. Shoaf, 17-28 (Binghamton: Medieval and 
Renaissance Text Studies, 1992). 
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creit/ Sei meisme vent e deceit" [Whoever relies on [women] or trusts them tricks and 
sells himself] (13455-56). Through such moralization, Benoît cleverly (and 
misogynistically) domesticates that which evades male control: he transforms Briseis’ 
psychological complexity into a knowable emblem of feminine instability. He not only 
reformulates her apparent deviance from rational thought as a typical feminine vice, he 
then proffers it as historical inevitability. Benoît situates his heroine in a uniquely 
precarious epistemological position in which, paradoxically, the more dynamic her 
actions and complex her emotions, the more limited her narrative agency becomes.  
 Although Benoît’s invention of the Criseyde-function provides a backdrop for a 
newly medieval reading of the Trojan War, his Briseis was not, in fact, the most well-
known version of the archetypal fickle woman prior to Chaucer. Strangely enough, it is 
actually the Latin translation of Benoît’s French romance that became the more 
successful text. Surviving in 144 manuscripts (compared to the Roman’s 30), Guido delle 
Colonne’s Historia Destructionis Troiae (c. 1220) effectively masked the narratological 
liberties of Benoît’s romance vernacularity and became the most widely read version of 
the narrative in its time.15    
Consonant with the its Latinity, Guido’s Historia also strips Briseis of some of 
her romance conventionality. Guido’s Briseis becomes even more notorious than 
Benoît’s version, an effect realized by his decision to feature her even less in his 
                                                
15 Benson notes that Guido’s Historia was translated three separate times into English 
within a generation of Chaucer’s Troilus. William Caxton later translated the text as well. 
See “True Troilus and False Cresseid: The Descent From Tragedy,” in The European 
Tragedy of Troilus, ed. Piero Boitani, 153-70 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 154. 
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narrative. But even as Guido condenses the speech and actions of Benoît’s Briseis, he 
amplifies her exemplarity through an increased attention to the Troilus-as-Troy motif. On 
the one hand, the addition of Criseyde to the Matter of Troy fulfills a specific, knowable 
function: she gives Troilus his Trojan horse. On the other hand, such an invention 
necessitates a departure from the historical “record” since Benoît is translating an already 
well-known Matter of Troy into vernacular romance history.16 Through an intervention 
that is simultaneously synchronic and diachronic, Criseyde gives the Trojan War a moral 
depth that helps bridge the temporal gap between a classical past and a medieval present.  
Boccaccio’s Il Filostrato (1335-1340) offers the next significant shift in the medieval 
Criseyde story. Between Guido and Boccaccio there exist several other versions of the Troilus 
and Criseyde legend, but only in Boccaccio’s text do we see a legend transformed.17 With his 
Filostrato, Boccaccio supplies two significant changes that would come to influence Chaucer’s 
narrative. First, he shifts the narrative focus directly to an expanded version of the love affair 
between Troilus and Briseis (here ‘Troilo’ and ‘Criseida’). Second, he introduces a narrative 
voice personally involved in the events of the affair. Here the narrative moves even closer to 
romance, as Boccaccio foregrounds the relationship between lovers, once a microcosmic 
diversion from the primary focus on the War, and displaces the historical matter almost entirely 
                                                
 16 On Guido’s influence on Chaucer, see George Hamilton, The Indebtedness of Chaucer’s  
Troilus and Criseyde to Guido delle Colonne’s Historia Trojana (New York: Columbia  
University Press, 1903). 
 17 Other versions of the narrative include Joseph of Exeter’s revision of Dares, the Frigii 
Daretis Ylias (c. 1185); Albert von Stade’s Troilus (ca. 1260); a late-thirteenth century 
prose version of Benoît; along with several Italian versions of the Matter, including the 
Libro della Storia di Troia, Binduccio dello Scelto, Istorietta Troiana, and Romanzo 
barberiniano. 
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to the background.  
Despite the personal investment of Il Filostrato’s narrator and the increased attention to 
the characters of Troilo and Criseida, Boccaccio too affirms Criseyde’s status as a type.18 
Narrator and reader are made aware of Criseida’s thoughts throughout the narrative, a comfort 
not shared by other characters. However, when in the opening “Proem” the narrator compares the 
looks and comportment of his absent lover to the famed beauty and behavior of Criseida, he 
confirms that his heroine is, indeed, a known figure. Rather than ingratiate Criseida to the reader, 
these moments in which Boccaccio recalls Criseida’s beauty render her all the more deplorable 
because the reader, who knows how the narrative will end, witnesses her potential for good.  
By extending the Troy/Troilus analogy with the addition of one more rung 
(Troy/Troilus/narrator), Boccaccio reintroduces potential, especially by way of Criseida, into a 
narrative of an otherwise-settled history. Boccaccio’s Criseida exists within two competing 
temporalities that operate by incompatible logics. The historical Criseida must be written 
according to the telos of her infidelity; on the other hand, the beauty, words, and actions of the 
literary Criseida, along with her status as stand-in for the narrator’s absent lover, induce 
optimism in a more positive outcome. This temporal split prefigures Chaucer’s Hector’s remarks 
which exist similarly both inside and outside of the historical framework of the narrative. For 
Boccaccio, the literary temporality collapses into the historical one, reducing Criseida’s literary 
potential to a bit of drama that renders her ultimate “desertion” of Troilo something the careful 
                                                
 18 This is not to say that this is the same Criseyde as can be found in Benoît, 
Boccaccio’s main source. Boccaccio’s Criseida comes across as less fickle than she is 
cautious. In a bit of courtly posturing, for example, Criseida, arguing with herself, shows 
reluctance to marry a Troilo whose social standing exceeds her own (II. 75-6). 
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reader anticipates, but for which she must wait, a belated response to an already-historical fact. 
This logic of belatedness also permeates the interior structure of Il Filostrato, for it is Boccaccio 
who introduces Criseida’s promise to return to Troy within ten days of her transfer to the Greek 
camp (IV. 155-6). This key moment situates narrator, reader, and Troilo as party to the same 
existential waiting game. 
Through the belated logic of Il Filostrato, Boccaccio picks up on one of Criseyde’s 
secondary functions: her role as an epistemological “bridge” between classical past and medieval 
present. Just as Troilo becomes the avatar for the narrator’s (debatably autobiographical) 
suffering, the narrator compares his absent lover to Criseida in a positive manner—despite and 
because of her centuries-long reputation as the paragon of female inconstancy. In Boccaccio’s 
text, the knowability of the historical record secures a legitimacy for the narrator’s lovesickness. 
The narrator’s overt identification with Troilo thus obliterates the historical distance between 
pre-Christian and Christian time: it seems that heartbreak requires no translation. While 
‘Criseida’ retains the bulk of her inherited significance in this homology, the structural changes 
in the relationship between teller and tale complicate the history of her character. As George 
Edmondson quips, “Troilo dies so that the narrator might gain an identity” (94). But could this 
comparison contain a resonance even more significant than individual life and death? If the 
narrator connects his fate to Troilo’s, and if the narrative tradition has homologized Troilo’s fate 
to that of Troy, the Filostrato offers one unsuccessful fourteenth-century relationship as 
metonymic instantiation of the originary betrayal that sets in motion all of secular history. 
Through Il Filostrato, Criseyde’s longstanding function as emblem of feminine deceit gives face 
to an emergent narrative of history as loss not, as Margherita suggests, because woman is 
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unknowable, but precisely because Criseida’s betrayal is guaranteed.  
Boccaccio’s Trojan retelling indicates something of Criseyde’s unique place in the 
history of unknowable female literary figures. It would be no exaggeration to insist that, of all of 
Chaucer’s characters, Criseyde has inherited the most complex critical portrait. Given her history 
as an emblematic figure, her awareness of this reputation, and her elusive behavior in Troilus, it 
is no surprise that critics have failed to reach a consensus on the character of Criseyde. As Nikki 
Stiller notes in her monograph devoted to the literary resonances that Criseyde has engendered 
from the twelfth through the twentieth centuries, part of Criseyde’s popularity as a literary figure 
results from how she participates in a larger theological-philosophical debate about the degree to 
which women exist independently of men.19 Put in psychoanalytic terms, Criseyde frames the 
question of sexual rapport: does her alleged infidelity raise larger implications about the 
possibility of mutual knowing in sexual relationships?  
The answer, unsurprisingly but necessarily, is that we cannot know. What then makes 
Criseyde such a unique character is not, in the end, her function as embodiment of unanswerable 
questions, but how writers have created positive knowledge from the “undecideability” she 
signifies. As Boccaccio illustrates, even when the literary act reopens a realm of potential 
through which Criseida might reveal her desire, the historical ambiguity she came to embody, 
insofar as it is a settled fact, must manifest itself unambiguously. In the Troilus-Criseyde 
narratives from Benoit through Boccaccio, Criseyde domesticates feminine potential by reducing 
its unknowability to a mundane and foregone conclusion that women are fickle. In what remains 
                                                
19 Stiller, The Figure of Cressida in British and American Literature: Transformation of 
a Literary Type (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1990), 9. 
 109  
of this chapter, I turn to Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde, which both enhances Criseyde’s 
unknowability by amplifying the ambiguity of her speech and actions, but also unsettles the 
notion that readers can “know” Criseyde at any level. 
Criseyde’s Next Chance 
At the time of Troilus and Criseyde’s composition, all three of the previously 
discussed versions were available and in circulation. Although Chaucer’s depiction of 
Criseyde borrows from each of these three, it is less interesting to cite where he borrows 
than it is to track what effects his specific choices produce in his version of Criseyde. 
Throughout the first book, Chaucer, by way of his narrator, attends to what can and 
cannot be known about Criseyde. From the first descriptive encounter of Criseyde, 
Chaucer establishes a relationship between her precarious social position and the text’s 
unstable narrative epistemology: 
Now hadde Calkas left, in this meschaunce 
Al unwist of this false and wikked dede 
His doughter, which that was in gret penaunce 
For of hir lyf she was ful sore in drede, 
As she that niste what was best to rede;  
For bothe a widowe was she, and allone  
Of any freend to whom she dorste hir mone. 
    (I. 92-98) 
In the first one-hundred lines of the poem, we learn three things about Criseyde: that she 
is the daughter of a man whose premonitory “forknowinge” (79) rendered him a “traytor” 
(87), that the state of Criseyde’s family’s affairs has left her quite lonely, and that these 
circumstances have something to do with how she eventually forsakes Troilus (56). In 
addition to these external facts, Chaucer also introduces his narrative as mired already in 
 110  
a crisis of knowing: Criseyde’s father leaves her because he knew too much; Criseyde 
knows not how to proceed. Thus, from the very beginning of Troilus, knowledge is 
presented as problematic. Just as Chaucer forges a synonymy between knowledge and 
treachery through Calkas, the narrator, who “wepen as I write,” laments the closed, 
known status of “[t]hise woful vers,” planting himself within a history whose veracity he 
will seek to invalidate with endless rhetorical challenges (6). 
If Chaucer situates the opening of the poem within a crisis of knowing, his earliest 
descriptions of Criseyde also form a resistance to the totalizing effects of historical 
comprehension. The narrator, too, betrays an early interest in complicating Criseyde’s 
reputation, as evidenced in his prayer to protect those “that falsly ben apeired/ Thorugh 
wikked tonges” (38-39) referring, presumably, to Criseyde. Throughout the first book, 
Criseyde is made more pitiable than she is in other versions of the narrative. Her status as 
a widow, a detail invented by Boccaccio, provides an existential depth to her loneliness in 
Chaucer, and it also places the beautiful courtly woman in something of an unfamiliar, 
uncertain category.20 Her experiences in love exceed those of the typical courtly maiden–
in Benoît, for example, she is a virgin— but Chaucer’s Criseyde is no mere seducer of 
men. Although later in the narrative Criseyde herself cites her marital independence as 
advantageous for her future dealings with men (II. 750-6), Chaucer’s early descriptions of 
Criseyde cast her widowhood almost exclusively in terms of her loneliness. Despite her 
                                                
20 Kathryn Jacobs views Chaucer’s Criseyde as “inverted” in comparison to other widow 
figures in medieval literature. See “Mate or Mother: Positioning Criseyde among 
Chaucer’s Widows,” in New Perspectives on Criseyde, eds. Cindy Vitto and Marcia 
Smith Marzec, 11-36 (Asheville: Pegasus, 2004).  
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historical reputation for beauty, none of these familiar niceties appear in the text until 
after the narrator establishes her widowhood. In the stanza directly following the one 
quoted above, the narrator launches into the customary superlatives: 
 Criseyde was this lady name a-right; 
 As to my dome, in al Troyes citee 
 Nas noon so fair, for passing every wight 
 So aungellyk was hir natyf beautee, 
 That lyk a thing immortal semed she,  
 As doth an hevenish parfit creature, 
 That doun were sent in scorning of nature. 
     (I.99-105) 
In a move that will become habitual for the narrator, the strangeness of Chaucer’s 
description depends less on what is said than where it is said and its relationship with his 
sources. Here the reader encounters the customary description of her radiance only after 
Chaucer endeavors to make her a sympathetic figure. The lag between the narrative’s 
literary potential and the historical backdrop against which this possibility is resolved 
already suggests a difference in the approaches of Boccaccio and Chaucer.  
Later in the first book, in the scene where Troilus first looks upon her, Chaucer 
once again subordinates Criseyde’s beauty to her widowhood: 
 Among thise other folk was Criseyda, 
 In widewes habit blak; but natheles, 
 Right as oure first letter is now an A, 
 In beaute first so stood she, makeles. 
     (I.169-72) 
Chaucer’s “natheles” and his insistence on her “makeles” [peerless] beauty serve to 
separate Criseyde’s widowhood from more conventional depictions.21 She is no mere 
                                                
21 For more on the conventional romance widow, see Rebecca Hayward, “Between the  
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type, these lines insist, at least not as is evident in Boccaccio, where her widowhood 
merely directs the reader to a thinly-veiled “lusty” nature, something more akin to the 
Wife of Bath. In Troilus and Criseyde, Criseyde’s widowhood helps us understand her 
situation not as a figure or type, but as an individual: it is made both exterior and interior 
to her being. Because it precedes even her famous beauty, the repetition of her status 
conveys the impression that, despite her literary renown, we may not know Criseyde as 
well as we had thought.  
 A few stanzas later, another fact of Criseyde’s domestic life is called into 
question: “But whether that she children hadde or noon,/ I rede it naught; therfore I late it 
goon” (132-33). This ostensibly benign non-detail appears to betray little more than the 
anxious temperament of a narrator handcuffed to his sources (a detail he mentions on at 
least ten separate occasions). Yet it just so happens that his “olde bookes” do, in fact, 
have something to say on this account. As mentioned earlier, Benoît settles the matter in 
by claiming that Briseis is a virgin so, barring a miracle, this would indicate that she was 
childless (l. 2751). Boccaccio is even more specific, stating definitively that Cressida had 
no children and also suggesting that she may not be capable of producing any (I.15). 
While Sanford Meech suggests that this moment of un-knowing previous narratives 
renders Chaucer’s Criseyde a comparatively acceptable woman to Troilus, a careful 
reader might keep an eye open to other, more insidious possibilities.  
                                                                                                                                            
Living and the Dead: Widows as Heroines of Medieval Romances,” in Constructions of  
Widowhood and Virginity in the Middle Ages, eds. Cindy Carlson and Angela  
Weisl, 221-43 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999). 
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 In order to better understand Chaucer’s characterization of his heroine, it is 
useful to untangle how the motifs of knowledge and non-knowledge figure in the Troilus’ 
larger structure. Of all the moments of knowledge being withheld in the text, the love 
affair itself provides the narrative’s most explicit advocacy of not-knowing. In Benoît and 
Guido, the affair is, of course, publicly known. Boccaccio supplies an added dimension 
of secrecy to the affair. On the surface, this resonates as a formal decision, as it brings the 
genre closer to romance. More importantly, it allows his narrator to suffer in silent 
solidarity with his avatar, Troilo. Chaucer’s decision to maintain the secrecy of their 
affair in Troilus and Criseyde has been explained in terms of the narrative’s generic 
commitments, with scholars citing Andreas Capellanus as evidence that discreetness 
serves as an important lubricant to the process of courtly love.22  
 Like Boccaccio’s Troilo, Chaucer’s Troilus hides his love out of an instinctive 
shame: “Lest it were wist on any manere side,/ His woo he gan dissimilen and hide” (I. 
321-2). It appears that Chaucer merely follows his source in keeping the love affair 
hidden, and yet the effect of this decision on the two texts differs. Since Boccaccio’s 
narrator allies himself with Troilo throughout, the depiction of Troilo’s pain serves 
mainly to elicit sympathy from the reader for the narrator’s analogous and otherwise 
private torment. If the reader becomes frustrated with Criseida, it is for the narrator’s 
                                                
22 Andreas Capellanus privileges secrecy throughout The Art of Courtly Love, from the 
first chapter forward. The Art of Courtly Love has also become an important touchstone 
for critics working to establish the Troilus’ generic commitments to the workings of the 
gaze. See, for example, Molly Martin, “Troilus's Gaze and the Collapse of Masculinity in 
Romance,” in Men and Masculinities in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, eds. Tison Pugh 
and Marcia Smith Marzec, 132-47 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2008). 
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sake; it recalls a suffering that still persists. Troilo’s heartbreak, on the other hand, is a 
matter of the past, a settled account. The clandestine nature of the affair in Chaucer’s 
version does not clarify an event outside of the narrative but instead appears to enhance 
the dramatic irony within the narrative. Just as Priam and his parliament cannot know 
Troilus’ woe when they agree to exchange Criseyde for Antenor (IV. 148-60), neither can 
Troilus understand why Criseyde has not returned as he waits at the city gates (V.1135-
41). But rather than provide the audience the details that his character lacks, Chaucer 
leaves readers ignorant to the true contents of Criseyde’s heart. Although the covert 
structure of the love affair remains the same in both texts, Chaucer reanimates Criseyde’s 
unknowability as more than a matter of interpersonal secrecy, but rather a structural 
concern of both narrator and reader. 
Lest Criseyde’s unknowability remain a mere external fact, Chaucer highlights 
narrative gaps in knowledge, whether between tale and its teller or between tale and its 
readers/characters. In Book II, Criseyde defies the lusty, fickle reputation she has 
inherited by depicting, or even embellishing Criseyde’s hesitancy to love:  
 For I sey nought that she so sodeynly 
 Yaf hym hire love, but that she gan enclyne 
 To like hym first, and I have told yow whi. 
     (II. 673-75) 
Attempting to emphasize the steady, methodical nature of Criseyde’s love for Troilus, the 
narrator performs the carefulness that Criseyde too inhabits. Rather than disclose her 
private thoughts for the reader, the narrator speaks only of the negative space behind the 
expectation of ‘love at first sight.’ For David Lawton, Criseyde herself may not know 
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what is going on inside of her own head.23  
Shortly after the narrator’s careful explication of her coming-to-love as a process, 
Criseyde launches into a monologue (708-763) that expands significantly on its analogue 
in Il Filostrato despite the narrator’s contention that he is strictly translating his source. 
Chaucer’s decision to more than double Boccaccio’s monologue for Criseyde suggests a 
desire to clarify her intentions and, indeed, her speech includes nine verbs that convey the 
process of comprehension (namely “knowe” and “woot”). Yet, rather than elucidate her 
motives, the monologue amplifies Criseyde’s indecision, contra the ‘love at first sight’ 
motif, as she debates to herself whether or not she should accept Troilus’ love. This 
monologue defies the formal expectations for extended monologues, as the only access to 
her ‘entente’ Chaucer supplies is a confirmation that she does not know what she wants.  
Troilus is, of course, markedly less subtle when it comes to his feelings. When 
Troilus finally proclaims his love in Book III, he announces, quite bluntly, that “Now be 
ye caught” (1207). A ostensibly relieved Criseyde, “al quit from every drede and tene” 
(1226), proceeds to reveal her feelings in apparent comfort: “Right so Criseyde, whan hir 
drede stente,/ Opned hir herte, and tolde him hire entente” (1238-39). Within Chaucer 
criticism, attempts to discern Criseyde’s internal state have centered around the 
Chaucer’s manipulation of the concept of “entente.”24 As this narrative progression 
                                                
 23 Lawton argues that the opacity of Criseyde’s desire in the early stages of the narrative 
envelops reader, narrator, and Criseyde as well. See Chaucer’s Narrators (Cambridge: 
D.S. Brewer, 1985), 78. 
 24 Patterson understands the question of Criseyde’s “entente” as a crucial point of access 
into the larger thematic works of the text. He urges the importance of comprehending this 
“entente” in order to transition from the comic to the tragic elements that arrive in Book 4 
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suggests, only belatedly can the reader glimpse Criseyde’s “hertes variaunce” (Patterson 
calls this process an “erotic deferral”). But other than adding a bit of erotic intrigue, what 
purpose might the deliberate obfuscations surrounding Criseyde’s “entente” serve? And, 
perhaps more importantly, does her “entente” become manifestly knowable in Book V, as 
Jennifer Campbell suggests?25  
Provided Troilus and Criseyde’s reputation for frustrating its critics, the poem’s 
deliberate uncertainties and unknowing might be understood as a formal mechanism 
implemented in order to make Criseyde’s betrayal all the more shocking. To create an 
atmosphere of surprise in an otherwise closed case of romantic betrayal would be one 
way to breathe new life into old “matere.” Yet there exist a few impediments that 
challenge this interpretation. Chaucer was not pressed into any obligation to tell this 
particular story, which suggests that there was no overt problem he had to work around. 
Additionally, he makes clear the fate of Troilus and Criseyde from the opening lines, 
which run against the desire to suspend disbelief. Lastly, but most importantly, there is 
the matter of the narrator, who obviously shows at least some compassion for Criseyde.  
Given Troilus and Criseyde’s lack of a structure of surprise, it appears that 
                                                                                                                                            
(Chaucer and the Subject of History, 139). Patterson notes the appearances of Criseyde’s 
“entente” in the so-called tragic books (IV.655-57; IV.1416-18; V.1003-4; V.1629-30) 
and laments that neither reader nor Criseyde “knows what she means” (139) until Troilus 
spies his own brooch on Diomede (V.1655-66). For Jennifer Campbell, the difference as 
regards Criseyde’s “entente” occurs between the “only partially knowable” Criseyde of 
the first three books and the “utterly decipherable” figure she becomes in Book V. See 
"Figuring Criseyde's 'Entente': Authority, Narrative, and Chaucer's Use of History," 
Chaucer Review 27 (1993): 342-58, 342. For more on the issue of “entente” and how it 
relates to Criseyde, see Elizabeth Archibald, “Declarations of ‘Entente’ in Troilus and 
Criseyde,” Chaucer Review 25.2 (1991): 190-213.  
25 Campbell, “Figuring Criseyde’s ‘Entente,’” 356. 
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Chaucer does not make Criseyde unknowable in order to condemn her further. At the 
same time, it is equally misguided to suggest that Criseyde’s opacity serves to ingratiate 
her to the reader. Even the narrator, her biggest advocate throughout the tale, eventually 
must give up hope. If the narrator refuses to confirm that Criseyde gives her heart to 
Diomede (V. 1050)26, he must nonetheless admit that, at some point, “both Troilus and 
Troie town/ Shal knotteles throughout hire herte slide” (V. 768-69). Unsurprisingly, some 
critics cite the poem’s ending as evidence of the narrator’s failure or of his masculine 
desire to oversimplify a complex web of love, duty, and self-preservation. However, as 
the narrator makes clear in the poem’s opening, the ending of this story has already been 
written. What leeway could this narrator have had? While Chaucer’s narrator might poke 
at his sources and un-know his heroine in an effort to interrogate the historicity of the 
events he retells, as a mere “instrument” he does not possess the authority to 
substantively alter the poem’s outcome.  
Rather than a boon to her reputation or indictment on her instability, the matter of 
Criseyde’s “entente” becomes for Patterson (and later, for Justice) a narrative device used 
to create “a more capacious representation of subjectivity” (142). While this may be true, 
it still does not answer the question of her “entente,” of what Criseyde actually wants. 
What makes readers believe that Criseyde, so emptied of humanity in earlier versions of 
the narrative, desires anything? Only in the last thirty years have critics become 
comfortable with the notion that Criseyde exceeds even the most careful critical 
                                                
 26 Even still, he equivocates in another confrontation with his “matere,”: “Men seyn—I 
not—that she yaf hym hire herte” (V.1050). 
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comprehension. Rather than assigning Criseyde an emblematic character trait, these 
scholars focus on how she remains “opaque27,” “undecideable28,” “unquantifiable29,” or 
“inscrutable.”30 Accurate as these accounts may be, there remains the question of what to 
do with this information. Before turning to a closer analysis of the narrator’s relationship 
with his heroine in order to explore this question, I end this section with a brief analysis 
of the ways critics have tried to deal with the problem of Criseyde’s “entente” without 
acquiescing to the notion of an un-knowable Criseyde. In doing so, I aim to move away 
from seeing Criseyde’s unknowability as only a frustration internal to the text and, 
instead, emphasize the way that Chaucer uses an unknowable Criseyde as a figure around 
which all knowledge in Troilus and Criseyde is organized.  
* * * 
Over the last hundred years, readers of Troilus and Criseyde have disagreed on 
nearly every conceivable detail of Criseyde’s character.31 Some readers understand 
                                                
 27 Benson, “The Opaque Text of Chaucer’s Criseyde.”  
 28 For Margherita “if Criseyde is a symptom of the poem’s disavowal of history and 
materiality, she also marks its radical undecideability” (“Criseyde’s Remains,” 271). 
 29 Allan Mitchell argues that “the exact ratio of freedom and fortune making up 
Criseyde's mind is unquantifiable” in “Criseyde's Chances: Or, Courtly Love and Ethics 
About to Come,” in Levinas and Medieval Literature: The Difficult Reading of English 
and Rabbinic Texts, eds. Ann Astell and J. A. Jackson, 185-206 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
UP, 2009), 199.  
 30 Laura Howes sums Criseyde’s character as “so veiled from us… as to be at best inscrutable  
and at worst morally repugnant.” See “Chaucer’s Criseyde: The Betrayer Betrayed,” in Reading  
Medieval Culture, ed. Robert Stein and Sandra Pierson Prior, 324-43 (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2005), 331. 
 31 For the most efficient overview of Criseyde’s critical reception, see Lorraine 
Kochanske Stock, “‘Slydynge’ Critics: Changing Critical Constructions of Chaucer’s 
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Criseyde to be the paragon of femininity32 while others remark her fundamentally 
masculine nature.33 Although her (in)actions may appear cowardly34 there might also 
exist elements of heroism in her restraint.35 Criseyde’s self-deliberations reveal her to be 
                                                                                                                                            
Criseyde in the Past Century,” in New Perspectives on Criseyde, eds. Cindy Vitto and 
Marcia Smith Marzec, 11-36 (Asheville: Pegasus, 2004). 
 32 For Sanford Meech, Chaucer’s Criseyde was "so feminized in her person and so gentled in  
behavior that she appears the quintessence of soft womanhood." See Design in Chaucer's Troilus  
(Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1959), 13. However unattractive this position, Meech’s assertion is  
supported in the first book the narrator admonishes that “Weren to wommanhod, that creature  
[Criseyde]/ was nevere lasse mannyssh in semynge” (I. 284). On the other hand, Matthew  
Corrigan argues that Criseyde’s lack of nuance betrays Chaucer’s ineptitude for creating a  
“genuine woman.” See “Chaucer’s Failure With Women: The Inadequacy of Criseyde,” Western  
Humanities Review 23 (1969): 107-20. The 1970s also introduced readings of Criseyde as  
herself a feminist. See Maureen Fries, “‘Slydyng of Corage’: Chaucer’s Criseyde as Feminist  
and Victim,” in The Authority of Experience: Essays in Feminist Criticism, eds. Arlyn  
Diamond and Lee J. Edwards, 45-59 (Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1977). 
 33 Angela Weisl notes a “female masculinity” within Criseyde that threatens to reveal 
the constructed nature of masculinity: “Whether Criseyde is ultimately a victim of her 
fears, or of patriarchal society and its traffic in women, or of romance… one thing is 
apparent— in choosing dishonor over death, in choosing Diomede's protection, Criseyde, 
within a feminized context, plays a "mannes game" with a "mannes herte." See “‘A 
Mannes Game’: Criseyde's Masculinity in Troilus and Criseyde,” in Men and 
Masculinities in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, eds. Tison Pugh and Marcia Smith 
Marzec, 115-31 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2008), 130.  
 34 In C.S. Lewis’ famous reading of Criseyde, she suffers, somewhat masochistically, from an  
overwhelming fear of everything. See The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), 85. This fear becomes an underlying  
meekness in R.A. Shoaf, “Troilus and Criseyde: The Falcon and the Mew,” in Typology and  
English Medieval Literature, ed. H.T. Keenan, 149-68 (New York: Ams Press, 1992), 151. 
Edward Condren writes of Criseyde’s “streak of cowardice,” but acknowledges that she cannot 
be reduced to one characteristic. See "The Disappointments of Criseyde," in Chaucer and the  
Challenges of Medievalism, ed. Donka Minkova and Theresa Tinkle, 195-204 (Frankfurt,  
Germany: Peter Lang, 2003), 204. Gretchen Mieszkowski emphasizes these qualities not as  
fearfulness, but as passivity and faithlessness (“Reputation of Criseyde,” 109). Alice Kaminsky  
catalogs the critical attention on Criseyde’s fearfulness in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde and  
the Critics (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1980). 
 35 See Mary Behrman, “Heroic Criseyde,” Chaucer Review 38.4 (2004): 314-36. 
Fradenburg writes that simplifications of Criseyde’s “have isolated her anxieties from the 
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self-interested36 but, because they are consistent, might also imply an underlying poise.37 
Her struggles to make decisions could suggest fickleness38 or reveal only that she is 
cautious.39 Although the critical accounts hardly agree on anything, these analyses affirm 
the way that Criseyde’s character exceeds her narrative function. She is consistently read 
as the exemplar of something. Even though she may be “the most difficult of Chaucer’s 
women to understand,” generations of critics have nonetheless asserted time and again 
that she can indeed be known.40  
The primary, most visceral, and longest standing of the Criseyde-oriented debates 
considers the matter of her culpability in the tragic events of the narrative and whether, as 
a result, Criseyde should be condemned or exhonnerated. Critics, however, rarely 
                                                                                                                                            
historical contexts that explain them… positing those anxieties as part of an essential 
character and thereby perpetuating fantasies of male rescue and feminine weakness.” She 
in turn praises Criseyde’s survival skills. See “‘Our owen wo to drynke,” 98-99. 
 36 Condren writes of “a calculating streak that increases over time” (“The Disappointments of  
Criseyde,” 197). D.W. Robertson suggests that these endless deliberations mark her as “self-\ 
seeking and vain” (qtd. in Stock, “‘Slydynge’ Critics,” 21). Jean Jost views Criseyde as self- 
conscious performer in “The Performative Criseyde: Self-Conscious Dramaturgy,” in New  
Perspectives on Criseyde, edited by Cindy L. Vitto and Marcia Smith Marzec, 207-30  
(Asheville: Pegasus, 2004).  
 37 George Kittredge was perhaps the first critic to insist on Criseyde’s underlying cleverness, 
“a mistress of her own actions.” See Chaucer and His Poetry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP,  
1913), 132. For another, briefer take on Criseyde’s poise, see J.J. Anderson, “Criseyde’s Assured  
Manner,” Notes and Queries 236 (1991): 160-1. 
 38 J. Milton French, defending Troilus, alleges “that she is fickle, that she knows she is 
fickle, that she knows other people will know it, and that she knows that her deed will 
remain notorious in ages to come (qtd. in Stock, 17).  
 39 McAlpine, Monica, “Criseyde’s Prudence,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 25 (2003): 
199-224. 
 40 Susannah Chewning, “Re-reading/Reteaching Chaucer’s Criseyde,” in New Perspectives on  
Criseyde, eds. Cindy L. Vitto, and Marcia Smith Marzec, 165-80 (Asheville, NC: Pegasus,  
2004), 165. 
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exercise a litigious sensitivity to detail in this matter of judgment. Evaluations of this key 
issue tend rather more towards kneejerk binarism than hermeneutical precision. On the 
one hand, “of all the women in English literature, Chaucer's Criseyde is the most lavishly 
praised. No other English heroine has ever cast a spell like hers.”41 In other accounts, 
Criseyde is the “dark angel” who draws out the basest desires of men.42 As Jamie Fumo 
argues, readers pick a side: “one may hate or love her— or both— but not remain neutral, 
at least according to the evidence of medieval Trojan narratives.”43 We must pick a side 
because, according to Fumo, we have all of the evidence. We know Criseyde (or at least 
we feel that we do).  
How is it then that readers so easily purport to understand Criseyde’s character if 
it is also true that what she desires cannot be known? Although the various motivations 
assigned to Criseyde by her readers are, as Stock indicates, “a natural function of the 
ambiguity of the language Chaucer selected in constructing his characterization of the 
enigmatic Trojan heroine,” Criseyde’s ambiguity alone cannot account for the zeal of her 
critics (35). We think we know Criseyde because the stakes for understanding her seem 
higher than it does for other Chaucerian characters. The real challenge of Criseyde comes 
not from attempting to discern her “entente,” but in trying to untangle a paradox: how can 
Criseyde embody the most fundamental of the narrative’s knowledges (Troilus was 
                                                
 41 Mieszkowski, “Chaucer’s Much Loved Criseyde,” Chaucer Review 26.2 (1992): 109-
32, 109. 
 42 Maria Greenwood, “Women in Love, or Three Courtly Heroines in Chaucer and 
Malory: Elaine, Criseyde, and Guinevere,” in A Wyf Ther Was: Essays in Honour of 
Paule Mertens-Fonck, ed. Juliette Dor, 167-77 (Liège: U of Liège, 1992), 177. 
 43 Fumo, “Hating Criseyde,” 24. 
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undone by Criseyde’s failure to return; Troilus’ downfall augured the fate of Troy) and 
remain fundamentally unknowable herself? Is it actually around her unknowability that 
critics make their pronouncements of allegiance or revulsion? 
Writing nearly sixty years before Fumo, E. Talbot Donaldson muses on this 
problem:  
Criseyde is so memorable a character because she evokes from us simultaneously  
the most powerful emotions of which we are capable, if the most opposed. 
Psychologically, we are never allowed to form any very precise or consistent 
image of her; indeed we are actively prevented from doing so. Yet because we 
know people not really with our minds but with our hearts, every sensitive reader 
will feel that he really knows Criseyde—and no sensible reader will ever claim 
that he really understands her.44 
 
Ironically enough, for the New Critic Donaldson, the aesthetics of the text are exceeded 
by the sensory, affective desires of the reader: sensitive and sensible. Despite the obvious 
dangers of universalizing a very personal (and overwhelmingly masculine) reading 
experience, Donaldson offers a thoughtful hermeneutic paradox that critics sometimes 
forget to appreciate: while it is true that our investment in a narrative correlates positively 
with our perceived familiarity with its characters, it is also true that as we sharpen our 
reading acuity we tend to more fully comprehend the thickness of human subjectivity, 
destabilizing that familiarity. What is puzzling about Donaldson’s insight is that he does 
not accede to his own argument: he really does think that he understands her.  
And, as Carolyn Dinshaw has famously argued, no critic has fallen under 
Criseyde’s spell quite like Donaldson. Criseyde, for Donaldson, is not only one of 
literature’s most alluring heroines, she exceeds her textual function and begins to take on 
                                                
 44 Donaldson, Speaking of Chaucer (London: The Athlone Press, 1970), 83. 
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a material body: marking “Chaucer’s supreme achievement in the creation of human 
character,” Criseyde possesses “all of the qualities that men might hope to encounter in 
their first loves.”45 Donaldson is far from alone in bestowing a materiality onto 
Criseyde’s textual body. Since Constance Saintonge’s “In Defense of Criseyde” (1954), a 
steady undercurrent of scholars have adopted a meta-disciplinary view of Troilus 
criticism in order to lament the tendency of some of Criseyde’s male critics to eroticize 
Criseyde as if she were materially knowable. For Dinshaw, this infatuation with 
Criseyde, combined with sometimes over-confident readings of Chaucer’s poem, unites 
Robertson and Donaldson as "masculine readers" who oversimplify Chaucer’s 
fundamentally "feminine" text through a compulsive need to control its fundamental 
multiplicity and settle on "a single… meaning fixed in a hierarchical structure.”46 
Unperturbed by the six-hundred year gap between the critics writing on the poem and 
Chaucer’s writing of the poem, Dinshaw offers a similar diagnosis of the Troilus narrator, 
whom she explicitly allies with the critics and whom she charges with “[turning] away 
from the feminine” (29). With her critique, Dinshaw importantly points out the reductive 
certainty desired (and performed) by many readers. By focusing solely on how the 
narrator behaves in Book V, she also implicates herself in the logic of her own critique by 
reducing a highly complex narrator to one more definitively “masculine” reader of the 
                                                
 45 Ibid., 67. 
46 See Dinshaw, Chaucer's Sexual Poetics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1990), 48. 
 124  
text.47 In the next section, I revisit Dinshaw’s claims in an analysis of the narrator, his 
relationship with Criseyde, and his legacy among critics.  
‘As seyth myn auctor’: Criseyde’s Narrator  
In Book III, the narrator interrupts Criseyde’s process of falling in love in order to 
make his most sustained complaint about the difficulty of balancing the tasks of historical 
fidelity and literary entertainment: 
  But now, paraunter, som man wayten would 
 That every word, or sonde, or look, or chere 
 Of Troilus that I rehersen sholde,  
 In al this whyle un-to his lady dere; 
I trowe it were a long thyng for to here-  
 Or of what wight that stant in swich disjoynte,  
 His wordes aile, or every look, to poynte. 
 
 For soothe, I have not herd it doon er this, 
 In storye noon, ne no man here, I wene; 
 And though I wolde I coude not, ywis; 
 For ther was som epistle hem bitwene, 
 That wold, as seyth myn auctor, wel contene 
 Neigh half this book, of which him list not wryte; 
 How shlde I thane a lyne of it endyte? 
    (III. 491-504).  
 
Although some readers might prefer a responsible narrator who recites every detail of the 
events he recalls, this narrator admits a narratological absence for the twin sakes of 
brevity and precedent—no raconteur has ever provided the details of these crucial 
moments. The decision to abbreviate the scene introduces the idea that a disparity might 
                                                
 47 The very titles of some publications dedicated to further exploring the Troilus 
narrator tell something about the complexity of this “character.” See, for example “The 
Narrator as Mythographic Glossator,” “History of a Shady Character,” “The Unlikely 
Narrator,” and “The Comic Function of the Narrator.” 
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exist between his two tasks. Any lack in the historical record jeopardizes the coherence of 
his narrative: in the case of the letters between Troilus and Criseyde, the narrator 
wonders, "How sholde I hanne a lyne of it endyte" (III. 504). If his “auctor” has neglected 
to include the text of these letters in his presumably complete history, is it still this 
narrator’s job to provide that information? The absence awakens the reader to the 
constructed nature of all narrative, however historical in intent, and also creates a space 
for the narrator to introduce elements of his own imagination into this story. In exposing 
the fantasy of consistent, stable history from which narrative can be drawn, this narrator 
seems to insist that literary art requires creation ex nihilo.  
Despite an occasional willingness to invent or question a historical detail, the Troilus 
narrator does not pretend to literary greatness. From the opening lines of the poem, the narrator 
situates himself not as creator of meaning, but as the medium, or “sorwful instrument,” through 
which an already-determined “sorwful tale” can reach an audience of lovers in the present 
(I.10;14). As he begins, however, the narrator begins to recognize the impossible task of 
remaining mere medium: sometimes the historical well lacks ink for his “instrument,” sometimes 
his sources disagree with one another, and sometimes, he realizes, he disagrees with them.  
For most readers, the narrator’s tortured interactions with his source material underwrite 
their estimations of his competence. Analyses of Chaucer's narrator in Troilus and Criseyde tend 
to focus on the difficult relationship between the narrator's foreknowledge of the text's ending 
and his ability to control his undeniable ambivalence regarding the retelling of these events. 
Throughout Troilus and Criseyde, the narrator tracks what can be known and not known about 
his story during short asides in which he informs the reader that his sources do not report the 
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details of a specific scene, that they differ, or that he wants to deviate from them. According to 
some critics, it is precisely this equivocation that makes the narrator a frustrating figure.48 As 
with Criseyde’s critics, those who write about the Troilus narrator vary in their ultimate 
determination of the narrator's efficacy, figuring him variously as "devious,”49 "uneasy,”50 "a 
“performer,”51 "flawed,”52 "idiot-historian,”53 or as “uncertain and fluctuating.”54 Regardless of 
their ultimate evaluation, critics tend to focus on the narrator’s two abiding preoccupations: the 
question of what to do with textual authority and the question of what to do with Criseyde. As I 
show in this section, these issues dovetail by the end of the narrative in order to frame Chaucer’s 
interrogation of what can be known about the written past. The narrator filters his refusal to fully 
know the past through his relationship with Criseyde, who, even as the presumed agent of 
                                                
 48 David Lawton summarizes the critical attitude of that considers the narrator's pursuits 
as threatening to undermine the poem itself, stating "we have characterized its narrator in 
terms that grossly insult Chaucer's own textual performance" (Chaucer’s Narrators, 90).  
 49 Ida Gordon refers to the narrator as “devious” in The Double Sorrow of Troilus: A  
Study of Ambiguities in ‘Troilus and Criseyde’ (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), 126.  
See also, Richard Wawso, "The Narrator of Troilus and Criseyde," ELH 50.1 (1983): 1-
25, 11. 
 50 Winthrop Wetherbee, Chaucer and the Poets, An Essay on Troilus and Criseyde 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 31. 
 51 Robert Jordan writes that “predominantly… he is a teller of other men's tales, a 
jongleur, a public performer—emphatically not an “auctor” or poet.” See “The Narrator 
in Chaucer’s Troilus,” ELH 25 (1958): 237-57, 238. 
 52 Donald Rowe, 0 Love, 0 Charite! Contraries Harmonized in Chaucer's Troilus, 
(Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Press, 1976), 160. 
 53 Although he later alters his position, A.C. Spearing writes of the “idiot-historian of 
Troilus and Criseyde” as Chaucer’s update of the “idiot-dreamer” of The Book of the 
Duchess. See Spearing, A.C. “Chaucer the Writer,” in Maurice Hussey, A.C. Spearing, 
and James Winny, An Introduction to Chaucer, 115-32 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1965), 121 
 54 For Lawton, the Troilus narrator “scrutinizes his text like a dreamer scans the mise-en-
scène of his dream,” which lends him also the dreamer’s characteristic uncertainty. See 
Chaucer's Narrators, 78-9. 
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Troilus’ destruction, remains unknowable in the text. Keeping in mind Margherita’s arguments 
against turning Criseyde’s unknowability into a trope, I would like to examine this 
unknowability in order to re-situate the Troilus narrator’s attempt to forge an ethical relationship 
to the past. Viewed in this light, the descriptions of the Troilus narrator as a failed storyteller or 
as Dinshaw’s “masculinist” reader fall short by ignoring the narrator’s attempt to balance the 
possibility of an unknowable past (as seen through Criseyde) with the burden of having to tell the 
story anyways.  
The Troilus narrator has generated such interest among its readers, in part, 
because he is so visible. Moreover, as Donald Rowe posits, it is to the narrator that the 
reader must turn to get a handle on the poem’s ambiguities (153). Because the narrator 
admits his status as a failed lover himself (and one who expresses a desire to exonerate 
Criseyde), it is not surprising that Criseyde represents his largest narratological blind 
spot. Other readers see potential in this relationship. For Donaldson, “in order to 
understand Criseide properly we should first have to send the narrator to a psychoanalyst 
for a long series of treatments and then ask him to rewrite the poem on the basis of his 
own increased self-knowledge” (67). Indeed, as the daughter of Calchas, a “gret devyn” 
and the first locus of authority in the text (“lord of greet auctoritee”), Criseyde is from the 
beginning situated within the dialectics of knowing against which the narrator so 
conspicuously labors (1.65-66) The narrator’s investment in Criseyde does not, in any 
way, equate to knowledge of his heroine, but instead emphasizes the gravity with which 
he undertakes his task. While the narrator may recognize Criseyde’s “entente” as the 
central force organizing his narrative, he struggles to find in his sources adequate insight 
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into her thoughts and actions. Where David Lawton claims that this lack of recognition 
highlights the narrator's function as rhetorician and “artificer,” it may also attest to the 
sheer unknowability of Criseyde, history, and the process of re-writing.  
 The labor the narrator expends trying to make sense of his sources and control his 
tale erupt into constant intrusions into the narrative. Not that this narrator is particularly 
unique among medieval narrators. For instance, as is the custom for many a medieval 
romance, the Troilus narrator relies frequently on the rhetorical trope occupatio, which 
alludes to an event by denying it will be mentioned—a kind of present absence. While 
medieval romance narrators typically employ this device to aid the romance mechanics of 
suspension and deferral as regards the revelation of the protagonist’s desired object, the 
Troilus narrator employs occupatio more literally as an admission that he cannot convey 
the consequences of his own narratological actions. Throughout the narrative, his 
interactions with Criseyde lead to moments in which the narrator confronts, through her, 
what exceeds his ability to know as a storyteller: “Of hire delit or joie soon the leeste/ 
Were impossible to my wit to seye” (III.1310-12). Rather than declare the inexpressibility 
of Criseyde’s desire de facto, the narrator emphasizes that the inability is his (“to my 
wit”), a confession of personal incompetence he reiterates two lines later when offering 
that “I kan namore” (1314). He knows nothing more. 
Criseyde does not appear to represent the fundamentally unknowable, however—
the narrator suggests that her desires are still part of the knowable, recoverable historical 
record: “Nought lyst myn auctour fully to declare/ What that she thoughte whan he seyde 
so” (III.575-76). Rather, Criseyde’s unknowability in Troilus is a function of the 
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narrator’s desire and his understanding of the past, but as the audience, readers participate 
in the difficulty of felicitously following an “auctour.” When the narrator wants to rely on 
a singular textual authority, he is sometimes unable to locate the proper narrative strand: 
"Nought lyst myn auctour fully to declare/ What that she thoughte whan he seyde so" (III. 
576-77). Conversely, when trying to extricate himself and his narrative from the rigidity 
of his own tale's telling, he often discloses an impotence to do so: "But sooth is, though I 
kan nat tellen al / As kan myn auctour, of his excellence" (III. l324-26). The narrator 
wants to believe in a source, a single authority from which his entire narrative might rely, 
and yet, if he invests such power in his presumed “auctour,” he must also acknowledge 
the gaps in this received vision of the Trojan past. A “double sorwe” indeed.  
Although these intrusions are not uncommon to medieval narrative, they are 
frequent (and distracting) enough to merit more sustained attention. It seems that these 
interruptions serve as the narrator’s performance of the difficulty of his job, the 
responsibility of not only establishing a unified textual ideology, but of needing to sustain 
it within an unending cycle of renewal. In essence, the task of the medieval narrator is a 
paradoxical one: to acquire authority (“auctoritas”), the narrator must create the 
impression of a closed text while at the same time recognizing the underlying openness 
that threatens to erupt and efface the illusion of a singular past. Larry Scanlon writes that 
the medieval concept of “auctoritas” bears great similarity to the comparatively modern 
notion of hegemony, inasmuch as it enacts an ideological dominance that bears on 
material reality and must constantly be "renewed and re-enacted" in order to be 
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sustained.55 In Troilus and Criseyde, "auctoritas" is not only established, it is blamed, 
praised, reinforced, avoided, stretched, and contracted; yet, the narrator never seems to 
quite know what to do with it. According to some critics, it is precisely this equivocation 
that makes the Troilus narrator a failed and frustrating figure, given the interests of the 
present analysis, this uncertainty is worth pursuing. 
This desire to impress his narrative with the vision of a unified past helps explain 
the invention of a persona, ‘Lollius,’ who stands in as the narrator’s ostensible source for 
important details. Early in Book One, when writing about Troilus’s initial impressions of 
Criseyde, the narrator identifies Lollius, as “myn auctour” (I. 394).56 However, rather 
than establish this source in order to corroborate his own version of the events, the 
naming of Lollius serves to distance the narrator from his primary source and establish 
his own, preeminent authority: 
 And of [Troilus’] song naught only the sentence, 
 As writ myn auctour called Lollius, 
 But plainly, save our tonges difference, 
 I dar wel seyn, in al, that Troilus 
 Sede in his song, loo, every word right thus 
 As I shal seyn; and whoso list it here, 
 Loo, next this verse he ma it fynden here. 
    (I. 393-99) 
 
Whereas Lollius can offer only the “sentence” or basic understanding of Troilus’s song, 
                                                
 55 Larry Scanlon, Narrative, Authority, and Power. The Medieval Exemplum and the 
Chaucerian Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 36. 
 56 The figure “Lollius” appears also in Chaucer’s House of Fame. Although there is still 
some debate, most Chaucerians place The House of Fame before Troilus in the 
chronology of his writings. In the House of Fame, Chaucer refers to Lollius as one of the 
poets who wrote about Troy, along with ‘Omer’ and ‘Guydo de Columpnis’ (III. 1468). 
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the narrator provides “every word,” providing, of course, for “our tonges difference.”57 
Even after reducing the numerous sources of Trojan history to one Lollius, the narrator 
insists that he can offer more. Given that Troilus names no other source, and that the first 
mention of Lollius coincides with the first mention of “auctour,” many readers of Troilus 
have assumed, reasonably, that Troilus’s ten other references to an “auctour” refer to that 
same Lollius, who is named explicitly only once more, at the end of Troilus (V.1653). 
The mentions of the narrator’s “auctour” often coincide with elements drawn from 
Boccaccio, whom we know Chaucer to have read. 
Although Chaucerians have searched exhaustively for an actual Lollius from 
which Chaucer might be drawing,58 the internal evidence suggests the far more likely 
                                                
 57 While Chaucer has been largely following Boccaccio to this point, the “Canticus 
Troili” that ensues is a translation of Petrarch’s “S’amor non è.”  
 58 Several theories have been proposed in order to establish Lollius as a historical 
personage. Thomas Speght, the first scholar to mention the “Lollius problem” (1598), 
identified him with a third-century “Italian historiographer,” as outlined in Lillian 
Hornstein, “Petrarch’s Laelius, Chaucer’s Lollius?” PMLA 63.1 (1948): 64-84. In 1868, 
R.G. Latham inaugurated a theory, later supported by Kittredge (1917), that the name 
derives from a misunderstanding of a line of Horace (Epistolae I, II, 1-2), but could not 
evidence his claim with any actual manuscript variances of this line. Latham, R.G. 
“Chaucer.” See Latham, The Athenaeum, Oct. 3, 1868. In his expansion of Latham, 
Kittredge assumes a lost work on the Trojan War by a Lollius; other than this large 
assumption, his claims are reasonable. According to Kittredge, “Chaucer takes quite 
particular pains to convey the impression that his Troilus… is a faithful translation from 
the Latin work of Lollius, without any material additions from other sources or from his 
own pen” and concludes that Lollius is “Chaucer’s fiction… whom Chaucer chooses, for 
his artistic purposes, to credit practically everything that the Troilus contains.” See 
Kittredge, "Chaucer's Lollius," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 27 (1917): 47-
109, 54-5. H.J. Epstein identifies a poet by the name of Bassus Lollius (d. 19 AD) from 
whom he builds a theory of how Chaucer might have discovered this author of epigrams 
through his Italian sources. Indeed, Epstein reads in Chaucer “some pride in marshaling 
this authority” and surmises that “Lollius seems to have been his discovery.” See Epstein, 
“The Identity of Chaucer’s Lollius,” Modern Language Quarterly 3 (1942): 391-400, 
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notion that Lollius is an invention of Chaucer/his narrator.59 Scholars have puzzled over 
Chaucer’s decision to not acknowledge his source(s), but these decisions resonate within 
the narrative not as Chaucer’s, but as the narrator’s, and remain consistent with the 
latter’s character. Considering the narrator’s worry about historical fidelity and about a 
knowable past, to collapse the narrative lineage of the fall of Troy (as well as the actual 
poem itself) unto a singular, mythical expression of authority should not surprise the 
reader. It would make sense for the narrator obsessed with historical authority to prefer a 
fictional, obscure, and older sounding authority to the contemporary, vernacular 
Boccaccio. In an attempt to simplify his historical burden, this displacement of 
“auctoritas” from many to one source provides the narrator with a single foil, one whose 
authority he may question, challenge and lament, and whose historio-literary 
inevitabilities he later attempts to resist.  
Chaucer and the Ethics of Re-Writing 
Critics have held stubbornly to a historical Lollius for a similar reason they have 
                                                                                                                                            
393. The aforementioned Hornstein chastises critics for wanting to read Lollius as a 
“literary hallucination,” and offers a theory that Lollius is a misreading of “Laelius,” a 
contemporary of Boccaccio and good friend of Petrarch (“Petrarch’s Laelius, Chaucer’s 
Lollius?”). R.A. Pratt comes to the rescue of Latham, as he discovers manuscript 
variances of the key line of Horace Latham believed to be mistaken as Lollius. See Pratt, 
“A Note on Chaucer’s Lollius,” Modern Language Notes 65 (1950): 183-87. 
 59 Only in 1977 do scholars begin to question the existence of Lollius. W.G. East states  
flatly, “the name Lollius is a joke,” a mere playful rendering of Boccaccio’s name. See East,  
“Lollius,” English Studies 58 (1977): 396-8, 398. See also Richard Utz, “‘As Writ Myn 
Auctour Called Lollius': Divine and Authorial Omnipotence in Chaucer's Troilus and 
Criseyde," in Nominalism and Literary Discourse: New Perspectives, eds. Hugo Keiper, 
Christoph Bode, and Richard Utz, 123-44 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997).  
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insisted on a knowable Criseyde. As figures of authorial imagination who were invented 
to create a more fluid transition from past to present, both are endowed with such 
meaning (and responsibility) that it seems hard to believe that they are not real. Critics 
must know the real Criseyde because so many of the text’s readers have maintained that 
they understand her; critics must find the real Lollius because previous theories about his 
identity, while compelling, have failed to account for Chaucer’s visible investment in this 
putative historical authority. Yet just as Criseyde and Lollius reduce the complexity of 
the past and, thus, make it easier for us to get from Troy to England in as few steps as 
possible, they also distance us from a thorny question: how does one make narrative 
choices without a precedent on which to rely, or when one has too many sources, or when 
one is not sure, or when the attempt at personalizing a history produces contradictions? 
Criseyde and Lollius are objects created in order to maintain the illusion of a consistent 
historical record so that the present might be explained in terms of the past. Regardless of 
his intentions, the narrator reveals the fundamental flaws imbedded within this view of 
historical writing. As Rowe writes, the narrator’s foreknowledge places him "in a 
position superior to his matter" at the beginning of Troilus, and as he becomes more 
invested in his tale's telling, "reacting to parts, he loses the whole" (159).  
In Book IV, the narrator distills his insecurities about a fully-knowable Trojan 
history, about translating from history to romance, and about his own emotional 
involvement in the lives of the characters into his concerns about portraying Criseyde. 
The exigencies of the poem’s narrative structure have brought the narrator to the point at 
which he must confront the tragic component that had heretofore only shadowed the 
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romance. The narrator’s agnostic pose regarding the unfolding of his text had previously 
mirrored Troilus’ passivity and Criseyde’s opacity, but he has delayed long enough, 
shrouded in the potential of unknowing his own narrative, and now he must press on: 
“And now my penne, allas, with chich I write,/ Quaketh for drede of that I most endite” 
(4.13-14). Although the narrator makes no explicit claim regarding the locus of this 
dread, the subsequent stanza posits Criseyde his primary object of concern: 
 For how Criseyde Troilus forsook— 
 Or at the leeste, how that she was unkynde 
 Moot hennesforth ben matere of my book, 
 As written folk thorugh which it is in mynde, 
 Allas, that they sholde evere cause fynde 
 To speke hire harm! And if they on hire lye, 
 Iwis, himself sholde han the vilanye 
 (IV.15-20) 
 
Without access to Criseyde’s “entente” (and without any “auctour” on which to rely), the 
narrator, even after resolving to disclose the betrayal that he fears speaking, remains 
committed to complicating the inherited history of Criseyde. He refuses to concretely 
avow Criseyde’s abandonment of Troilus, and poses the possibility that her “unkynde” 
actions (both unkind and unnatural) can only be understood outside of his narrative’s 
horizon of intelligibility.  
Having already divulged his attachment to Criseyde, the narrator attempts to 
avoid condemning her for as long as possible: someone else must be to blame for the 
parts of the narrative that criticize women and Criseyde. At such moments, the narrator 
invokes his old books, what "the storie telleth us." This strategy carries him even to Book 
V, where he describes Criseyde's inevitable turn to Diomede: 
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I fynde ek in the stories elleswhere, 
Whan thorugh the body hurt was Diomede 
Of Troilus, tho wepte she many a teere, 
Whan that she saugh his wyde wowndes blede; 
And that she took, to kepen hym, good hede; 
And for to helen hym of his sorwes smerte, 
Men seyn-I not-that she yaf hym hire herte.  
(V, 1044-50) 
 
The narrator’s refusal to commit to this textual comprehension of Criseyde (“Men seyn—
I not”) marks him both as responsible historian, dissociated from a past he cannot know, 
and as an incompetent storyteller, unable to follow to completion the narrative strand he 
began. While his ‘othering’ of a romance female is far from novel, the narrator’s 
commitment to its maintenance and to unknowing Criseyde parallels his feelings about 
the writing process itself. All of this suggests a reading of Criseyde as something far 
more than the Freudian “dark continent.” The unknowing of Criseyde reflects, for the 
narrator, both an ethical decision and a structural necessity for the integrity of the 
narrative as romance. 
Criseyde, of course, correctly predicts her own literary fate in the poem, 
prophesying that future iterations of the narrative will destroy her (“wol me shende”). 
Having made more or less the same speech since her first narrative appearance, Criseyde, 
like the narrator, understands knowing as a textual act. It is not surprising, then, that 
Chaucer adds to Criseyde’s traditional lament by including the narrator in the meta-
textual discussion of Criseyde’s reputation. Providing a counter-weight to Criseyde’s 
traditionally self-pitying apology, the narrator reaffirms Criseyde’s undying guilt as a 
purely textual matter and pleads that his readers put her body to rest:  
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 Ne me ne list this sely womman chyde 
Forther than the storye wol devyse. 
Hire name, allas! is punysshed so wide, 
That for hire gilt it oughte ynough suffise.  
(V. 1093-96) 
 
In discussing the narrator’s “turn” in Book V from trying to defend Criseyde to 
acknowledging her guilt, it is important to emphasize a few things. First, however open-
ended Criseyde’s “entente” may be, the same cannot be said for her actions. Throughout 
all five books, the narrator locates moments where an absence in the historical record 
provides him with an opportunity to destabilize what his reader might think he or she 
knows about Criseyde, and thus re-infuse his putatively historical narrative with 
possibility once more. Yet while the narrator may unknow Criseyde by concentrating on 
the narrative’s logical gaps and on her “entente,” he cannot, in the end, fully separate her 
from the structural desire that required her advent in the first place. Criseyde’s function 
and destiny were determined before she ever entered the narrative tradition.  
The narrator cannot change “history,” but he can employ literary techniques that, 
taken together with his insistent refrain of objectivity, threaten the truth claims the Matter 
of Troy was meant to instantiate. The narrator, it seems, is less troubled by Criseyde’s 
guilt than he is for having to re-tell it. The narrator’s final admission of Criseyde’s 
guilt—“That al be that Criseyde was untrewe” (V.1774)— has been understood too 
frequently as a critical end point, an indication of a narrator too defeated to continue the 
difficult project of un-knowing Criseyde.60 As the narrator adds two lines later, with an 
                                                
60 Dinshaw reads the ending of Troilus as a confirmation that the originally "multiple" 
narrator of Troilus and Criseyde has given into the same masculinist impulse to 
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ostensibly earnest defensiveness, “Ye may hir gilt in othere bokes see”: the textual record 
speaks for itself (V.1776). Of course the narrator has spent the last eight thousand lines 
proving that the authority of his source contains so many gaps that readers might rightly 
begin to question how reliable medieval narratives about the past really are. What critics 
routinely overlook in these closing moments of the poem is that Chaucer’s literary 
subversion of Trojan history, which requires the narrator to affirm his duty as historical 
“instrument” while continuing to undermine his “auctour,” has already taken hold.  
Although critics regard Troilus and Criseyde as Chaucer’s “most historical 
poem,” the collapse of Chaucer’s actual sources onto a singular, fictional representative 
of historical fidelity, Lollius, only magnify the narrator’s deviations from the 
historiographic record.61 Chaucer’s narrator turns out to be an inversion of Boccaccio’s in 
                                                                                                                                            
streamline thought as do the male critics of Troilus, dissolving narrative tension in order 
to arrive, unequivocally, where the story began: with the historical fact of Criseyde’s 
guilt (Chaucer’s Sexual Poetics, 28). In order to better characterize the narrator’s role in 
the unknowing of Criseyde it may be useful to compare the actions of Troilus’ “failed 
lover” narrator with another famous Chaucerian narrator, the “eunuch” Pardoner of the 
Canterbury Tales. Dinshaw draws an implicit comparison between these two narrators in 
her Chaucer’s Sexual Poetics, which contains chapters on both the Troilus narrator and 
on the Pardoner, whose projects she opposes to one another. By noting the parallels 
between these two narrators as well as the differences, we might see the Pardoner's 
“castration” is more of an interpretive means toward an argument about the status of 
language (and of the ethical demands of retelling) than a critical end in itself. Analyses 
that reduce the Pardoner to a discourse on sexuality and condense the discussion of 
Troilus narrator unto his sources may obscure the importance of these narrators’ 
contributions to a conversation on the difficult position of the Chaucerian narrator. In 
redirecting the critical narratives concerning both the Pardoner and the Troilus narrator 
toward the structural relationships they maintain with the act of narration itself, these 
figures can be seen not as anomalous failures, but as characters who embody the 
difficulties faced by medieval storytellers as well as the subsequent anxieties about 
auctoritas and the ethics of re-telling, Christian and secular. 
61 Sylvia Federico discusses Troilus and Criseyde’s “literary future” fueled by narrative acts she  
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Il Filostrato, and the differences between these two storytellers help outline Chaucer’s 
departure from Boccaccio, and from the demands of history. Unlike Boccaccio’s narrator, 
Chaucer’s is no lover; where Boccaccio’s narrator explicitly allies himself with Troilo, 
Chaucer’s invests in Criseyde; and, finally, whereas the narrator folds Filostrato’s 
literary aspirations into the teleology of its historical moral, the Troilus narrator renders 
Boccaccio’s “rhetoric of closure” into Chaucer’s “poetics of unknowing.”62 
* * * 
As traced in the previous sections, the motif of unknowability in Troilus and 
Criseyde helps unite three prominent features of Chaucer’s text: a narrator who 
constantly calls attention to the knowability of the historical record; a version of Criseyde 
who is often at odds with the historical reputation she has inherited; and a series of formal 
changes enacted by Chaucer that place him at odds with his sources. On the formal level, 
the combination of these features suggests that there is more to the story than has been 
recorded. The sense of a larger, inaccessible historical record lurking behind the 
uncertainty corroborates—at least indirectly—the historicity of a character who exists 
solely as an historiographical mechanism and a explanatory function. In this sense, these 
narrative eruptions might be understood better as formal features that help create the 
illusion or the effect of a historical depth from which Criseyde the subject has emerged, in 
fragmentary form.  
                                                                                                                                            
calls “not history.” See "Chaucer's Utopian Troy Book: Alternatives to Historiography in Troilus 
and Criseyde," Exemplaria 11.1 (1999): 79-106. 
62 James Dean employs the phrase “rhetoric of closure” to describe Boccaccio’s poem in 
“Chaucer’s Troilus, Boccaccio’s Filostrato, and the Poetics of Closure,” Philological 
Quarterly 64.2 (1985): 175-84, 175. 
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If indeed Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde “unknows” Criseyde, and if, as I have 
argued so far in this dissertation, one effect of this literary unknowing is to suspend 
questions of knowledge and/or meaning that putatively historical figures have come to 
inherit, how are the effects of unknowing Criseyde manifest? To answer this question, I 
return to the narrator’s admonition at the beginning of Book V, quoted earlier, that 
readers not punish her “forther than the storye wol devyse” (1094). Here the narrator 
comments on the same extra-textual phenomenon that Criseyde herself laments 
throughout her narrative history: that her reputation has exceeded her narrative function. 
This had been the case for decades if not centuries by the time of Chaucer’s poem, and 
this excessive quality was not lost on prior authors, just as it was not lost on Criseyde. 
Boccaccio, along with his predecessors, remedies the problem by reintegrating this 
excess into a masculine economy of history, wherein Criseyde’s misdeeds are moralized 
into a historical truth about the fickleness of women, a kind of necessary irritant inherent 
to, but in excess of, the process of translatio. This moralization is, however, 
conspicuously absent in Chaucer’s narrative. Chaucer’s narrator does not instrumentalize 
Criseyde’s guilt for any purpose, but instead asks that she be forgiven. This would strike 
some readers as a reasonable request, considering especially how the narrator has already 
destabilized the conditions by which her blame was so easily assigned. However, despite 
the narrator’s efforts to mitigate the blame Criseyde receives, he does not achieve his 
goal. The narrator cannot put Criseyde’s body to rest.  
This excessive quality to Troilus and Criseyde did not go unremarked by its 
readers. First among these is Robert Henryson who, nearly a century after the 
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composition of Troilus and Criseyde, retrofits Chaucer’s narrative with a sense of 
finality. In The Testament of Cresseid (late-fifteenth century), Henryson’s narrator, 
inspired by a dream vision, rereads the end of Chaucer’s Troilus before picking up “an 
uther quaire” that becomes the Testament itself, a narrative in which Chaucer’s heroine is 
unequivocally judged and sentenced. Henryson’s account of Cresseid’s demise begins 
when, abandoned by Diomede, she contracts leprosy (a clear sign of sexual impropriety) 
and ends shortly after when, failing to recognize Troilus when he takes pity on her, she 
dies alone confessing her wrongdoing once and for all. Perhaps due to its tidy punishment 
of its heroine, the Testament gained the status of Troilus’ official-unofficial ending. In the 
first printed edition of Chaucer’s works (1532), William Thynne included The Testament 
of Cresseid as Troilus and Criseyde’s “sixth book” and thus inaugurated a century of 
confusion in which the Testament was often mistaken as Chaucer’s work.  
What made Henryson’s 600-line coda, which differs from the Troilus in genre, 
dialect, and tone, so popular? The fact that so many readers wanted to understand the 
Testament as Troilus’s ending suggests first and foremost a confirmation of the excess 
generated but left suspended by Chaucer’s unknowing-knowing Criseyde. Regardless of 
the debates over whether Henryson was sympathetic to his heroine or not, it is apparent 
that he felt some need to punish Cresseid and, moreover, that a subsequent generation of 
readers expressed a similar desire. Chaucer’s readers needed to know how Criseyde’s 
story ends. The popularity of the Testament suggests that Cresseid gets what some 
readers felt she deserved.  
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If the act of unknowing Criseyde rendered her historical guilt excessive because it 
could not be instrumentalized towards any purpose, The Testament of Cresseid attempted 
to salvage the historical work of Troilus and Criseyde by inserting Criseyde into its 
economy of justice. The popularity of the Testament testifies to the discomfort some 
readers experienced as a result of Chaucer’s unknowing of Criseyde, but we still cannot 
know what historical intentions Chaucer may have had in writing Troilus and Criseyde. 
Chaucer’s attention to what we do not and cannot know about Criseyde destabilizes what 
we do know about her as well as what we need to know in order to consider her 
knowable. That a fact-finding narrator cannot unearth trivial, but seemingly obvious, 
details makes these absences even more poignant.63 Yet there is more to Chaucer’s 
treatment of history in Troilus and Criseyde than missing stories: Chaucer’s Troilus 
presents its readers with a hermeneutic paradox. On the one hand, there exists the 
narrator’s conspicuous detours from the historical “matere,” which have long been the 
focus of earlier Trojan narratives. On the other hand, the very choice to treat the “Matter 
of Troy”—what Lee Patterson has termed a foundational myth of secular medieval 
history— belies an equally discernable interest in the function of late-medieval 
historiography.64 This paradox, combined with Justice’s observation about Chaucer’s 
“history effect” that gives his characters a subjective depth to which readers have no 
                                                
63 Elizabeth Scala discusses the formal importance of such absence in medieval 
narrative, especially in Chaucer’s works, noting that medieval narratives are often 
“structured by missing stories.” See Scala, Absent Narratives: Manuscript Textuality, and 
Literary Structure in Late Medieval England (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 8. 
 64 Patterson notes the “special urgency” surrounding the time of the poem’s composition 
as one possible source of Chaucer’s interest in what Patterson calls “the philosophy of 
history” (Chaucer and the Subject of History, 84-5).  
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access, raises an important question: why does Chaucer engage the past so frequently in a 
narrative that readily admits to the impossibility of any meaningful recovery of that past? 
While Elizabeth Scala rightly points out that Middle English literature produces its 
impact via narrative gaps, Troilus and Criseyde shows how Middle English literature’s 
recourse to re-writing also involves a deliberate un-knowing of stories that were received 
as history. These narratives must be repurposed and un-known in order to make space for 
an ethics of, literary writing. 
Although Criseyde’s reemergence in Henryson appears to enact a sort of “return 
of the repressed,” it does not guarantee (or even suggest) that readers might fully 
understand Criseyde upon finishing this “uther quaire.” Nor can critics know what 
element of Boccaccio’s adaptation urged Chaucer to write his poem. This has not, of 
course, stopped critics from trying to answer these impossible questions. In discussing 
C.S. Lewis’ famous thesis regarding Chaucer’s encounter with Il Filostrato, George 
Edmondson avers that Boccaccio “disinters” Troilus from his historical grave, “his story 
made to repeat itself after it has already found its ending.”65 In connecting what eludes 
our understanding of a complicated relationship between history, narrative, desire, and 
some of the most influential Chaucerian criticism, Edmondson’s use of psychoanalytic 
concepts provides a novel framework for discussing that which otherwise remains 
inaccessible to the modern scholar. This is certainly useful, yet I do not want to dispense 
so easily with the unknowable, for it is precisely the irresolvable nature of what remains 
                                                
65 Edmondson, The Neighboring Text: Chaucer, Boccaccio, Henryson (Notre Dame: U 
of Notre Dame P, 2011) 102.  
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unknown in Troilus and Criseyde that undergirds Chaucer’s contribution to the 
“philosophy of history.” Adherence to the psychoanalytical model of hermeneutics has 
too often given critics the false impression that Criseyde’s “entente” might be recoverable 
as long as we critics produce our best analytical work. 
Insofar as Criseyde’s guilt and unwieldy reputation ground a common moral that unites 
the Trojan past and English present, it appears that Chaucer’s narrator’s plea to end Criseyde’s 
excessive torment must remain structurally unmet. After all, her proposed betrayal becomes the 
knowledge that structures the possibility for a felicitous translation from past to present. In this 
sense, Criseyde cannot be put to rest, not because she has never been anything more than a 
function, but because she is herself the tomb for a Trojan history that has ascended to higher 
realms. Insofar as these medieval writers substitute her actions for those that facilitate the Fall of 
Troy, Criseyde’s betrayal becomes the act through which the past is buried in order to regenerate 
itself into the future. Her betrayal provides the necessary means by which translatio occurs. 
But since Criseyde’s guilt in Troilus and Criseyde guarantees nothing, suspending the 
question translatio guaranteed by earlier narratives, I would like to insist, both with and against 
Edmondson, that the narrator’s refusal to subject Criseyde’s betrayal to some greater, knowable 
truth positions Troilus and Criseyde within “the space between two deaths.”66 This formulation 
derives from Jacques Lacan’s notion of a second death beyond physical death, “the point at 
                                                
66 The theme of the “space between two deaths” resounds throughout Edmondson’s The 
Neighboring Text. Through much of the book, Edmondson insists on Troilus’ status 
between two deaths, but ends his chapter on Troilus and Criseyde by suggesting that 
“Able neither to add nor subtract, the narrator simply hands his enjoyment over to the 
socio-Symbolic Other… leaving Criseyde precisely where her words have left her: in the 
space between two deaths” (The Neighboring Text, 196).  
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which the very cycles of the transformations of nature are annihilated.”67 This term, which has 
been overused within literary studies, refers to a mode of an extreme isolation seldom 
encountered by literary characters, a space of unknowing within which absence and presence 
become indistinguishable, a place where existence and non-existence are united by their shared 
lack of demand. Whereas Edmondson sees Troilus “disrupt the logic of the symbolic order” from 
within this space, I would like to insist that he is in fact powerless to do so (150). As Henryson 
makes clear in his Testament, it is Criseyde who haunts the symbolic economy from without, the 
leper who needs to be “eliminated from the world of the living.”68  
While Criseyde’s abandonment of Troilus sends Troilus into something of a zombie-like 
state, he has always already been encrypted insofar as Troy has always already fallen. After all, 
in the logic of translatio imperii, it is the action of Troy’s downfall that signifies, not the city 
itself. Troilus’ death depends on Criseyde’s betrayal, which, of course, is not up for debate. 
Chaucer’s narrator, however, refuses to employ Criseyde’s betrayal toward a specific 
epistemological end. The unknowing of Criseyde not only leaves her suspended but leaves the 
text itself between two kinds of death. Criseyde’s famous laments in which she bemoans the 
reputation with which she shall be received mark her recognition of an existence that is already 
both fragmentary, insofar as her agency has already been taken from her, and excessive, insofar 
as her textual body will exceed and outlive the “historical” body that the text will leave behind. 
Criseyde never experiences the “second death” that would remove her from the signifying 
economy in the same act that mobilizes her to fulfill a function within it. So too does Troilus and 
                                                
67 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan 
Book VII, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: Norton, 1997), 248.  
68 Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 280. 
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Criseyde avoid the event of encryption that might, as Lacan puts it, “end the cycles of 
transformation,” the act through which Empire might rest squarely, permanently in England. 
Through Troilus and Criseyde’s unknowing of the efficacy for which Criseyde’s betrayal is 
purposed, we might say then that when Chaucer “disinters” Troilus from Boccaccio’s grave, he 
leaves the tomb open.  
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Chapter Three 
Pearl and the Arithmepoetics of Unknowing 
 
“But I haven’t been writing,” Ulrich said crisply. 
“I’m glad to hear it.” Arnheim adjusted to the fact.  
“Writing, like the pearl, is a disease.”  
   -Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities 
 
 
The third-century Syrian Acts of Thomas, whose influence I will trace in chapter 
four through the Prester John legend, contains a poetic excursion through which we might 
glimpse the curious history of another medieval conduit of unknowability: the pearl.  
Shortly before the Apostle Thomas outlines King Gundafor’s famously ethereal 
palace that later serves as the blueprint for Prester John’s own residence, the apocryphal 
Acts of Thomas (early third century) breaks off into a Gnostic poem of Syrian origin, 
often referred to as “Hymn of the Pearl.”1 Within the poem, Thomas is sent to Egypt 
equipped with a message, written into his heart, which instructs him to wrest a pearl from 
a serpent. In return, his father promises that Thomas will earn the rights to the kingdom. 
Thomas adheres purposefully to the message. Once he arrives in Egypt, he heads 
directly for the serpent. However, because he disguises himself as an Egyptian, the 
residents confuse him for a local. Resigned by politeness to acquiesce to their hospitality, 
                                                
 1 Here I follow A.F.J. Klijn’s edition of The Acts of Thomas, Supplements to the Novum 
Testamentum 5 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962), 120-25. At this point in the narrative of the 
Acts, the king Mazdai sends Thomas to prison where Thomas chants the hymn in 
response to a request by the other prisoners to pray for t hem. In his commentary on 
the hymn, Klijn remarks on the difficulty of discerning what is meant by the pearl in the 
poem (277-8).  
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Thomas becomes distracted; he forgets his task and, full of food and drink, falls into a 
deep sleep. Meanwhile, hearing no word from his son, Thomas’ father sends a letter of 
reminder from his kingdom. This letter, a magical document, arrives at its slumbering 
recipient and coaxes the dreamer from his sleeping state by announcing its own arrival 
and message, urging the young prince to “Remember the pearl” (l. 45). Awakened to his 
task, the speaker retrieves the pearl and earns the rights to the kingdom.  
As a poem about the difficult recovery of a lost pearl whose rescue requires a 
metaphysical intervention to break through a dreamer’s state of resistance, the “Hymn of 
the Pearl” shares a fundamental structure with a better-known Middle English analogue.2 
In the fourteenth-century Pearl, too, a dreamer’s pearl, symbolizes, upon its retrieval, the 
gratification of a specific desire, completing a circuit among an external demand, the 
disembodied medium through which the demand travels, and the recognition of a desire 
to answer the demand. The strangeness of these poems, however, lies less in their 
symbolism and more in their narrative logic, which hinges on an impossible 
communication between conscious and non-conscious worlds.3 Moreover, in the latter 
poem, the burden of understanding resides not with that metaphysical agent of the vision, 
but with the pearl itself, an object that exists not only within but also between two worlds.  
                                                
 2 While I do not advocate a direct relation between the two texts, it is worth noting that 
Ross Arthur cites fourteenth-century sermons on the Apostle Thomas as one of the 
influences of Pearl. See “The Day of Judgment is Now: A Johannine Pattern in the 
Middle English Pearl,” American Benedictine Review 38 (1987): 227-42.  
 3 This “betweenness” has long been recognized as a hallmark trait of the dream vision genre.  
Steven Kruger, writing about medieval systems of dream interpretation, references Calcidius’ 
belief that no matter how significant, dream visions always prevent a full union between God and 
man. See Dreaming in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 992), 30; 41.  
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I compare these two poems not to posit an evolutionary teleology of their shared 
symbolism, but to insist that readings of the Middle English Pearl have not adequately 
accounted for the poet’s innovative handling of the rich symbolism of the medieval pearl. 
Although it has become a critical commonplace to note how the poet’s playful 
manipulation of the central symbol renders the poem’s signifying chain a veritable string 
of pearls, few studies have contextualized their reading within the rich medieval tradition 
of the pearl.4 As I will show, across medieval texts and contexts, from the Classical to the 
Christian, the figure of the pearl always signals a collision between material and 
immaterial forces, an encounter between what can be known/observed/studied and the 
phenomena that exceed human cognition.  
After establishing a history of the medieval pearl, I show how the poet develops 
the theme of the impossible encounter not only in the poem’s content but within its form, 
through which the poet attempts to articulate the impossible encounter of writing. 
                                                
 4 Theodore Bogdanos provides a useful model for integrating the traditional medieval 
symbolism of the pearl into a thematic reading of the poem, even though he views the 
poem’s context as “the ultimate shaping force of the symbol’s meaning.” See Pearl: 
Image of the Ineffable (University Park: Penn State UP, 1983), 14-19. While the critical 
literature focused on Pearl’s pearl tracks its symbolic evolution in the poem or its 
resonances outside of the text, no study attends to the object itself to ground a reading of 
the poem’s epistemology. William Schofield inspired the tradition of reading the poem 
allegorically in “The Nature and the Fabric of The Pearl,” PMLA 19.1 (1904): 154-215. 
Marie Padgett Hamilton situates the poem as dream-vision allegory in “The Meaning of 
the Middle English Pearl,” PMLA 70.4 (1955): 805-824. Stanton Hoffman outlines the 
meanings critics have attached to the pearl in "The Pearl: Notes for an Interpretation," 
Modern Philology 58.2 (1960): 73-80. A.C. Spearing proposes an understanding based on 
the evolving nature of Pearl’s pearl in “Symbolic and Dramatic Development in Pearl,” 
Modern Philology 60.1 (1962): 1-12. The biblical context of pearl symbolism is 
discussed in D.W. Robertson Jr., “The Pearl as Symbol,” Modern Language Notes 65.3 
(1950): 144-161, and more elaborately in Constantino Vona, “La Margarita Pretiosa 
Nella Interpretazione Di Alcuni Scrittori Ecclesiastici,” Divinitas 1 (1957): 118-160. 
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Through a rigorous engagement with mathematical principles of proportionality evident 
among all poems of the Cotton Nero A.x manuscript, Pearl imitates, but never achieves, 
the harmony that both poet and dreamer seek. In both cases, the anticipated event of 
union exceeds all available means of comprehension. Consequently, the pearl comes to 
represent something more than loss; given the interest in “crafting” shared by poet and 
dreamer, a jeweler, the pearl becomes the material embodiment of perfection that no act 
of human labor could ever achieve. It is then this excessive quality of this signifier, this 
pearl, that founds a poetics rooted in the impossibility of representing that which it so 
desperately seeks. Pearl crafts what I call an “arithmepoetics of unknowing”– a 
mathematical flattening of the signification process that, by approximating a meta-
language through which perfect the poem’s drive for perfection might be approached, 
calls into question the very possibility of generating meaning through language. 
Ultimately, the poem uses mathematical, theological, and linguistic principles to draw a 
parallel between writing and “good works” to demonstrate its lesson: only through faith, 
a state of unknowing can individuals engender a relationship with the Divine. 
 In other words, the goal of the chapter is to show how the poem builds on the 
tradition medieval significance of the pearl in order to posit a poetics capable of 
representing the impossible condition of knowledge as such. Pearl does so by 
contextualizing its discourse of un-knowing within a geometrically-inflected 
consideration of the pearl’s genesis as a perfectly felicitous (and thereby impossible) 
poetic act. Seeking a relationship between the medieval pearl and the poem’s formal 
architecture, I show how the poet extrapolates on the intellectual history of the pearl in 
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order to construct a spatial representation—not unlike a cathedral— of the dreamer’s 
desire for divine illumination.5 On the formal level, what results is a poem that attempts 
to establish a poetics informed by a meditation on the signifier itself (the pearl) that 
endeavors to unknow any event of signification (the act of union) to which it might 
aspire. It is in this way that the pearl becomes no mere symptom but, as Robert Musil 
quips in the epigraph to this chapter, the disease: the poetic act itself.  
• 
As becomes clear, the Middle English Pearl is hardly a typical dream vision.6 
Composed in the Northwest Midlands of England in the second half of the fourteenth 
century, Pearl begins a series of four poems (Cleanness, Patience, Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight) recorded by a single scribe in the manuscript now known as BL Cotton 
                                                
 5 There already exists a critical tradition, extending perhaps from Nolan’s influential 
Gothic Visionary Perspective, of scholars who link aspects of Pearl to a medieval visual 
tradition. See especially Britton Harwood’s emphasis on the visual aspects of the poem 
in, “Pearl as Diptych,” in Text and Matter: New Critical Perspectives of the Pearl-poet, 
eds. Robert Blanch, Miriam Youngerman Miller, and Julian Wasserman, 63-77 (Troy, 
NY: Whitson, 1991) and Ann Meyer’s superb discussion of allegorical architecture in 
Medieval Allegory and the Building of New Jerusalem (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2003).  
 6 Within the last thirty years especially, critics have disagreed about Pearl’s status 
within the traditional generic classification of the medieval dream vision. These 
disagreements suggest that, at the very least, Pearl is as an unorthodox example of the 
genre. At most, the dreamer’s resistance and seeming inability to comprehend the lesson 
of his vision situates the poem as a failed example of the traditional medieval genre, 
hinting that other factors must animate the poem’s epistemological framework. For the 
most nuanced treatment of Pearl within the traditions of mystical and dream vision, see 
Jessica Barr’s chapter, “Worldly Attachment and Visionary Resistance in Pearl,” in 
Willing to Know God: Dreamers and Visionaries in the Later Middle Ages (Columbus: 
Ohio State UP, 2010), 122-151. Although the dream vision has long been considered ripe 
generic ground for discussions of epistemological limits in medieval thought, I prefer 
here to focus on the figure of the pearl and its own attendant history with the unknown, 
for reasons I will make clear below.  
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Nero A.x.7 Pearl sets biblical matter into in a French-inspired rhyming pattern of 
ababababbcbc, and, though structurally resembling Boccaccio’s Latin eclogue Olympia, 
its metrical pattern of the alliterative long line bears the mark of English poetry’s 
resurgent use of Old English verse patterns.8 Pearl is divided into twenty sections, each 
containing five stanzas, which are composed of twelve lines. On the manuscript page, 
each five-stanza section takes up one stanza less than two complete pages, thereby 
linking folio leaves one to another. The poet provides cohesion within each section 
through the use of a key word that is repeated at the end (and also sometimes at the 
beginning) of each of its five stanzas. The poet also employs concatenation, through 
which he links the sections by repeating the last word of a section in the first line of the 
next section. As Sarah Stanbury observes, this complex interlinking creates “an echoic 
effect that strings stanzas together like pearls on a necklace.”9  
The only break in Pearl’s elegant and highly mathematical structure occurs in the 
fifteenth section, which contains an additional stanza (that is, a sixth), bringing the poem 
                                                
 7 There is still much disagreement regarding the dating of the poem/manuscript. Critics 
generally agree on a terminus a quo of 1348, the date that marks founding of the Order of 
the Garter, whose motto appears as a coda for the poem (although there is some question 
whether or not the coda was a later addition in a different hand). According to 
paleographical evidence, the terminus ad quem for the manuscript is c. 1400. For the 
most thorough account of the manuscript, see A.S.G. Edwards, "The Manuscript: British 
Library MS Cotton Nero A.x," in A Companion to the Gawain-Poet, eds. Derek Brewer 
and Jonathan Gibson, 197-220 (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1997). 
 8 As Sandra Pierson Prior avers, the poet “draws on biblical texts not just for subjects 
and stories but for their assumptions about history and narrative and about signs and 
patterns and how to interpret them.” See The Fayre Formez of the Pearl Poet (East 
Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1996), 1.  
 9 See Sarah Stanbury’s introduction to the TEAMS edition of Pearl, 6.  
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to 1212 lines and 101 stanzas.10 As has been long observed, the last line repeats the 
opening line and returns the reader to the original setting, the poem itself becomes 
circular, like a pearl. While the interactive nature of the manuscript suggests both a single 
authorship and a unifying thematic design, in a more fundamental way the manuscript’s 
abiding concerns with precision, containment, and expansion are expressed through the 
governing symbol of its first poem. In other words, the pearl, which symbolizes its 
poem’s desire for both meaning and enclosure, becomes an emblem of the larger 
structural program of the manuscript: regulated (and perhaps overdetermined) by an 
architectural precision, but inspired by the celestial forces that resist codification 
(evidenced by an obsession with proportionality), the pearl frames poem and manuscript 
as negotiating a tension between circumscription and illimitability.11  
                                                
 10 Much has been made of the importance of numbers in Pearl and especially to the 
question of the extra stanza in section 15 that runs the poem’s total to 101 stanzas. 
Critical attention to the numerical structure of the poem first appears in print in C.O. 
Chapman supplies a complicated and ultimately unpersuasive explanation for the need 
for an extra stanza (it allowed the total to be 99, a significant number, if we discount the 
last two stanzas which exist outside of the main narrative of the poem). See Chapman, 
“Numerical Symbolism in Dante and the Pearl,” Modern Language Notes 54 (1939): 
256-9. Patricia Kean suggests that the out of place stanza signals a numerological break 
in from a system based in 5’s to one of 6’s and allows the poem’s 1200 lines to swell to a 
more significant (in terms of Revelation numerology) 1212. See Kean, “Numerical 
Composition in Pearl,” Notes & Queries 12 (1965): 49-51. Condren is far more 
exhaustive than previous engagements with the significance of numbers in the poems of 
Cotton Nero A.x, as he moves a way from a numerological interpretation to a geometric 
and/or proportional understanding of the uses of these key numbers. See The Numerical 
Universe of the Gawain-Pearl Poet: Beyond Phi (Gainesville: U of Florida P, 2002) 
11 Although Pearl and its companion poems appear nowhere outside of Cotton Nero 
A.x., literary scholars have struggled to definitively establish that the poems were 
composed by a single author. Although arguments disputing a clear indication of single 
authorship have been made fairly consistently since William Schofield’s article in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, the most plausible arguments for a multiple 
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Like other critics, I hesitate to submit Pearl to an evolutionary understanding of 
the medieval vision, especially one in which, as Kathryn Lynch contends, “differences 
such as those between the ‘supernatural’ in a medieval world view and the ‘unconscious’ 
in a modern one become simply the differences of ‘terminology.’”12 I think Pearl resists 
conforming to traditional critical narratives not only because the poem so forcefully 
controls its own poetics, but also due to its paradoxical status as a self-contained poem 
that nonetheless proves to be highly unstable. Hoping to unite thematic concerns with the 
poem’s formal geometry, I turn to poetics.  
Before undertaking a reading of the major scenes of Pearl, I want to isolate a 
moment near the end of the poem to frame the more local intervention I would like to 
make in this chapter into the subfield of Pearl studies. Within the poem’s final act of 
dialogue the dreamer asks to be shown “Þat myry mote” [city/court] that has become the 
Maiden’s home (l. 936). More than a plea to glimpse something of the celestial New 
Jerusalem, the dreamer’s entreaty resonates as a last-ditch attempt to persuade the 
Maiden to make visible, and thereby recoverable, the materiality of his lost pearl. And 
                                                                                                                                            
authorship tend to be made on linguistic grounds. See, for example, Matsuji Tajima, 
“Additional Syntactical Evidence Against the Common Authorship of MS Cotton Nero 
A.x,” English Studies 59.3 (1978): 193-98 and Yoko Iyeiri, “MS Cotton Nero A.x. poems 
once again: A study of contracted negative forms,” in English Historical Linguistics and 
Philology in Japan, eds. Jacek Fisiak and Akio Oizumi, 79-90 (Berlin: Walter de Guyter, 
1998). While critics have located some unifying tendencies based on linguistic habits 
evident in each of the poems, the most persuasive evidence for a single author comes 
from the innovative and mathematically complex formal patterns that govern the 
manuscript and the interactions among and between poems. It is precisely through the use 
of numbers that readers glimpse the poetic and thematic designs of a poem that otherwise 
seems quite impenetrable.  
12 See The High Medieval Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy, Literary Form (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1988), 3. 
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yet, as the Maiden continually insists, none of what this jeweler sees is really happening: 
these dream experiences necessarily exceed a mortal capacity to sense and reason. 
Moreover, as we have learned from the poem’s first stanza, a perfect pearl possesses no 
such “mote” [stain/spot/blemish], which resounds as the underlying principle that makes 
its recovery impossible. Accordingly, the dreamer’s request to be shown this “mote” of 
New Jerusalem is met with a paradoxical rejoinder from the Maiden, who describes the 
New Jerusalem as “Hys mote withouten moote,” a self-cancelling turn of phrase that 
threatens to undo the only means of knowing left to the dreamer (l. 948).  
It is only when the two understandings of “mote” cancel each other out that the 
reader can confidently conclude that Pearl’s vision contains little to nothing of its genre’s 
claims to revelation: these dream experiences hardly correlate with any knowledge that 
might be implemented in the material world.13 When the Maiden subsequently denies the 
dreamer’s request to access the New Jerusalem, citing his failure to meet the prerequisite 
condition of being “clene wythouten mote” (l. 972), the poem confirms the impossible 
status of the vision itself: material existence already presupposes the sin or “mote” from 
which one must separate in order to experience the truths the Maiden espouses. The 
vision, like the poem itself, merely approximates a felicitous interaction between the 
material world and the celestial hereafter. When the poem transitions to its promised 
vision of the New Jerusalem (ll. 973-1152), the dreamer is confronted with an utterly 
                                                
 13 Of this scene, Sylvia Tomasch writes, “Synonyms…antonyms… and traditional 
puns… become inextricably, humorously, and seriously intermixed when to "enter 
wythinne hys tor" or the "elene eloystor" the dreamer himself must first, outside of the 
city, be without spot: "elene wythouten mote." See "A Pearl Punnology," JEGP 88 
(1989): 1-20; 10. 
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conventional representation that merely conforms to his previous knowledge of 
Revelation (ll. 985-6).14  
The poet’s careful attention to language at this late stage in the poem reveals that 
the critique of the dreamer’s desire for divine knowledge resonates not only at the level 
of argument, but also formally, at the level of its poetics. Just as the pearl escapes 
material possession, so too does it exceed linguistic comprehension, a reminder that the 
pearl is not just a thing, but a kind of negative space. Even in its symbolic plentitude, here 
the pearl resonates not as some evasive knowledge from which the dreamer might 
benefit, but instead signals the unknowability of a meaningful contact between material 
and immaterial worlds. What representational tools are then left to a poet so emphatic 
about the inadequacies of human sense and language without having to accede to the 
Maiden’s poetics of failure? 
To begin, I think that for the most part, studies of the poem have avoided this 
despairing conclusion by attending to what readers can know from the poem about this 
intersection of earthly and divine worlds. For instance, the longstanding debate across 
decades of Pearl criticism— that of whether Pearl is better understood as elegy or as 
allegory— can be simplified to opposed accounts of how the poet handles the scene of 
contact between material and immaterial worlds. For the elegists, championing a view of 
the jeweler as physical man coping with the loss of a small child “Ho watȝ me nerre then 
                                                
 14 While Bogdanos remarks the poet’s boldness in creating a dreamer who claims to see 
what the Apostle himself saw, I suggest that readers experience this New Jerusalem as no 
more “real” (i.e. materially graspable) than the Maiden herself. See Bogdanos, Image of 
the Ineffable, 12.  
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aunte or nece,” this realm resonates as a space of loss, designating the Maiden’s function 
as primarily consolatory (l. 233).15 For those who insist on an allegorical reading, the 
realm between worlds is generally a theological space, one whose lack of experiential 
record obligates the Maiden to carefully delimit its opaque doctrinal contours.16  
Of course, for many, the elegy/allegory question has lost currency as a viable 
approach to the poem: recent criticism shows how this framework creates a false divide 
between what can be ultimately reduced to a genre (elegy) and a literary mode 
(allegory).17 The more closely one reads Pearl, the more one realizes the impossibility of 
untangling Pearl’s personal and symbolic registers. A purely elegiac reading centered on 
a private loss risks conflating the dreamer-jeweler with the poet, whose voice resounds 
                                                
 15 The poem’s nineteenth-century editors championed an elegiac interpretation (Morris, 1864; 
Osgood, 1906; Gollancz, 1921), which has remained popular. P.M. Kean aptly summarizes the 
elegiac attitude by insisting that the maiden “represents the soul of a person who once lived, and 
with whom the dreamer had the special relationship of father to child, not of lover to beloved.” 
See The Pearl: An Interpretation (Routledge: New York, 1967), 130.  
 16 Schofield inaugurates the tradition of reading Pearl as dream vision allegory, a critical  
practice that resists the poem’s ambiguity. Other critics view Pearl as spiritual allegory. See  
Hamilton, “The Meaning of the Middle English Pearl”; Ian Bishop, The Pearl in its Setting: A  
Critical Study of the Structure and Meaning of the Middle English Poem (Oxford: Blackwell,  
1968); Louis Blenkner, "The Theological Structure of Pearl," Traditio 24 (1968): 43-75; and  
Lawrence Clopper, "Pearl and the Consolation of Scripture." Viator 23, (1992): 231-45.  
 17 J.B. Fletcher planted the seed for reconciliation in “The Allegory of the Pearl,” JEGP 
20 (1921): 1-21, and the theme is developed further in Bogdanos, Image of the Ineffable; 
Sandra Pierson Prior, The Pearl Poet Revisited (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994); 
and Sarah Stanbury’s introduction to Pearl (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, 2001). 
Thomas Niemann summarizes the critical sea change admirably: “Where allegorists 
overread the text, forcing on it external structures and meanings it cannot sustain, the 
elegists persistently underread it, refusing to admit that words are connotative as well as 
denotative, and that it is possible to suggest more than is explicitly stated without altering 
or negating the statement.” See “Pearl and the Medieval Christian Doctrine of Salvation” 
(PhD Diss, University of Michigan, 1973), 36. 
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through the poem’s highly deliberate structural markings. Likewise, strict allegorical 
understandings of the poem overlook the emotional intensity of the speaker’s loss and, 
perhaps more egregiously, force closure onto what must be considered, at best, an 
ambiguous ending. Finally, readings focused solely on narrative plot (elegiac, allegorical, 
or otherwise) tend to obscure the centrality of the poem’s elaborate form to its meaning.  
Nonetheless, even in recent criticism ostensibly “beyond” the elegy/allegory 
question, scholarly understandings of that indefinite space between worlds continue to 
conform to the positions established in the old debate. Even the presumably self-
contained critical lenses of psychoanalysis and New Historicism, so often relied on to 
provoke perspectival shifts in our readings of medieval texts, tend to thematize this scene 
of contact in familiar terms. Psychoanalytical readings of the poem, for instance, have 
picked up on the poem’s intense meditations on loss popularized in earlier, elegiac 
readings. Rather than reconstructing a historical subject who might have inspired the 
poem18,  these readings tend to focus on the play of and management of desire within a 
scene of loss, often in order to arrive at the workings of mourning and/or melancholia 
within its narrative.19 New Historicist approaches have looked to English political 
                                                
 18 According to Aranye Fradenburg, one reason that psychoanalysis belongs in medieval 
studies is that “psychoanalysis, like religion, posits a subject constructed through a 
history, a narrativity, of desire” [emphasis mine]. Although I agree with Fradenburg, it 
seems that critics too often overlook the historical dimension in psychoanalytical 
analyses of medieval texts. See “‘Be not far from me: Psychoanalysis, Medieval Studies, 
and the Subject of Religion” Exemplaria 7.1 (1995): 41-54; 43. 
 19 The earliest psychoanalytical accounts of the poem are thinly-veiled appeals to a 
transhistorical formalism. Paul Piehler reads the Maiden through Jungian notions of the 
archetype, an influence also apparent in Spearing’s Medieval Dream-Poetry (1976). See 
Piehler, The Visionary Landscape: A Study in Medieval Allegory (London: Edward 
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history, fourteenth-century popular theology, and English courtly practices to frame the 
space between dreamer and Maiden as the instructional site of discrete material or 
doctrinal fact.20 Not all critical work on Pearl falls into one of these two camps, of 
course, but the ways that recent criticism reanimates old debates testifies to an abiding 
fascination with the liminal space between worlds historically associated with the pearl.  
My reading of the poem seeks to relate this important thematic question to the 
equally vibrant criticism on the formal techniques of the poet.21 In doing so, I adopt what 
might be called a third approach to the encounter between material and immaterial 
worlds, one whose advent I credit to Theodore Bogdanos in his influential book Pearl, 
                                                                                                                                            
Arnold, 1971). More recent psychoanalytic interpretations of the poem, influenced 
mostly by Freud and Lacan, display concern with psychoanalysis’ critical flexibility for 
tracking affect in an event of loss. See David Aers, “The Self Mourning: Reflections on 
Pearl,” Speculum 68 (1993): 54-73; Sarah Stanbury, “The Body and the City in Pearl,” 
Representations 48 (1994): 30-47; George Edmondson, “Pearl: The Shadow of the 
Object, the Shape of the Law,” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 26 (2004): 29-63; Daniel T. 
Kline, “Resisting the Father in Pearl” in Translating Desire in Medieval and Early 
Modern Literature, ed. by Craig A. Berry and Heather Richardson Hayton, 1-29 (Tempe, 
AZ: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005). 
 20The critical desire to historicize the more shadowy details of the poem’s thematic 
contour might be traced to John Bowers’ insistence on isolating the “cultural poetics” of 
the poem within the milieu of Ricardian court culture. See The Politics of Pearl: Court 
Poetry in the Age of Richard II (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2000). For other accounts that 
attempt to reconcile these two worlds, see Helen Barr, Socioliterary Practice in Late 
Medieval England (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), 41; Michael Foster, “Textual Voices: 
Self-Representation and Religious Instruction in the Works of the Pearl-Poet,” Medieval 
and Early Modern English Studies 20.2 (2012): 187-214; Jennifer Garrison, “Liturgy and 
Loss: Pearl and the Ritual Reform of the Aristocratic Subject,” Chaucer Review 44.3 
(2010): 294-322; Elizabeth Harper, “Pearl in the Context of Fourteenth-Century Gift 
Economies,” Chaucer Review 44.4 (2010): 421-39; H.L. Spencer, “Pearl: ‘God’s Law’ 
and ‘Man’s Law’,” Review of English Studies 59 (2008): 317-341.  
 21 I do not claim to be the first to unite theme and form in Pearl. Barbara Nolan and 
Edward Condren discuss the poet’s quest for a Pythagorean unity. See, respectively, The 
Gothic Visionary Perspective, 172-74 and The Numerical Universe of the Gawain-Pearl 
Poet: Beyond Phi (Gainesville: U of Florida P, 2002), 39-74.  
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Image of the Ineffable (1983). For Bogdanos, who discusses the poem in terms of 
negative theology, or for J. Allan Mitchell, whose comparatively agnostic perspective 
borrows from Levinasian philosophy, that hazy space between worlds resonates also as 
permanently unknowable and/or infinite.22 This third position frames my reading of Pearl 
as a poem that expresses in both content and form the impossible condition of securing 
knowledge at this metaphysical junction.  
But rather than an end point, I would like to take the unknowability of the pearl as 
my point of departure. In this approach, I echo Paul de Man’s suspicion regarding the 
separation of autobiography and fiction when he asks whether it is possible “to remain… 
within an undecideable situation.”23 Following de Man, I suspect that the perceived 
division between material and immaterial worlds in Pearl (or between elegy and 
allegory) is not unlike that between autobiography and fiction in that the desire to inhabit 
the interstices of these categories masks a particularly untidy knot of poetics and the 
purpose for which language is enacted.  
Like de Man, I will interrogate the degree to which the literary text (Pearl) 
reveals the linguistic as the fundamental register on which readers approach and address 
the chain of substitutions that comprise the epistemological foundation of narrative. 
However, I would like to separate my reading from the vocabulary both of “theory” and 
                                                
 22 Of those that take up the unknowability of Pearl, the works of Allan Mitchell and 
J.A. Jackson have been most formative to this chapter’s thematic focus. See Mitchell, 
“The Middle English Pearl: Figuring the Unfigurable,” Chaucer Review 35 (2000): 86-
111 and Jackson, “The Infinite Desire of Pearl” in Levinas and Medieval Literature, eds. 
J.A. Jackson and Ann Astell, 157-84 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 2009). 
 23 Paul de Man, “Autobiography as De-facement,” MLN 94.5, Comparative Literature 
(1979): 919-930; 921.  
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medieval negative theology in order to better approach Pearl on its own terms—
specifically, the eponymous base unit of the poem’s formal and thematic structure, the 
pearl itself. Just as the dreamer fails to remedy his loss, so too does the poet’s formal 
attempt to craft a pearl through language and mathematics performatively fall short of the 
harmony it seeks. In other words, unlike the “spoteless” object its dreamer attempts to 
recover the poem becomes but a mere approximation of a connection between material 
present and celestial hereafter. This arithmepoetics of the pearl will help show how, 
rather than merely theorizing contact between zones as unknowable, Pearl envisions 
impossibility beyond the “undecideable,” and thus contributes to an enduring critical 
debate regarding the points of contact between writing, language, and belief. 
A Pearl at What Price? 
Unlike Herod and Prester John (but rather like Criseyde), the figure of the pearl 
claims no history as textual agent prior to its entrance into the medieval literary tradition. 
Nonetheless, few objects in the Middle Ages carried such a diverse and powerful set of 
resonances as this precious jewel. Perhaps most familiarly, the pearl serves as a 
conventional, if somewhat opaque, Christian symbol.24 The Bible mentions the figure of 
the pearl nine times, most memorably in Matthew (Parable of the Pearl) and Revelation 
                                                
 24 Although a largely outmoded method of interpretation by the high Middle Ages, I 
argue that, historically, understandings of the Pearl relied on the symbolic mode of 
interpretation, from which Pearl departs. I refer to Auerbach’s version of the symbolic 
mode, where “the thing represented must always be something very important and holy 
for those concerned something affecting their whole life and thinking, and that this 
something is not only expressed or imitated in the sign or symbol, but considered to be 
itself present and contained in it” (“Figura,” 56-7). 
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(where it stands both for worldly riches and the opulence of the New Jerusalem).25 The 
scriptural pearl cuts a paradoxical figure, as noted by Bogdanos: symbol of a natural (or 
impossible) wisdom (Matthew 7:6; Matthew 13:45-6), and also a warning against 
material dependency/ornament (I Timothy 2:9).26 The biblical pearl signifies the 
condition of Christian knowing and marks the quality of this salvation as something that 
necessarily exceeds material understanding. The pearl as scriptural object thus functions 
as an abstract representation of a spiritually transformative moment. 
Pliny the Elder’s observations about the pearl in his Natural History (c. 77-79) 
represent the other major tradition, the natural history of the pearl. Pliny’s text values the 
pearl above all other natural materials because it is fundamentally unique (unio) and also 
because, unlike gems, its genesis requires an interaction between both natural and un-
natural forces, a collision between an earth-bound drop of celestial dew and an oyster, 
which receives the dew along the top of the sea: 
Origo atque genitura conchae sunt, haut multum ostrearum conchis differentes. 
Has ubi genitalis anni stimularit hora, pandentes se quadam oscitatione impleri 
roscido conceptu tradunt, gravidas postea eniti, partumque concharum esse 
margaritas pro qualitate roris accepti. Si purus influxerit, candorem conspici; si 
vero turbidus, et fetum sordescere; eundem palere caelo minante. Conceptum ex 
eo quippe constare, caelique iis maiorem societatem esse quam maris: inde 
nubilum trahi colorem aut pro claritate matutina serenum (9.55)27  
                                                
 25 Job 28:18, Matthew 7:6, Matthew 13:45, Matthew 13:46, I Timothy 2:9, Revelation 
17:4, Revelation 18:12, Revelation 18:16, Revelation 21:21. 
 26 Though, for Augustine, the pearl symbolizes “the knowledge of the Word in its purity 
and self-consistency of meaning,” Bogdanos notes that most Christian thinkers 
emphasize its function as material metaphor for an impossibly immaterial truth (Image of 
the Ineffable, 16). 
 27 English translation: “The source and breeding-ground of pearls are shells not much 
differing from oyster-shells. These, we are told, when stimulated by the generative season 
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 Through some mysterious intuition, the oyster anticipates the trajectory of the dew and 
upon receiving the heavenly vapor, returns to the sea, whereupon the dewdrop transforms 
into a pearl. The quality of the pearl then depends on the purity of the dew (9. 54). The 
Natural History thus makes explicit what the Christian tradition merely insinuates: an 
understanding of the pearl as conceived by a union of divine and terrestrial forces. 
So too in the Middle English elegy, where the pearl resides at the unrepresentable 
intersection of symbolism and material knowledge. At the poem’s outset, this theme is 
introduced through the speaker’s early attempts to figure the pearl as containable, an 
object capable of satisfying a prince, “clanly close in golde” (l. 2). The speaker’s 
characterizations of the pearl’s dimensions, value, and uniqueness betray his desire to see 
the pearl as a quantifiable, knowable object. The pearl’s dimensions— “So rounde, so 
reken in vche araye,/ So small, so smoÞe her sydez were” (ll. 5-6)—foreshadow later 
descriptions of the dream’s Maiden and draw our attention to the speaker’s abiding focus 
on the physical appearance of the pearl. The speaker’s redundant desire to establish the 
pearl “sengeley in synglure” [singular in uniqueness] (l. 8), suggests an effect beyond 
material loss. For all of the desire to establish the precise dimensions of the pearl in order 
                                                                                                                                            
of the year gape open as it were and are filled with dewy pregnancy, and subsequently 
when heavy are delivered, and the offspring of the shells are pearls that correspond to the 
quality of the dew received: if it was a pure inflow, their brilliance is conspicuous but if it 
was turbid, the produce also becomes dirty in color. Also if the sky is lowering (they say) 
the pearl is pale in color: for it is certain that it was conceived from the sky, and that 
pearls have more connexion with the sky than with the sea, and derive from it a cloudy 
hue, or a clear one corresponding with a brilliant morning.” See the LOEB edition of The 
Natural History, Volume 3: Books 8-11, ed. and trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 1940), 235.  
 163  
to “sette” its value, the pathos-laden admission of its loss also admits, much to the 
chagrin of this prince, that this pearl eludes such enclosure. As such, the first stanza 
formulates a central tension in the poem between what can be known (the pearl’s “sette” 
value and the desire to contain it) and what remains impossible (the ability to recover, 
replace, or enclose that singularity). 
The image of a flawless pearl the speaker longs to regain and “sette” contrasts 
with the language of escalation and growth introduced in the second stanza that works 
against first’s desire for containment. Here the pearl is still a material object, but one that 
escaped or “sprange” (leapt forth, shot up, spread) from the speaker (l. 13), suggesting the 
consubstantiality of speaker and pearl, having once been part of a single body. Given the 
dreamer’s distressed state and the section’s focus on intimacy, this loss resonates both as 
a material dispossession and also as a symbolic loss of understanding. Standing over her 
gravesite, the speaker focuses on the paradoxical dilemma of recovering an object whose 
diminutive materiality belies the monumental impact of its loss. Reminiscent of Julian of 
Norwich’s hazelnut, the smooth pearl could fit in his hand but, because it has no sides 
(sydez), it is also utterly endless. The pearl’s lack of a physical “spot” is lost on the 
narrator who believes that he can recover the pearl—it must be here somewhere.  
From the physical spot upon which the speaker founds his loss, this pearl, “clad in 
clot” (clod/earth), engenders the very garden (“erbere”) the speaker enters.28 The speaker 
                                                
 28 Barbara Nolan notes the significant parallels between the poet’s conception and use 
of the “erbere” and Bernard of Clairvaux’s sermon on the understanding of the threefold 
nature of history in terms of a garden. In Bernard’s formulation, first we have the 
Creation as a scene of planting and sowing, then those seeds flourish in the 
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reveals that the pearl, though encircled by its own perfection, possesses nonetheless an 
illimitable fertility: while its physical dimensions are “sette,” the pearl’s inherent 
liveliness would accelerate the germination of any seeds that lie near it (ll. 35-36), “For 
vch gress mot grow of graynez ded” (l. 33). While the speaker not only believes (wot) but 
also knows (wene) that he stands over the pearl’s “spot” (l. 47), he has lost access to any 
realm from which he could reach her. The image of a pearl “Out of orient” in the first 
stanza (l. 3), now emitting the exotic aroma of spices from an “erber grene,” hints at an 
unfamiliar landscape, more akin to Prester John’s East than a homely, known place. Yet 
the traces of the otherworldly run against the third stanza’s more familiar imagery of 
harvest and customarily English flora.29 The conflicting images portray a delirious 
speaker caught between worlds, wandering aimlessly about an uncanny setting.  
At this spot, the pearl has become a human body, a rotting corpse paradoxically 
bestowing life upon all around it. Beset by his loss, the dreamer recognizes precisely that 
which he cannot comprehend, a speaking about what escapes signification, framed as an 
almost meta-linguistic epistemological indeterminacy. The speaker, now too left 
“spoteles,” attributes the breaking-apart of worlds to the loss of the pearl. A faint song in 
the background hints at the elusive harmony the speaker desires, but, emotionally 
exhausted from the dissidence his loss has spawned, he falls asleep, mindful of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Reconciliation as the heavens open up and rain down Christ, and finally the Restoration 
brings about a brand new heaven and earth. The parallels between Bernard’s sermon and 
the Pearl’s narrative symbolism suggest the intricacy of the poet’s conceptualization as 
well as his familiarity with important theological ideas. See Nolan, The Gothic Visionary 
Perspective, 165.  
 29 That is, even if as Nolan points on, peonies do not bloom in August in England (The 
Gothic Visionary Perspective, 164). 
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“odour” (l. 58) that emanates from the spices that carry forth the spirit of the same pearl 
that helped grow them. Even as the pearl continues to slip away from speaker and reader, 
the crucial first section of Pearl establishes many of the poem’s lasting motifs, including 
the pearl’s agency and its paradoxical relationship with both harmony and impossibility. 
If the loss of the pearl gives the dreamer a knowledge that undoes his ability to know at 
all, then only through an existential confrontation with a spiritual embodiment of his loss 
can he un-learn and un-do the impossible economy of grief in order to be put at peace.30 
• • 
 
Pliny’s classical notion of the genesis of pearls endured throughout the Middle 
Ages and found its way into several influential medieval texts.31 In an essay tracing the 
development of the pearl as a metaphor for writing, Friedrich Ohly insists that this 
tradition and the pearl’s status as poetic symbol outlived even the Middle Ages: citing the 
poetry of Goethe, Ohly states, “the belief that the pearl originates in a marriage of heaven 
and earth… is continually expressed and repeatedly celebrated in verse right down to the 
eighteenth century.”32 However, whereas Pliny offers little on the uses of the pearl, these 
later writers began to unite the narrative of its conception with the question of its natural 
                                                
 30 This is the emotional territory upon which psychoanalytic readings of the poem 
ground their claims about mourning, a psychological state in which loss often exceeds 
linguistic representation. See Aers, “The Self Mourning.”  
 31 These include Isidore’s Etymologiae (c. 630), Hrabanus Maurus’ De Rerum Naturis 
(c. 842-847), Bartholomeus Anglicus’ De Proprietatibus Rerum (c. 1240), Albertus 
Magnus’ De Animalibus (c. 1250), along with numerous lapidaries and bestiaries. 
 32 Friedrich Ohly, “Dew and Pearl: A Lecture” in Sensus Spiritualis: Studies in 
Medieval Significs and the Philology of Culture, ed. Samuel Jaffe and trans. Kenneth J. 
Northcott, 235-51 (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005), 245. 
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properties, which often touched on symbolism evident in the biblical tradition.  
In addition to emphasizing the uniqueness of each individual pearl, writers touted 
the health benefits of possessing/wearing pearls. In language reminiscent of Pearl, John 
Trevisa, translating Bartholomeus Anglicus, boasts their cleansing power: “And haue 
vertue of comfort by all the kynde theorof… they ben bysprongen with certeyn kynde” 
(II. 856).33 The emphasis on its potential energy parallels the pearl that “sprange” from 
the speaker in order to fertilize the surrounding earth (ll. 13; 25-36). Similarly, according 
to Caxton’s edition of the Legend Aurea, “The vertu of thys stone is sayd to be ayenst the 
effusyon of blood, ayenst passyon of the hert, and to confortacyon of the spyryte.”34 
While one can never fully appropriate its powers, the pearl closes wounds: it heals. But 
what of the disease? The space between the singularity of the dreamer’s pearl and the 
irreducible symbol the reader encounters mirrors the poem’s own thematic concerns 
regarding the strained communication between material and immaterial worlds. 
As is evident even the first section of Pearl, the poet weaves the materiality of his 
central object so deftly through the formal and material concerns of his poem—
perfection, circularity, enclosure, impossibility— that we can see how, in George 
Edmondson’s psychoanalytical argot, the pearl becomes the very “shape of the Law.”35 
                                                
 33 Bartholomaeus Anglicus, De Propretatibus Rerum, trans. John Trevisa, ed. M.C. 
Seymour. 3 Vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).  
 34 Qtd. in C.A. Luttrell, “The Mediaeval Tradition of the Pearl Virginity,” Medium 
Ævum 31 (1962): 194-200; 194. 
 35 In “Pearl: The Shadow of the Object,” Edmondson invokes the Lacanian view of 
“Law,” a concept influenced by the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Freud’s 
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But why a pearl? Moreover, if the pearl continues to accrue meaning in the poem, 
delineating the prohibitions to knowledge, does it become an empty signifier, bound not 
to a tradition but to an ultimately negative understanding of Christian epistemology? 
Though the fluidity of the symbolism in Pearl suggests a complicated departure from its 
traditional symbolic use, that textual tradition of the pearl actually informs the symbolic 
expansion of Pearl’s pearl in several key ways. Upon closer examination, the poet’s craft 
of fashioning the central object itself proves far more encyclopedic than inventive.  
The Geometry of Ineffability 
 
Just as the flowers spring up due to their proximity to the pearl, the soul of the dreamer, 
once bound by loss, sprouts forth from his body: “Fro spot my spyryt Þer sprang in 
space” (l. 61). Some ineffable quality within the pearl propels the speaker out of the 
paradoxes of his bodily life and into a state of un-knowing, where, “in auenture,” he 
wanders this new landscape, “ne wyste in Þis worlde quere Þaȝ hit wace” [I knew not 
where or why] (l. 65). Whereas earlier the speaker struggled to act on what he 
instinctively knows, here the dreamer’s movements are compelled by sights of such 
spectacular brilliance that they elude experiential and linguistic comparison. 
Instead of the sides (sydez) of the pearl, the soul perceives the regions or ways 
(sydez) of this new dream landscape:  
                                                                                                                                            
Totem and Taboo. For Lacan, the Law refers to Symbolic realm, ruled by language, that 
imposes limits on desire.  
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Dubbed wern alle þo downeȝ sydeȝ 
Wyth crystal klyffeȝ so cler of kynde. 
Holtewodeȝ bryȝt aboute hem bydeȝ 
Of bolleȝ as blwe as ble of Ynde; 
   (ll. 73-73) 
The play on “sydez” suggests that the dream landscape too is contained by that same 
pearl, which, bursting forth from the dreamer himself, promises to create a condition 
through which he might come to terms with his loss. Without direct access to that pearl of 
wisdom, however, the movement within the poem is controlled by the excesses of this 
realm’s “dubbement” [splendor/adornment], which the dreamer fails to describe 
adequately in terms of vision, place, or affect (ll. 95-96; 99-100; 135-6). The action 
brings dreamer and reader to a limit point—the “dubbement” that eludes representation.36 
Until the dreamer meets the Maiden, he faces the task of depicting an environment that 
language could not possibly capture. 
How does one write about that which exceeds representation? Significantly, the 
first positive identification the dreamer makes in this new world is with the pearl Maiden 
(ll. 157-8). The dreamer describes this initial recognition neither in terms of familiarity 
nor as sensory event, but in terms of knowledge. Believing that he has regained his lost 
pearl, the dreamer expresses relief, though he fears the inevitable return to a waking state 
of loss, “lest ho me eschaped Þat I Þer chos” (l. 187). Even within this scene of putative 
recognition, the pearl continues to elude the enclosure this dreamer seeks. This section 
affords the first glimpse of narrative detail that literalizes the chasm separating material 
from celestial spheres, the stream that separates dreamer from Maiden (ll. 145-156). 
                                                
 36 The inexpressibility topos is evident at ll. 83-4; 91-2; 95-6; 99-100; 133-6; 157-8. 
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Upon identifying his lost pearl, the dreamer begins to self-identify as a jeweler, a motif 
that persists through the section (ll. 240-300). Here the dreamer’s desire for possession 
accompanies any perceived responsibilities to polish and set the “spoteles” jewel. 
Just as the reader begins to understand something of the endless unfurling of this 
pearl, the repetition of the dreamer’s inability to signify his surroundings reflects 
attention back onto the poem itself. The poet’s use of repetition, concatenating stanzas, 
and precise structural dimensions, predicated as they are on measurement and 
circumscription, suggest a clear thematic intention to recreate the scene of possession for 
which the poem’s dreamer longs. As for the poem’s content, the emphasis on the 
intersectionality of earthly and celestial existence also resembles the encyclopedic 
understanding of the genesis of a pearl, in which these realms overlap in a manner 
inaccessible to mortal apprehension.  Rather than rely solely on language to communicate 
the experiential paradoxes associated with recovering an impossible loss, the poet turns to 
mathematics to construct the space of the poem, the cathedral of the pearl.  
• • 
 
As has been oft-remarked, the concatenation in-and-between stanzas, along with 
the way that the end of the poem folds back onto its beginning, promote a circular 
reading experience. Indeed, the tightly-wound, self-consuming, “sydelez” text suggests a 
topography—a perfect sphere37— widely considered to be the most geometrically perfect 
                                                
 37 For more on sphericity in the poem, see Kevin Marti, Body, Heart, and Text in the 
Pearl-Poet (Queenston, Ontario: Mellen Press, 1991). For more on the notion of 
“perfect” in the context for Pearl’s perfection, see P.M. Kean, “Symbols of Perfection,” 
in The “Pearl”: An Interpretation, 138-61. For a sample of the critical tendency to 
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shape in the Middle Ages. According to Thomas Bradwardine, an influential fourteenth-
century theologian and mathematician, the geometrical perfection of the sphere, “mobile 
and perfect,” resides at the “limit of uniformity,” the tri-dimensional manifestation of the 
most elemental geometrical object, the point (4.40).38 It should not be surprising, given 
the relationship between mathematics and the divine within the Middle Ages, that this 
poetic attempt to recover a perfectly spherical pearl, an object impervious to the tools of 
human craft, should invoke the language of mathematics, a discourse in which perfection 
might be reached. Indeed, it would appear that the balance required to polish this poem 
complements the unknowable perfection that unites material and divine realms.  
Yet, as the Maiden insists, a pearl cannot be simply willed into being. Upon closer 
inspection, the formal dynamics of the pearl produce not the enclosure the poem appears 
to seek, but instead outline an elusive geometry we begin to trace though a series of failed 
descriptive encounters. If the dreamer’s experiences truly do exceed linguistic depiction, 
the poem situates its reader, like the dreamer, longing for the other side of the “bonkez 
brade” (l. 138), increasingly aware of the impossibility of such contact. 
                                                                                                                                            
describe the poet’s desire to create the “pearl” as spherical or perfect, see Bogdanos, 
Image of the Ineffable, 17; Meyer, Medieval Allegory and the Building of New Jerusalem, 
147; Stanbury, “The Body and the City,” 33; Mitchell, “Figuring the Unfigurable,” 92; 
Daniel T. Kline, “Resisting the Father in Pearl,” 23.  
 38 Bradwardine begins his treatise on geometry with a description of the point, which he 
extends, one dimension at a time, into a line, surface, and body. See Geometria 
Speculativa: Latin Text and English Translation, ed. and trans. George Molland (F. 
Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1989), 22-3. Note the importance of the “poynt" in two of 
Cotton Nero A.x.’s other poems. Patience begins and ends with the notion that patience 
is a “poynt.” An emphasis on “poynt” occurs at least five times in Gawain, from the 
infamous pentangle, a figure of “fyue poyntez,” to the culminating scene in which the 
Green Knight nicks the neck of Gawain with his blade and announces that Gawain’s 
penance has been paid at the “poynt of myn egge” (l. 2392).  
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In Edward Condren’s formulation, Pearl’s circularity is less a result of the poet’s 
meditation on its central object and more the product of an obsession with proportionality 
that spans the entire manuscript. For Condren, the manuscript divides itself into two 
circles, an inner one, consisting of Cleanness and Patience, and an outer one, consisting 
of Pearl and Gawain. Condren’s observations about circularity extend from his most 
salient observation, his ability to unearth the manuscripts reliance on phi, the Middle 
Ages’ most significant ratio, known also as the “golden mean” or as “God’s measure.” 
Condren observes, for instance, that the relationship (in terms of line numbers) between 
the entire Cotton Nero A.x manuscript (6,086) and the combined lines in Pearl and Sir 
Gawain39 (3,743) stands in equal proportion with the ratio of line numbers of Pearl and 
Gawain (3,743) to the combined length of Purity and Patience (2,343).40 While this level 
of architectural precision may appear superfluous to a modern reader, it is consistent 
(perhaps maniacally so) with the late-Middle Ages’ most influential manual on poetics, 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria Nova, which insists that a composition adhere carefully to 
a “natural order.”41  
In actuality, these ratios are only approximately proportional (1.63 and 1.60, 
respectively), but they very nearly approach phi, which can be rounded to 1.62.42 In the 
                                                
 39 This calculation of the lines in Gawain (2531) omits the Garter motto but reflects the 
customary editorial practice of counting the bob as its own line.  
 40  These ratios stand approximately at 1.63 and 1.60, respectively.  
 41 See Poetria Nova, rev. edition, trans. Margaret Nims (Toronto: PIMS, 2010), 21-2.  
 42 As Condren explains, phi is a unique ratio because it can be expressed as both  
arithmetic and a harmonic proportions; in other words, it satisfies two equations: a + b = 
c (arithmetic) and a : b = b : c (harmonic). This “divine proportion” was known from 
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Middle Ages, phi was known as “God’s measure” because it was unchangeable, 
ubiquitous, and yet unrepresentable in any way other than as an approximate ratio (it 
could not be reduced to a fractional relationship between integers). This indivisible 
identity, according to Condren, “holds the manuscript together in a continuous ratio that 
implies a divine path to infinity and eternity” (26). In order to qualify the degree to which 
the poem’s structure reflects such a “divine path” one might take a closer look at Pearl’s 
craftsmanship (both structural and thematic), which can provide access to the process of 
refining/setting the poem as a pearl. However, Condren takes a different tack: in 
extending the longstanding critical discussion of the function of key numbers in the 
poems, Condren reads the poem’s form as revealing not a sphere, but the most divine of 
all geometric shapes, the dodecahedron. 
 This complex geometric figure, likely obscure to many modern readers, would 
have been recognized by an attentive student of the quadrivium as the fifth (and most 
complex) Platonic solid.43 Constructed of twelve pentagonal sections—a shape native to 
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (and one which requires phi for measurement)— the 
regular dodecahedron possesses twenty apexes or vertices, twelve total faces, and five 
edges on each face. These measurements are of course consistent with the dimensions of 
                                                                                                                                            
Greek mathematics as an indivisible ratio observable in nature and believed to be present 
in every part of the universe (The Numerical Universe, 9). Phi has long been observed in 
the spiral growth of sea shells, the leaf distribution in many plants, and in the physiology 
of terrestrial and marine creatures (dolphins, penguins, butterflies, tigers, ants). 
 43 The Platonic solids and the notion of the golden ratio are discussed in the Timeaus (as 
well as in the book’s many commentaries) in addition to Book XIII of Euclid’s Elements.  
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the poem (twenty sections of five stanzas composed of twelve lines).44 The beauty of the 
dodecahedron lies in its simplicity, for its construction depends only on obtaining the 
length of one edge (one can arrive at the diagonal by multiplying this side by phi). In the 
Timaeus, long considered a medieval companion to Genesis, Plato distinguishes the 
dodecahedron as the model by which some “divine craftsman” arranged the twelvefold 
division of the Zodiac (55 C). The Neoplatonic Christianization of sacred geometry in the 
early Middle Ages secured a lasting alliance between the dodecahedron and the Christian 
eternal, an influence evident even in the twentieth century through Dali, who sets The 
Sacrament of the Last Supper (1955) in a dodecahedron-shaped room. 
Condren values these proportional equivalences above the geometry that houses 
them because proportion implies ratio, which, as he explains, carries medieval 
associations not only with relationality but also with procedure, faculty for calculation, 
reasonable cause, and law. Far more than mere balance, then, the careful arrangement of 
the manuscript imitates of a higher order in order to frame the infinite as a worthy site of 
contemplation itself (41). As such, Condren renders Pearl’s poetic process of 
signification transcendental, transparent, and objective. However, the pearl’s position in 
Condren’s linguistic economy remains unclear, and, thus, the question of whether the 
poem ultimately champions such a resolution remains unanswered. 
                                                
 44 Here we might begin to glimpse the intertextual importance of the pentagon, which is 
also responsible for Gawain’s pentangle. Indeed, Condren insists that “the fundamental 
building block of a dodecahedron is the same Divine Section… used as the controlling 
proportion throughout Cotton Nero A.x.” (60).  
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Whether the poem becomes a sphere or dodecahedron, Condren’s work provokes 
fascinating questions about the relationship between the poem’s form and its content. 
Through his discoveries about the geometric harmony of Cotton Nero A.x, Condren allies 
himself with the camp of scholars (descending from Bogdanos) who view Pearl’s poetics 
as consciously (and optimistically) imitative of the divine.45 All studies interested in 
Pearl’s poetics need to account for Condren’s discoveries, but here I want to suggest that 
the question of harmony might not indicate a desire to imitate divine perfection, as 
Condren has it, but, recalling the medieval tradition of the pearl, provide instead an 
illustration of the impossibility and unknowability of such harmonious balance. By 
further interrogating the context in which late-medieval arguments about proportionality 
circulated, and by examining popular understandings of medieval literary theory, I hope 
to further unite Pearl’s form with its symbolic content.  
First, while the architectural framework of the poems correlates well with the 
overarching thematic concerns within individual poems (balance, circularity, enclosure), 
the figure of phi so crucial to their formal composition existed outside the framework of 
mathematical understanding in the Middle Ages (insofar as it is an infinite, non-repeating 
decimal—what we would now call an irrational number). For the poet (and contemporary 
mathematician), rather than admit to the reality of its infinite extension, phi must be 
approximated as a fraction. For fourteenth-century mathematicians, values such as phi or, 
even more commonly, the square root of two (the measure of the hypotenuse of an 
                                                
 45 Bogdanos reads the poem as an “incarnational symbol of God’s universe” and argues 
that, like Dante, the Pearl-poet “wants his poem read as an analogue to God’s Word” 
(Image of the Ineffable, 11).  
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isosceles triangle with legs of one) possessed divine significance precisely because they 
exceeded mathematical understanding and could not be represented as a proportion of 
integers. Rather than regard this need for approximation as indicating a flawed 
understanding of mathematics, religious minds discovered in these identities the limits of 
human striving for an inexpressible divine presence. For this reason, music, as the study 
of harmony, bore associations with the celestial in the Middle Ages and held a high place 
in the quadrivium. Until mathematicians began (reluctantly) to accept the notion that 
these irrational numbers actually belong to the set of real numbers, the idea of a 
mathematical entity irreducible to a relationship between integers (i.e. a fraction) 
suggested the existence of an alternate numerical realm outside or in excess of 
mathematics, an epistemological space unavailable to material understanding.46  
Late-medieval mathematicians linked these irreducible quantities with Divine 
balance rather than potential disorder, in order to avoid having to admit to an irrational 
universe. Thus, Condren’s phi, much like the pearl itself, must inhabit an unknowable 
space between an infinite world that exceeds signification and its inexact material 
manifestation, a fraction. This is all to say that if the poet employed phi as a method to 
measure the immeasurability of the pearl, he must also recognize the failure inherent to 
this project (measuring the perfect pearl with a self-consciously inexact mathematical 
identity). This notion of excess certainly permeates the poems’ form in other ways, most 
                                                
 46 Though Euclid technically proves the existence of irrational numbers (i.e. numbers 
that cannot be reduced as fractions) in the tenth book of his Elements, the notion of 
irrational quantities as real numbers does not emerge until the seventeenth century. Many 
medieval scholars would not even be aware of Euclid’s work since most universities in 
the fourteenth century only required mastery over the first six books of Elements. 
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obviously in the poet’s use of 101 stanzas (rather than 100). Given that the entire 
thematic platform of Pearl circles back to an impossible, even paradoxically excessive 
unity, signifier and signified must coexist without difference in any requisite 
mathematical framework meant to underscore that theme. 
Secondly, while the poet’s use of mathematical proportion certainly contributes to 
Pearl’s formal and thematic design, so too does this poet appear to be inspired by 
medieval understandings of poetry as craft. If the poet did intend to shape the poem as 
dodecahedron, one would think that this shape would hardly need polishing, given its 
longstanding representational association the notion of ‘eternal kingdom.’ However, 
Condren links his argument about the poem-as-dodecahedron to the pearl by claiming 
that the work of the poem smoothes out the spikiness of the Platonic solid. This 
interpretation resounds with a medieval model of poetics as craft, evident in how, for 
example, the troubadour poet builds, ex nihilo, around the absent center of an impossible 
lover.47 The artisanal metaphor of polish, a relatively popular trope of medieval literary 
                                                
 47 The opening lines of Arnaut Daniel’s “En cest sonet coind’e leri” provides an 
exemplary instance of a self-conscious identification between poiesis and craft[ing]. The 
poem begins: 
 En cest sonet coind’e leri, 
 Fauc motz, e capuig e doli, 
 Que serant verai e cert  
 Qan n’aurai passat la lima, 
 Qu’Amors marves plan’e daura 
 Mon chantar, qu de liei mou 
 Que Pretz manten e governa. 
    (ll. 1-12) 
 [Though this measure quaint confine me,   
 And I chip out words and plane them,  
 They shall yet be true and clear, 
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theory, seems to be a natural fit for a poem whose speaker self-identifies as a jeweler. In 
discussing the medieval understanding of a Christian poetics as craft-work, Alexandre 
Leupin writes: 
[I]f Christ is the model for literature, the medieval writer can no longer conceive 
of his task as an otium, that is, as an artistic diversion (as it was in classical 
antiquity). To write is to work in reality, in imitation of Christ the carpenter. For 
Geoffrey [of Vinsauf], this brings about an infinite series of references to all the 
crafts of the artisan. Even the most humble serves as the emblem for the work of 
the writer.48  
 
For Leupin, the Reality of the Incarnation replaces the metaphorically absent center of the 
troubadour lyric with the real substance of Christ. While Pearl appears to adhere to such 
a Christian poetics, the organizational center is clearly the pearl, rather than Christ. As I 
will discuss in the next section, the pearl’s relationship with value and, subsequently, 
with virginity complicates the discussion of presence and absence that haunts the center 
of this most polished of poems.  
The Immaterial Economy of Salvation 
Once the dreamer recognizes himself in the vision, he solicits the Maiden’s 
permission to let him access what she knows (a comfort with which frustrated readers 
                                                                                                                                            
 When I finally have filed them. 
 Love glosses and gilds them knowing 
 That my song has for its start 
 One who is worth’s hold and warrant.] 
Taken from Lark in the Morning: The Verses of the Troubadours, ed. Robert Kehew 
(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005), 218-20. I have included Ezra Pound’s English 
translation, also supplied in the volume.  
 48 See Alexandre Leupin, Fiction and Incarnation (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
2002), xxi.  
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might empathize). She, in turn, reproaches him for putting his trust in the superficial 
system of appearances shared by vision and language: 
Þou ne woste in worlde quat on dotz mene; 
Þy worde byfore Þy wytte con fle. 
Þou says Þou trawes me in Þis dene 
Bycawwse Þou may with yȝen me se 
   (ll. 293-96) 
 
 I am not really what or where you think I am, she effectively states. Is this Maiden a 
figment of his dream, a figure of heaven, or both? She certainly makes clear that she is no 
material thing. For the Maiden, sensory gratification affords no real pleasure since the 
“spote” of knowledge the jeweler seeks exists beyond (or outside of) what can be 
materially grasped. She continues, levying that it is not only foolish but also sinful to 
interrogate that which must remain unknown: 
ȝe setten hys wordeȝ ful westernays 
Þat leueȝ noþynk botȝe hit syȝe. 
And þat is a poynt o sorquydryȝe, 
Þat vche god mon may euel byseme, 
To leue no tale be true to tryȝe 
Bot þat hys one skyl may dem. 
   (ll. 306-311) 
 
 The Maiden reasons that pride/arrogance (“sorquydryȝe”) and an overvaluation of one’s 
senses leads one to a false sense of comprehension, “To leue no tale be true to tryȝe”: 
only God can populate that opaque epistemological territory (l. 312). Rather than 
acquiesce to Russell’s contention that the poem’s conversations about worth assure 
“some continuity…between heavenly and earthly values,” the Maiden maintains the 
radical incommensurability between the realms, especially as they pertain to the concept 
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of value, an evaluative category that the dreamer-jeweler should presumably understand. 
Only in death can the dreamer begin to approach the quidditas of his pearl (ll. 320-4) 
because, as the Maiden later indicates, only through the Christ’s death do “We purȝoutly 
hauen cnawyng” [completely receive knowledge/understanding] (l. 859).  
By section seven of the poem (ll. 360-420), the dreamer, less distracted by his 
environs, begins to acquiesce to the authority of the Maiden. For the next 500 lines, the 
relationship between dreamer and Maiden takes the form of student and master, 
respectively. Yet even in the realm of instruction the dreamer struggles to comprehend 
the Maiden’s discourse. Particularly, the Maiden’s baffles the dreamer in her careful 
exposition of Heaven as a world of difference without hierarchy, a concept whose 
incomprehensibility Russell terms “a form of verbal unknowing” (164). However 
paradoxical it may appear, this notion becomes crucial to the poem’s philosophical 
message regarding the space between material and immaterial realms; thus, we might 
tolerate the dreamer’s pronounced resistance with at least some sympathy, considering 
especially the difficulty of untangling the Catholic doctrine of hierarchy with those 
understandings perpetuated in courtly or visionary contexts.  
How are readers to understand such a paradox as a world of difference without 
hierarchy? According to the dreamer, his pearl’s singularity places it above all other 
objects, and he struggles to disentangle this logic from the Maiden’s description of her 
heavenly place. Though this pearl is the dreamer’s most prized possession, it would be 
blasphemy, according to the dreamer, for this Maiden to understand herself as Christ’s 
“quen of cortaysye”: this is “to dere a date” [too high a rank] (l. 492). Yet within Pearl’s 
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heavenly schema, the Maiden’s high rank establishes her as both uniquely blessed in the 
economy of Christ’s love and utterly equivalent to all that receive it, including Mary, the 
true “queen of cortaysye.” If Christ’s love is infinite, the Maiden reasons, how can those 
who receive it be ranked? And yet, as recipient of that love, each individual retains 
uniqueness. Here, in the content of the poem, we see the interest in geometry and 
proportionality filter back in. Put in terms of the Maiden’s language, while she is 
“maskelles” [pure; singular] she is certainly not “makelez” [peerless] (ll. 782-85). 
Still, the dreamer resists. In an ostensible attempt to clarify her meaning, the 
Maiden ends her their debate with a reference to the “pearl of great price” (ll. 720-744), 
through which she shifts the place of the pearl once more, flattening it into the opaque 
representation of heavenly reward given through God’s illimitable, equitable grace.49  
The jeweler’s response to the Parable of the Pearl constitutes one of the major unsolved 
mysteries within the poem, especially since it occurs at the point of the divine section 
within what Condren argues is the proportional design of the poem. Here the dreamer 
responds to the Maiden’s instruction with more praise, citing the impossibility of her 
appearance [“thy beauté com neuer of nature”] (l. 749). Then, in a passage that has 
inspired much critical confusion, the dreamer makes an inquiry into the Maiden’s origins: 
Quo formed þe þy fayre figure?  
                                                
49 According to Robertson, the traditional medieval interpretation of the Biblical “pearl 
of great price” relies on an acknowledgment of the necessity of sacrifice: drawing on 
Gregory, Bede, and Rabanus, Robertson explains that “the members of the earthly 
church… renounce what they have in order to obtain the pearl ‘aeternae felicitatis’” 
(“Pearl as Symbol,” 159). Although within the sacrificial act one obtains infinite reward, 
this understanding of the pearl lacks the existential paradox of difference without 
hierarchy, and therefore fails to clarify the Maiden’s message for the dreamer. 
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Þat wroȝt þy wede he watz ful wys; 
Þy beauté com neuer of nature— 
Pymalyon paynted neuer þy vys, 
Ne Arystotel nawþer by hys lettrure 
Of carped þe kynde þese propertéz; 
Þy colour passez þe flour-de-lys, 
Þyn angel-hauyng so clene cortez. 
Breue me, bryȝt, quat kyn offys 
Berez þe perle so maskelez? 
  (ll. 749-756) 
 
A paleographic uncertainty in the manuscript obscures the meaning of this passage at a 
key point: because of the scribe’s cramped handwriting and his inclusion of a phantom 
mark above one of the letters in the word, it is unclear whether the dreamer asks what 
kind (“kyn”) of office (“offys”) or what type (“kyn”) of oyster (“ostryiys”) might 
bear/possess (“Bereȝ”) a pearl such as her (l. 755).50 In one sense, the difference does not 
seem to matter, since both understandings express the Dreamer’s awe for the Maiden’s 
wisdom and beauty. Yet the possibility of an explicit reference to an oyster (the poem’s 
first) would indicate the poet’s explicit interest in bringing together the encyclopedic 
tradition of the pearl and the Christian notion of the “pearl of great price.” The problem 
becomes not only one of paleography but one symbolism. If here the dreamer speaks of 
an oyster, this further emphasizes the unfamiliarity of the Maiden (especially coupled 
with his statement that her beauty is somehow unnatural) and more explicitly allies the 
Maiden with Christ qua the perfect product of a Marian oyster.  
Though most scholars, and all of the printed editions, opt for the more 
                                                
 50 Condren reads the superscript as an indication of the omission of the consonant ‘r’ 
and thus creating the word “oystris.” E. Talbot Donaldson has advanced this reading in 
his article that more thoroughly outlines this paleographic puzzle. See “Oysters, 
Forsooth: Two Readings in ‘Pearl,’” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 73 (1972): 75-82. 
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conservative “offys,” the relative frequency with which medieval treatments of the pearl 
wed the Christian tradition to the classical understanding merits a consideration of the 
latter possibility. The pearl’s association with Mary and, through her, virginity, best 
exemplifies the synthetic product of the two main strands of the medieval pearl 
tradition.51 As C.A. Luttrell notes, from the twelfth century, preachers Christianized the 
classical understanding of the pearl as symbol of purity by comparing the “pearl of great 
price” (Matthew 13:45-6) with the purity of the Virgin, an association recorded by 
Vincent of Beauvais.52 In this analogy, Mary, who ascended to the temple of God, 
receives the words (celestial dew) of Gabriel by opening and closing her heart without 
break—just as she later nourishes the words and gives birth to her own pearl, Christ.53  
I follow the jeweler’s response so closely because of what I think it signals about 
the dynamism of the pearl not only as poetic symbol, but as medium through which the 
act of poiesis transforms the object or signifier. This passage constitutes a key moment in 
which readers might begin to understand how the pearl grounds the very act of writing 
the poem because of the paradox it begins to reveal regarding the pearl’s theological 
                                                
 51 Ohly writes, “the natural myth, of the origin of the pearl in the heavens, serves over 
and over again for the verbal expression of mysteries such as the Immaculate Conception 
of the Virgin Mary, and the Annunciation of the Virgin, to name but two theological 
themes that maintained a lively connection with the myth of dew and pearl, especially in 
the 17th c.” (Sensus Spiritualis, 235). 
 52 Luttrell, “The Mediaeval Tradition of the Pearl Virginity,” 195.  
 53 See, for example, Hugh of St. Victor’s De Bestiis 2.35, about which Luttrell writes 
“There is indeed a parallel between the fertilizing dew of Gabriel’s announcement and 
that of God’s grace in De Septem Donis and Speculum Morale” (197). This association is 
also found in Pierre Bercheur’s De Rerum Proprietatibus 11.93 and in Gower’s Mirour 
de l’omme (l. 16837 ff.).  
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associations, which circumscribe Maiden, Mary, Jesus, poet, and dreamer.  
While Luttrell limits the early Virgin-pearl association to “specialized homiletic 
usage,” she notes that the salutary effect of this Mary-pearl connection finds its way into 
popular theology by the fourteenth century, providing some precedent for Pearl’s 
appropriation of this relationship.54 By the end of the fourteenth century writers 
employed this hybrid understanding of Mary-as-pearl as a conduit for expressing larger, 
super-linguistic, seemingly metaphysical phenomena like love, death, and life.55 Even in 
an explicitly Christian context, the virginity-pearl association retains the co-presence of 
immaterial forces and material nourishment conveyed in the encyclopedic tradition.56 
                                                
 54 For Luttrell, “it is of some significance” that one of the readings given at Masses of 
Virgins and Holy Women was Matthew 13:44-52, which includes the parable of the 
“pearl of great price.” According to Luttrell, this connection can be observed most visibly 
in the vita of St. Margaret of Navarre (margarita is, of course, the Latin word for pearl). 
She notes that Wace’s Vie de sainte Marguerite was the first text to note the resemblance 
between the saint and the stone (“Medieval Tradition,” 196). Pearl refers to its central 
symbol as margarita (spelled various ways in the poem) at lines 199, 206, and 1037.  
 55 This later association is evident in Pearl as well in Thomas Usk’s contemporaneous 
Testament of Love. The Testament combines the tradition of autobiographical consolation 
(i.e. Boethius) with courtly love topoi in order to relate Usk’s attempt to reconcile himself 
to his imprisoned fate and the loss of his love, Margarite, via a dialogue with an 
anthropomorphized figure of Love. Along with the explicit mention of a pearl in the end, 
the figure of the pearl infiltrates the poem’s structure in order to belatedly intervene in the 
thematic meaning of the poem: the beginning of Usk’s chapters form an acrostic that 
spells out “MARGARETE OF VIRTUE HAE MERCY ON THIN USK.” For Usk, the 
healing virtues of the pearl correspond with its larger power over the philosophies of 
nature, morality, and knowledge (Ohly, Sensus Spiritualis, 246). For more on the 
function of the pearl in the “Testament,” see S.K. Heninger, Jr., “The Margarite-Pearl 
Allegory in Thomas Usk’s Testament of Love,” Speculum 32.1 (1957): 92-98. 
 56 Peter Brown shows how virgins, like angels were thought as “mediator[s] between 
the human and the divine.” See “The Notion of Virginity in the Early Church,” in 
Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century, eds. Bernard McGinn and John 
Meyendorff, 437-43 (New York: Crossroad, 1985).  
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However, even such an overt link between Mary and the Pearl fails to give definitive 
precedent to line 755 with regard to the “kind” of oyster capable of producing a pearl like 
the Maiden. The proper answer to this question would not be mortal Mary, but the divine 
Christ. Therefore, just as Christ becomes the pearl to Mary’s oyster, so might the gift of 
salvation signify as the pearly product formed in the oyster of Christ’s love. The poet 
indicates such a familiarity with the Mary-Pearl tradition elsewhere, specifically when he 
describes Mary as “my lady of quom Jesu con spryng” (l. 453), a line that parallels the 
opening section in which the pearl similarly “sprang” from the dreamer. On the other 
hand, to assent to the reading of Christ as oyster/human as pearl risks collapsing two 
figures (Mary and Christ) who obviously perform very different theological functions, 
and who cannot, doctrinally, represent equally the enclosure through which the “pearl of 
great price” is generated. If line 755 does indeed imply Christ as oyster, it would 
constitute a marked departure from exegetical tradition, marking the need to reconsider 
the relationship between the pearl’s symbolism and the Maiden’s professed alliance 
between of singularity and equality.  
Yet, to move to the most literal level, it is neither Christ nor Mary who gives birth 
to this specific pearl in question. For those who take the pearl to be the dead infant 
daughter of the speaker, this analogy situates the dreamer in the position of an oyster, an 
understanding that once again recalls the poet-jeweler conception of poiesis as an act of 
craft and polish. In additional to the medieval pearl-virginity link, R. Howard Bloch 
describes one medieval understanding of virginity as bearing also on broader 
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understandings of epistemology and medieval poetics.57 Bloch traces the discourse of 
virginity from the Church Fathers through late-medieval vernacular literature, and shows 
it to be an “impossible” category: a virgin not only avoids sexual contact, she has never 
desired sexual contact nor has she been desired sexually; she not only resists soliciting 
the gaze of men, but she also guards against her own gaze upon her own body. Virginity 
represents a complete escape from desire, and as Bloch quips, “the only true virgin—is a 
dead virgin” (108). As such, the notion of virginity as “pure negativity” forms an 
interesting complement to the pearl, which might be understood (in the context of the 
“pearl of great price”) as an impossible fullness.  
The play between these two notions, which may not be so different after all, 
recalls the act of unknowing as the moment at which presence and absence become 
indistinguishable. This duality of negativity and abundance also resonates at the medieval 
scene of writing, or specifically, the troubadour poetics of craft, where a poiesis ex nihilo 
aims to articulate what escapes signification because it is simultaneously too 
overwhelming and fundamentally absent. Rather than an impediment to a clear 
understanding of the poem, the ambiguity of this crucial line perfectly sets up what is 
often considered the poem’s climax, the vision and description of a New Jerusalem that 
necessarily eludes knowing. 
A Specular Jerusalem 
 
                                                
 57 R. Howard Bloch, “The Poetics of Virginity” in Medieval Misogyny and the Invention 
of Western Romantic Love, 93-112 (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991). 
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Given the eponymous impetus of its source text to reveal, reader and dreamer 
might expect the vision to divulge the secrets of the New City, or at least attend to 
intricacies that John’s text does not cover. However, the vision’s faithful representation 
its source text ironically resists its logic of revelation.58 The dreamer describes his 
surroundings as a string of twelves, which, in Condren’s reading, evinces the poet’s 
implementation of the duodecimal system; the twelves are also, of course, prominent 
within Revelation as well as in astrology.59 In addition to the twelve-line stanzas and 
1212 total lines60, Pearl’s dreamer remarks on New Jerusalem’s twelve tiers (l. 992) with 
twelve steps (ll. 993, 1022) arrayed with twelve different gems (ll. 997-1020) on a 
foundation of twelve furlongs length and depth (ll. 1030-32). Each of the city’s four sides 
had three gates (ll. 1033-35), the doors upon which each feature the name of one of 
Israel’s twelve sons (ll. 1039-42). In the land surrounding the city, there exist twelve trees 
(l. 1078) which blossom twelve times each year (l. 1079). The pure spectacle of the scene 
                                                
 58 Louis Blenkner points to the density of Pearl’s vision of New Jerusalem in terms of 
biblical allusion, averaging one per five lines (“Theological Structure of Pearl, n. 44). 
However, as Jenny Rebecca Rytting argues, while the poet occasionally cites Scripture in 
order to make points that differ from that biblical passage, he does not cite any such case 
in the vision of New Jerusalem. See “Pearl and the Translation of Scriptural Paraphrase,” 
The Theory and Practice of translation in the Middle Ages 8 (2003): 281-93. 
 59 The repeated use of the number twelve in Revelation is certainly well-remarked 
throughout the Middle Ages as well as in modern readings of the book. For Plato, the 
duodecimal system indicates the realm of Fate.  
 60 Citing Bede’s finger counting system, Condren remarks that the excesses or 
“remainders” of twelve found in Pearl (1212 lines) and Purity (1812 lines) signal that 
these poems should be read “in the key of 12” (Numerical Universe, 21). The latter two 
poems, Cleanness (531 lines) and Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (2531 lines) signal 
the “key of 10” since 31 is the tenth prime number. Condren argues that these keys are 
significant because they frame the manuscript as a tension between the duodecimal 
system of Christian salvation and the decimal system of the Old Law.  
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has left the dreamer like a startled quail and he makes no claims to understand it. Nothing 
in the section suggests that the emphasis on twelve, so pregnant with symbolism in 
Revelation, carries any meaning not already present in Pearl’s sources. 
The inclusion of symbolically important numbers in the poem commends itself to 
a numerological reading, as this has long been a historically viable approach to 
Revelation. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the repetition of key numbers (5, 6, 
12, 20) occurs not only in the vision of New Jerusalem, but also within the poem’s formal 
architecture. Numerology alone cannot account for the poem’s obvious concern for 
structural precision. While the number twelve symbolizes perfection, it might also signal 
abundance, in addition to the twelve parts of man (evidenced through twelve prophets, 
Apostles, and tribes of Israel). The architectural use of numbers in Pearl is neither 
numerological (which requires interpretation) nor numerical (which implies aesthetic 
preference), but geometrical. As Condren so aptly demonstrates, the poet employs a 
numerical structure within the form of the poem in order to emphasize harmony. I 
emphasize this difference given geometry’s status as a medieval natural science linked to 
the divine.61 If I appear to overstate this connection, it is in order to differentiate the 
discussion of the poet’s structure from a “formalist” approach to the poem.62  
As mentioned earlier, Condren identifies the poet’s preoccupation with the 
                                                
 61 See Michael Edwards’ chapter “Pearl Beyond Measure: Geometry and 
Revelationism” in his “Geometric Theology and the Meaning of Clannesse in the Poems 
of the Pearl Manuscript” PhD Thesis, University of California-Davis, 2004, 40-103.  
 62 As we repeatedly find in formalist studies of medieval literature, the more we apply 
standards that would not have been recognized by medieval poets, the more medieval 
literature appears inferior to modern (“Geometric Theology,” 15). 
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“golden section” or “divine proportion” otherwise known as phi. This indivisible 
proportion, an important mathematical identity for medieval architecture, supplies 
cohesion and circularity to the manuscript. A number of medieval Gothic cathedrals—
structures Barbara Nolan terms the “earthly models of the New Jerusalem”— 
implemented this value (approximated as 7:5) into their architectural scheme (45).63 As it 
turns out, in addition to phi, the Pearl poet utilizes the 7:5 ratio in the construction of 
Cotton Nero A.x.64 These ratios indicate more than geometric wizardry: the poet’s 
reliance on two excessive values to balance the manuscript effectively cancels out a 
numerological interpretation of either, forcing us to consider their similarity instead.  
While I maintain the likelihood that the poet intends to use numbers scientifically 
(perhaps in Lacan’s understanding of the scientific),65 I insist that the poet’s precise-but-
not-precise enough formal geometry ultimately lays bare the inadequacies of human 
rationality as a means of epistemological access (even in its highest, mathematical 
                                                
 63 Condren cites St. Gall and St. Michael’s at Hildesheim, as well as cathedrals at 
Chartres and Amiens, as all utilizing this ratio (The Numerical Universe, 23).  
 64 As Edwards explains, “Adding together the line-totals of Pearl and Patience we find 
that the ratio between Pearl's length, 1200, and the length of both poems together, 1700 
(1200 + 500), or 17:12, is as near the square root of two as need be for a medieval 
mathematician” (“Geometric Theology,” 237). Donna Crawford Stevick cites both ratios 
as also integral to the formal constructions of Cleanness. See “The Architectonics of 
Cleanness,” Studies in Philology 90.1 (1993): 29-45, esp. 34-6.  
 65 See Jacques Lacan, “Science and Truth” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: 
Norton, 2006), 726-45. I explore the Lacanian understanding of the scientific, especially 
as regards language and the practice of analysis, in the dissertation’s conclusion.  
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form).66 For while cathedrals might employ irrational quantities to signify divine 
concepts, there exists within their measurements a recognized slippage between signifier 
and signified that a reading insisting on Pearl’s perfect unity tries to overlook. The 
geometry of poem and manuscript does not just suggest the infinite in order to meditate 
on that concept (as might be the case with a cathedral); it also inscribes the infinite as to 
further establish the impossibility of any precise relation to God (as expressed by a poet 
and dreamer who infelicitously attempt to understand reality mathematically/logically). 
Just as the dreamer cannot reason his way towards an understanding of divine grace, 
neither can the poet create a perfect sphere through a proportional arrangement of 
numbers. Considering the Zeitgeist of anti-Thomism in the fourteenth century in which 
thinkers rejected logic in favor of revelation, Pearl seems to undercut such dichotomous 
thought, rejecting both approaches in favor of an understanding of an unknowing that 
grants the necessity of divine excess.67  
  As Michael Edwards notes, late-medieval mathematicians were in fact 
preoccupied with the inadequacy of mathematics as the faultless tool of human 
measurement. According to Bradwardine, for example, the existence of ubiquitous, but 
                                                
 66 For Edwards, the poet's use of such geometric ratios to structure his poems does in 
fact have meaning, and is meant to evoke the "cleanness" of geometry as a reflection of 
Logos, the Word, or Christ (“Geometric Theology,” 15).  
 67 Following the so-called Condemnations of 1277, a wave of thinkers, including Duns 
Scotus, Thomas Bradwardine, and William of Ockham begin to reject the logic of 
Thomism in favor of the revelatory power of the Word. Lynch situates the end of what 
she calls “the natural order of knowing,” defined as a progression from imagination, 
reason, and memory towards truth, as occurring the thirteenth century. She then explains 
how philosophical paradigms in the Middle Ages shift to accommodate new empirical 
data. See The High Medieval Dream Vision, 11.  
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unrepresentable ratios show that geometry can be both rational and indeterminate, just as 
God’s will can be free, rational, and still indeterminate.68 In this vein, the mathematical 
quantities that so fascinate the Pearl poet, though necessarily imprecise, suggest that 
humans lack access to the underlying rationality of these quantities (rather than imply the 
probability of their fundamental irreducibility). Even if the Pearl poet was not actively 
engaged contemporary mathematical thought, he/she shares an interest with fourteenth-
century mathematicians regarding the correlation between geometric harmony and 
Christian epistemology.69 This perceived relationship, while perhaps foreign to a modern 
reader, hearkens back thousands of years: Pythagoras’ desire to formulate mathematics as 
a stable, self-reflexive language capable of describing the universe also becomes 
frustrated by irreducible quantities, whose reality the Pythagorean Brotherhood 
continually denied.70 Though by the Middle Ages, the Christianization of the unknowable 
character of irrational numbers links irreducible quantities with Divine balance rather 
than potential disorder, neither ideology willingly grants the possibility of an irrational 
universe.  
                                                
 68 Edwards, “Geometric Theology,” 71-5. 
 69 Few critics have considered the influence Bradwardine’s conservative theology of 
faith and grace had on the poem. For more on Bradwardine’s theology and Pearl see 
Carleton Brown, “The Author of the Pearl Considered in the Light of his Theological 
Opinions,” PMLA 39 (1904): 115-53. 
 70 Since Pythagoras left no writings, many apocryphal tales have circulated about the 
man, painting him as much a mystic as mathematician. One such rumor claims that after 
one of Pythagoras’ students (a man named Hippasus) brought to his master an 
understanding that the square root of two could not ever be reduced to a fraction, the 
master sentenced his student to death by drowning for fear of contradicting his theory of 
the harmony between number and nature.  
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To be clear, I do not mean to assess the mathematical fluency of a poet we know 
nothing about; rather, I would like to situate the poet’s use of geometric proportions 
within the context of the time that he wrote. Put bluntly, the poet’s attempt at an 
arithmepoetics that might reduce the structure of a pearl to a geometric proportion fails in 
the same way the dreamer misperceives the consequences of his own lesson. Although 
several of Pearl’s critics offer the mathematical contemplation of infinitude as an 
endpoint, the poem rejects out-of-hand the notion of mathematics as a mystical 
technology: this poet more closely resembles a jeweler or craftsman. Within this model, 
the poet expresses the inexpressible through the materiality of the pearl, which becomes 
not only the pearl of “great price” but also the pearl “beyond measure.”  
Pearls, Pearls, Pearls 
 If the medieval pearl marks the scene of contact that joins material and immaterial 
worlds, the image of the stream separating dreamer from Maiden at the end of section 
nineteen confirms the impossibility of a felicitous transmission of meaning back to the 
earthly existence.71 Just as the familiarity of the dreamer’s New Jerusalem betrays an 
almost exact reliance on the source he hoped to augment, so too does his final 
engagement with the Maiden return to sentiments expressed in their initial encounter: 
Lorde, much of mirþe waȝ þat ho made 
Among her fereȝ þat watȝ so quyt! 
                                                
 71 Edmondson frames the disconnect in terms of linguistic versus extra-linguistic 
worlds, explaining that the stream “underscore[s] the radical incommensurability between 
the mediated, language-bound world of the dreamer and the realm of the limitless 
jouissance beyond the river” (“Pearl: Shadow of the Object,” 55). 
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Þat syȝt me gart to þenk to wade 
For luf-longyng in gret delyt 
  (ll. 1149-1152) 
 
Here the dreamer’s determination to invalidate the very words he just received from the 
Maiden betray that, for him, desire exceeds comprehension. The dreamer cannot grasp 
that the kingdom, like the Maiden, is a mirage and so he begins to “wade” the chasm 
between unknowing and knowing, an act that thrusts him immediately back to earthly 
existence. Unable to suppress his “luf-longyng,” the dreamer tests the literalized 
boundaries outlined by the Maiden throughout the poem. 
 For if the poem brings the dreamer (and reader) into any state of knowing, it is 
reached only belatedly, after being told precisely what cannot be comprehended 
intellectually: the irreducibility of God’s infinite grace to any human mode of perception 
(sensory, linguistic, literary, or mathematical). Even within a fantasy within which the 
dreamer can fully trace the trajectory of his loss, the contact the he makes with 
immaterial reality is illusory. The dreamer must do more than Lacanian ethical command 
to “love his symptom”: he must unknow this contact, submitting to faith this gap between 
his meager perception of the vision and the infinite equality of salvation, lest he 
misperceive the radical complexity of the theological paradox he was presented. Readers 
too must reduce all that the dreamer experiences to mere approximation.   
Upon waking, the dreamer claims to belatedly understand one of the Maiden’s 
primary lessons—that his desire for knowledge fundamentally exceeds his ability to 
comprehend. Reducing our inexhaustible intellectual thirst to an inherent human 
weakness, the speaker even has the nerve to caution the reader against epistemological 
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lust (ll. 1199-1200). Though the lesson is sensible, this is a strange one to hear from this 
speaker; after all, it is highly questionable whether he has even learned this lesson 
himself. Earlier in the stanza he professes a belief that if only he “ȝerned no more en watz 
me guen” (ll. 1190), God would have guided him, “To me of His mysterys I had ben 
dryuen” (l. 1195). Not only does his abiding belief in the knowability of God’s 
“mysterys” betray a misperception regarding the limits of human cognition, he also 
seems to offer a view of human longing in which desire can be satiated by just desiring a 
little less. What other of “His mysterys” might have the Maiden revealed to augment his 
understanding or to satisfy his yearning? Recalcitrant desire notwithstanding, the speaker 
ends the poem with a vision of faith without understanding, implying that the 
incomprehensible transfer of Christian truth between material and immaterial realms 
occurs only through a divine transformation, the sacrament of the Eucharist (1207-09). 
Quite fittingly, the poem’s last two lines confirm that, as daily witnesses to the 
transubstantive, we too, as readers, become pearls. 
• • 
  
By the poem’s end, we have truly come full circle: the speaker who lost a pearl 
has become a pearl found in Christ. Given the collapse of the poem’s animating symbol 
into two ostensibly opposed forces, it seems reasonable to suggest, along with 
Edmondson, that the poet has completely evacuated the pearl of any meaning (32). The 
pearl has become everything and nothing within the poem and thus impossible to pin 
down. And yet this is precisely the point. Lest we take impossibility as the poem’s one 
conclusive lesson, we must glance, belatedly, once more at the poet’s symbolic unfurling 
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of the pearl. Now that its signifying weight has consumed even the speaker, the pearl, so 
pregnant with meaning throughout the poem, has structurally enclosed the entire poem 
despite and because it has become the basic signifying unit within the poem’s Christian 
economy of salvation. Whereas Edmondson returns the reader to the signifier, I would 
like to highlight how the poet, armed with an impossible task, employs, through the pearl, 
what Alexandre Leupin calls the “incarnational poetics” of Christian discourse to unknow 
the process of signification itself.72  
Rather than unite a mourning jeweler with his lost jewel, Pearl articulates a 
system of designed failure that approximates the union of material and ethereal worlds, 
but maintains such contact as impossible. Through slippery wordplay, symbolic 
geometry, and meditation on the relation between the divine and the infinite, Pearl 
exposes the inadequacy of signs (linguistic, visual, and even mathematical) in any 
attempt to communicate divine knowledge. For those who insist on a more nuanced 
theological reading, in which Pearl’s manifestly theological digressions indicate a 
specific program of doctrinal instruction, the pearl becomes an object whose retrieval 
might signify the discovery of the soul, a turn to the ascetic life, or unmediated faith in 
God. And these readings are hardly surprising given that the pearl, understood as 
scriptural object, was already thought to participate in the economy of knowledge that 
helped collate the relationship between Kingdom of God, Word, and believer—a union of 
                                                
 72 Leupin describes medieval Christian poetics as a realist rhetoric that uses the model 
of the Christ’s Incarnation to attempt to suture the gap between signified and signifier. He 
does not account for the poetic skepticism of a work like Pearl, though Leupin’s brilliant 
analysis of Christian rhetoric certainly fits the mold of the Pearl poet’s concerns. See 
Fiction and Incarnation. 
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the material and the immaterial. Yet, despite the dreamer’s insistent treatment of the pearl 
as an object of knowledge, the Maiden guarantees the impossible status of the very 
information she delivers. In both form and content, Pearl addresses the question of how 
much one can know about what one does not know, and in doing so, meta-linguistically 
verifies unknowing as a viable approach to Christian salvation. 
Pearl’s engagement with the discursive history of its central object complicates 
the poem’s point about the unknowability of salvation by building the immateriality that 
exceeds signification back into the same object (pearl) that functions also as metaphor for 
the way all knowledge is communicated in the poem. In other words, Pearl’s 
epistemology champions the inseparability of knowing and unknowing: in order to 
recognize impossibility one must also un-recognize what appears to be (but is not) 
possible. Consequently, any attempt to isolate the pearl’s symbolic import is frustrated by 
an endless and seemingly arbitrary transfer of meaning—a meaning that often negates its 
preceding significance. Thus the pearl both embodies and solves the poem’s paradoxes: it 
is both the infinite and the same, the “more” and the “less,” Mary and Christ, foundation 
and “addubbement,” form and content. Put another way, the pearl signifies both the 
condition of Christian knowing (salvation) and the fundamentally excessive intractability 
that makes its material possession impossible.  
In order to follow the argument that the pearl encompasses everything, it must 
also represent the simplest of things. More fundamental than language or mathematics, it 
is the pearl itself that proves to be the poem’s irreducible unit of meaning, the “spoteles” 
foundation of its arithmepoetics of unknowing. Of course, no poet can inhabit, let alone 
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harness, the infinite singularity of the pearl and its relationship to God’s salvific 
economy: the mathematic balance for which the poet strives can only approximate the 
harmonious proportionality of the divine Word. The poet can only attempt to model the 
celestial poetics of infinite singularity through a metaphorical reduction of all 
signification to an interaction among pearls, objects understood throughout the Middle 
Ages as possessing the requisite qualities of uniqueness and endlessness. While language 
leaves readers with difference and the transcendental singularity of the number is undone 
by the un-representability of irrational quantities (the divine section, phi, the square root 
of two), the singularity of the pearl cannot be reduced. With the pearl, an object that 
exceeds human comprehension or control, the poet has a metaphor within which all 
meaning, however contradictory, coexists without slippage. Thus, in order to avoid the 
impossibility of signification its content champions, the poet employs a performatively 
approximate reconstruction of the pearl in order to at least partially recreate the effects of 
a signifying economy of salvation whose basic unit is paradoxically infinite and singular.  
To consider Pearl’s architecture as form does not require us to force enclosure 
onto a poem that so resists circumscription, but instead grants a point of entry into the 
poet’s conception of his/her craft, a glimpse that exacerbates the need to consider Pearl’s 
historical and cultural context. In terms of the rich tradition of Pearl criticism, I hope to 
have contributed a reading of how the ethereal Maiden of Pearl exceeds the generic 
expectations of the “literariness” of late medieval dream-narratives in order to emphasize 
the dream narrative’s simultaneous relationship with a scientific understanding of 
signification. Within the field of medieval literary studies, I have attempted to offer a 
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model of how the putatively literary symbol can intervene in the historical understanding 
of a subject’s relationship to the Word and the contradictions of reading practice.  
But even as our “modern sensibilities” impel us to presume a natural separation 
between mathematical and literary thought, the distinction was not necessarily defined so 
clearly in the fourteenth century. Nor is Pearl singular in its interests: Chaucer’s poetry 
possesses a playfulness with geometric riddles as well. The ending of the Summoner’s 
Tale, for example, culminates in an absurdist reworking of the mathematical paradox of 
how to divide nothing (a fart) twelve ways.73 In a similar vein, Condren cites Sir Thopas, 
a tale whose half-baked formal architecture (three fitts descending from eighteen stanzas 
to nine to four and a half) reveals a more explicit failure of balance than that of Pearl (6). 
In order to understand the medieval object whose perfect circularity belies its 
failure to realize itself in the material world, perhaps it is more appropriate then to echo 
the poet’s own advice from Sir Gawain: Þe forme to Þe fynisment foldez ful selden; that 
is, the beginning seldom folds onto the end completely. In this sense, Edmondson’s view 
of the poem as “indivisible remainder” resonates as a particularly apt descriptor of 
Pearl’s place within medieval literature— not because it cannot be easily integrated 
within the canon of Middle English literature, but because it admits a lack of unity that 
results also in a left-over, both unknowing and exceeding literary studies.
                                                
 73 See Glending Olson, “Measuring the Immeasurable: Farting, Geometry, and 
Theology in the Summoner’s Tale,” The Chaucer Review 43.4 (2009): 414-27. 
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Chapter Four 
Legend, Empire, and the Nomadic Prester John1 
 
It is the year 1222. Intelligence relayed from Bohemond IV, ruler of the crusader 
state of Antioch, to Jacques de Vitry, preacher and crusade propagandist, reaches 
crusaders anxiously waiting in Damietta. The intelligence, a report written in Arabic 
obtained from traveling spice merchants in Antioch, details the westward military 
progression of a certain King David, purportedly the great-grandson of the famed Prester 
John, a military leader who, rumor has it, has systematically destroyed Muslim armies in 
the east. Jacques has the report, later called the Relatio de Davide, translated 
immediately.2 He then sends letters containing parts of the Relatio to Pope Honorius, 
King Henry III of England, Duke Leopold of Austria, and to several academics at the 
University of Paris. Spirits lift within and without the crusader camp, essentially 
renewing the hope for a Christian recovery of Jerusalem. In dire need of good news, the 
de facto crusade leader at Damietta, Cardinal Pelagius, links this report to a local 
prediction, the Arabic Prophecy of Hannan, Son of Agip. This second prophecy augurs 
the arrival of a certain “King of the Abissi” who conquers Mecca in order to “scatter the 
                                                
 1 Portions of this chapter have been published in Christopher Taylor, “Global 
Circulation as Christian Enclosure: Legend, Empire, and the Nomadic Prester John,” New 
Medieval Literatures 11.7 (2014): 445-59. 
 2 On the prophecy, see Jean Richard, “The Relatio de Davide as a Source for Mongol 
History and the Legend of Prester John,” in Prester John, the Mongols, and the Ten Lost 
Tribes, eds. C.F. Buckingham and B. Hamilton (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), 139-58. 
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bones of Mahomet.”3 Pelagius sees himself as the tall man with a lean face whom the 
prophecy foretells would invade Egypt and capture Damietta, since Pelagius had done 
just that in 1219. Meanwhile, the crusaders are also restlessly awaiting the appearance of 
the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick II, a figure who had promised to show up and whose 
imminent appearance finally seemed certain. Frederick’s arrival, like John’s, is predicted 
by a third prophecy, extracted by Cardinal Pelagius from an apocalyptic Arabic text, The 
Book of Clement, which, among other things, announced the impending dissolution of 
Islam, which would occur when a King from the East (presumably Prester John, or one of 
his descendants) and one from the West (Frederick) met in Jerusalem during a year when 
Easter fell on the third day of April. By happiest coincidence, that would be this very 
year, 1222. Buoyed by prophecy and heedless of local conditions, the crusaders at 
Damietta decide to invade Cairo immediately, rejecting an agreement with the Sultan Al-
Kamil that would have given Jerusalem back to the crusaders in exchange for Damietta. 
The Nile rises, turning the invasion of Cairo into defeat. The armies of the Fifth Crusade 
surrender to the Sultan of Egypt, Al-Kamil, Saladin’s nephew, a few weeks later.  
                                                
 3 According to Bernard Hamilton, this prophecy was an update of the work of a ninth-
century Persian Nestorian scholar, Hunan Ibn Ishak, and “Abissi” refers to the 
Abyssinians (in Ethiopia). Hamilton believes that a Coptic Christian wrote the copy of 
the prophecy that Pelagius obtained. More recently, Christopher Tyerman has suggested 
that the prophecy was written around 1220 by a nearby Egyptian Nestorian. See, 
respectively, Bernard Hamilton, “Continental Drift: Prester John’s Progress through the 
Indies,” in Prester John, the Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes, ed. C.F. Buckingham and 
B. Hamilton (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), 243; Tyerman, God’s War: A New History of 
the Crusades (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2006), 642. For more on the contents of 
this prophecy, see Paul Pelliot, “Deux passages de ‘la prophétie de Hannan fils d’Issac,’” 
in Prester John, the Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes, ed. C.F. Buckingham and B. 
Hamilton, 113-38 (Aldershot: Varorium, 1996). 
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*  *  *  
With victory in sight at Damietta, the strange ending of the Fifth Crusade has long 
puzzled scholars: how is it possible for so many people to not only believe in a Prester 
John figure, but to have faith that he would show up? The tactical disasters of the Fifth 
Crusade help quantify the reach of belief with which medieval Christians—especially 
those invested in the project of crusading—were willing to grant to the notion an Eastern 
Christian sovereign fated to help drive out the threat of Islam once and for all. For Pope 
Innocent III, the divisions between and among Christians, coupled with the potential 
alliance between Christian and Muslim, evidenced the internal discord of Christendom. 
Therefore, Innocent made crusading it an all-inclusive affair, an event in which all 
members of Christian society participate.4 This communal ideology gave the militaristic 
dimensions of crusading added spiritual depth, and the spiritual aspects a stronger 
material agency. This latter point, combined with the council’s demands for clarity and 
revelation, clears a space for prophecy as a viable means for making the unknown known 
or knowable. And as Michael Goodich discusses, Innocent’s vitas would have us believe 
that he was quite susceptible to prophecy himself.5 After all, what better way to achieve 
clarity than through revelation? 
                                                
 4 This includes mandatory intercessory prayer, redemption for crusade vows, and a 
vision of crusade as imitatio Christi, rendering it a mechanism for salvation, not unlike 
the Eucharist itself. 
 5 Michael Goodich, “Vision, Dream and Canonization Policy Under Pope Innocent III,” 
in Pope Innocent III and his World, ed. John C. Moore, 151-63 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
1999). 
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But Prester John was much more than a mere vessel for crusading hopes. 
According to the most authoritative rumors—many of which were propagated by a man 
claiming to be John himself—this eastern warrior priest-king possessed the richest 
kingdom on earth, replete not only with an vast store of jewels, spices, and Christian 
soldiers, but also home to monsters, Jews, and, even worse, Nestorian Christians (of 
which Prester John was reputedly one). It seems the Prester John belonged to a much 
larger, more complex network of desires regarding identity and politics, the known and 
the unknown. Yet, through the Fifth Crusade, the most important component of this 
medieval myth was surely John’s promise to help vanquish the enemies of the cross. 
Indeed, from its inception in the twelfth century, the legend of Prester John linked the 
impulse to explore a global landscape with a desire for this landscape to be revealed as a 
continuation of, rather than a departure from, the known—as already Christian.  
Buried under such a burden of historical expectation, John seemed destined to 
disappoint for any number of reasons, not the least of which because he did not 
technically exist. In this chapter, rather than dwell on the historical demands that 
produced such fervent belief, I pick up where the opening anecdote left off. Strangely 
enough, despite never showing up to defend crusader armies and refusing to reveal 
himself to European travelers, an increasingly global audience refused to relinquish faith 
in Prester John, who remained an important cornerstone to Western conceptions of a 
global Christendom for six centuries. How was this possible? As I discuss in this chapter, 
belief in Prester John persisted for centuries because what the legend sustained had little 
to do with reality. Adherents to the legend attended not to material concerns but rather to 
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the hope that the varied liminal spaces around the world might ultimately reveal an 
expansive Christian network, a Christian enclosure of the globe, so to speak. The 
transmission of the legend, fueled by hundreds of manuscripts of supposedly self-
authored Letter, establishes an expectation that the known world would inevitably 
succumb to the will of global Christianity, within which alterity threatens to become a 
productive force, once and for all. 
In this chapter, I discuss how writers made productive use of John’s 
unknowability and how these texts helped sustain the persuasive force of the legend. The 
legend survived, in part, because the promise it offered outweighed the fact that John 
remained materially unknown to all who sought him. As I hope to show, the effective 
preservation of Christian hope John embodied required a transposition away from the 
realm of history to a setting whose geographies he might less problematically negotiate: 
the space of literature. I argue that the literary aspects of the legend lent more than 
ornament to John’s unknowability; these resonances served, paradoxically, to enhance 
John’s historical profile. Prester John would have likely retained his supporters regardless 
of the believability of the legend. However, the proliferation of late-medieval Prester 
John narratives recasts his historical failures into a crucial component of the legend’s 
nomadic poetics, which allowed the European imagination to imagine him everywhere 
precisely because he could neither be confirmed nor denied an existence anywhere.  
By focusing first on the twelfth-century Letter of Prester John and later on the 
literary character of the legend, I show how, for centuries, Prester John helped writers 
mediate threatening encroachments onto the Christian present by giving face to (and 
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therefore helping to domesticate) the unknown. In the first section of this chapter, I 
reconsider some of the Letter’s supposed irregularities and contest readings that reduce 
the legend to a chain of utopic impulses aimed at describing some vaguely defined, 
fantastic community. In order to contextualize my reading of the Letter as Crusading 
fantasy, I compare the Letter’s textual project of Christian enclosure, the first Latin 
translation of the Qur’an (1143). While the Letter reveals a powerful Eastern Christian 
ally in order to clarify the place of the crusades in a larger eschatological schema, its 
focus on an ambiguous, fantastic geography sets in motion later versions of the legend 
rooted in the intractability of John and his kingdom.  
In the second section of the chapter, I show how later versions of the legend make 
use of John’s unknowability in order to sustain a narrative tradition. An analysis of the 
relationship between the historical expectations and literary flourishes reveals that these 
two narrative modes were not incompatible, but interdependent. An Anglo-Norman 
translation of the Letter softens the historical character of the legend while maintaining 
the expectations attached to John’s promises. Middle English texts, such as Chaucer’s 
Squire’s Tale and The Three Kings of Cologne, along with continental texts, including 
Wolfram von Eschenbach’s Parzival and, later, Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso, integrate the 
legend into other popular medieval narrative traditions. These narratives serve both to 
aestheticize John’s unknowability at the same time that they work to familiarize John to a 
growing European audience. Moving from the realm of politics to that of poetics, the 
legend of Prester John demonstrates some long-term consequences of actively organizing 
epistemological pursuits around a romanticized notion of the unknown. By re-examining 
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how “John” self-fashions a malleable and yet fundamentally consistent identity across the 
texts he appears in, I show how the legend complicates received notions about  how late-
medieval narratives handled questions of authorship, temporality, geography, and 
theology. Insofar as it articulates a politics of Empire predicated on a purposefully 
delayed encounter with the reality of human difference, the legend of Prester John pushes 
the poetics of unknowing into a global, political arena. 
A Purloined History 
Prester John first appears in 1145 within Otto of Friesing’s universal chronicle of 
Christian history based on a comparison between the heavenly kingdom of Jerusalem and 
the earthly kingdom of Babel.6 In Book VII, Chapter 3 of the Historia, Otto recalls a 
story he obtained from a certain Bishop Hugh of Jabala. While at the court of Pope 
Eugenius III, Hugh overheard talk of a Nestorian Christian prince, Iohannes, hailing from 
the distant East of the Magi (from whom he claimed lineage). This prince had recently 
conquered Persia and had headed West to assist crusaders in their defense of the Holy 
Land, but was thwarted by a flooded Tigris River.7 It remains a mystery why so credible 
                                                
 6 Otto, the uncle of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, wrote the Historia de duabus 
civitatibus during a time of civil unrest in Germany, following the collapse of the first 
crusader county, Edessa. 
 7 If the dates are correct, Hugh was likely to have been in Rome for the specific purpose 
of reporting to Pope Eugenius III that Edessa had fallen to Muslim control. Raymond, 
Prince of Antioch, had sent Hugh to Rome in 1144 to deliver the news. Less than a year 
later, Eugenius issued a bull inaugurating the Second Crusade. Although the rumor 
spawned centuries of expectations regarding an Eastern potentate capable of uniting all of 
Christendom, the initial account was later revealed to refer not to utopic Christians at all, 
but to the Qara Khitai, a nomadic Chinese tribe descending from Manchuria.  
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an historian as Bishop Otto, whose writings remain a useful source for contemporary 
historians, would write about this strange “Iohannes” knowing so little about him, to say 
nothing of how this “John” became Westernized in name and intent. A Nestorian 
Christian—a heretic by Latin Christian standards— would seem an unlikely candidate to 
assist in a Latin Christian recovery of Jerusalem, let alone be desired for such a mission.8 
Given that the fall of Edessa to Seljuk Turks in 1144 helped spawn the Second Crusade 
one year later—a crusade that Otto himself participated in—it should come as no surprise 
that, at the time of Otto’s account, crusaders were looking to the divine in order to 
support, or at least sustain, their actions.9 Nothing in Otto’s narrative suggests that Prester 
John provided a solution to these crusader crises, however. In fact, the text explicitly 
states that John and his army had been forced to turn back before reaching Jerusalem.  
After its initial appearance in 1145, the legend of Prester John goes unremarked 
for about twenty years, at which point a letter materializes, reportedly authored by John 
himself.10 In what has come to be known as the Letter of Prester John, John professes to 
be a devout Christian king of an immense, militarily powerful kingdom from which he 
                                                
 8 Although a number of hypotheses have been afforded to explain how medieval 
Europeans Latinized the name of the Mongol Prince, it is perhaps more important to 
recognize the fact that some of the Mongols were Christianized. Robert Silverberg 
suggests that that Hugh purposefully dissuaded the Pope from believing in the 
omnipotence of Prester John because John’s presence might render the deployment of 
European armies to the Holy Land less necessary. See The Realm of Prester John 
(Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1972), 8-10.  
 9 According to the Historia, it was the fall of Edessa that finally inspired this Nestorian 
prince to cross the Alps. 
10 The conventional dating of the Letter of Prester John to 1165 derives from the 
chronicle of Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, writing 1232-52. 
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announces his intentions to visit the Holy Sepulcher and to aid crusaders.11 While early 
copies were addressed to the Byzantine emperor Manuel, with whom “John” takes a 
hostile tone, the Letter likely circulated within Latin Europe rather than through the 
territories of the Greek Empire.12 It became an immediate success. In addition to the 
extant hundred-plus Latin manuscripts, the Letter was translated into multiple vernacular 
languages, including French, Italian, German, English, Hebrew, Serbian, and Russian. 
The Western appropriation of a letter apparently written for an Eastern audience 
highlights the Letter’s status as purloined, while its vernacular popularity suggests that 
even as the legend spread locally, linguistic difference hardly undermined the hope for a 
unified Christian future. It seems, rather, the unification the Letter provided was, in fact, 
predicated on such linguistic and cultural difference.  
                                                
 11 For a complete English translation of the Latin letter, see Michael Uebel, Ecstatic 
Transformation: On the Uses of Alterity in the Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave, 2005),  
 155-60. For the still-authoritative critical edition of the Latin manuscripts, see Friedrich 
Zarncke, “Der Priester Johannes,” Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Classe 
der königlich sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 7 (1879): 872-934. 
Subsequent in-text quotations from the Letter include corresponding page numbers in 
Uebel and Zarncke, respectively.  
 12 The oldest known versions of the Letter are all addressed to Manuel despite their 
being written in Latin: no Greek version has yet been found. For a detailed investigation 
of the historical conditions surrounding the original letter as well as an excellent study of 
its style and analysis, see Vsevolod Slessarev, Prester John: The Letter and the Legend. 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1959), 32-54. The only serious scholar to claim a Greek 
ur-text is Alexander Vasiliev in his unpublished study, available at the Byzantine Library 
of Dumbarton Oaks, Washington DC: Prester John: Legend and History, (n.p., n.p.), 90.  
 207  
In the Letter, John boasts of an Eastern Christian kingdom bordering paradise that 
surpasses the power and virtue of any other Christian principality.13 Throughout the 
Letter, the speaker balances Occidental familiarities (Christian values, crusading 
promises) with traditional Eastern lore. John promises to protect all Christians through 
the excessive power he wields, by which the Letter attempts to secure his place among 
the idealized rulers of the Middle Ages, both real, such as Charlemagne, and imagined, 
such as Arthur.14 Prester John’s superlative wealth aligns the legend with traditional 
accounts of Eastern riches. His frequent avowals of faith and piety establish his kingdom 
as a Christian node of a vast empire that approaches, asymptotically, the very bounds of 
the earth: “from the farthest India, where the body of St. Thomas the Apostle rests, to the 
place where the sun rises” (155; 910). John not only endures alongside but rules over 
many well-known markers of the medieval fantastic, including the Tower of Babel, 
Mount Olympus, the tomb of the Old Testament prophet Daniel, the fountain of youth, 
and the dwelling places of the ten tribes of Israel, the Amazons, and the Brahmans. By 
presenting the topography of Prester John’s kingdom via well-known touchstones of 
Western accounts of the East, the Letter echoes the way that medieval mappaemundi 
indicate and plot topographical relationships and also how travel narratives, according to 
                                                
 13 The original Letter does not survive and when scholars refer to it, they almost always 
mean Zarncke’s recreation of an ur-text based on his work with the manuscripts. In 
addition to the recreated ur-text, Zarncke identifies five separate redactions of the Letter. 
 14 The Latin Letter of Prester John began circulating not thirty years after the 
completion of Geoffrey of Monmouth’s Historia Regum Brittaniae, the text that marks 
King Arthur’s Latin debut. This historical coincidence should not be overlooked, 
especially since Geoffrey’s Arthur, like Prester John, responded also to the demands of 
Empire. See, for example, Arthur’s speech at ix.4.  
 208  
Paul Zumthor, “[betray] the author’s faith in a complete world, pointing up his terror of 
the void, but conferring on the text a fictive veracity.”15 While the imaginative riches of 
John’s realm confirm Western fantasies of an exotic East teeming with strange treasures, 
the Letter appropriates these expectations for Western hopes via John’s Christianity.  
The Letter avoids the doctrinal conflicts plaguing twelfth-century Europe by 
uniting all forms of Christianity under John’s protective banner.16 John promises to 
defend Christendom against all inimicos crucis Christi and advocates a military policy of 
humiliation and defeat (“humiliare et debellare”) rather than annihilation (155; 910). 
Along with providing hope for a global Christendom, Prester John helps assimilate the 
mysteries of the East by re-routing all networks of power and human difference through a 
naturalized Christian rule. John’s kingdom models a form of rule that domesticates even 
the most heterogeneous lands: despite the fact that seventy-two kings pay tribute to him, 
“John” boasts, only “a few are Christian.” (155; 910)17 In addition to Muslims, pagans, 
and the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, the land is rife with the creatures of medieval bestiaries, 
                                                
 15 See Zumthor, “The Medieval Travel Narrative,” trans. Catherine Peebles. New 
Literary History 25 (1994): 809-24; 816. 
 16 John is presumably as a Nestorian (although the Letter never identifies him as such), 
but here he is uniting himself with Catholic ideals. Otto of Friesing’s account links John 
to Nestorianism and Mandeville’s mid-fourteenth-century reimagining of Prester John, 
which uses the original epistle as a source text, too posits the king as Nestorian, which 
suggests that John continued to be popularly identified as Nestorian. Slessarev reads the 
original Letter’s association between John and St. Thomas (a very important figure for 
Nestorian Christians) as an implicit acknowledgement of Prester John’s Nestorianism 
(The Letter and the Legend, 14). Geraldine Heng reads this passage as John’s pledge to 
join the Crusading movement (Empire of Magic, 283, 446). 
 17 According to Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies, ii.2., the world was composed of 
seventy-two tribes of people. The fact that John rules over seventy-two kings suggests 
that John is a universal ruler.  
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including griffins, phoenix, satyrs, dog-headed men, one-eyed men, and giants.18 In order 
to maintain order in this heterotopia, John projects an ethos predicated on adherence to 
moral principles (temperance, humility) rather than confine himself to rigorous doctrinal 
allegiances. In doing so, the Letter valorizes a shared core of Christian values that closely 
resemble Islamic doctrines instead of obsessing over the differences that undermine the 
possibility of a united Christendom.  
Despite all the talk of heresy in the genres that inform it, the Letter mentions 
neither the word nor the concept. All who recognize John’s sovereignty are welcome in 
the realm; John makes alterity work under the banner of Christianity without destroying 
its productive potential. As avowedly humble potentate of sacral and secular power, John 
solves, with elegant simplicity, the ongoing Investiture struggles that were now 
reverberating in the conflict between Frederick Barbarossa and Pope Alexander III 
(1153-1177): 
For we have in our court many officials who are more deserving of title and 
office, as far as ecclesiastical honor is concerned, and they are provide with divine 
service even greater than ours. In fact our steward is a primate and king, our cup-
bearer an archbishop and king, our marshal a king and archimandrite, and our 
chief cook a king and abbot. (Uebel, 160) 
 
Prester John’s kingdom, as Bernard Hamilton points out, resembles Emperor Frederick 
I’s vision for the West.19 As if to leave any doubt of the political leverage John’s 
                                                
 18 Much has been made in the last twenty years about the medieval monster and what it 
signals for English identity. See the work of Jeffrey Cohen: Of Giants: Sex, Monsters, 
and the Middle Ages (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1999) and the edited collection 
Monster Theory: Reading Culture, ed. J. Cohen (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996). 
 19 See “Prester John and the Three Kings of Cologne,” in Prester John, the Mongols, 
and the Ten Lost Tribes, eds. C.F. Buckingham and B. Hamilton, 171-85 (Aldershot: 
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imagined support garnered, early copies of the Letter that were addressed to Barbarossa 
shifted the dynamic between emperor and pope enough that the latter tried to requisition 
the support of John himself. Pope Alexander sent a request to meet through an emissary 
in 1177, the same year that the Peace of Venice ended the power struggle between the 
two leaders and forced Frederick to recognize papal supremacy.20  
Although most scholars of the legend situate the politics of the Letter in terms of 
these two models of Western power, it cannot be overlooked that John’s kingdom models 
an inclusivity absent in either form. This inclusive stance toward Christian expansion 
survives the Letter, resurfacing in later texts mentioning John’s kingdom, a topic I 
explore in the next section. Although scholars, including Hamilton, have tried to explain 
the legend as a hoax perpetuated by Frederick’s inner circle that spiraled out of control, 
this explanation fails to account for the survival of the legend beyond the political 
intrigues of the twelfth century. By proposing a kingdom under which heretics, pagans, 
                                                                                                                                            
Variorum, 1996). Hamilton goes further, claiming that “the aim of the author of this letter 
is to show that Frederick’s concept of church-state relations, unlike that of Alexander III, 
produced harmony in the Christian world, and enabled Christians to unite against the 
enemies of the faith” (180).  
 20 Pope Alexander sent Master Phillip, his personal physician, as envoy to provide a 
reply to Prester John’s Letter and urge John’s instruction in Catholicism. We never hear 
back from Master Phillip. For the text of the letter, see Zarncke, Abhandlungen, 941-4. 
While Alexander’s letter is typically read at face-value, it also has the effect of re-
inscribing ecclesiastical power, in the form of doctrinal Catholicism, as the most 
important feature of any imperial project. Hamilton reads the letter as a kind of public 
rhetorical performance, a stance he supports by noting that Alexander made several 
copies of his letter. See Bernard Hamilton, “Prester John and the Three Kings of 
Cologne,” in Prester John, the Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes, eds. C.F. 
Buckingham and B. Hamilton, 171-85 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), 184. Nicholas 
Jubber, eight hundred years later, attempts to re-trace the emissary’s route and deliver 
Alexander’s reply, despite the obvious facts standing in the way of this feat, in The 
Prester Quest (London: Doubleday, 2005). 
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and monsters coexist, the Letter offers a glimpse of a confidently universal Christendom 
that need not force assimilation or extermination to extend its rule. Instead, the 
descriptions of the monstrous in the Letter remind us that, like Prester John, Christianity 
has seen it all; therefore, it can withstand it all. 
Acts of Enclosure 
Spatially considered, the idea of a powerful Eastern Christian kingdom provided 
the West with a tactical comfort: such a military intervention from the East led by Prester 
John inspired a strategic vision in which Muslim armies appeared to be surrounded from 
both West and East. The Letter redirects the “persecutorial impulse” of the twelfth-
century West away from the fragmentation internal to Christian identity and focuses these 
energies on a clearly defined external enemy. This rhetorical move is significant not only 
because it obviates the notion of heresy but also because it posits Islam as something 
external to Christian practice. For many twelfth-century Christians, Islam was best 
categorized as a Christian heresy, and it was not until Islam was better understood that it 
was fully granted the status as a religion separate from Christianity.21 John’s realm’s 
boundlessness suggests the illimitability of Christendom, while its vaguely eastern 
geography guarantees a topographical enclosure, or final limit, of this uncanny identity 
haunting its sacred place of origin, an ever-increasing Islamic empire. 
                                                
 21 John Tolan discusses this twelfth-century understanding of Islam as Christological 
heresy in Sons of Ishmael (Tallahassee: U of Florida P, 2008). See especially “Peter the 
Venerable and the ‘Diabolical Heresy of the Saracens,’” 46-65. 
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Indeed, the larger thematic picture of the Letter closely resembles a 
contemporaneous textual enclosure of Islam used to delineate an unambiguous Christian 
identity: the first Latin translation of the Qur’an. Commissioned in 1143 by the powerful 
Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, the translation, called Lex Mahumet 
pseudoprophete, was the centerpiece of a planned codex unveiling Muslim doctrine, 
which could then be authoritatively critiqued.22 Spatially analogous to a Christian 
landscape that includes an powerful eastern ally, the translation allowed Christians to 
enclose the message of Islam as conveyed by the Qur’an into the language of the 
Christian Church and to surround the Islamic message with Christian glosses, 
commentary, and marginal notes.23 
Peter’s was the first attempt to identify and translate the actual doctrine of Islam 
into the language of the Catholic Church. As late as the twelfth century, the Latin texts 
                                                
 22 In 1142 Peter the Venerable (also known as Peter of Montboissier), abbot of Cluny, 
traveled to Spain at the request of Emperor Alfonso VII with the ostensible goal of 
visiting the Cluniac monasteries of Spain. Having established a reputation for reform 
during his twenty-year abbacy (a crucial time in the history of Cluny), Peter had also 
recently emerged as a powerful international figure, shadowed in influence perhaps only 
by his friend (and sometimes rival) Bernard of Clairvaux. In Toledo, Peter assembled a 
group of scholars who would together produce a systematic Latin account of Islamic 
doctrine. Peter assembled a research and translation team that included an English 
theologian and scientist (Robert of Ketton), a French academic (Peter of Poitiers), a 
Mozarab Christian (Peter of Toledo), a Dalmatian astronomer (Herman of Carinthia), and 
an Iberian Muslim named Moḥammed. For the most specific outline of Peter’s itinerary, 
see Charles Biskho, Spanish and Portuguese Monastic History, 600-1300 (London: 
Variorum Reprints, 1984), 344-50. 
 23 Thomas Burman analyzes the Latin translations of the Qur’an in Reading the Qur’an 
in Latin Christendom, 1140-1560 (Philadelphia: U of Penn P, 2007). For more on the 
translation and Letter as strategies of enclosure, see Christopher Taylor, “Prester John, 
Christian Enclosure, and the Spatial Transmission of Islamic Alterity in the Twelfth-
Century West” in Contextualizing the Muslim Other in Medieval Christian Discourse, ed. 
Jerold Frakes , 39-64 (New York: Palgrave, 2011). 
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concerned with the practice of Islam focused mainly on Muhammad and inserted the 
prophet into a highly imaginative genealogy of heretics and pagans hostile to the 
Christian faith.24 Sensing that a military engagement with Islam had its limitations, Peter 
maintained, in opposition to his friend Bernard, that the elimination of the Islamic threat 
required Christians to understand and, finally, refute Islam’s relationship to Christian 
doctrine.25 In his estimation, the reconciliation of Islam to the Christian faith would prove 
a far more impressive feat than vanquishing the Muslims. Although Peter planned the 
codex (referred to now as the Toledan Collection MS 1162 of Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal 
in Paris) primarily for use at Cluny, the eventual audience for the project proved much 
more diverse. 
 At the center of the Toledan Collection was Robert of Ketton’s translation of the 
Qur’an, entitled Lex Mahumet pseudoprophete. Framed by other texts in the manuscript 
that related the genealogy, deeds, beliefs, and errors of Muḥammad, Robert’s translation 
rendered a religious code that relied largely on oral transmission into a speculative object 
to be studied alongside Christian texts.26 This is not to say that the Latin Qur’an was a 
completely faithful translation. Robert took many liberties with the text, not necessarily 
                                                
 24 See “Forging Polemical Images,” in Tolan, Saracens, 69-170. 
 25 Peter’s letters to Bernard reveal the former’s relative disapproval for crusading and 
his preference instead for instruction and conversion. See especially Letter 111 from 
Peter to Bernard in The Letters of Peter the Venerable, Vol. 1, ed. Giles Constable, 274-
99 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1967). On Peter’s interaction with the Muslim faith, 
see James Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1964). 
26 Burman remarks on the resemblance between the Toledan Collection and a 
contemporary Christian scholar’s Bible, which exemplifies the extent to which the 
author-compiler worked to assimilate Islam into a Christian cultural paradigm (Reading 
the Qur’an, 63). 
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with the intention of polemic but in order to provide Western Christians with a sense of 
traditional Muslim exegetics. Robert’s Qur’an presents its reader with two enclosures: he 
translates Islamic doctrine into Latin and then distills each sura into its condensed 
meanning.27 Along with the twelfth-century preoccupation with heresy, the Latin Qur’an 
shows that during the twelfth century, the Church often valorized the peripheral as a more 
urgent theological concern than the central identity delimiting the outside from inside in 
the first place. The Lex Mahumet seeks the preservation and territorial extension of a 
societas Christiana in such a way that it comes to resemble the violent efforts of the 
crusading movement it was formulated to subtend.  
The coding of the Muslim faith as Christian heresy established a tautological 
relationship between the two faiths—Islamic doctrine is known to be incorrect because it 
disagrees with the Christian doctrine to which it is so clearly indebted. However, despite 
the book’s dependence on its inevitable refutation, the stylistic prestige bestowed upon 
the Toledan Collection legitimates the text itself as theologically significant. Both Peter 
and Robert regarded the translation a serious endeavor, and, in fact, Robert’s translation 
later became a popular Scholastic text. The result was a doctrinally accurate although 
highly paraphrased treatise, translated “by sense, rather than the word,” that nonetheless 
showed careful philological considerations. Linguistic and theological interests coincide 
in the relation between Robert’s sober text and the prescriptive commentary provided in 
                                                
27 Robert took the translation process seriously, which resulted in a final product that 
actually resembled a work of Christian theology. Burman notes that Robert wrote in an 
elevated register of Latin that “bespoke prestige and cultural validity,” even though 
readers were instructed to read the Qur’an as heresy (Reading the Qur’an, 13, 14). 
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the margins.28 Commentary not only guided readers through unfamiliar territory but also 
assured them of an interpretive “auctoritas” whose purpose was to disarm the 
equivocations of the reading process. Given the relation between reading correctly and 
living correctly in the Middle Ages, this desire for textual assurance might represent a 
more urgent desire for stability at a time when the Christian identity faced ideological and 
military danger. In the case of Lex Mahumet, the marginalia colored the neutral tone of 
Robert’s paraphrased translation with necessary polemical anti-Islamic warnings, which 
helped cement shared Christian values. 
The decade that produced the 1143 Latin Qur’an challenged the notion of a united 
Latin Christendom that Pope Urban II had promised at the Council of Clermont in 1095. 
Indeed, Peter’s translation project reflected the uncertainties underwriting the time period 
in which it was produced: unstable leadership (four popes in the decade), the ascendancy 
of the Cistercians, the fall of Edessa (1144), the unsuccessful Second Crusade that 
followed (1145), and the seeds of the now infamous legend of Prester John (1145). Once 
borders between Islam and Christian could be properly marked, a distinctive Christian 
identity could be produced, and the new ideological space granted to Islam could be 
recaptured under the banner of a newly united Christendom. When hope gave way to 
experience, however, Christians began to rely increasingly on prophecy and legend to 
make intelligible the difficulties faced during the crusading movement and to situate war 
                                                
 28 As Rita Copeland has shown, manuscript marginalia bestow a final interpretive 
authority across space and time and sometimes overshadow the text itself. See Rhetoric, 
Hermeneutics, and Translating in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
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with Islam within a Christianized telos. Two resulting fantasies of enclosure—Qur’anic 
translation, Prester John’s legend—bolstered hopes for retaking lost Eastern strongholds 
(Edessa, Jerusalem) and capturing new ones (Cyprus, Acre, Jaffa), but also indicate a 
desire for Islam to be absorbed into the narrative of Christianity.  
The strategy of enclosure might resemble a colonial impulse; however, 
considering that Muslims occupied the symbolic center of Christian identity (Jerusalem), 
these actions are framed more precisely by the logic of reconquest or return. Peter the 
Venerable’s linguistic enclosure of the Qur’an offered opportunities for Western readers 
to disassemble the logic underwriting Islamic doctrine, and thus to re-assert the 
theological superiority of a doctrinal Christianity. Rather than combat an unknown force 
on the ground, Peter favored an act of revelation to allow the text to speak for itself. Peter 
reasoned that making Islam more knowable could facilitate its defeat in a way that 
military engagement could not. On the other hand, the Prester John Letter and its 
geographical fantasy of enclosure lacked the alchemy that transformed knowledge into 
power so directly. Rather, hinged to the more indirect power of belief, the legend of 
Prester John made its readers wait; its true promise relied on John’s fated arrival. And 
yet, while the Letter appears to reveal everything except where to find Prester John, it 
does provide some sense of who the king might be. By linking the figure of Prester John 
to key figures of the European Christian imagination, the Letter offers an outline of the 
future that answers one of the legend’s fundamental questions. We may not know where 
John lives, but we can know what kind of man he is.  
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Uncanny Doubles 
 
For many of its readers, the Prester John legend creates an Eastern complement to 
the prowess of Western Christendom. However, the legend’s preoccupation with Islamic 
lore and its attention to contemporary cultural events positions John as the West’s 
Christian counterpart precisely because of his position as the uncanny double of Muslim 
success. As abstract locus of power for a potentially global Christian empire, John’s 
kingdom offered a nascent societas Christiana a cipher through which Christians might 
acknowledge and contain the excess that threatened Latin Christian identity: heresy from 
within, Islam from without, and Mongols from afar.  
In the Letter and the twelfth-century material that inspired it, John’s associations 
with Islam cannot be untangled from his proximity to Edessa and his connection to the 
Apostle Thomas. Traditionally linked to the spread Christianity in the East, Thomas was 
not an especially popular apostle within the Latin Christian community.29 However, this 
most skeptical of the Apostles became John’s Christian predecessor. In addition to using 
his tomb as a point of orientation, John constructs his palace to replicate the spiritual 
palace Thomas builds for King Gundafor in the Acts of Thomas. The Apostle Thomas 
provides John with an Eastern Christian forebear that helps maintain the powerful 
expectation of an already Christian East. However, the connection between these figures 
exceeds even this useful homology as Thomas’ placement in the legend’s helps assemble 
                                                
29 The Syrian Acts of Thomas, even when translated into Latin, did not have much of a 
Western readership. 
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a powerful network connecting West and East, past and future, known and unknown, 
through a logic of doubleness that extends through centuries of Prester John lore.  
As Zarncke discovered, John and Thomas became something of a pair even 
before the legend of Prester John began to circulate through the Letter. In the De adventu 
patriarchae Indorum ad Urbem sub Calixto papa secundo [De adventu], a certain 
Patriarch John, hailing from India, travels to the Pope in 1122 to give an account of the 
vast wealth and power of Indian Christians who guard the shrine of St. Thomas, a site of 
many miracles.30 A contemporaneous letter written by Odo of Rheims, abbot of St. 
Remy, addressed to a Count Thomas, attests to similar Eastern miracles associated with 
the shrine of St. Thomas in India.31 With a base population of Christians and a reliable 
method of conversion through miracles, these texts depict India as a veritable factory for 
producing new Christians. In both texts, Patriarch John goes to Rome in order to prove 
his commitment to a global societas Christiana by advocating for the reunification of 
Eastern and Western churches. Collectively, Thomas and Prester John represented an 
exotic East that rejected Islam and could capably defend themselves against it.  
 Within communities of Eastern Christians, a slightly different history of St. 
Thomas attested similar miracles to those of de Adventu but placed them in a curious (and 
                                                
 30 Slessarev finds an analogue and predecessor of the Prester in the de Adventu text; see 
The Letter and the Legend, 7-14. The de Adventu is edited by Zarncke in the collection of 
Prester John related texts; see “Der Priester Johannes,” 837-46. 
 31 The only substantial difference between the de Adventu and Odo’s letter is that in 
Odo’s version John is an archbishop, and that he came to Constantinople to request a 
replacement for the prince of Hulna, who had recently died; see Slessarev, The Letter and 
the Legend, 9-14. Anthropologist Manuel João Ramos provides a compelling argument 
about the link between John and the Thomas legends; see “What is a Fallen Angel?” in 
Essays in Christian Mythology (Lanham, MD: UP of America, 2006), 183-92. 
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highly relevant) locale: Edessa. A twelfth-century account of India written by the monk 
Elysaeus, influenced in part by the Prester John Letter, situates the miracles of St. 
Thomas on a mountain just outside of the crusader county lost around the time the Prester 
John legends began to circulate.32 Edessa was regarded as one of the chief Christian cities 
at the time, both for its Christian population and for its strategic location as a Christian 
gateway to the East. Edessa had also been historically considered a hotbed of 
Nestorianism, Prester John’s reputed faith, ever since the School of Edessa’s support of 
Nestorius in the fifth century. These twelfth-century narratives establish Edessa not only 
as a magical place worth defending, but as a naturally Christian locale. While Jerusalem 
might be the center of the Christian world, Edessa, the first crusader state to be 
established (and lost), marks the first successful expansion of a Latin Christian empire.  
Whatever inspired the timely conjunction that convened Edessa and Prester 
John’s India, it seems that reported events within these locales were circulating more 
closely than their geographies would indicate. By planting the seeds of legend into the 
history of Edessa, twelfth-century writers participate in an active un-knowing of history, 
through which the legend might persist. Given that the Prester John legend arose, in part, 
out of the news that Edessa had fallen, it should not be surprising that this association 
persists well into the fourteenth century. Johannes Witte de Hese, whose fanciful 
“travels” recall those of the more famous John Mandeville, even names Edessa as the city 
                                                
 32 The Latin Acts of Thomas, which evolved into two more popular treatises, De 
miraculis Beati Thomae and the Passio Sancti Thomae, identifies Edessa as the final 
burial place of Thomas. Some traditions posit that Thomas rested simultaneously in 
Edessa and India. See Nicolaus Nilles, Kalendarium manual utriusque ecclesiae 
orientalis et occidentalis, vol. 1 (Oeniponte: Innsbruck, 1896), 297-98.  
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that houses the infamous kingdom of Prester John.33 By associating the lands of Prester 
John directly or indirectly with Edessa, writers employ the creative power of fiction to 
un-know the traumatic loss of this “gateway to the East.” 
Considering that Muslims and Nestorians represented two of the West’s most 
historically problematic and intractable “heresies” it should come as no surprise that they 
are also grouped together in Western Christian texts.34 Principal among these connections 
is the strange fact that Western authors of the twelfth century inaugurated traditions, 
devoid of any literary precedent, claiming that the tombs of Muhammad and St. 
Thomas’s floated in mid-air.35 In both cases, this phenomena does not betray an 
underlying sanctity, but rather the result of strategically placed magnets. These stories, 
which were Latin Christian inventions, appear to forge a connection between the Eastern 
                                                
 33 When de Hese first mentions Prester John, he notes that “sailing farther for fourteen 
days, one comes to the city of Edissa where Prester John lives,” and that this city, the 
capital of John’s realm, “is located in Upper India at the end of the inhabited earth.” See 
Scott Westrem, Broader Horizons: A Study of Johannes Witte de Hese's Itinerarius and 
Medieval Travel Narratives (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 2001), 
213. Westrem’s excellent edition of the Itinerarius includes an edited Latin edition, an 
English translation, and a very useful introduction. 
 34 Tolan remarks that authors of these heresiographies “insist on the spiritual heritage of 
Muhammad: while the prophet himself claims affinity to Moses and Christ, the authors 
instead profess Muhammad’s solidarity with the great heresiarchs of old, in particular 
Arius and Nestorius” (Saracens, 138, 144). 
 35 The de Adventu contains the narrative of Thomas’ floating tomb, described 
beautifully in Michael Uebel’s “The Pathogenesis of Medieval History,” Texas Studies in 
Literature and Language 44.1 (2002): 47-65; 55-6. Embrico of Mainz’s twelfth-century 
Vita Mahumeti inaugurated the tradition of Muhammad’s tomb being suspended in mid-
air by magnets. See La vie de Mahomet, ed. Guy Cambier (Brussels: Latomus, 1961). 
Other twelfth-century portraits of Muhammad, including those in the Chanson 
d’Antioche and Gautier de Compiegne’s De otia Machometi, offer similar descriptions of 
Muhammad’s tomb, envisioned ostensibly in order to showcase the way in which 
Muhammad feigned piety and miracles in order to assure adherents of his sanctity.  
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Christians’ reverence of the Apostle Thomas with Muslims’ adulation of their prophet 
Muhammad as a way of un-knowing the difference between them. Heresy is heresy, after 
all, as the Fourth Lateran Council would soon make clear. If Muhammad’s tomb mirrored 
the Christians’ Jerusalem, as historian John Tolan contends, these legends provide a 
counter-narrative that Thomas’s tomb, under Prester John’s control, might augur a 
different fate for this most sacred Christian site.36  
That these figures and faiths should be associated with the lands of Prester John is 
not surprising given John’s reputed Nestorianism and the legend’s dependence on the 
Thomas tradition. However, as the Letter makes clear, John maintains an unblemished 
reputation despite the proximity of his land to such deviant systems of belief. In fact, in 
its design and in its social practices, John’s kingdom promotes abstinence and self-
control. While his court dines, the amethyst columns that support the dining table 
guarantee that “no one sitting at the table becomes inebriated” (158; 918). Although 
John’s bedchamber is “marvelously gilded and ornamented with all kinds of stones,” the 
Letter makes clear that John’s sapphire-lined bed offers more than aesthetic adornment 
(158; 918). As John explains, the bed was so designed “on account of the stone’s virtue in 
chastity”— a good thing since John’s kingdom contains “the most beautiful women” and 
                                                
 36 The stories of Muhammad’s resting place, which described his tomb as a pilgrimage 
destination akin to Christian Jerusalem, represent an additional structural relation where 
Islam is figured as Christian Other, as “a sort of mirror image of the crusaders’ 
Jerusalem, an anti-Jerusalem.” See Tolan, Saracens, 144.  
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that its residents practice polygamy (158; 917).37 Muhammad’s numerous wives became 
a point of contention for Christians in their twelfth-century writings on Islam. 
Muhammad was known to have had as many as twelve wives at once, an exception 
allowed him by the Qur’an (33:50), which restricts other men to four.  
The Letter’s response to polygamy is telling. The mechanisms of chastity in the 
land of Prester John rely on self-control as much as they rely on magic. The text of the 
Letter implies that while Prester John only has sex four times during the year and for 
strictly procreative purposes, he still has multiple wives, “and thus sanctified by us, as 
Bathsheba by David, each one returns to her place” (158; 918).38 Although John’s 
kingdom contains elements as the Islamic Paradise, John remains indifferent to the 
pressures of the material world. Abstemious in the face of temptation, John and his 
retinue maintain Christian moral values despite the temptations of the opulent East. 
Even more explicitly, the Letter maintains that John’s residence replicates the 
spiritual palace Thomas builds for King Gundafor in the Acts of Thomas—that is, except 
that John’s palace is guarded by a panoptical mirror tinged with Muslim splendor.39 This 
                                                
 37 Here I am indebted to Geraldine Heng’s reading of the Prester John Letter in “Sex, 
Lies, and Paradise: The Assassins, Prester John, and the Fabulation of Civilizational 
Identities.” differences 23.1 (2012): 1-31. 
 38 The curious addition at the end, “ut Bersabee a David,” offers a rare critique of John’s 
lifestyle. That John himself sanctifies his couplings as Bathsheba was sanctified by David 
should recall for Western Christians the story in 2 Samuel 11 about David seducing and 
impregnating an already-married Bathsheba, whose child, punished by God, died a few 
days after being born. The text of the Letter suggests that John’s couplings, while perhaps 
driven by an austere piety, resonate nonetheless as infelicitous undertakings. 
 39 Slessarev, The Letter and Legend, 49-50. Slessarev attributes the magic mirror to 
Arabic tales of sorcery and as a well-known trope in Persian literature, extending 
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“mirror of very great size” rests atop a structure built on a series of geometrically stacked 
columns, a design that recalls the famed gardens of the legendary Old Man in the 
Mountain (158; 918).40 The mirror protects his realm from invasion as it allows him to 
see any distance in any direction. In what seems more than a coincidence, this Christian 
panopticon is guarded by 12,000 soldiers both day and night—the same number of angels 
guard the top of the ladder leading into the Afterworld in stories of Muhammad’s 
Ascension.41 The Letter thus provides both a parallel and a complement to one of the 
foundational stories guaranteeing an Islamic Paradise, even as it admits a Muslim origin 
at the heart of Christianity’s panoptical surveillance. Prester John’s Letter guarantees that 
however expansive Islam may become, it cannot harm a Christian kingdom protected by 
                                                                                                                                            
especially to the account of Eldad had-Dani. Silverberg cites the lighthouse of Alexandria 
as another source (The Realm of Prester John, 67).  
 40 The Old Man of the Mountain, whose legend was a product of the Crusades and about 
whom Marco Polo wrote, was rumored to consider converting to Christianity himself. A 
mysterious Muslim leader, he built a luxurious paradise on earth by stacking one 
beautiful garden on top of another in an immense and highly geometrical manner. At the 
top, the Old Man and his followers reveled in the finest in food, drink, and women. There 
the Old Man trained his devotees, known to the West as Assassins, to kill his enemies 
and, in return, he promised reentrance into his palace once missions were accomplished.  
 41 See Ibn Ishaq, Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq’s Birat Rasul Allah, trans. 
A. Guillaume (London: Oxford UP, 1955), 184. The number 12,000 possesses 
significance in Christian numerology as well, most significantly as the dimensions 
(length, width and height) of the New Jerusalem (Rev 21:16). The number also signifies 
the number of people set to be saved from each of the twelve tribes of Jews (Rev 7:3-8). 
While this number has clear significance in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic tradition, the 
notion of 12,000 bodies situated at a great height recalls the Islamic use of the number 
more directly than it does either Christian or Jewish uses of the number. For more on the 
Western narrative of Muhammad’s ascension, see the thirteenth-century Liber Scale 
Machometi, available as Le Livre d'Échelle de Mahomet, trans. Gisèle Besson and 
Michèle Brossard-Jandré, (Paris: Librairie Génerale Française, 1991). 
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a panoptical mirror—even a mirror purloined from Muslim cultural sources, and even if 
Prester John would likely have been a Nestorian heretic. 
Not surprisingly, the appearance of the Letter led to dozens of Eastern incursions 
motivated, in part, by the prospect of an immense Christian kingdom. Although these 
travelers occasionally discovered small Christians communities (which were sometimes 
taken as traces of Prester John’s Eastern influence), they found neither John nor any of 
the splendor promised in his Letter. On his pilgrimage from Spain to the Holy Land, 
Benjamin of Tudela (c. 1165) described an encounter with powerful Eastern king, called 
Kofar-al-Turak, increasing Western interest in the Mongols but hardly shedding light on 
the Prester John legend.42 In 1245, Pope Innocent IV had sent Franciscan John of Plano 
Carpini to deliver letters to the Mongol khan, inviting the khan to embrace Christianity. 
The resulting journey, the most widely known of all early Western accounts with 
Mongols, describes “Ethiopians” from the lands of Prester John, but here John has 
already lost his place at the head of Eastern politics. Prester John plays no part in 
William’s mission to guarantee cooperation from the Great Khan.43 Later narratives, 
including those of Ascelin of Lombardia (1245-48)44, André de Longjumeau (1249)45, 
                                                
 42 The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela: Critical Text, Translation and Commentary, ed. 
and trans. Marcus Nathan Adler (New York: Philipp Feldheim, 1907). Benjamin claims 
to visit the famed lighthouse of Alexandria, whose reflective mirror he marveled at.  
 43 John of Plano Carpini, “History of the Mongols,” in Mission to Asia, ed. Christopher 
Dawson, 3-72 (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1980). 
 44 In the portion of Ascelin’s narrative that survives (that which was transcribed by 
Vincent of Beauvais), Ascelin reports that Prester John has integrated his family into that 
of the Mongol royal family by betrothing Prester John’s granddaughter to Chinggis Khan. 
Most of Ascelin’s journey is lost, but that which remains, recorded by Simon of Saint-
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Joinville’s Chronicle46, and John Mandeville47 allude to a union between these Mongols 
and Prester John. John of Monte Corvino (c. 1294) brought back a more reliable account 
of Indian Christians than had been circulating previously in the West but does not 
explicitly mention Prester John.48 Other travelers, including William of Rubruck (c. 
1253), Marco Polo (c. 1269-99), and Odoric of Pordenone (1320s) attempt to rationalize 
the assumptions regarding a kingdom of Prester John as fantastical extrapolations of 
minor Eastern truths.49  
 Even when these writers undercut some of the splendor of John’s kingdom, they 
keep him alive figuratively and literally. To ally Prester John with the Mongols may seem 
                                                                                                                                            
Quentin, was kept alive by Vincent of Beauvais. See Gregory Guzman, “The 
Encyclopedist Vincent of Beauvais and His Mongol Extracts from John of Plano Carpini 
and Simon of Saint-Quentin” Speculum 49.2: 287-307. Ascelin’s journey is outlined 
earlier in Guzman, “Simon of Saint-Quentin and the Dominican Mission to the Mongol 
Baiju: A Reappraisal” Speculum 46.2 (1971): 232-49. 
 45 André describes a meeting with a “David,” a Kerait chieftain, whom he concludes has 
allied with a Mongol general in order to attack Muslims in Syria. See Silverberg, The 
Realm of Prester John, 105-39. 
 46 Joinville, using information from André Longjumeau, narrates the destruction of 
Prester John by the Mongols. See Silverberg, The Realm of Prester John, 96-111. For the 
English translation of Joinville see Chronicles of the Crusades, trans. Frank Marzials 
(New York: Dover, 2012), 219-30. 
 47 Although the Travels borrows directly from Ascelin, the Mandeville narrator, who 
clearly demonstrates a desire to entertain, expands significantly on this union.  
 48 “The Letters of John of Monte Corvino” in Mission to Asia, ed. Christopher Dawson, 
224-38 (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1980). 
 49 “The Journey of William of Rubruck” in Mission to Asia, ed. Christopher Dawson, 
89-223 (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1980), 141. For Polo, Prester John (or Un-khan) was a 
powerful prince who ruled over the Tartars (Mongols), but was overthrown, in a battle 
Polo himself describes, by the Mongol leader “Chingis-khan.” See The Book of Ser 
Marco Polo, Vol. 2, 17-22. Odoric writes that “not one hundredth part is true of what is 
told of [Prester John] as if it were undeniable.” See Odoric of Pordenone, The Travels of 
Friar Odoric, trans. Sir Henry Yule (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 
2002), 150. 
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like a threat to the legend’s persistence, but in fact these travelers were updating the 
legend of Prester John by integrating John into the genealogy of an Eastern people 
foremost in the minds of Western leaders since the mid-thirteenth century. Even as some 
writers describe the legend as an exaggeration, their authority is restricted by the fact that 
none of these travelers claimed to have met the enigmatic figure.  
Copies of the original Letter continued to circulate. Since its advent, the efficacy 
of the legend depended, at least partially, on the unknowability of the Eastern 
geographies over which John claimed to rule. However, once increased travel began to 
reveal a less exotic “India” than the legend’s adherents had anticipated, the legend risked 
becoming outmoded by the comparatively accurate historical reports of travelers 
returning from these lands. Even as the Letter’s promises remained undiscovered, many 
refused to relinquish faith in the legend: the messianic comforts of a future delivered of 
Western turmoil (lack of stable leadership, fear of Muslim ascendency) had taken hold of 
too many Europeans.  
Those invested in the legend developed strategies to assure European audiences 
that John need not be known in order to exist. In order to combat the disappointing 
accounts of contemporary travelers, the physical location of John’s kingdom was 
constantly (and necessarily) re-imagined in order to sustain the belief that this kingdom 
was alive and well, despite the failures by those who sought it. Some ten years after 
Marco Polo returned to the West, another Prester John letter surfaces, allegedly sent by 
John to the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles IV. While several thirteenth-century writers 
integrated the legend of Prester John into their developing understanding of the Mongols 
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on the Steppe, a number of fourteenth-century travelers relocated John’s kingdom to 
Ethiopia/Abyssinia, or “Middle India.”50 These later writers connected this meeting with 
the kingdom of Prester John and reignited the theory of an Ethiopian John, an 
identification that would continue through Portugal’s sea explorations.51 
When historical knowledge about the East began to replace the fantasmatic 
projections that had accumulated over the previous centuries, the structure of the 
narrative changed, and yet Prester John remained fixed in the European imagination. 
During this time of increased travel, writers began to emphasize John’s literary qualities 
with greater frequency. As detailed in the following section, these strategies were hardly 
incompatible; in fact, both involve un-knowing what was becoming an already 
                                                
 50 C.F. Buckingham details such a visit by Ethiopian Christians to Pope Clement V at 
Avignon in 1306. According to later texts which recount the meeting, the Ethiopian 
ambassadors desired their European brethren to return to the true doctrine of the Christian 
church. Beckingham refers specifically to the Supplementum chronicarum of Philippus 
Bergomas (1483) but also cites texts by Chasseneux (1546), Godinho (1615), and Le 
Mire (1619), which record the same event. See “An Ethiopian Embassy to Europe c. 
1310,” in Prester John, the Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes, eds. C.F. Buckingham and 
B. Hamilton, 197-206 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996). Matteo Salvadore writes of 
Ethiopian Christian envoys who arrive in Italy in 1402. See “The Ethiopian Age of 
Exploration: Prester John’s Discovery of Europe: 1306-1458,” Journal of World History 
21 (2010): 593-627, esp. 604-6. 
 51 Friar Jordanus of Séverac (c. 1320) writes of a dragon-filled kingdom of Prester John 
in Ethiopia; in the mid fourteenth century, The Book of the Knowledge of All the 
Kingdoms, Lands, and Lordships That Are in the World claimed that Prester John was the 
patriarch of Nubia and Abyssinia; Henry the Navigator’s explorations of Africa were 
rooted in the hope of an Ethiopian Prester John; in 1482, Francisco Suriano, in his Iter, 
mentions arriving at the court of Prester John, a primitive place in which ten Italians were 
currently living, and paints a picture of mud huts and simple churches; Vasco da Gama’s 
Roteiro mentions the desire to make contact with Prester John; in 1499, Italian poet 
Guiliano Dati, composes a pair of poems on PJ (“Treatise on the Supreme Prester John, 
Pope and Emperor of India” and “Ethiopia and Second Song of India”); in 1500, a letter 
from “Johannes Africanus” materializes, which details how Prester John, once mighty 
and powerful, is now a humble steward and laborer (guilty of pride). 
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unknowable Prester John. Rather than attempting to clarify the uncertainty regarding the 
historicity of John’s kingdom, those interested in the legend began to further mystify the 
historical circumstances surrounding John’s kingdom. In doing so, literary unknowing 
became a technology to enhance historical knowledge. In turn, John’s elusiveness 
became a focal point of the legend, which, adapting to historical circumstance, adopted a 
kind of nomadic poetics, moving from one genre to another as his kingdom was re-
imagined across the globe.  
Literary Knowing as Historical Unknowing 
 
 Otto of Freising, the man indirectly responsible for creating the legend of Prester 
John, helps bring to focus the political overtones underwriting some of the legend’s most 
seemingly literary details. After all, Otto was also uncle to Frederick Barbarossa, the 
emperor who, at the time of Prester John’s advent, was hell-bent on obtaining sovereignty 
over the Pope. Otto’s account provides some of the basic “facts” about the legend, and 
while the Letter greatly expands on Otto’s account, it does not very much increase its 
audience’s knowledge of the elusive figure. Otto tells us that Prester John is a morally 
pure, militaristically capable Eastern (Nestorian) Christian king claiming descent from 
the Magi. As mentioned earlier, Otto’s Prester John anecdote was likely generated from 
the political fallout subtending the loss of Edessa. The Crusading support Prester John 
voiced likely helped assuage fears that the West might require outside assistance in order 
to maintain the recovered sites of Christian history.  
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 John models a form of leadership that the West lacked, but his connection to the 
Magi offers a direct connection to the court of Frederick I and, moreover, represents one 
of the legend’s key moments of literary invention. In 1158, one year after Otto completed 
his Historia, Frederick Barbarossa “found” three bodies in Milan, which he had verified 
as those of the Magi. Prior to this moment, little was known about the three kings: 
through Biblical commentaries (and misunderstood geography), the Magi had become 
associated with the Apostle Thomas.52 Just as a competent Eastern Christian priest-king 
helped strengthen Frederick’s own position in the West, so too did a materially verifiable 
trace of the Magi enhance the Emperor’s claim to authority. The relics of these Magi 
were transferred to Cologne in 1164 and Barbarossa’s anti-pope canonized Charlemagne 
at Aachen one year later. Thus, in a period of two years, the Emperor helped create a cult 
of Christian kingship by creating two separate shrines to secular power.  
When, during such chaos, the Prester John Letter appears, it is quite curious that 
John’s existence is described in terms of his genealogical relation to the very same Magi 
whose Western significance was actively being codified in Germany. As with the Latin 
Qur’an, which Europeans knew to be heretical because it deviated from Catholic 
doctrine, the reputations of Magi and Prester John become symbiotically intertwined via 
rhetorical tautology. The newly discovered, public fact of the Three Kings lends 
                                                
 52 Beckingham, “Prester John and the Three Kings of Cologne,” 175. Beckingham 
describes how, prior to the twelfth century, interest in the Magi was primarily restricted 
to the iconography of the Nativity. Little was known about these Eastern figures. 
Beckingham associates the idea of three Magi with Tertullian, who understood the Magi 
as typologically fulfilling a prophecy from Psalm 72. Likewise, a popular medieval 
commentary on Matthew’s Gospel, falsely ascribed to John Chrysostom, suggested that 
St. Thomas had himself baptized the Magi during his Eastern evangelism.  
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credibility to the presence of a Prester John in the East just as John’s existence draws 
further interest in the Magi, all of which appears to advance the political cause of 
Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. Insofar as Prester John and the Magi bolster each other’s 
legacies, the creation of the Letter might be understood as a literary act in itself, ex nihilo, 
a “by-product of the need… to provide the Three Holy Kings with suitable Acta.”53 In 
other words, the fiction of a Prester John helps create a historicity, or “history effect” to 
use Justice’s term, for the revised importance of the Magi as model secular Christian 
kings. Once writers begin to fill out the back-story of the Magi with additional literary 
flourish, culminating with John of Hildesheim’s Historia Trium Regum (c. 1378), Prester 
John was given a plausible lineage the helped stabilize his historical existence.54 As the 
Magi/Prester John connection shows, the literary act can indeed reinforce, if not create, 
history. However, in order to adapt to the changes to Eastern geography brought about by 
thirteenth-century travel narratives, Prester John relocates to the realm of literature.  
* * * 
One version of the Letter in particular helps us understand the transformation 
John’s legend was beginning to undergo. The Anglo-Norman verse translation of the 
original Latin Letter, dated to the second half of the thirteenth-century, exists as one of 
the oldest vernacular translations of the letter. According to its author, the Anglo-Norman 
                                                
 53 Ibid., 180-1. In addition to his view that the Letter came about, in part, to enhance the 
story of the Magi, Beckingham identifies the Letter’s address to Manuel as a “literary 
device” to obviate the matter of how an Eastern envoy delivered the Letter to Frederick 
unnoticed (180). 
 54 The Historia Trium Regum connects Prester John, St. Thomas, and the Three Magi in 
a single text for the first time. 
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Letter came to be when an English crusader named Gilbert le Butelier obtained a copy of 
the Latin text from Constantinople on his return from the Holy Land to England. 
Although the text names of Gilbert’s companion, William de Vere, as well as the 
translator himself, Roau d’Arundel, historians have yet to identify these individuals, a 
precise date, or even the precise crusade that led to the translation.55 Despite this 
document’s unique transformation of an epistolary, supposedly historical document—to 
which so much real hope was pinned— into something more closely resembling 
romance, the text has received very little critical treatment by scholars of Prester John (or 
otherwise) and has not yet been translated into English.56 
In addition to offering early evidence of the vernacular use of the Latin Letter, 
d’Arundel’s Anglo-Norman text offers the first significant expansion of the Latin 
material. Less a translation than a re-telling, d’Arundel’s text replaces concerns regarding 
John’s historical arrival with a desire to tell an entertaining story. Although its two 
manuscripts are unconnected to other vernacular translations, the Anglo-Norman letter 
                                                
 55 The translation survives in two manuscripts, named the Dublin and Yale, which are 
presented side-by-side in Martin Gosman, La Lettre du Prêtre Jean: Les versions en 
ancien français et en ancien Occitan, Textes et commentaries, (Netherlands: Groningen, 
1982), 121-43. 
 56 Slessarev, The Letter and Legend, 55-7. Robert Anthony Vitale’s dissertation 
provides and English language introduction to the Anglo-Norman Letter as well as a 
glossary in its edition of the Yale manuscript. See “Edition and study of the Letter of 
Prester John to the Emperor Manuel of Constantinople: The Anglo-Norman Rhymed 
Version,” (PhD Diss, University of Maryland, 1975). I hope to have completed my 
English translation of the Anglo-Norman text by 2015. My translation uses the Yale 
Version (MS 395 in the Beinecke Library) obtained from the earlier German edited 
version of the manuscript. See G. Koerting and E. Koschwitz, ed., Zeitschrift: für 
französische Sprache un Litteratur (Chemnitz und Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Gronau, 
1915), 100-1. 
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merits serious study, if only for the interesting formal deviation it represents. This version 
updates its source in three specific ways that suggest a legend on the move: d’Arundel 
opts for verse rather than prose, alters the narrative frame, and recasts the Letter’s genre. 
The shift in narrative frame provides the most fundamental difference between the 
Latin Letter and the Anglo-Norman retelling. Whereas the original Letter resembled an 
actual letter, d’Arundel’s version appends a prologue and epilogue. Crucially, the 
prologue, identical in both manuscripts, introduces a narrator figure who forges a bit of 
distance between John-as-speaker and audience. While the original Letter secures its 
impact only to the degree that John’s rhetoric persuades the reader, the intimacy garnered 
by the original’s epistolary structure almost certainly helped inspire belief among its 
readers. D’Arundel’s text, by contrast, shows little concern for believability. The 
inclusion of a prologue disrupts that intimacy between the text and its reader, and also, 
along with the movement to verse, illuminates its literary quality, urging readers to split 
their attention between the spectacular content and the words chosen to describe it.  
Though it was hardly unheard of to treat mid-thirteenth century historical writing 
in verse, the author makes several self-conscious changes to the Letter that suggest a 
change in genre as well. In addition to d’Arundel’s use of a framing device for the 
translated content, he also offers linguistic evidence for the Anglo-Norman Letter’s shift 
toward a more self-consciously literary textual practice. The formal rearrangement of 
d’Arundel’s text offers a legendary king who reads less as a historical figure than an 
entertaining legend; however, it is only in the text’s epilogue that d’Arundel reveals his 
desire for this text to be read specifically as a romance. Throughout the Anglo-Norman 
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Letter, d’Arundel uses the word rumanz, an infamously vague Old French word, five 
times.57 Several of these uses occur in the construction en rumanz, which likely refers to 
the text’s vernacularity. In the epilogue, the narrator, reflecting on his tale, refers to the 
letter twice as cest rumanz. In the opening lines of the epilogue, d’Arundel writes,  
Seigneurs, en cest rumanz aid it 
Apertement tuit l’escrit 
De chief en autre, cume mei est vis, 
Ke Prestre Johan ad tramis 
Al riche home dunt vus aid it.58 (ll. 1093-96) 
 
The construction “cest rumanz” clearly indicates a second meaning: story, tale, romance. 
The self-conscious shift from historical document to tall tale recovered on a trip to 
Constantinople signals a transposition to a more imaginative realm, but at what cost? 
Whether or not d’Arundel opted for a verse retelling in order to distance the Letter 
from historical expectation, the 1202 lines of rhyming couplets signal at the very least a 
desire to put his own stamp on the legend. The fact that d’Arundel preferred to retell the 
story might indicate an increasing interest in the legend itself. To shift from Latin prose 
to vernacular verse does make the text more accessible, which, regardless of intent, 
provides the legend a new audience. The rhyming couplets suggest that d’Arundel’s 
version was meant for oral delivery, which too implies increased access to the legend. 
There exists a strange addition in the body of the text that undercuts the theory that 
d’Arundel’s retelling meant to introduce this crusading legend to a new audience. While 
                                                
57 Rumanz or romans can refer to the “langue courante” as well as a story (récit). Of the 
five appearances of the word rumanz, one occurs in the translated body of the Letter and 
the other four appear in the epilogue. 
58 English translation: “Lords, in this story I have told/ All of it true/ From end to end, as 
it seems to me, That which Prester John sent/ So that many men could hear it.” 
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the bulk of the Latin Letter focuses on introducing Prester John to an unfamiliar Western 
audience, d’Arundel’s Prester John boasts that regardless of what his audience thinks 
about him, they have certainly heard of him “[p]ar la novel k’est venue” [from news that 
has traveled]. This addition to the text insinuates that John’s fame has permeated non-
Latin speaking audiences, and also suggests that the motive for the Letter’s circulation 
had out grown its original purpose to inform. Whether an exaggeration or not, John’s 
boast gives the legend’s foundational document something of a nomadic tenor. 
Whatever the literary merits of the Anglo-Norman Letter, d’Arundel’s retelling 
did not itself inspire a widespread shift in how medieval Europeans, let alone the English, 
understood the legend. However, his was not the only rendering of the legend taking 
place in the first half of the thirteenth century. Appropriately enough, given the legend’s 
beginnings, it is through German provinces that Prester John cements his legacy within 
the English imaginary. In Parzival, Wolfram von Eschenbach offers the first significant 
literary expansion of the legend when he assimilates the legend of Prester John into the 
realm of Arthurian lore. 
 Written in the first quarter of the thirteenth century, Wolfram’s Parzival offers 
readers the most elaborate medieval presentation of the Grail legend of the time.59 
Framed as something of a rejoinder to the Chrétien de Troyes’s incomplete Perceval, 
Wolfram’s narrative follows an enigmatic source, Kyot, through whom the reader is 
granted access to “heathen” Arabic material essential to the story of the Grail but absent 
                                                
 59 Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival, trans. Cyril Edwards (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2006). 
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in Chrétien. Much like Chaucer’s Troilus narrator’s Lollius, “Kyot” allows Wolfram to 
experiment with a supposedly historical tradition while retaining the medieval narrator’s 
responsibility to auctoritas. Among Wolfram’s inventions to the narrative is the inclusion 
of Feirefiz, the pagan half-brother to Parzival, an equal in knightly virtue and ability and 
distinguished primarily by his mottled black and white skin.60 Feirefiz, who falls in love 
with the Grail’s maiden, Repanse de Schoye, decides to accept baptism in order to be 
closer to his love, an act that also allows him to see the Grail. Soon after, Parzival decides 
to pass the Grail onto Feirefiz, who marries the Grail maiden, returns to the East to 
preach Christianity, and gives birth to a son, the future keeper of the Grail. That son is 
Prester John, whose name thereafter becomes the official title of Indian kings.61 
In Parzival, Wolfram not only incorporates Prester John into Arthurian lore, he 
consequently builds John into English history. Prester John becomes a distant descendent 
of Parzival, himself a distant descendent of Arthur, and yet Wolfram also maintains 
John’s uncanny, hybrid status in the minds of his readers. For one, Prester John continues 
to reside in a mysterious, mostly pagan East. Moreover, as the son of the mottled Feirefiz, 
Wolfram’s Prester John is himself marked, genealogically and physically, as 
simultaneously European and Other. Yet while the text integrates John into the Matter of 
                                                
 60 Feirefiz is the son of Parzival’s father, Gahmuret, and the Moorish queen Belacane. 
When Parzival returns to Munsalvaesche, the Grail castle, and becomes the Grail king at 
the end of the narrative, he discovers that his half-brother cannot see the Grail 
(presumably because he is not a Christian). 
 61 Wolfram writes, “[Repanse de Schoye] gave birth… in India, to a son, who was 
called Johan. Prester John they called him; forever they retained that name for the kings 
there. Feirefiz had letters sent all over the land of India, telling them about the Christian 
way of life” (344-5).  
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England, Parzival makes no explicit reference to the legend of Prester John. Rather than 
accrete onto what is already a dense historical tradition, Wolfram connects the two 
worlds, un-knowing the Prester John legend in order to begin a tradition that might better 
amplify John’s relevance to Wolfram’s audience.  
On a first read, the association between John and the Grail appears to be little 
more than an interesting, ultimately inconsequential afterthought to Wolfram’s mostly 
meandering romance. However, Albrecht von Scharfenberg, who continues Wolfram’s 
narrative, chooses to expand on the Prester John portion of the Grail legend in his 
Younger Titurel by including a description of Prester John’s lands. Rather than a literary 
distraction from the historical expectations surrounding Prester John, Wolfram’s Parzival 
updates the legend in a way that helps perpetuate, rather than suspend, expectations in a 
land of Prester John by keeping John alive in the European imagination at a time when 
increased Eastern travel had threatened to uproot belief.  
* * *  
In addition incorporating the legend into its vision of the Grail narrative, Parzival 
contains a trace of the Letter that it never ties explicitly to Prester John. In the portion of 
Parzival dedicated to Gawain (Books X-XIII), Wolfram recounts how Parzival’s 
companion, in pursuit of his love Orgeluse, visits a magical fortress, Castle Merveille, 
built by the magician Clinschor and indirectly associated with the Grail Castle. Upon 
entering, Gawain encounters the lit merveille, a supernatural bed that nearly kills him. 
When Gawain wakes from his battle with the bed, still in a daze, he encounters a large, 
ornate vault, upon which was mounted a device familiar to those acquainted with the 
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Prester John legend. When Gawain ascends the steps circling around the pillar, he 
discovers a round vault, wrought with precious gems. When he inspects this strange 
creation, it “seemed to [Gawain] that in the great pillar all countries were made known to 
him, and that the lands were going round and round” (248). Gawain questions his 
caretaker Queen Arnive, the wife of Uther Pendragon, about this marvelous device, and 
she explains that the magical stone: 
has shone by day and every night since I first became acquainted with it, for a 
radius of six miles into the surrounding country. Whatever happens within that 
compass, in water and in the fields, can be seen in this column—it gives a true 
report. Be it bird or beast, stranger or forester, foreigner or familiar, they have 
been found therein. (249) 
 
In a clear allusion to the magical mirror featured in the Prester John Letter, Wolfram has 
scaled back the infinite range of his precedent: Castle Merveille’s mirror’s “beam” ranges 
a comparatively meager six miles. However, as with John’s panopticon, Castle 
Merveille’s mirror did not originate in Christendom, even if nobody knows how exactly it 
got there. Arnive claims that “it was stolen in Tabronit from Queen Secundille” (249).62  
Once again, a Western literary text depicts the mirror as a surveillance technology 
purloined from Eastern sources. Although the relationship between medieval West, East, 
and mirror has become something of a commonplace in discussions of medieval East-
West relations, the twelfth-century Letter remains the earliest extant text depicting the 
mirror as a technology of Western surveillance. As the Letter began to circulate, writers 
with comparatively secular intention adopted the mirror (speculum) as an apt metaphor 
                                                
 62 Wolfram never again alludes to the mysterious land of “Tabronit,” but the queen he 
refers to, Secundille, rules over Tribalibot, which corresponds with Wolfram’s “India.” 
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for encyclopedic works.63 In addition to recalling an inverted and distorted relationship 
between the two faiths, the mirror also gives Christians a schema for understanding Islam 
as a contained threat. Like the metaphors of enclosure modeled in the production of the 
Latin Qur’an and by the crusading hopes attached to Prester John, the speculum, along 
with the metaphor of reflection underwriting it, depict the Other as knowable.64 Similarly, 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s popular rhetorical manual, the Poetria Nova (ca. 1210), invokes 
the mirror to model how one might render the foreign as familiar to clarify meaning: 
Quando tuum proprium transsumis, plus sapit istud 
Quod venit ex proprio. Talis transsumptio verbi 
Est tibi pro speculo: qui ate specularis in illo 
Et proprias cognoscis oves in rure alieno (796-800)  
 
[When you transpose a word whose literal meaning is proper to man, it affords 
greater pleasure, since it comes from what is your own. Such a metaphor serves 
you as a mirror, for you see yourself in it and recognize your own sheep in 
another’s field]65 
 
While specularity functioned as a metaphor for containment, it also suggested 
boundedness. For the metaphor of the speculum to register as epistemologically reflective 
practice, the mirror must be understood as a totalizing force. The Islamo-Christian 
                                                
 63 See, for example, Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum Historiale; Albertus Magnus, 
Speculum astronomiae; Roger Bacon, Speculum alchimiae.  
 64 Just as Christians wrote hagiographies of their saints, they too composed 
heresiographies of Muhammad, the supreme anti-saint, with a similar sense of totality.As 
Tolan notes, Adelphus’s Vita machometi describes Muhammad as “the Nestorius of the 
Agarenes” and has him marrying the Queen of Babylon (Saracens, 138). Tolan remarks 
that “all four authors [of twelfth-century Latin biographies of Mu ammad] insist on the 
spiritual heritage of Mu ammad: while the prophet himself claims affinity to Moses and 
Christ, the authors instead profess Muhammad’s solidarity with the great heresiarchs of 
old, in particular Arius and Nestorius” (Ibid., 144).  
 65 Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova, revised edition, ed. Martin Camargo and trans. 
Margaret Nims (Toronto: PIMS, 2010), 44. 
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relationship produced a similar conundrum: just who is reflecting whom? What does it 
mean Prester John, rather than a Western Christian, possesses this tool? Even as John’s 
mirror guarantees complete surveillance over the Islamic Other, he was himself an 
uncanny figure: Christian, but a ruler of (mostly) pagan lands; ally and potential hero, but 
one whose heterodox faith suggests the most abhorrent of heresies. Why would Western 
Christians seek comfort in the thought that hybridist nomad oversaw the doings of the 
primary enemies of the West? While the desire for Prester John indicates a drive for Latin 
Christians to overpower the Other by attempting to absorb it topographically, the 
legend’s preoccupation with borders (shared with the Latin Qur’an) suggests a still-
ductile Christian identity. 
 In his study of the Letter of Prester John Michael Uebel associates the legend’s 
interest in frontiers with an attention to the “interspaces” of identity formation, a process 
he describes as “doubly specular.”66 According to Uebel, rather than cement a binary 
opposition between Islam and Christianity, the Letter reveals that the frontier separating 
self from other is a line that must be crossed. Prester John’s kingdom then provides a 
utopic space within which the gradients between self and other become apparent. Yet, 
while John’s hybridity certainly implies a future less reliant on a binary understanding of 
human difference, his mirror, which comes to influence subsequent texts more than any 
other of the Letter’s details, seems to imply just such a binary opposition that John’s 
kingdom supposedly resisted. Rather than projecting a confident Latin Christian identity 
or providing a utopian space that effaces human difference, the Prester John legend 
                                                
 66 Uebel, Ecstatic Transformation, 36-8. 
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ultimately signifies the Latin Christian reluctance to engage ideologically with Islam in a 
direct manner and instead posits an imagined Christian community from which the West 
can better control the relationship between Christian and Muslim identity. It appears that 
one purpose of the legend was to externalize the inassimilable excesses inherent but 
disavowed in such an attempt at a wholly Christian subjectivity. 
 Far from a simple metaphor of reflection, Prester John’s mirror encapsulates a 
complex rhetorical position in which knowledge is made available to oneself without the 
ideological sacrifice of self-understanding. In this way, the mirror nicely illustrates 
Parzival’s larger themes, reminiscent to those of the Pearl, in which mortals are 
presented with fantasy scenarios containing a mysterious knowledge that should not be 
materially knowable. As Pearl’s dreamer struggles to understand the logic of Christian 
doctrine, so too does Parzival marvel in ignorance of the Grail procession that unfolds 
before his very eyes. Both narratives rely on a conscious historical un-knowing in order 
to achieve the goals described by the narrative: the dreamer must acquiesce to the 
impossibility of divine insight just as Parzival must un-know the advice he receives about 
courtesy in order to ask the “question,” the opportunity for which he will cannot summon 
through reason, but through faith alone.  
 The mirror also helps illustrate a connection between Pearl and the legend of 
Prester John that shows how the metaphor of the mirror becomes a literary device. Both 
narratives offer readers an unknowable agent through whom impossible knowledge is 
made available. As with Pearl, Parzival couples a desire to be made party to the world’s 
excess with a complementary drive to contain those excessive knowledges in a discrete, 
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bounded system through which appropriate action might be taken. The magical mirror 
functions then as a technology of translatio, making the unknown known. Insofar as its 
revelatory potential depends on inserting a cut between the viewing subject and the world 
around her, Prester John’s mirror also becomes a narrative device that functions not only 
to illustrate temporal knowledge, but also to create a metonymic understanding of literary 
culture as such: a techne that creates knowledge, but belatedly, only to the degree that the 
historical facts underlying that knowledge can be confined to an inaccessible realm.  
That this mirror re-appears in an English romance tale about the East, Chaucer’s 
unfinished “Squire’s Tale,” should not then be surprising given the speculum’s symbolic 
function for literary texts along with previous pairings of Prester John and England. In 
the tale, an unnamed knight sent as envoy by the King of India and Arabia brings gifts to 
the Tartar king, Cambyuskan [Genghis Khan], in celebration of Cambyuskan’s twenty 
years on the throne. Along with a brass horse, golden ring, and magical sword, the knight 
presents Cambyuskan with a mirror, which 
Hath swich a might that men may in it see  
Whan ther shal fallen any adversitee 
Unto youre regne or to oureself also, 
And openly who is youre freend or foo.  
(ll. 132-5) 
 
The Squire’s mirror clearly recalls that of Prester John, a man whom many mistook for 
the historical Genghis Khan, but it inverts the direction of the gaze: the speculum of “The 
Squire’s Tale” allows the East to monitor their own behavior and compare themselves 
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against others from a distance.67 Of the gifts, the mirror may be the most recognizable, 
but as John Fyler observes, all four gifts become “devices for translatio.”68 The horse 
needs only one day to reach any destination; the ring deciphers communication between 
birds; the sword restores the bodily injuries it causes. It is the mirror, however that 
addresses problem of containment.  
The idea of absorbing what is wholly other into the topography of the self by 
cordoning it off as materially discrete, which is perhaps the goal of the medieval 
speculum, provides an ironic complement to the Squire’s unfinished tale, itself a 
performance on the difficulty of containment. In Chaucer’s “Squire’s Tale,” the narrative 
accretes layer upon layer of descriptive density until it ultimately escapes its teller, 
trailing off before it has even begun (after 708 lines).69 The tale itself is a case study in 
occupatio: the inexperienced Squire constantly loses control of the Eastern wonder he 
attempts to describe, and ends up writing himself ever more clumsily into an admission 
that the sheer marvel of his story exceeds his linguistic abilities as a teller.70 The process 
of narration leaves the Squire belatedly nostalgic for the tongue of the “deed” Lancelot—
                                                
 67 John L. Lowes is one of few scholars to note the connection between mirror and 
Prester John (“The Squire’s Tale and the Land of Prester John”). H.S. Jones cites the 
legend as a source for the “Squire’s Tale” in Sources and Analogues of Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales, eds. W.F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster, 357-76 (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1941), 357. 
 68 Fyler “Domesticating the Exotic in the Squire’s Tale,” 3.  
 69 On the ending of the tale, see Brian Lee, “The Question of Closure in Fragment V of 
‘The Canterbury Tales’ The Yearbook of English Studies 22 (1992): 190-200. 
 70 For more on the motif of occupatio in the “Squire’s Tale,” see Alan Ambrisco, “‘It 
Lyth Nat in My Tonge’: Occupatio and Otherness in the ‘Squire’s Tale’” The Chaucer 
Review 38.3 (2004): 205-28. 
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the only man the Squire believes capable of describing such marvel (l. 287). As Kathryn 
Lynch notes “the tale neither ravels into a knot nor unravels,” rendering it “even more 
discontinuous, more open-ended than the Easter tales that form its closest analogues.”71 
The mirror, like the romance form the Squire’s Tale burlesques, promises a containment 
that neither the Squire nor his readers can access, despite their desires for a closed 
understanding of the world. Once again, the figure of the mirror embodies the paradox of 
literary invention. Inextricably tethered, the desires to contain and grant excess reveal the 
Tale’s Orientalism both within and without the Tale’s apparent structure.72  
Just as the “Squire’s Tale” remains uncontainable and thus unable to reflect a 
singularly pointed literary truth, so does Chaucer’s structure of the Tales as a whole resist 
the pressures of a unified vision in favor of multiplicity and spectrality. In this light, the 
Squire’s Tale indeed renders its teller an “archetypal” Chaucerian narrator, as Elizabeth 
Scala has it, more akin to the narrator of Troilus and Criseyde than a uniquely 
incompetent character.73 What unites these two narrators is the sense that storytelling 
requires more than a mere translation of the past. As the Squire pleads, 
The knotte why that every tale is toold, 
If it be tarried til that lust be coold 
Of hem that han it after herkned yore,  
                                                
71 Kathryn Lynch, “East Meets West in Chaucer’s Squire and Franklin’s Tales,” in 
Chaucer’s Cultural Geography, ed. Kathryn Lynch, 76-101 (New York: Routledge, 
2002), 84. 
 72 While for Said, orientalism consists of a fascinated objectification of the other along 
with a desire for containment, the Prester John legend and Squire’s Tale complicate 
Said’s formula by juxtaposing simultaneous desires to contain and recognize excess. See 
Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 2003). 
 73 Scala, Absent Narratives, xix. 
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The savour passeth even lenger the moore.   
(ll. 401-4) 
  
More than anything, the literary text works with the past’s unknowability to present 
history not as knowledge, but as a kind of belated materiality. These narratives form a 
knot whose enjoyment rests not in a narrative’s resolution, but in its telling, and this 
model served to accommodate the Prester John legend for centuries to come. While 
Wolfram and Chaucer expand the Prester John legend’s literary relevance from the realm 
of literature, a turn to one of Chaucer’s sources for the “Squire’s Tale” reveals how the 
putatively historical text can also help create a literary consciousness rooted in a poetics 
of unknowing the inconvenient details that undermine belief in the mythical king.  
John Mandeville’s Travels soften the historical rigor expected of the travel genre 
in its account of Prester John, just as d’Arundel offered a more epistolary account of 
John’s kingdom in the thirteenth century that embraced the literary narrative’s impetus to 
entertain. The Mandeville text (1357-1371), extremely well-received in the time of 
Chaucer’s writing, generating some 300 manuscripts, despite the fact (or perhaps 
because) the text relied so heavily on reworking and/or synthesizing earlier legendary and 
travel material, including aspects of the Prester John Letter.74 The Travels is not without 
                                                
 74 The history of the Mandeville text is complex and, for many, there is no one preferred 
edition. The most complete edition probably remains Malcolm Letts’ edition and 
translation of the Egerton text. See Letts, ed. and trans., Mandeville’s Travels: Texts and 
Translations, 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society, 1953). For ease of access, I will refer to 
page numbers in the Penguin edition when mentioning pertinent details of the text. See 
The Travels of Sir John Mandeville, rev. ed., trans. C.W.R.D Moseley (New York: 
Penguin, 2005). For a succinct summary of the publication history of the Travels, see the 
first footnote in Moseley, “The Metamorphoses of Sir John Mandeville,” The Yearbook 
of English Studies 4 (1974): 5-25.  
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its own merits, however, even for the modern reader. Mandeville’s account of the East, 
published ostensibly in furtherance of a crusade, depicts an East more natively Christian 
than the West. Mandeville walks his reader through Christian geographic markers, much 
like the Letter, in a manner that more closely resembles a cycle play than a travelogue.75 
Not only does Mandeville’s East contain kernels of Christian history, those kernels 
manifest the Christian materiality of its geography: bananas naturally produce crosses 
when split open (65), birds reverence the Virgin Mary (70), abbeys naturally repel pests 
(71), and a tree that survived the death of Christ refuses to grow (74).  
Amid such Christian naturalism, Prester John’s kingdom endures. Although 
John’s family has now allied with that of the Great Khan, the promise of a global 
Christendom lives on. As with the Anglo-Norman Letter, Mandeville recasts John as the 
famed figurehead of an unknowable realm through which the belief he clearly inspired 
may persist. Though the literary value of Mandeville’s text itself has been debated, its 
influence on later medieval literary texts cannot be denied.  
John makes literary appearances in Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso, Cervantes’s Don 
Quixote, and Milton’s Paradise Lost, among other texts. In Orlando Furioso, Ariosto 
features an Ethiopian priest-king called Senapo who rules over an immensely wealthy 
kingdom and controls the flow of the Nile River—the very river that dashed crusader 
                                                
 75 The sites include Japheth’s city Joppa, the kingdom of Arabia where Magi came 
from, Joseph’s barn, Moses’ burning bush, Lot’s grave, Noah’s Ship, and the edge of the 
earthly paradise. 
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hopes during the Fifth Crusade.76 Although Ariosto’s is a highly satirical text, his 
inclusion of the legend shows how, even in the sixteenth century, writers were still 
attempting to create a plausible backstory to unite the imaginative interest in the legend 
with a history from which he may have emerged. Thus, despite his transformation into a 
metonymy of the geographic limits of romance, John retains his historical place 
independent of the romance landscape he also inhabits well into the eighteenth century.  
Because Prester John offered believers little more than a figure through which 
they might concentrate their abstract hopes, the legend was able to survive, above all, 
through a transposition to a narrative register more capable of handling the contradictions 
inherent to the legend. After all, the location of John’s kingdom was never about 
geography; a twelfth-century East merely offered a convenient location to harbor a 
mythical figure meant to arbitrate the known from the unknowable. Rather than 
adventurers uncovering a hundred-year hoax, the thirteenth-century travelers who 
journeyed across John’s India reveal the degree to which Prester John had become 
miscast in the realm of historical geography. Although John remained somewhere in the 
East, his permanent address lay more precisely at the horizon of Christian possibility.  
Waiting For Prester John 
 
As adventurers and scholars continued to seek Prester John throughout history, 
the spatial boundaries of Christianity continually depended on the vicissitudes of the 
reading practices through which they were enacted. Prester John shows up as a guarantor 
                                                
76 Ludovico Ariosto, Orlando Furioso, trans. Guido Waldman (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1998), 102-11. 
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of Eastern riches in the writings of early modern world travelers such as Prince Henry, 
the Infante Dom Henrique, Christopher Columbus, and Duarte Lopes. A related history 
of Prester John’s kingdom in Ethiopia held Western attention through the European 
exploration of Africa from the mid-fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. John’s use-
value, once driven by political exigencies, became subject to economic forces. While it is 
true that these later forays for Prester John were undertaken for reasons more immediate 
than the hope of a global Christianity, the legend remained an important precisely 
because of the expectations faith in John engendered. In an age of increased travel, John’s 
unknowability became essential to his historical function. Rather than fade into the annals 
of crusading lore, Prester John became part of the Catholic plan. 
The search for Prester John along these Eastern routes, along with the Western 
circuits formed through the Letter’s transmission, helped found a prophetic expectation of 
a global Christianity rooted in the willed projection of its eschatological unfolding. Given 
his uniquely nomadic signifying capability, John was able to exemplify competing 
identities and meanings. By way of his magic mirror, Prester John transcends boundaries 
of time and space, controlling the path of history via a magic trick that likely appealed to 
crusaders waiting for their leaders, real (Frederick II) or imagined (Prester John). 
Dissolving the false binary between imaginative and material space, the medieval version 
of the Prester John legend proposes a community within which all human experience is 
recast and subordinated to an already-determined Christian future.  
For the twenty-first century scholar acculturated to an intellectual history 
conditioned by the radical doubt of the post-Enlightenment subject, the speculative logic 
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of the Hegelian dialectic, the linguistic turn of philosophy, and the establishment of 
language as ontological determiner, it would be too easy to assume that twenty-first-
century critics can accurately locate and diagnose the errors of our medieval forebears. 
After all, how else can one explain the persistence of the Prester John fiction without 
recourse to modernity’s psychiatric register, labeling such disregard for reason as 
paranoid and delusional? Yet it is my view that we are clearly not “over” or “beyond” 
Prester John; indeed, our delusions of modernity echo in the same logical structure as the 
legend. Although it is unsurprising that no one was ever able to find Prester John (let 
alone agree on his kingdom’s location), the resilience of this legend despite increasing 
pressures to disbelieve attests to the persistence of an ardent faith in the unknown. 
A literary understanding of Prester John does not signal the end of his historical 
relevance, but instead reveals the grip he had on the medieval Christian imagination. As 
Christendom’s epistemological anchor positioned at the horizon of the known world, 
Prester John avoids the demands of revelation by solving the problem differently: he 
adopts Lateran IV’s program of visibility, even as his kingdom remains invisible, by 
transforming a legend of becoming into one of the always-already.  
Sober efforts to seek out the land of Prester John lasted through the eighteenth 
century and, despite being written out of world history textbooks (at least in the US)77, 
the imaginative import of the legendary figure lives on in twentieth-century adventure 
                                                
 77 Brooks, “A Reexamination,” 174-83. Brooks argues that the importance of the Prester 
John legend has been written out of world history in order to forge a more modern view 
of the late medieval European dispossessed of the mystical and superstitious beliefs 
associated with the Middle Ages. 
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novels, comic books, and fantasy fiction. Umberto Eco’s Baudolino (2000) is likely the 
most recognizable popular representation of Prester John. For a more recent, more 
fantastical reimagining, See Catherynne Valente, The Habitation of the Blessed. John 
Buchan’s pro-colonial adventure novel Prester John (1910), still in print, tells of a 
cultural clash between a Scotsman in South Africa and a Zulu uprising connected to 
medieval legend of Prester John. Stranger still, Prester John began to appear in pulp 
novels and comics, beginning in the 1960s, most famously in twenty-three comics of the 
Marvel Universe.78 Like Christians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries waited on John 
for Christian unity, we strangely wait for history to provide clarification and a resolution 
of this strange medieval hoax. We are still waiting for Prester John. Not only can we then 
affirm Geraldine Heng’s assertion that “where Prester John goes, Europe is not far 
behind”79; given his ability to signify meaning from the place of the unknown, we might 
also say, in the manner of Freud’s aphoristic Wo Es war, soll Ich werden, that “‘where 
Prester John was (supposed to go), there Europe will be.”
                                                
78 See, for example, Fantastic Four, 1966; Avengers, 1973; Defenders, 1973; Thor, 
1992; Avataars, 2000; Cable & Deadpool, 2005; X-Men, 2010. In these popular comics, a 
Crusader named Prester John is discovered to have been kept alive by wizards after a 
plague decimated his kingdom, the mythical Avalon (first mentioned in Geoffrey’s 
Historia and later co-opted by Arthurian lore). 
79 Heng, Empire of Magic, 287. 
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Conclusion 
From a Poetics of Unknowing to a Politics of the Literary  
 
As the political basis of the Prester John legend gave way to a poetics that 
sustained his import by suspending the question of his arrival, so too did this poetics 
come to bear political consequences. The vestigial belief in John’s continually 
undiscovered kingdom underwrote the early phases of European imperialism by 
providing a model of a knowable, wealthy outpost that inspired exploration and discovery 
for those looking to profit from a competitive trading economy. This after-life separates 
Prester John from the other four figures: here the legend re-positioned unknowing to 
create knowledge, or, more specifically, to create a knowable world. 
Even in its medieval stages Prester John’s unknowability helped stabilize Western 
identity by providing a repository for Christian alterity that also guaranteed defense 
against the threat of Islamic alterity. For the twelfth-century West, this space outside 
signification becomes literalized as the land of Prester John, a mythical Christian king, 
who although heterodox in his beliefs, aims to recuperate Latin Christian identity against 
the threat of an ever-expanding Islam. Prester John is then established, not as the Other of 
Christianity, but as the Other of Islam, providing the ultimate spatial guarantee—a 
metalanguage from which Latin Christian space might be guaranteed within the logic of 
Christian eschatology. He became what Jacques Lacan might call the “Other of the 
Other”: his existence allowed Christians to displace the uncanny similarities shared 
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between themselves and Islam onto a third, intermediary figure.1 Prester John’s provided 
a space in which Latin Christians could externalize their reactions to and anxieties about 
Islam. This allowed Western Christians to renounce their own connection to Islam: 
Prester John and the mythic East are in competition with Islam, not Western Christians. 
As the Other of the Other, Prester John represents a way to speak about difference, an 
anchoring point, without having to acknowledge the inherent alterity in Christian identity. 
In this way, Prester John guarantees the enclosure of an Islamic threat kept under 
constant surveillance, allowing Latin Christians to postpone the recognition of inhabiting 
the other side of a dialectical tension with Islam, which would necessarily amount to an 
admission of a relational subjectivity dependent on something outside of itself. If the 
crusades produced Islam as the other of Christianity, Prester John thus becomes the Other 
of the Other—a third term able to guarantee not only the relationship between Latin 
Christendom and Islam, but the separation between them as well.  
Lacan refers to the notion of the Other of the Other as “the problem of meta-
language” because it creates a secondary system of logic that insincerely forces closure 
                                                
 1 Twentieth-century post-structural thinkers including Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques 
Lacan, Julia Kristeva have stressed the difficulty of depicting this relationship because of 
the Other's inherent unrepresentability. Resisting the idea inherited by traditional 
metaphysics that the Other exists purely as a product of the self, these writers share the 
contention that the Other exists outside of consciousness and can therefore only be 
represented in discourse from elsewhere: the face-to-face encounter (Levinas), the 
unconscious (Lacan), or the semiotic (Kristeva). Thus, for Lacan, The Other of the Other 
exists as a place: “It finds its place even if we cannot find it anywhere in the real, even if 
all we can find to occupy this place in the real is simply valid insofar as it occupies this 
place, but cannot give it any other guarantee than that it is in its place” (The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, 66).  
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on a concept that must remain open (language, alterity).2 This concept is, of course, a 
fantasy. There is no sustainable epistemological framework for creating and managing 
meaning—identity is no less arbitrary than the linguistic categories that formulate it. To 
the extent that Prester John never actually appears, the legend perpetuates Lacan’s dictum 
that there can be no Other of the Other despite a fervent desire to move beyond the space 
of signification. Lacan will later assert in The Other Side of Psychoanalysis that 
“anything that one might think is of the order of a search for the meta in language is 
simply, always, a question of reading.”3 Although a spatial fantasy, the legend’s primary 
mode of dissemination (a letter), along with its importance in the realm of prophecy 
(decisions during the Fifth Crusade were actually made based on the assumption of 
John’s arrival), do reveal the dependence on a certain (perhaps ethical) mode of reading.  
Insofar as the Prester John legend turns this spatial understanding into a politics, 
this method might be understood, as it is by Gaston Bachelard, as, fundamentally, a 
strategy of reading.4 As with the Other of the Other, “reading has no place, ” according to 
Michel de Certeau, because in its willed suspension it “takes no measures against the 
                                                
2 For Lacan, the Other of the Other represents a false solution to the problem of meta-
language, a defensive projection for those who refuse to grant that language systems are 
irredeemably open. See Jacques Lacan, Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1998). 
3 See The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, trans. 
Russell Grigg (New York: Norton, 2007), 190. 
4 This mode of reading spaces is encapsulated by what he calls the “phenomenological 
attitude,” predicated on the ability to “induce in the reader a state of suspended reading.” 
See Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1994), 21.  
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erosion of time.”5  Waiting, as the political implementation of unknowing, becomes an 
essential component to the evaluation of space, whether it be social, physical, or mental. 
Just because judgment is perpetually postponed, just because Prester John never shows 
up, does not mean that believers should give up on the potential for that space to 
guarantee a desire that it can never untangle itself from.  
The manner in which the fantasy of metalanguage transforms Prester John’s 
poetics of unknowing into a politics of reading invites a reconsideration Pearl’s 
investment in metalanguage as a means of scientizing the literary. Pulling away from a 
reading of Pearl indebted to an apophatic understanding of the divine, we move back 
toward the genre of dream vision, a literary mode whose theorists and fourteenth-century 
practitioners began to think about in terms of scientific discourse. One major 
consequence of the Scholastic Aristotelianism that pervaded the medieval university in 
the thirteenth century was the movement to see theology as a science, an alliance that 
gave renewed purchase to some significant “pagan” philosophical texts, whose ideas 
could now combine with a rational, dialectical approach to understanding the challenging 
and unknowable aspects of theology. Not that this was an entirely new idea in the Middle 
Ages. Macrobius, whose commentary on Cicero’s Dream of Scipio established medieval 
dream categories had also been influential for structuring medieval exegetical practice. 
Plato’s Timaeus, as one of the most well known (or at least the most widely commented 
                                                
5 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (U of  
California P, 1984), 174.  
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on) of Plato’s texts in the Middle Ages, collates math, science and dreams.6 Moreover, in 
Augustine’s Neoplatonic worldview, numbers help us approximate a conception of the 
Divine Ideas existing in the mind of God.  
Not surprisingly, then, as Kathryn Lynch describes, in the late-medieval West 
“the age’s greatest minds were absorbed with task of finding the most precise and 
comprehensive correspondences between the orders of nature and grace preoccupied with 
devising an epistemology that might lead one from this, most literal, world to the next, 
most divine, one” (59). Several prominent philosophers, including Nicole Oresme (1320-
1382), viewed the study of science and the study of dreams not as complementary 
pursuits, but as part of the same investigation, as can be seen in his Tractatus de 
commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi. As Lynch discusses, the 
dream’s “ability to combine the realms of spirit and matter in a single experiential 
phenomenon” rendered the realm of the vision a useful site of contemplation for studying 
the scientific limits of human knowledge (56).  
Although one methodological aim of chapter three was to distance my reading of 
Pearl from the language of contemporary “theory” in order to less noisily approach a 
poem that writes its own terms by its own terms, I would like to now compare the Pearl’s 
interest in the limits of signification with Lacan’s drive to affirm science as the subject of 
                                                
 6 Although Plato was more or less ambivalent about the usefulness of dreams, he 
discussed them in the section two of the Timaeus, his manual, which discusses how the 
world came into being, in reference to the way that humans create images or 
representations of the world in the mind. Later in section two, Plato suggests that God 
utilizes numbers to shape the elements and to impose regularity onto the relationship 
between these elements. 
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psychoanalysis as a means returning to the transhistorical and ultimately political stakes 
of unknowing.7  
The Pearl poet reinforces the unknowability of divine will—framed by the 
dreamer’s waking contention that our desire to know will always exceed our ability to 
know— by calling attention to his own failed formal attempts to signify and 
communicate felicitously through language, mathematics, or symbols. In reducing 
everything in the poem to the symbol of the pearl, the poet can at least approximate the 
radical excess inherent to the concept of salvation, a concept that necessarily reduces 
everything involved within its economy to a notion of infinite equality. Lacan’s instinct 
regarding the modern subject appears to oppose this notion entirely, as Lacan reads the 
doubt inherent in the Cartesian shift towards scientific thought as not only making space 
for an unconscious, but also betraying the plight of modern subject as one who desires 
not to know his/her truth.8 As so with the Pearl, however, Lacan tests this theory in the 
                                                
 7 In “Science and Truth,” Lacan writes that the “only one subject is accepted as such in 
psychoanalysis, the one that can make it scientific” (729). 
 8 See “The Unconscious and Repetition” in Lacan’s Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 17-41, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977). As 
Jason Glynos explains, “as the paradigmatic model of the modern subject, Descartes 
wants to know nothing about his truth… simultaneously reducing it to a knowledge… 
and projecting it, by means of symbolic faith, onto another Subject-Supposed-to-Know.” 
See Jason Glynos, “Psychoanalysis Operates upon the Subject of Science: Lacan between 
Science and Ethics,” in Lacan and Science, eds. Jason Glynos and Yannis Stavrakakis, 
51-88 (London: Karnac Books, 2002), 59.  
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realm of literature, but to different ends: his reading of Hamlet establishes the modern 
subject’s desire not to know as consonant with Hamlet’s “failure to act.”9  
Along with a shared desire to look to both science and literature in order to 
establish the parameters of human subjectivity, Lacan also shares with Pearl an interest 
in the effects that language have on epistemological-ethical orientations (desiring to 
know/desiring not to know). Specifically, Lacan too was obsessed with the possibility 
that mathematical representations (what he calls the matheme) might more precisely 
demonstrate his ideas. Lacan had, after all, put himself in a difficult position as a thinker: 
how could he accurately communicate (or ethically claim to communicate) his ideas if 
one of his foundational premises was the insistence on an irredeemable lack that inhabits 
all language?10 
From his second seminar through his later writings, Lacan insisted that “there is 
no such thing as meta-language”; that is, while he allowed for an existence outside of the 
letter (contra Derrida), he denies the possibility affixing meaning to that “Real” outside 
of the Symbolic register of language.11 Lacan’s concept of the matheme, devised later in 
his career (early 1970s) as a mathematical representation of a psychoanalytic concept, 
allowed him to bypass this slippage by theorizing a form of representation that Leupin 
                                                
9 See Lacan, "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet," in Literature and 
Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading Otherwise, ed. Shoshana Felman, 11-52 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 
10 Although he later seeks to “complete” his ideas through mathemes, Lacan often cites 
Gödel’s theory of incompleteness to help ground his ideas about the inevitable slippage 
within the domain of language.  
 11 This deceptively powerful claim helped ground Lacan’s later contention that there is 
no sexual relationship (rapport).  
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calls “a writing without remainder.”12 The graph of desire and the four discourses 
represent two of the more infamous mathemes in Lacan’s oeuvre.13 The matheme served 
at least three purposes meant to assuage several of Lacan’s major insecurities regarding 
the articulation of psychoanalysis. First, it sought to clarify complex psychological 
relationships that were otherwise bogged down by the imprecise and contradictory nature 
of language. Secondly, it did so in a manner that did not contradict his position on meta-
language, since the matheme eliminates the distinction between signifier and signified. 
Third, the matheme, understood as a self-reflexive representation of an idea, more closely 
aligned the discipline of psychoanalysis with the hard sciences.  
But like the Pearl-poet, Lacan, who was a post-structuralist after all, betrays the 
hopelessness of this drive. As Erin Labbie explains in her book Lacan’s Medievalism, 
“Lacan’s graph of desire, his idealization of mathematics, the matheme as the perfect 
signifier, and the hard sciences, are abutted by his concomitant awareness of the 
impossibility of the formalism he seeks” (154).14 So according to Labbie, Lacan’s view 
of language begins to look more similar to that of the Pearl poet. Labbie thereafter 
grounds Lacan’s realism in a discussion of knots in Sir Gawain, a textual object that 
fascinates both Lacan and the Pearl poet. Through her reading, Labbie argues that despite 
psychoanalysis being intrinsically modern, “its persistence was already embedded within 
                                                
 12 Leupin, Fiction and Incarnation, 28. 
 13 These mathemes are found in the very difficult “The Subversion of the Subject and 
the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious” and Seminar XVII, respectively.  
 14 See the chapter, “The Quadrangle, the Hard Sciences, and Nonclassical Thinking” in 
Lacan’s Medievalism, 146-89 (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2006). 
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the medieval mind” (188). Her larger point, however, is the inverse of that statement: that 
Lacanian psychoanalysis relies on concepts that are intrinsically medieval.  
In sum, the desire to reach a more accurately realist understanding of human 
experience by uniting science and language allies Pearl most with psychoanalysis. As 
Leupin frames it, while humanists have long attempted to bridge the gap between 
humanities and sciences by “making science itself a metaphor” (or by trying to inject 
some degree of slippage into the exact), Lacan “solved” this problem by situating science 
as the subject of the unconscious, of psychoanalysis.15 Taking science to be both 
mathematicizable and empirically verifiable (Leupin’s reduction of Galileo’s 
conception), neither of these two processes can be possible without the act of 
signification through language. For as Leupin poses, what is a praxis without words? 
Even as Lacan romanticizes the matheme as a safer bet than linguistic description, he 
remains nonetheless tethered to a system of thought that must subordinate even 
mathematics (understood as one more discourse) to psychoanalysis. Similarly, while 
Pearl articulates the failures of mathematics (or any other language) to signify precisely, 
the poem submits those failures to the transformative work of faith, and thus, to a 
“spoteles” economy of Christianity— contra Lacan’s modernity qua Cartesian doubt. 
Otherwise the existence of the poem would obliterate the purpose for which it was 
crafted. Even as both Lacan and Pearl acknowledge the imprecision that inhabits 
                                                
 15 Leupin, Lacan Today: Psychoanalysis, Science, Religion (New York: Other Press, 
2004).  
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language, so too do they nonetheless valorize its essential status—we just have to take a 
little more comfort in a little less knowing.  
Because one understanding of the function of literature has been its ability to 
house the imaginative resonances of events whose material realities obscure that event’s 
unknowable potential, we might celebrate the liberatory promise of the medieval literary 
text unbound by the strictures of rationality or theology. As André Breton, an early 
disciple of a psychoanalytic approach to the literary himself, outlines in his program of 
automatic writing, literature has long held the key to “the incurable mania of wanting to 
make the unknown known, classifiable” (9).16 And given the impetus towards revelation 
that spread throughout Christian discourse after the clarified literalism of the Fourth 
Lateran Council (1215), Pearl’s departure from the dream vision’s thirteenth-century 
program of clarification and hierarchy and toward a literary science testing the limits of 
knowledge itself seems to resonate with the model of literature as liberation. Or, as 
Kathryn Lynch more succinctly formulates, “what philosophy can’t, poetry might” (15). 
But this is not Pearl’s program; this poem does not reveal so much as lay bare the 
bounded nature of all material claims to knowledge.  
By showing the degree to which theology, mathematics, science, and literature all 
rely on the imperfect system of language to communicate their knowledges to the world, 
Pearl shows how poiesis becomes, at bottom, the art of negotiating an ethics of 
unknowability. In order to communicate this lesson, Pearl runs into the same problems of 
                                                
 16 André Breton, “First Surrealist Manifesto,” in Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans. 
Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1972). 
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meta-language that haunt Lacan’s texts. Like Freud and Lacan after him, the Pearl poet 
returns the material world’s most reflexive knowledges (math and science) to the extra-
linguistic realm of the dream, a site of signification in which thinkers medieval and 
modern are able to sidestep the political consequences of such an ethics of willed 
stupidity. But unlike the revelatory dream visions popularized in the thirteenth century, 
the Pearl-poet does not grant the possibility of the dream itself as a meta-language.  
Whereas Lacan turns to mathematical and scientific discourses in the hopes of 
creating a matheme capable of closing the gap, Pearl uses these discourses as additional 
examples of the impossibility to extend comprehension outside of the bounds of 
language. Though this narrative is familiar enough to most medievalists, it may seem 
foreign to the modern temperaments of those who insist, following the work of Arkady 
Plotnitsky that so-called “nonclassical thought,” the valorization of the unknowable as a 
means of epistemological orientation, arrives only with the advent of theoretical physics 
and post-structural philosophy. Not only does the comparison between Pearl and the later 
work of Lacan establish the potential “modernity” of medieval literary texts, it also 
domesticates Lacan’s turn to scientific discourse as less idiosyncratic and perhaps more 
political than it has sometimes been considered.  
I would like to close with a few thoughts on the legacy of Fourth Lateran via a 
turn to the austerity of the now and the deleterious effects of the drive to clarify or reveal 
the function of the humanities within the contemporary university. Just as the council 
helped move theology towards the scientific, the related pressure to scientize the 
humanities through ostensibly reflexive metrics of “excellence” show us how, 800 years 
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later, the epistemological stakes of the apocalyptic moment are still framed in terms of 
discipline, or disciplinarity. Disciplines link us, prescribing an ethic of commonality as 
the primary means of recognition, “techniques for assuring the ordering of human 
multiplicities,” in Foucault’s words.  
But as Henri de Lubac reminds us, disciplina is also a warning. Like language, 
discipline interpolates us if only to alert us to its strictures-- such that it might be 
impossible to remove oneself from its web of symbolization. That is why, like Prester 
John, we might look to un-knowing as a methodological alternative to the functionalism 
of disciplina. Rather than position the unknown as a central cog within the machinery of 
human subjectivity, I believe that tracing narrative uses of unknowing can help unite 
imaginative, epistemological, and eschatological discourses into one that renders the 
unknowable “an irreducible part of knowledge” because of its permanent inaccessibility. 
In a world of endings, rather than an antechamber to revelation, the unknown, recognized 
as an uncolonizable non-place, might reorient disciplinary groupings of knowledge on the 
level of projects better attuned to the parameters of what is, in fact, possible. Perhaps as 
Lateran IV teaches us, lest we subject ourselves to a more untraceable standard of 
“excellence,” we should take comfort in the fact that some things must remain 
unknowable. 
 
 
 262  
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
A Stanzaic Life of Christ. Edited by Frances A. Foster London: Oxford University Press,  
1926. 
 
The Acts of Thomas: Introduction, Text, and Commentary. Edited and translated by A.F.J. Klijn. 
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962. 
 
Ariosto, Ludovico. Orlando Furioso. Translated by Guido Waldman. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1998. 
 
Augustine. On Christian Doctrine. Translated by D.W. Robertson. New York: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1958. 
 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus. De Propretatibus Rerum. Translated by John Trevisa and edited by 
M.C. Seymour. 3 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.  
 
Benjamin of Tudela. The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela: Critical Text, Translation and  
Commentary. Edited and translated by Marcus Nathan Adler. New York: Philipp  
Feldheim, 1907. 
 
Benoît de Sainte-Maure. Le Roman de Troie en prose. Edited by Léopold Constans and  
Edmund Faral. Paris: Champion, 1922. 
 
Boccaccio, Giovanni. Il Filostrato. Edited by Vincenzo Pernicone and translated by Robert P. 
Roberts and Anna Bruni Seldis. New York: Garland Publishing, 1986 
 
Bradwardine, Thomas. Geometria Speculativa: Latin Text and English Translation. Edited and 
translated by George Molland. F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1989. 
 
Buchan, John. Prester John. New York: George Duran, 1910.  
 
Chaucer, Geoffrey. The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd edition. Edited by Larry Benson. Boston:  
Houghton Mifflin, 1987. 
 
The Chester Mystery Cycle, Vol. 1: Text. Edited b R.M Lumiansky and David Mills.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. 
 
The Cloud of Unknowing and the Book of Privy Counseling. Edited by Phyllis  
Hodgson. London: Oxford University Press, 1944. 
 263  
 
The Coventry Corpus Christi Plays. Edited by Pamela King and Clifford Davidson.  
Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2000.  
 
Cursor Mundi. 4 vols. Edited by Richard Morris. London: Oxford University Press,  
1874-76. 
 
Eco, Umberto. Baudolino. Translated by William Weaver. New York: Harcourt, 2002. 
 
Embrico of Mainz. La vie de Mahomet. Edited by Guy Cambier. Brussels: Latomus,  
1961.  
 
Eusebius. The History of the Church from Christ to Constantine. Translated by G.A.  
Williamson. New York: New York University Press, 1966.  
 
Flavius Josephus. The Jewish War. 2 vols. Edited and translated by H. St. J. Thackeray.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.  
 
------. Jewish Antiquities. Translated by Ralph Marcus. Cambridge, MA: Harvard  
University Press, 1961. 
 
Geoffrey of Monmouth. The History of the Kings of Britain. Translated by Lewis Thorpe.  
New York: Penguin, 1966.  
 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf. Poetria Nova, revised edition. Translated by Margaret Nims. Toronto: 
PIMS, 2010.  
 
Higden, Ranulph, and John Trevisa. Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden, Monachi Cestrensis; 
Together with the English Translations of John Trevisa and of an Unknown Writer of the 
Fifteenth Century. Edited by Churchill Babington. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1869.  
 
Ibn Ishaq. Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ishaq’s Birat Rasul Allah. Translated by  
A. Guillaume. London: Oxford University Press, 1955. 
 
Isidore of Seville. Etymologies,Vol. 1. Translated by Priscilla Throop. Charlotte, VT:  
MedievalMS, 2005.  
 
Johannes of Hildesheim. The Three Kings of Cologne: An Early English Translation of  
the ‘Historia Trium Regum.’ Edited by C. Horstmann. London: Oxford University  
Press, 1886. 
 
John of Monte Corvino. “The Letters of John of Monte Corvino.” In Mission to Asia,  
 264  
revised edition. Edited by Christopher Dawson, 224-38. Toronto:  
University of Toronto Press, 1980.  
 
John of Plano Carpini. “History of the Mongols [Ystoria Mongalorum].” In Mission to  
Asia, revised edition. Edited by Christopher Dawson, 3-72. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1980. 
 
Joinville, Jean de and Geoffrey Villehardouin. Chronicles of the Crusades. Translated by  
Frank Marzials. New York: Dover, 2012. 
 
Jubber, Nicholas. The Prester Quest. London: Doubleday, 2005.  
 
Le Livre d'Échelle de Mahomet. Translated by Gisèle Besson and Michèle Brossard- 
Jandré. Paris: Librairie Génerale Française, 1991.  
 
Love, Nicholas. The Mirrour of the Blessed Lyf of Jesu Christ. Edited by Lawrence F.  
Powell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1908. 
 
Lydgate, John. Fall of Princes. 4 vols. Edited by H. Bergen. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1924. 
 
Macrobius. Saturnalia. Translated by Percival Vaughan Davies. New York: Columbia  
University Press, 1969. 
 
Mandeville’s Travels: Texts and Translations. 2 vols. Edited by Malcolm Letts. London:  
Hakluyt Society, 1953.  
 
Marco Polo. The Book of Ser Marco Polo. Two Vols. Translated by Henry Yule. London:  
John Murray, 1921-26. 
 
Mirk, John. Festial: A Collection of Homilies, Vol. 1. Edited by Theodre Erbe. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1905.  
 
Musil, Robert. The Man Without Qualities, Vol. 1. Translated by Sophie Wilkins. New York: 
Vintage, 1996. 
 
The N-Town Play, Vol. 1: Text. Edited by Stephen Spector. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1991. 
 
Odoric of Pordenone. The Travels of Friar Odoric. Translated by Sir Henry Yule. Grand 
 Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002. 
 
Oliver of Paderborn. “The Capture of Damietta.” In Christian Society and the Crusades,  
 265  
1198-1229. Edited by Edward Peters and translated by Joseph Gavigan, 49-140. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.  
 
Paston Letters and papers of the Fifteenth Century. Edited by Richard Beadle and Colin  
Richmond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
 
Pearl. In The Poems of the Pearl Manuscript, revised edition. Edited by Malcolm  
Andrew and Ronald Waldron. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2002. 
 
Pliny the Elder. The Natural History, Volume 3: Books 8-11. Edited and translated by H. 
Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940. 
 
Pseudo-Dionysius. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works. Edited and translated by  
Colm Luibheid. Paulist Press: New York, 1987.  
 
Riga, Peter. Aurora Rigae Biblia Versificata: A Verse Commentary on the Bible. 2 vols.  
Edited by Paul E. Beichner. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998. 
 
Selections from English Wycliffite Writings. Edited by Anne Hudson. Toronto: University  
of Toronto Press, 1997. 
 
The Travels of Sir John Mandeville. Translated by C.W.R.D Moseley. New York:  
Penguin, 2005.  
 
Two Coventry Corpus Christi Plays, 2nd edition. Edited by Hardin Craig. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1957. 
 
Voragine, Jacobus de. Legenda Aurea. 2 vols. Edited and translated by William Granger Ryan.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
 
Valente, Catherynne M. The Habitation of the Blessed: A Dirge for Prester John, Vol. 1.  
San Francisco: Night Shade Books, 2010. 
 
Vitale, Robert. “Edition and Study of the Letter of Prester John to the Emperor Manuel  
of Constantinople: The Anglo-Norman Rhymed Version.” PhD Diss, University  
of Maryland, 1975. 
 
Wolfram von Eschenbach. Parzival and Titurel. Translated by Cyril Edwards. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Westrem, Scott D. Broader Horizons: A Study of Johannes Witte de Hese's Itinerarius  
and Medieval Travel Narratives. Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of 
America, 2001. 
 266  
 
The York Plays. Edited by Richard Beadle. London: Edward Arnold, 1983. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 267  
Secondary Sources 
 
Abraham, Nicolas and Maria Torok. The Wolf Man’s Magic World: A Cryptonomy. Translated 
by Nicholas Rand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.  
 
Aers, David. "The Self Mourning: Reflections on Pearl." Speculum 68.1 (1993): 54-73. 
 
Alexandrov, Vladimir. “Literature, Literariness, and the Brain.” Comparative  
Literature 59.2 (2007): 97-118. 
 
Ambrisco, Alan. “‘It Lyth Nat in My Tonge’: Occupatio and Otherness in the ‘Squire’s  
Tale.’” The Chaucer Review 38.3 (2004): 205-28. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of  
Nationalism, revised edition. London: Verso, 2006. 
 
Antonelli, Roberto. "The Birth of Criseyde—An Exemplary Triangle: 'Classical' Troilus and the 
Question of Love at the Anglo-Norman Court." In The European Tragedy of the Troilus, 
edited by Piero Boitani, 21-48. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
 
Archibald, Elizabeth. “Declarations of ‘Entente’ in Troilus and Criseyde.” Chaucer Review 25.2  
(1991): 190-213. 
 
Arthur, Ross G. "The Day of Judgment Is Now: A Johannine Pattern in the Middle English 
Pearl." American Benedictine Review 38 (1987): 227-42. 
 
Ashley, Kathleen. “The Politics of Playing Herod in Beaune.” European Medieval  
Drama 9 (2005): 153-65. 
 
Auerbach, Erich. “Figura.” 1938. Reprinted in Scenes From the Drama of European  
Literature. Edited by Paulo Valesio and translated by Ralph Manheim. University  
of Minnesota Press, 1984. 
 
Bachelard, Gaston. The Poetics of Space. Translated by Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon  
Press, 1994.  
 
Barr, Helen. "Pearl—or 'the Jeweller's Tale.’" Medium Ævum 69 (2000): 59-79. 
 
------. Socioliterary Practice in Late Medieval England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Barr, Jessica. Willing to Know God: Dreamers and Visionaries in the Later Middle Ages. 
Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2010. 
 
 268  
Bataille, Georges. Literature and Evil. Translated by Alastair Hamilton. London: Marion  
Boyars Publishing, 1973. 
 
------. The Accursed Share, Vols. 2 and 3. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York:  
Zone Books, 1993. 
 
Beadle, Richard. “The Chester Cycle.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Medieval English Theatre, 2nd edition, edited by Richard Beadle and Alan  
Fletcher, 99-124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
  
Beckwith, Sarah. Signifying God: Social Relation and Symbolic Act in the York Corpus  
Christi Plays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 
 
Behrman, Mary. "Heroic Criseyde." Chaucer Review 38.4 (2004): 314-36. 
 
Beidler, Peter G. “Dramatic Intertextuality in the Miller’s Tale: Chaucer’s Use of  
Characters from Medieval Drama as Foils for John, Alisoun, Nicholas, and 
Absolon.” Chaucer Yearbook 3 (1996): 1-19. 
 
Benson, David. “True Troilus and False Cresseid: The Descent From Tragedy.” In The European 
Tragedy of Troilus, edited by Piero Boitani, 153-70. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
 
------. “The Opaque Text of Chaucer’s Criseyde.” In Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde: 
Subgit to alle Poesye. Essays in Criticism, edited by R.A. Shoaf, 17-28. Binghamton: 
Medieval and Renaissance Text Studies, 1992. 
 
Biddick, Kathleen. The Typological Imaginary: Circumcision, Technology, History.  
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003. 
 
Bishop, Ian. Pearl in Its Setting: A Critical Study of the Structure and Meaning of the Middle 
English Poem. Oxford: Blackwell, 1968. 
 
Blanchot, Maurice. The Space of Literature. Translated by Ann Smock. Lincoln:  
University of Nebraska Press, 1982. 
 
Blenkner, Louis. "The Theological Structure of Pearl." Traditio 24 (1968): 43-75. 
 
Bloch, R. Howard. Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
 
Bloomfield, Josephine. "Stumbling toward God's Light: The Pearl Dreamer and the Impediments 
of Hierarchy." Chaucer Review 45.4 (2011): 390-410. 
 
 269  
Bogdanos, Theodore. Pearl, Image of the Ineffable: A Study in Medieval Poetic Symbolism. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1983. 
 
Bowers, John M. "The Politics of Pearl." Exemplaria 7.2 (1995): 419-41. 
 
------. The Politics of Pearl: Court Poetry in the Age of Richard II. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer,  
2000. 
 
Boyle, Leonard. “The Fourth Lateran Council and Manuals of Popular Theology.” In The  
Popular Literature of Medieval England, edited by Thomas Heffernan, 30-43. 
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985. 
 
Breton, André. “First Surrealist Manifesto.” In Manifestoes of Surrealism. Translated by Richard 
Seaver and Helen R. Lane. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972. 
 
Brewer, Derek. "The History of a Shady Character: The Narrator of Troilus and Criseyde.” In 
Modes of Narrative: Approaches to American, Canadian and British Fiction, edited by 
Reingard M. Nischik and Barbara Korte, 166-78. Wurzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
1990.  
 
Bridges, Margaret. "The Sense of an Ending: The Case of the Dream-Vision." Dutch Quarterly  
Review 14 (1984): 81-94. 
 
Brooks, Michael. “Prester John: A Reexamination and Compendium of the Mythical  
Figure Who Helped Spark European Expansion.” PhD Diss, University of Toledo, 
2010. 
 
Brown, Carleton. “The Author of the Pearl Considered in the Light of his Theological 
Opinions.” PMLA 39 (1904): 115-53. 
 
Brown, Peter. “The Notion of Virginity in the Early Church.” In Christian Spirituality: Origins 
to the Twelfth Century, edited by Bernard McGinn and John Meyendorff, 437-43. New 
York: Crossroad, 1985.  
 
Buckingham, C.F. “An Ethiopian Embassy to Europe, c. 1310.” In Prester John, the  
Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes, edited by C.F. Buckingham and B. Hamilton, 
197-206. Aldershot: Variorum, 1996. 
 
Bullón-Fernández, María. "'Byyonde the Water': Courtly and Religious Desire in Pearl."  
Studies in Philology 91.1 (1994): 35-49. 
 
Burger, Glenn. “Doing What Comes Naturally: The Physician’s Tale and the Pardoner.” In 
Masculinities in Chaucer, edited by Peter G. Beidler, 117-30. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 
 270  
1998. 
 
Burman, Thomas. Reading the Qur’an in Latin Christendom, 1140-1560. Philadelphia:  
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. 
 
Burno, Miriam Dahl. “Herod the Great in the Middle English Cycle Plays: A Study in  
Traditions.” PhD Diss. University of Chicago, 1970. 
 
Burns, E. Jane. Arthurian Fictions: Re-Reading the Vulgate Cycle. Columbus: Ohio State  
University Press, 1985. 
 
Campbell, Jennifer. "Figuring Criseyde's 'Entente': Authority, Narrative, and Chaucer's Use of 
History." Chaucer Review 27 (1993): 342-58. 
 
Campbell, Thomas. “Liturgy and Drama: Recent Approaches to Medieval Theatre.”  
Theatre Journal 33 (1981): 289-301. 
 
Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven Rendall.  
University of California Press, 1984.  
 
Certeau, Michel de and Marianne Brammer. “Mysticism.” Diacritics 22.2 (1992): 11-25. 
 
Chapman, C.O. “Numerical Symbolism in Dante and the Pearl.” Modern Language Notes 54  
(1939): 256-9. 
 
Chenu, M.D. Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century. Translated by Jerome  
Taylor and Lester Little. Toronto: MARTS, 1997. 
 
Chewning, Susannah. "Re-Reading/Re-Teaching Chaucer's Criseyde." In New Perspectives on 
Criseyde, edited by Cindy L. Vitto, and Marcia Smith Marzec, 165-80. Asheville, NC: 
Pegasus, 2004.  
 
Clopper, Lawrence M. "Pearl and the Consolation of Scripture." Viator 23 (1992): 231-45. 
 
Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome. Of Giants: Sex, Monsters, and the Middle Ages. Minneapolis:  
 University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 
 
Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome, ed. Monster Theory: Reading Culture. Minneapolis: University  
of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
 
Coletti, Theresa. “Re-reading the Story of Herod in the Middle English Innocents Plays.”  
In Retelling Tales: Essays in Honor of Russell Peck, edited by Thomas Hahn and 
Alan Lupack, 35-59. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1997. 
 271  
 
Condren, Edward I. The Numerical Universe of the Gawain-Pearl Poet: Beyond Phi. 
Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2002. 
 
------. "The Disappointments of Criseyde." In Chaucer and the Challenges of Medievalism, 
edited by Donka Minkova and Theresa Tinkle, 195-204. Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang, 
2003.  
 
Copeland, Rita. Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translating in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Corrigan, Matthew. “Chaucer’s Failure With Women: The Inadequacy of Criseyde.” Western  
Humanities Review 23 (1969): 107-20.  
 
Coulson-Grigsby, Carolyn. “Enacting Herod the Great’s Diseased Spirit.” Early Drama,  
Art, and Music Review 23 (2001): 110-126. 
 
Coward, H. and T. Foshay, eds. Derrida and Negative Theology. Albany: SUNY Press,  
1992. 
 
D’Arcy, Anne Marie. ““Cursed folk of Herodes al new”: Supercessionist Typology and  
Chaucer’s Prioress.” In Writing Gender and Genre in Medieval Literature: 
Approaches to Old and Middle English Texts, edited by Elaine Treharne, 117-36. 
Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2002. 
 
Davenport, Tony. "Jewels and Jewellers in Pearl." Review of English Studies 59.241 (2008): 508- 
20. 
 
Dean, James. "Chaucer's Troilus, Boccaccio's Filostrato, and the Poetics of Closure." 
Philological Quarterly 64.2 (1985): 175-84. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Margins of Philosophy. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University  
of Chicago Press, 1982. 
 
Dinshaw, Carolyn. "Readers in/of Troilus and Criseyde." The Yale Journal of Criticism 
 1.2 (1988): 81-105. 
 
------. Chaucer's Sexual Poetics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. 
 
Donaldson, E. Talbot. Speaking of Chaucer. London: The Athlone Press, 1970. 
 
------. “Oysters, Forsooth: Two Readings in ‘Pearl.’” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 73 (1972): 
75-82. 
 272  
 
Doob, Penelope. Nebuchadnezzar”s Children: Conventions of Madness in Middle  
English Literature. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.  
 
Doyle, Kara. "Criseyde Reading, Reading Criseyde." In New Perspectives on Criseyde, edited by 
Cindy L. Vitto and Marcia Smith Marzec, 75-110. Asheville, NC: Pegasus, 2004. 
 
East, W.G. “Lollius.” English Studies 58 (1977): 396-8. 
 
Edmondson, George. "Pearl: The Shadow of the Object, the Shape of the Law." Studies in the 
Age of Chaucer 26 (2004): 29-63. 
------. The Neighboring Text: Chaucer, Boccaccio, Henryson. Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2011. 
 
Edwards, A.S.G. "The Manuscript: British Library MS Cotton Nero A.x." In A Companion to the 
Gawain-Poet, edited by Derek Brewer and Jonathan Gibson, 197-220. Cambridge: D. S. 
Brewer, 1997. 
 
Edwards, Michael. "Geometric Theology and the Meaning of Clannesse in the Poems of the 
Pearl Manuscript." PhD Thesis, University of California, 2004. 
 
Enders, Jody. The Medieval Theater of Cruelty: Rhetoric, Memory, Violence. Ithaca:  
sCornell University Press, 1999. 
 
Epstein, Hans J. “The Identity of Chaucer’s Lollius.” Modern Language Quarterly 3  
(1942): 391-400.  
 
Evans, Ruth. “Body Politics: Engendering Medieval Cycle Drama.” In Feminist Readings  
in Middle English Literature: The Wife of Bath and All Her Sect, edited by Ruth  
sEvans and Lesley Johnson, 111-40. London: Routledge, 1994. 
 
Federico, Sylvia. "Chaucer's Utopian Troy Book: Alternatives to Historiography in Troilus and 
Criseyde." Exemplaria 11.1 (1999): 79-106. 
 
Fitzgerald, Christina. The Drama of Masculinity and Medieval English Guild Culture.  
New York: Palgrave, 2007.  
 
Fletcher, J.B. “The Allegory of the Pearl.” JEGP 20 (1921): 1-21. 
 
Foster, Michael. “Textual Voices: Self-Representation and Religious Instruction in the Works of 
the Pearl-Poet.” Medieval and Early Modern English Studies 20.2 (2012): 187-214. 
 
Fradenburg, L.O.A. “‘Oure owen wo to drynk’: Loss, Gender and Chivalry.” In Chaucer's 
 273  
Troilus and Criseyde: Subgit to alle Poesye. Essays in Criticism, edited by R.A. Shoaf, 
86-106. Binghamton: Medieval and Renaissance Text Studies, 1992. 
 
------. "'Be Not Far from Me': Psychoanalysis, Medieval Studies and the Subject of Religion." 
Exemplaria: A Journal of Theory in Medieval and Renaissance Studies 7.1 (1995): 41-54. 
 
Fries, Maureen. “‘Slydynge of Corage’: Chaucer’s Criseyde as Feminist and Victim.” In The 
Authority of Experience: Essays in Feminist Criticism, edited by Arlyn Diamond and Lee 
J. Edwards, 45-59. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977. 
 
Fumo, Jamie C. "Hating Criseyde: Last Words on a Heroine from Chaucer to Henryson." 
Chaucer Review 46.1-2 (2011): 20-38. 
Fyler, John. “Domesticating the Exotic in the Squire’s Tale.” ELH 55 (1988): 1-26. 
 
Garrison, Jennifer. "Liturgy and Loss: Pearl and the Ritual Reform of the Aristocratic Subject."  
Chaucer Review 44.3 (2010): 294-322. 
 
Gillespie, V. and K. Ghosh, eds. After Arundel: Religious Writing in Fifteenth-Century  
England. Turnhout: Brepols, 2011.  
 
Glynos, Jason. “Psychoanalysis Operates upon the Subject of Science: Lacan between Science 
and Ethics.” In Lacan and Science, edited by Jason Glynos and Yannis Stavrakakis, 51-
88. London: Karnac Books, 2002. 
 
Goodich, Michael. “Vision, Dream and Canonization Policy Under Pope Innocent III.” In Pope 
Innocent III and his World, edited by John C. Mooore, 151-63. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999. 
 
Gordon, Ida. The Double Sorrow of Troilus: A Study of Ambiguities in ‘Troilus and Criseyde.’ 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1970.  
 
Gosman, Martin. La Lettre du Prêtre Jean: Les versions en ancien français et en ancien  
Occitan. Textes et commentaires. Netherlands: Groningen, 1982.  
 
------. “Le royaume de Prêtre Jean: L’interprétation d’une Bonheur.” In L’idée du  
Bonheur au moyen âge, edited by D. Buschinger, 213-23. Göppingen: Kümmerle,  
1990. 
 
Grant, Michael. Herod the Great. New York: American Vintage Press, 1971.  
 
Greenwood, Maria. “Women in Love, or Three Courtly Heroines in Chaucer and Malory: Elaine, 
Criseyde, and Guinevere.” In A Wyf Ther Was: Essays in Honour of Paule Mertens-
Fonck, edited by Juliette Dor, 167-77. Liège: University of Liège, 1992. 
 
 274  
Guzman, Gregory. “Simon of Saint-Quentin and the Dominican Mission to the Mongol  
Baiju: A Reappraisal.” Speculum 46.2 (1971): 232-49. 
 
------. “The Encyclopedist Vincent of Beauvais and His Mongol Extracts from John of  
Plano Carpini and Simon of Saint-Quentin” Speculum 49.2: 287-307.  
 
Hamilton, Bernard. “Prester John and the Three Kings of Cologne.” In Prester John, the  
Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes, edited by C.F. Buckingham and B. Hamilton, 
171-85. Aldershot: Variorum, 1996. 
 
Hamilton, George. The Indebtedness of Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde to Guido delle 
Colonne’s Historia Trojana. New York: Columbia University Press, 1903. 
 
Hamilton, Marie Padgett. "The Meaning of the Middle English Pearl." PMLA 70.4 (1955): 805-
24. 
 
Harper, Elizabeth. "Pearl in the Context of Fourteenth-Century Gift Economies." The Chaucer  
Review 44.4 (2010): 421-39. 
 
Harris, Jonathan Gil. “‘Look not big, nor stamp, nor stare’: Acting up in The Taming of  
the Shrew and Coventry Herod Plays.” Comparative Drama 34 (2001): 365-398. 
 
Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  
1988. 
 
Harwood, Britton. “Pearl as Diptych.” In Text and Matter: New Critical Perspectives of the  
Pearl-poet, edited by Robert Blanch, Miriam Youngerman Miller, and Julian Wasserman, 
63-77. Troy, NY: Whitson, 1991. 
 
Hassel Jr., Chris. “‘No Boasting like a fool?’ Macbeth and Herod.” Studies in Philology  
98 (2001): 205-224. 
 
Hayward, Rebecca. “Between the Living and the Dead: Widows as Heroines of Medieval 
Romances.” In Constructions of Widowhood and Virginity in the Middle Ages, edited by 
Cindy L. Carlson and Angela Jane Weisl, 221-43. New York: St. Martin’s, 1999. 
 
Heng, Geraldine. Empire of Magic: Medieval Romance and the Politics of Cultural  
Fantasy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.  
 
------. “Sex, Lies, and Paradise: The Assassins, Prester John, and the Fabulation of 
Civilizational Identities.” differences 23.1 (2012): 1-31. 
 
Heninger, S.K. Jr. “The Margarite-Pearl Allegory in Thomas Usk’s Testament of Love.”  
 275  
Speculum 32.1 (1957): 92-98. 
 
Hoffman, Stanton. "The Pearl: Notes for an Interpretation." Modern Philology 58.2 (1960): 73-
80. 
 
Holsinger, Bruce. The Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of Theory. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005.  
 
Hollywood, Amy. Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexuality, and the Demands of History. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002.  
 
Hornstein, Lillian. “Petrarch’s Laelius, Chaucer’s Lollius?” PMLA 63.1 (1948): 64-84. 
 
Howes, Laura. “Chaucer’s Criseyde: The Betrayer Betrayed.” In Reading Medieval Culture, 
edited by Robert Stein and Sandra Pierson Prior, 324-43. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2005.  
 
Howie, Cary. Claustrophilia: The Erotics of Enclosure in Medieval Literature. New  
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
 
Hussey, S. S. “How Many Herods in the Middle English Drama?” Neophilologus 48  
(1964): 252-259. 
 
Irwin, Alexander. Saints of the Impossible: Bataille, Weil, and the Politics of the Sacred. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.  
 
Iyeiri, Yoko. “MS Cotton Nero A.x. Poems Once Again: A Study of Contracted Negative 
Forms.” In English Historical Linguistics and Philology in Japan, edited by Jacek Fisiak 
and Akio Oizumi, 79-90. Berlin: Walter de Guyter, 1998. 
 
Jackson, J. A. "The Infinite Desire of Pearl." In Levinas and Medieval Literature: The 'Difficult 
Reading' of English and Rabbinic Texts, edited by J.A. Jackson and Ann Astell, 157-84. 
Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2009. 
 
Jacobs, Kathryn. “Mate or Mother: Positioning Criseyde among Chaucer’s Widows.” In New 
Perspectives on Criseyde, edited by Cindy L. Vitto and Marcia Smith Marzec, 59-73. 
Asheville: Pegasus, 2004.  
 
Jones, H.S.V. “The Squire’s Tale.” In Sources and Analogues of Chaucer’s Canterbury  
Tales, edited by W.F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster, 357-76. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1941. 
 
Jordan, Robert M. "The Narrator in Chaucer's Troilus." ELH 25.4 (1958): 237-57. 
 276  
 
Jost, Jean E. “The Performative Criseyde: Self-Conscious Dramaturgy.” In New Perspectives on 
Criseyde, edited by Cindy L. Vitto and Marcia Smith Marzec, 207-30. Asheville: 
Pegasus, 2004.  
 
Justice, Steven. “Chaucer’s History Effect.” In Answerable Style: The Idea of the Literary in 
Medieval England, edited by Frank Grady and Andrew Galloway, 169-94. Columbus: 
Ohio State University Press, 2013.  
 
Kaminsky, Alice. Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde and the Critics. Columbus: Ohio State  
 University Press, 1980.  
 
Kean, Patricia M. “Numerical Composition in Pearl.” Notes & Queries 12 (1965): 49-51.  
 
------. The Pearl: An Interpretation. Routledge: New York, 1967. 
 
Kehew, Robert, ed. Lark in the Morning: The Verses of the Troubadours. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Keiper, Hugo et al., eds. Nominalism and Literary Discourse: New Perspectives.  
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997. 
 
King, Pamela. “‘He pleyeth Herodes upon a scaffold hye?’” LSIE 32 (2001): 211-27. 
 
Kittredge, George. Chaucer and His Poetry. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913.  
 
------. "Chaucer's Lollius." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 27 (1917): 47-109. 
 
Kline, Daniel T. "Resisting the Father in Pearl." In Translating Desire in Medieval and Early 
Modern Literature, eds. Craig A. Berry and Heather Richardson Hayton, 1-29. Tempe, 
AZ: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005. 
 
Koerting, G. and E. Koschwitz, ed., Zeitschrift: für französische Sprache un Litteratur.  
Chemnitz und Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Gronau, 1915. 
 
Kolve, V. A. The Play Called Corpus Christi. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966.  
 
Koppelman, Kate. “‘The Dreams in Which I’m Dying’: Sublimation and Unstable Masculinities 
in Troilus and Criseyde. In Men and Masculinities in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, 
edited by Tison Pugh and Marcia Smith Marzec, 97-114. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2008.  
 
Kritzeck, James. Peter the Venerable and Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1964. 
 277  
 
Kruger, Steven. Dreaming in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
 
Labbie, Erin. Lacan’s Medievalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 
 
Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977.  
 
------. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan VI: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Translated by Jacques 
Alain-Miller. New York: Norton, 1997.  
 
-------. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis. Translated by 
Russell Grigg. New York: Norton, 2007.  
 
------. “Science and Truth.” In Écrits. Edited and translated by Bruce Fink, 726-46. New York: 
Norton, 2006. 
 
------. "Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet." In Literature and Psychoanalysis: The 
Question of Reading Otherwise, edited by Shoshana Felman, 11-52. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1982.  
 
Latour, Bruno. Science in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. 
 
Latham, R.G. “Chaucer.” The Athenaeum. Oct. 3, 1868. 
 
Lawton, David. Chaucer's Narrators. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1985. 
 
Lee, Brian. “The Question of Closure in Fragment V of ‘The Canterbury Tales.’  
The Yearbook of English Studies 22 (1992): 190-200. 
 
Leupin, Alexandre. Fiction and Incarnation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. 
 
------. Lacan Today: Psychoanalysis, Science, Religion. New York: Other Press, 2004. 
 
Lewis, C.S. “What Chaucer Really Did to Il Filostrato.” Essays and Studies 17 (1932): 56-75. 
 
------. The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1936. 
 
Loomis, Roger Sherman. The Grail: From Celtic Myth to Christian Symbol. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 1963. 
 
Lowes, John L. “The Squire’s Tale and the Land of Prester John.” Washington University  
 278  
Studies i, part ii (1913): 1-18. 
 
Lubac, Henri de. Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture. 2 vols. Translated by  
Marc Sebanc and E.M. Macierowski. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans  
Publishing, 1998-2000. 
 
Luttrell, C. A. "The Mediaeval Tradition of the Pearl Virginity." Medium Ævum 31 (1962): 194-
200. 
 
Lynch, Kathryn. The High Medieval Dream Vision: Poetry, Philosophy, and Literary Form. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988. 
 
------. “East Meets West in Chaucer’s Squire and Franklin’s Tales.” In Chaucer’s  
Cultural Geography, edited by Kathryn Lynch, 76-101. New York: Routledge,  
2002. 
 
Man, Paul de. “Autobiography as De-facement.” MLN 94.5 (1979): 919-930.  
 
Mans, M. J. “The Early Latin Church Fathers on Herod and the Infanticide.” Hervormde  
Teologiese Studies 53 (1997): 92-102. 
 
Mapstone, Sally. "The Origins of Criseyde." In Medieval Women: Texts and Contexts in Late 
Medieval Britain: Essays for Felicity Riddy, edited by Jocelyn Wogan-Browne et al.,  
131-47. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2000.  
 
Marcus, Jacob. The Jew in the Medieval World: A Sourcebook, 315-1791. New York:  
JPS, 1938. 
 
Margherita, Gayle. The Romance of Origins: Language and Sexual Difference in Middle English  
Literature. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994. 
 
------. "Criseyde's Remains: Romance and the Question of Justice." Exemplaria 12.2 (2000): 
257-92. 
 
Marti, Kevin. Body, Heart, and Text in the Pearl-Poet. Queenston, Ontario: Mellen Press, 1991. 
 
Marlin, John. “The Investiture Contest and the Rise of Herod Plays in the Twelfth  
Century.” Early Drama, Art, and Music Review 23 (2000): 1-18. 
 
Martin, Molly. “Troilus's Gaze and the Collapse of Masculinity in Romance.” In Men  
and Masculinities in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, edited by Tison Pugh and  
Marcia Smith Marzec, 132-47. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2008.  
 
 279  
------. "Criseyde's Prudence." Studies in the Age of Chaucer 25 (2003): 199-224. 
 
McGavin, John. “Performing Communities: Civic Religious Drama.” In The Oxford  
Handbook of Medieval Literature in English, edited by Elaine Treharne and Greg  
Walker, 200-18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Meech, Sanford. Design in Chaucer's Troilus. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,  
1959. 
 
Meyer, Ann R. Medieval Allegory and the Building of the New Jerusalem. Cambridge: D.S. 
Brewer, 2003. 
 
Mieszkowski, Gretchen. "The Reputation of Criseyde, 1155-1500." Connecticut Academy  
of Arts and Sciences Transactions 43 (1971): 71-153. 
 
------. "Chaucer's Much Loved Criseyde." Chaucer Review 26.2 (1992): 109-32. 
 
Miller, Mark. “The Ends of Excitement in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: Teleology, Ethics, 
and the Death Drive.” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 32 (2010): 215-56. 
 
Mills, David. “Some Possible Implications of Herod’s Speech: Chester Plays VIII 153- 
204. Neuphilologische Mitteilungen: Bulletin de la Sociétié néophilologique de  
Helsinki 74 (1973): 131-143. 
 
Mitchell, J. Allan. "The Middle English Pearl: Figuring the Unfigurable." Chaucer Review 35.1 
(2000): 86-111. 
 
Mitchell, J. Allan. "Criseyde's Chances: Or, Courtly Love and Ethics About to Come."  
In Levinas and Medieval Literature: The Difficult Reading of English and 
Rabbinic Texts, edited by Ann W. Astell and J. A. Jackson, 185-206. Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 2009.  
 
------. Ethics and Eventfulness in Medieval English Literature. New York: Palgrave,  
2009. 
 
Moore, R.I. The Origins of European Dissent. London: Allen Lane Publishing, 1977.  
 
------. The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe,  
950-1250. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1988. 
 
Moretti, “Graphs, Maps, Trees” New Left Review 24 (2003): 67-93. 
 
Morey, James H. Book and Verse: A Guide to Middle English Biblical Literature. Illinois  
 280  
Medieval Studies. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000.  
 
Morse, Ruth. Truth and Convention in the Middle Ages: Rhetoric, Representation, and  
Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Moseley, C.W.R.D. “The Metamorphoses of Sir John Mandeville.” The Yearbook of  
English Studies 4 (1974): 5-25.  
 
Myers, Walter. “Typology and the Audience of the English Cycle Plays.” In Typology  
and English Medieval Literature, edited by Hugh T. Keenan, 261-73. New York:  
AMS Press, 1992.  
 
Niemann, Thomas C. "Pearl and the Medieval Christian Doctrine of Salvation." PhD Diss, 
University of Michigan, 1973. 
 
Nilles, Nicolaus. Kalendarium manual utriusque ecclesiae orientalis et occidentalis,  
Vol. 1. Oeniponte: Innsbruck, 1896. 
 
Nolan, Barbara. The Gothic Visionary Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. 
 
Ohly, Friedrich. Sensus Spiritualis: Studies in Medieval Significs and the Philology of Culture, 
edited by Samuel Jaffe and translated by Kenneth J. Northcott. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005. 
 
Olson, Glending. “Measuring the Immeasurable: Farting, Geometry, and Theology in the 
Summoner’s Tale.” The Chaucer Review 43.4 (2009): 414-27. 
 
Owst, G. R. Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England, 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,  
1961. 
 
Parker, Roscoe. “The Reputation of Herod in Early English Literature.” Speculum 8  
(1933): 59-67. 
 
Patterson, Lee. Chaucer and the Subject of History. Madison: University of Wisconsin  
Press, 1991.  
 
Paull, Michael. “The Figure of Mahomet in the Towneley Cycle.” Comparative Drama 6  
(1972): 187-204 
 
Paxson, James. "Triform Chaucer: Deconstruction, Historicism, Psychoanalysis, and  
Troilus and Criseyde." In Approaches to Teaching Chaucer's Troilus and 
Criseyde and the Shorter Poems, edited by Tison Pugh and Angela Jane Weisl, 
127-42. New York, NY: Modern Language Association of America, 2007.  
 281  
 
Pelliot, Paul. “Deux passages de ‘la prophétie de Hannan fils d’Issac.’” In Prester John,  
the Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes, edited by C.F. Buckingham and B. 
Hamilton, 113-38. Aldershot: Varorium, 1996.  
 
Peter the Venerable, The Letters of Peter the Venerable, Vol. 1. Edited by Giles  
Constable. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
 
Piehler, Paul. The Visionary Landscape: A Study in Medieval Allegory. London: Edward Arnold, 
1971. 
 
Plotnitsky, Arkady. The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclassical  
Thought, and the ‘Two Cultures.’ Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,  
2002.  
 
Pokorn, Nike Kocijaneie. “The Language and Discourse of The Cloud of Unknowing.”  
Literature & Theology 11.4 (1997): 408-21. 
 
Pratt, Robert Armstrong. “A Note on Chaucer’s Lollius.” Modern Language Notes 65  
(1950): 183-87. 
 
Preus, James Samuel. From Shadow to Promise: Old Testament Interpretation from  
Augustine to the Young Luther. Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University Press, 
1969.  
 
Prior, Sandra Pierson. The Pearl Poet Revisited. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994. 
 
------. The Fayre Formez of the Pearl Poet. East Lansing: Michigan State Press, 1996. 
 
 
Purdon, Liam. The Wakefield Master’s Dramatic Art. Gainesville: University of Florida  
Press, 2003. 
 
Putter, Ad. Introduction to the Gawain-Poet. London: Longman, 1996. 
 
Queller, Donald and Thomas Madden. The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of  
Constantinople. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997. 
 
Ramos, Manuel João. Essays in Christian Mythology: The Metamorphosis of Prester  
John. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006. 
 
Reiss, Timothy. The Discourse of Modernism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982. 
 
 282  
Richard, Jean. “The Relatio de Davide as a Source for Mongol History and the Legend of  
Prester John.” In Prester John, the Mongols, and the Ten Lost Tribes, edited by 
C.F. Buckingham and B. Hamilton, 139-58. Aldershot: Variorum, 1996.  
 
Riddy, Felicity. “Jewels in Pearl.” In A Companion to the Gawain-poet, edited by Derek Brewer  
and Jonathan Gibson, 143-56. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1997. 
 
------. "The Pearl as Symbol." Modern Language Notes 65.3 (1950): 144-61. 
 
Robertson, Jr. D.W. A Preface to Chaucer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. 
 
Ronell, Avital. Stupidity. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2002. 
 
Rowe, Donald. O Love, O Charite! Contraries Harmonized in Chaucer’s Troilus.  
Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois Press, 1976. 
 
Rubin, Miri. Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
 
Russell, Stephen J. The English Dream Vision: Anatomy of a Form. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1988. 
 
Rytting, Jenny Rebecca. "Pearl and the Translation of Scriptural Paraphrase." Medieval 
Translator/Traduire au Moyen Age 8 (2003): 281-93. 
 
Said, Edward. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient, revised edition. New  
York: Penguin, 2003.  
 
Salvadore, Matteo “The Ethiopian Age of Exploration: Prester John’s Discovery of  
Europe: 1306-1458.” Journal of World History 21 (2010): 593-627. 
 
Sanok, Catherine. "Criseyde, Cassandra, and the Thebaid: Women and the Theban  
Subtext of Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde." Studies in the Age of Chaucer 20 
(1998): 41-71. 
 
Scala, Elizabeth. Absent Narratives: Manuscript Textuality, and Literary Structure in  
Late Medieval England. New York: Palgrave, 2002.  
 
Scanlon, Larry. Narrative, Authority, and Power. The Medieval Exemplum and the  
Chaucerian Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Schofield, William. "The Nature and Fabric of the Pearl." PMLA 19.1 (1904): 154-215. 
 
 283  
Schreckenberg, Heinz. “The Works of Josephus and the Early Christian Church.”  
In Josephus, Judaism, and Christianity, edited by Louis Feldman and Gohei Hata,  
315-24. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987. 
 
Sedgewick, Eve Kosofsky. “Privilege of Unknowing.” Genders 1 (1988): 102-24. 
 
Shoaf, R. A. “Troilus and Criseyde: The Falcon and the Mew.” In Typology and  
English Medieval Literature, edited by H.T. Keenan, 149-68. New York: AMS  
Press, 1992.  
 
Silverberg, Robert. The Realm of Prester John. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1972. 
 
Simpson, James. The Oxford English Literary History, Vol. 2, 1350-1547: Reform and  
Cultural Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Skey, Miriam Anne. “Herod the Great in Medieval European Drama.” Comparative  
Drama 13 (1979): 330-35. 
 
------. “The Death of Herod in the Cursor Mundi.” Medium Aevum 57 (1988): 74-80. 
 
------. “Herod’s Demon-Crown.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 40  
(1977): 274-276. 
 
Slessarev, Vsevolod. Prester John: The Letter and the Legend. Minneapolis: University  
of Minnesota Press, 1959. 
 
Smalley, Beryl. The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell,  
1973. 
 
Southern, R.W. Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Harvard  
University Press, 1963. 
 
Spearing, A.C. "Symbolic and Dramatic Development in Pearl." Modern Philology 60.1 (1962): 
1-12. 
 
------. “Chaucer the Writer.” In An Introduction to Chaucer, edited by Maurice Hussey,  
A.C. Spearing, and James Winny, 115-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965.  
 
------. Medieval Dream-Poetry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 
 
Spencer, H.L. “Pearl: ‘God’s Law’ and ‘Man’s Law.’” Review of English Studies 59 (2008): 
317-41. 
 284  
 
Stahuljak, Zrinka, Bloodless Genealogies of the French Middle Ages: Translatio,  
Kinship, and Metaphor. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2005.  
 
Staines, David. “To Out-Herod Herod: The Development of a Dramatic Character.” In  
The Drama of the Middle Ages: Comparative and Critical Essays, Vol. 1, edited  
by Clifford Davidson, 207-25. New York: AMS Press, 1982.  
 
Stanbury, Sarah. Seeing the Gawain-Poet: Description and the Act of Perception. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. 
 
------. "The Body and the City in Pearl." Representations 48 (1994): 30-47. 
 
------. “Women’s Letters and Private Space in Chaucer.” Exemplaria 6.2 (1994): 271-85. 
 
Stanbury, Sarah, ed. Pearl. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute, 2001. 
 
Steinberg, Clarence. “‘Kemp Towne’ in the Towneley ‘Herod’ Play.” Neuphilologische  
Mitteilungen: Bulletin de la Sociétié néophilologique de Helsinki 71 (1970): 253- 
260. 
 
Steinmetz, Karl-Heinz. “Heich savour of the Godhead: Some Reflections of the ‘Cloud of 
Unknowing’ and the Discourse of Perceiving God in Fourteenth Century England.” 
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 64 (2008): 483-98. 
 
Stevick, Donna Crawford. “The Architectonics of Cleanness.” Studies in Philology 90.1 (1993): 
29-45. 
 
Stevens, Martin. “Herod as Carnival King in the Medieval Biblical Drama.” Mediaevalia  
18 (1995): 43-66. 
 
Stiller, Nikki. The Figure of Cressida in British and American Literature:  
Transformation of a Literary Type. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1990. 
 
Stillwell, Gardiner. “Chaucer in Tartary.” The Review of English Studies 24 (1948):  
177-88. 
 
Stock, Lorraine Kochanske. “‘Slydynge’ Critics: Changing Critical Constructions of  
Chaucer’s Criseyde in the Past Century.” In New Perspectives on Criseyde, edited 
by Cindy L. Vitto and Marcia Smith Marzec, 11-36. Asheville: Pegasus, 2004.  
 
Strayer, Joseph. The Albigensian Crusades. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,  
1992. 
 285  
 
Tajima, Matsuji. “Additional Syntactical Evidence Against the Common Authorship of MS 
Cotton Nero A.x.” English Studies 59.3 (1978): 193-98. 
 
Taylor, Christopher. “Prester John, Christian Enclosure, and the Spatial Transmission of  
Islamic Alterity in the Twelfth-Century West.” In Contextualizing the Muslim 
Other in Medieval Christian Discourse, edited by Jerold Frakes, 39-64. New 
York: Palgrave, 2011.  
 
------. “Being Beheld: Julian of Norwich’s Mystical Surreal and the Violence of  
 Vision.” In Beholding Violence in the Medieval and Early Modern Culture, edited  
by Erin F. Labbie and Allie Terry-Fritsch, 105-23. London: Ashgate, 2012.  
 
Thorne, Christian. The Dialectic of Counter-Enlightenment. Boston: Harvard University  
Press, 2010. 
 
Tolan, John. Saracens: Islam in the European Imagination. New York: Columbia  
University Press, 2002. 
 
------. Sons of Ishmael: Muslims through European Eyes in the Middle Ages. Tallahassee:  
University of Florida Press, 2008. 
 
Tomasch, Sylvia. "A Pearl Punnology." JEGP 88 (1989): 1-20. 
 
Travis, Peter W. Dramatic Design in the Chester Cycle. Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press, 1982. 
 
Twycross, Meg. “The Theatricality of Medieval English Plays.” In The Cambridge  
Companion to Medieval English Theatre, 2nd edition, edited by Richard Beadle  
and Alan Fletcher, 26-74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.  
 
Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. Cambridge, MA: 
 Belknap Press, 2006. 
 
Uebel, Michael. Ecstatic Transformations: On the Uses of Alterity in the Middle 
Ages. New York: Palgrave, 2005.  
 
------. “The Pathogenesis of Medieval History.” Texas Studies in Literature and  
Langauge 44 (2002): 47-65. 
 
Utz, Richard J. “‘As Writ Myn Auctour Called Lollius': Divine and Authorial  
Omnipotence in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde." In Nominalism and Literary  
 286  
Discourse: New Perspectives, edited by Hugo Keiper, Christoph Bode, and 
Richard Utz, 123-44. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997.  
 
Vasiliev, A.A. Prester John: Legend and History. Unpublished manuscript available at  
the Byzantine Library of Dumbarton Oaks, Washington DC. 
 
Vona, Constantino "La Margarita Pretiosa Nella Interpretazione Di Alcuni Scrittori 
Ecclesiastici." Divinitas 1 (1957): 118-60. 
 
Walsh, Timothy. The Dark Matter of Words: Absence, Unknowing, and Emptiness in  
Literature. Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998. 
 
Warren, Victoria. "(Mis)Reading the 'Text' of Criseyde: Context and Identity in Chaucer's  
Troilus and Criseyde." Chaucer Review 36.1 (2001): 1-15. 
 
Watson, Nicholas. “The Phantasmal Past: Time History, and the Recombinative  
 Imagination.” Studies in the Age of Chaucer 32 (2010): 1-37. 
 
Watson, Thomas Ramey. “N-Town Death of Herod.” Explicator 40 (1981): 3-4. 
 
Wawso, Richard. "The Narrator of Troilus and Criseyde." ELH 50.1 (1983): 1-25. 
 
Weinstein, Phillip. Unknowing: The Work of Modernist Fiction. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005. 
 
Weisl, Angela Jane. “‘A Mannes Game’: Criseyde's Masculinity in Troilus and  
Criseyde.” In Men and Masculinities in Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, edited by 
Tison Pugh and Marcia Smith Marzec, 115-31. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 2008.  
 
Wetherbee, Winthrop. Chaucer and the Poets: An Essay on Troilus and Criseyde. Ithaca:  
Cornell University Press, 1984. 
 
Williams, Arnold. “Typology and the Cycle Plays: Some Criteria.” Speculum 43 (1968):  
677-684. 
 
Wilson, Suzanne. “From Enigma to Explanation: Rereading Old French Grail Stories in  
Light of the Fourth Lateran Council.” PhD Thesis, Washington University in St.  
Louis, 1989. 
 
Woolf, Rosemary. The English Mystery Plays. Berkeley: University of California Press,  
1974. 
 
------. “The Effect of Typology on the English Medieval Plays of Abraham and Isaac”  
 287  
Speculum 32 (1957): 805-25. 
Wright, John Kirtland. Geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades. New York:  
American Geographical Society, 1925. 
 
Zarncke, Friedrich. “Uber eine neue Redaction des Briefes des Priester Johannes.” 
 Berichte uber die Verhandlungen der koniglich sachsischen Gesellschaft der  
Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Phililogischen-historische Classe, Vol. 29, 1877. 
 
------. “Der Priester Johannes.” Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Classe der 
 königlich sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 7 (1879): 831-1028. 
 
Zumthor, Paul. “The Medieval Travel Narrative.” Translated by Catherine Peebles. New  
Literary History 25 (1994): 809-24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
